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FIELD MANUAL

# HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR

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HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
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FIELD MANUAL
No. 30–102

HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., *1 June 1973*

# HANDBOOK ON AGGRESSOR


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# PART ONE
# INTRODUCTION
# CHAPTER 1
# GENERAL

## Section I. INTRODUCTION

### 1–1. Purpose and Scope

*a.* This manual provides guidance to commanders and staffs for the employment of Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy, in maneuvers, field training, and command post exercises, and service school instruction, regardless of the size or type of participating unit or whether Aggressor forces are to be physically represented or simulated.

*b.* Aggressor is designed to accomplish four primary purposes as the opposing force by:

(1) Providing realism to the exercise.

(2) Adding emphasis to intelligence training.

(3) Providing a common and realistic basis for the development of the training exercise and service school instruction.

(4) Instilling an awareness in exercise participants of the basic differences between United States and potential enemy forces.

*c.* This manual provides background data on an imaginary nation with an assumed history, government, political philosophy, military organization with conventional and insurgent tactics, weapons and equipment. The countries, people and armed forces portrayed are fictitious and are hypothetically located in known geographical areas for command post and field exercises, maneuvers, and service school instruction. Situations may be developed to apply to all intensities of warfare. Aggressor was devised as a training vehicle for the United States Army and facilitates realistic scenario composition for maneuvers and training exercises.

*d.* FM 30–103 provides order of battle (OB) information on the Aggressor Armed Forces and insurgent forces. Development of additional Aggressor forces to meet local requirements of emphasizing actual combat situations is authorized.

### 1–2. Explanation of Terms

Terms used in this manual are in accordance with AR 310–25. Additional explanation of terms pertaining to Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy, are contained in the glossary.

### 1–3. Notice to Users

***a.* Users of this manual are encouraged to submit recommended changes or comments to improve its contents and clarity. Comments should be keyed to the specific page, paragraph, and line of the text in which the change is recommended. Reasons should be provided for each comment to insure understanding and complete evaluation. Comments should be prepared using DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications) and forwarded direct to the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: Office of Doctrine Development, Literature, and Plans, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613.**

*b.* Users are reminded that FM 30–102 and FM 30–103 are designed as guides to assist in planning for the employment of enemy forces in an exercise. Users are encouraged to modify information contained herein to meet local conditions and to stimulate participant interest. Additional Aggressor Order of Battle (AOB) information may be obtained upon request to the office indicated in paragraph 1–3*a*. (Refer to app C for the Aggressor information request and report formats.)

*c.* Users are requested to forward to the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: Office of Doctrine Development, Literature, and Plans, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613, copies of any locally developed materials relating to Aggressor, i.e., exercise scenarios, order of battle studies which expand on the contents of FM 30–103, development of additional or specialized Aggressor forces, local

supplements to the Aggressor field manuals, and exercise after action reports relating to enemy forces. This material will greatly assist in monitoring the employment of Aggressor, as well as provide a basis for future revisions of the field manuals.

## Section II. PLANNING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AGGRESSOR

### 1–4. Detailed Plans for Aggressor Employment

*a.* This section is designed as a guide and provides recommended procedures to be followed in planning Aggressor representation. Aggressor representation should be initiated early and integrated into the overall exercise planning program. This Aggressor planning should proceed in conjunction with all other exercise preparations. Detailed guidance on the planning, preparation, and conduct of tactical exercises is found in FM 105–5.

*b.* Planning is dependent upon the determination of factors usually contained in the directive ordering the exercise. These include:

(1) Time, place, date, and duration of the exercise.

(2) Units to participate.

(3) Facilities available.

(4) Physical limitations.

(5) Tactical doctrine or techniques to be emphasized.

(6) Procurement or local fabrication of special supply items, such as Aggressor equipment and uniforms.

*c.* In planning, the generalized tactical characteristics for Aggressor representation must be taken into consideration.

(1) General War/High-Intensity Conflicts (1975–79). General War conflicts are those conflicts in which the major powers are engaged in all out warfare, including employment of strategic thermonuclear weapons. The Aggressor would be characterized by a sophisticated, highly mobile, armor heavy force with APC-borne infantry and advanced electronic techniques, to include command and control. Air support would include advanced ground support and air defense aircraft, as well as improved tactical airlift capabilities. All types of air and ground weapon systems would be employed, to include nuclear capable bombs, rockets, missiles and artillery. Political, strategic, and tactical cover and deception would be employed to gain security, surprise, and a more favorable ratio of combat power.

(2) Limited War/Mid-Intensity Conflicts (1975–79). Limited War conflicts are those interstate conflicts in which the major powers need not be directly involved and in which all types of general purpose forces and tactical weapon systems can be employed, but no strategic thermonuclear weapons are involved. The Aggressor forces would be essentially the same as the force in the General War conflict but would be less sophisticated and would not include strategic nuclear weapons, although some tactical nuclear systems could be used. All levels of cover and deception would be employed as in a General War situation with perhaps greater emphasis being placed on strategic and tactical cover and deception and less emphasis on political deception.

(3) Insurgent Type/Low-Intensity Conflicts (1975–79). Insurgent Type conflicts are primarily internal conflicts involving insurgencies or civil wars. However, this level conflict may take the form of revolutions against colonial powers or interstate conflicts between minor nations not possessing significant military forces. Any combination of nations, including the major powers, may be involved but these conflicts will be limited to stability type operations. Cover and deception activities would probably feature greater emphasis on tactical and less emphasis on political and strategic cover and deception. The Aggressor would primarily employ infantry operations frequently characterized by paramilitary forces operating in insurgent type roles. Very little armor, artillery or air support would be in evidence.

*d.* Preparation of the intelligence activity and the Aggressor background scenario should be developed. Specific discussion of intelligence activity can be found in chapter 2.

*e.* Aggressor tactical propaganda may be used to achieve a greater degree of realism in tactical exercises. It will also familiarize the US soldier with special warfare techniques in order to strengthen his capacity to resist this type of attack, in a future war. Aggressor psychological warfare activities may employ various media, including:

(1) Leaflets dropped from aircraft.

(2) Posters or leaflets placed at selected points along routes of communication.

(3) Planted prisoners or civilians within the combat area.

(4) Loudspeaker broadcasts (supervised by personnel trained in psychological warfare for maximum benefits).

*f.* Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations may be expected to be employed by the Aggressor. New types of radiological detection devices, simulated radioactive contamination devices and chemical agent detection and protection equipment tend to aid in exercise play when introduced.

*g.* Aggressor should be portrayed as exercising meticulous planning and execution of cover and deception (C&D) activities and operations. Accordingly, Aggressor C&D activities should be carefully planned and realistically integrated into the exercise. The use of C&D by Aggressor will assist in developing techniques for recognizing enemy C&D indicators and strengthen procedures for developing counter-deception activities by US commanders and staffs.

*h.* Aggressor should be given credit for extensive use of partisan, guerrilla and agent operations. The use of organized guerrilla bands, Circle Trigon Party subversive groups, raid intelligence groups, and combat intelligence agents operating behind enemy lines will assist in the development of training against techniques used in unconventional warfare. Aggressor tactics and techniques used to assist Insurgency Operations are discussed in part IV of this manual and in FM 31–16 and FM 31–23. In planning the insertion of unconventional Aggressor warfare operations into training exercises, credit should be given to Aggressor's long and profitable experience in this type of operation so that its capabilities may be assessed more realistically.

*i.* Determine Aggressor uniforms, equipment, ammunition, and other supply requirements and procurement plan. Whenever practical, planning should include a separate base of supply for Aggressor forces.

*j.* Establish tentative dates for—

(1) Participating Aggressor headquarters to become operational.

(2) Beginning the intelligence build-up phase.

(3) Troops to assemble.

*k.* Prepare plans for organizing and training the Aggressor force to include conversion to and rehearsal of the tactical plan.

*l.* Plan Aggressor ground activity.

*m.* Prepare operation plans or orders for the Aggressor force.

*n.* Prepare an implementation plan for—

(1) The handling of Aggressor prisoners of war, agents, casualties, and deserters, and the injection of documents and foreign material into the exercise play.

(2) The initial flow of intelligence to the United States force commander that could be expected to be in the hands of higher headquarters.

*o.* Prepare the communications plan to support Aggressor operations.

*p.* Prepare Aggressor forces air support plan.

## 1–5. Control and Limitations of Aggressor Employment

The operation of the Aggressor force in an exercise is in accordance with the limitations established by the exercise controller. The controller acquaints the Aggressor force and the umpire group with the general plan of the exercise. In free exercises, it is necessary that the Aggressor force have assigned umpires to insure realistic play. Normally, in controlled exercises, umpire liaison teams, fire marker teams and limited additional umpire personnel are provided for the Aggressor force. Overall limitations on actions of the Aggressor force are normally based on missions assigned, operations of opposing forces and restrictions imposed by time, area, and forces available.

## 1–6. Conversion of US Army Units to Aggressor

*a.* The effectiveness of Aggressor in helping to attain the desired objectives of an exercise is primarily dependent upon detailed planning and preparations. Personnel of the Aggressor force will normally represent larger units and be exposed to considerable activity during the exercise.

*b.* To add realism to the play of Aggressor, it is recommended that, when applicable, an appropriate foreign language be employed in the preparation of Aggressor documents and by personnel selected to portray prisoners of war.

## 1–7. Use of Aggressor in Command Post Exercises (CPX)

*a.* In a command post exercise, Aggressor is usually represented by umpires/controllers. Much of the planning involved in a field training exercise pertaining to physical representation will not be necessary for a CPX. However,

planning for Aggressor employment in a CPX is still a vital consideration. When the exercise objectives and important training aspects are determined, a logical development of Aggressor activities should be planned to insure that all exercise objectives are met.

*b.* Conduct of the CPX should also be done in two phases.

(1) In the pre-exercise phase, a scenario should be developed which will account for the presence of Aggressor in the exercise area, and bring exercise personnel up to date concerning Aggressor deployment, strength, and recent activities.

(2) During the exercise phase, further information should be introduced concerning Aggressor activities to guide the exercise players toward reaching the exercise objective. This information may be made available either through an Aggressor force or the umpires/controllers. In a controlled exercise, it is best to use previously prepared reports to guide the players along the desired course. In a free exercise, umpires/controllers will have to be more flexible and be prepared to respond as the Aggressor would to US actions.

*c.* Intelligence activity during a CPX is the most profitable way of employing Aggressor. Here the intelligence staff personnel are tasked with developing Aggressor order of battle information which is then used to formulate tactical plans. Since much of the play must be simulated, it is highly desirable to assign controller personnel specific intelligence areas to handle, i.e., aerial and ground surveillance, prisoners, human intelligence, and signal intelligence if appropriate. In this manner, more critical evaluation of player requests for information can be made by the controllers to determine the feasibility, suitability and completeness of the request.

### 1–8. Use of Aggressor in Service School Instruction

Aggressor Employment is a selected training subject which has been designated by DA and CONARC for special emphasis. The Aggressor field manuals (30–102 and 30–103) are the official references for Aggressor in service school instruction. A Selected Training Instructional Material Packet, entitled "Aggressor Employment," was developed by the US Army Intelligence Center and School. This packet provides guidance to instructors on how to best take advantage of the field manuals in developing classroom exercises, student CPX's and field training problems. The material reflects current policy, doctrine, and training requirements as an aid to other service schools in systems engineering of the Aggressor course. Selected training subjects are taught at the discretion of each school commandant. Commandants must insure that the subject taught is progressive for each level of instruction. Requests for instructional material for the selected training subject, Aggressor Employment, will be in accordance with CON Reg 310–17.

## Section III. ORGANIZING AND TRAINING AN AGGRESSOR FORCE

### 1–9. Aggressor Combat Elements

*a.* The strength and composition of the Aggressor force must be sufficient to achieve realistic play and to permit accomplishment of the training objectives established in the concept of the exercise. Numerical designations of participating Aggressor forces should be included in the background scenario material, which is prepared in the early stages of exercise planning. Actual designation(s) of United States unit(s) to portray Aggressor should be made as soon as the total availability of exercise participating forces and their commitments are known.

*b.* No fixed ratio of Aggressor to friendly forces can be established that would be applicable to all types of tactical exercises. However, normal combat element ratios vary between 1 Aggressor to 2 friendly and 1 to 6 or 7 depending upon several factors:

(1) Whether the Aggressor force is free or controlled.

(2) The training objectives for the exercise.

(3) Personnel and facilities available.

(4) The scheme of maneuver.

(5) The types, strengths, composition and status of training in the participating units.

(6) Area of operations.

(7) Weapons systems to be employed.

(8) The adequacy of controller personnel.

*c.* Aggressor forward units should be represented at full strength. Rear area units, installations, and activities should be portrayed to add realism and provide logical targets for ground and aerial observation, and photo-

graphic reconnaissance missions. Prefabricated or improvised models of equipment, appropriate simulation devices, and especially prepared installations may be used to represent significant Aggressor activities (app D).

## 1-10. Other Aggressor Elements

*a.* Actual service elements for Aggressor logistical support should always be based upon real requirements rather than upon the fictitious personnel strength ratio of Aggressor personnel strength to friendly personnel strength. The required service support elements must be established in the maneuver area prior to the arrival of the main Aggressor force. The designated commander of the Aggressor force should participate in the initial planning by the maneuver headquarters.

*b.* Aggressor higher headquarters, adjacent units, and the reserve elements are normally simulated in the exercise. The play of these simulated units is the responsibility of controller personnel. It is therefore, necessary that this subject be covered during the controller/umpire training program.

## 1-11. Reorganization to Aggressor Order of Battle

*a.* When converting United States forces to Aggressor forces, it is preferable to convert to a larger unit, i.e., company to battalion or brigade to division. This enables a United States unit commander to readily convert his organization to a completely different type of organization, while retaining the same elements of control as in his own structure.

*b.* In reorganizing as an Aggressor unit, each United States unit concerned should adopt the organization, history, numerical designation, and identity of the Aggressor unit it is representing. The names and ranks of commanders of Aggressor units represented in the order of battle are assumed by the appropriate personnel while Aggressor names and personalities are arbitrarily assigned to all other Aggressor personnel.

*c.* The reorganization, conversion and training of the United States personnel to act as the Aggressor force is facilitated by selecting units similar in type and equipment to the Aggressor units that they are to represent.

## 1-12. Timing of the Reorganization

Reorganization of the United States units designated to represent the Aggressor force should begin immediately after the Aggressor units have been selected by type and the Aggressor order of battle has been determined.

## 1-13. Orientation of Personnel

All Aggressor personnel should be oriented on Aggressor, its purpose, history, uniforms, and the special equipment and procedures to be employed in the exercise. Personnel and units that will portray Aggressor must be thoroughly familiar with the tactics and activities of the units they will represent to insure a realistic representation during the exercise; as a minimum, they should be exposed to those sections of this manual pertinent to their play. Identification of friendly elements should be included in the orientation so that Aggressor personnel will have some familiarity with their enemy.

## 1-14. Preparation by Aggressor Commander and Staff

To achieve maximum effectiveness, the Aggressor Commander and Staff, as well as the personnel designated to represent the Aggressor forces, should be available in the maneuver area sufficiently in advance of the actual tactical phase of the exercise to permit completion of pre-exercise plans and preparations. A planning and operational headquarters should be established immediately in order to—

*a.* Accomplish the complete reorganization of the designated units so they may accurately and effectively assume their Aggressor role for the exercise.

*b.* Supervise the conversion of US Army uniforms to resemble Aggressor uniforms.

*c.* Issue additional weapons, documents and equipment to all personnel.

*d.* Prepare the necessary Aggressor intelligence plans, materiel and documents to be used during the planning as well as the tactical phase of operations.

*e.* Construct progressively, in accordance with the exercise situations, the defense positions to include normal camouflage. Positions should be so constructed that if detected and properly evaluated by United States intelligence agencies they will portray the desired Aggressor situation.

*f.* Prepare and execute other plans for Aggressor activities to portray the desired development of the Aggressor situation. These plans, particularly in the Aggressor-controlled type of exercise, are based upon the United States plans for air, sea, and ground reconnaissance furnished by Director Headquarters. They must

be flexible, as the Aggressor Commander should be prepared to change his plans if United States forces plans or operations are changed or supplemented.

*g.* Select personnel to act as prepared Aggressor prisoners of war, agents and line crossers, and arrange for their training and employment, to include adequate development and study of the roles they are to play, and the information they are to give to United States forces.

*h.* Plan and prepare for the implementation of patrol, agent, guerrilla and special warfare activities, as well as those pertaining to operations of any other agency appropriate to the level of the exercise.

*i.* Plan and conduct rehearsals by the Aggressor force in conjunction with the umpires. Care must be exercised to insure that such rehearsals do not disclose the Aggressor plans prematurely.

## 1-15. Training Program

*a.* The time required to train United States personnel for the role of Aggressor varies with the size, type, and duration of the exercise and with the Aggressor activities to be included. To train a few Aggressor soldiers for a squad or platoon exercise without extensive intelligence activity requires much less time than to train a larger unit for an extended exercise.

*b.* A sample training program for Aggressor forces is contained in appendix B. It is not necessary that the training be given in a separate block. Those units which can do so should insert limited Aggressor instruction into their normal education and training program. Training should also include anything special which is required for new or different situations.

## 1-16. Rehearsals with Umpires

*a.* The Aggressor force should rehearse the planned tactical operations with the umpires. This enables both to become familiar with the terrain and the control measures to be employed. Normally, one day of rehearsal should be the minimum time allowed for each phase of tactical play in the exercise. The rehearsal phase is probably the most important phase of the training program, for it is here that actual results of what is to be accomplished can be predetermined. These rehearsals should be thorough, and each means of communication should be checked and rechecked to insure that it will properly serve its purpose. It should be determined whether there are alternate means of communication available to supplement each primary means and to immediately replace any primary means which might go out of order or for some reason might not work properly.

*b.* The rehearsal phase allows for the elimination or changing of those situations which are so "canned" that they are completely unrealistic. Where time permits, there should be at least three rehearsals of each major phase. The rehearsal phase is also applicable to small unit exercises. A rifle platoon or squad which has been well trained and rehearsed in its Aggressor role can provide a very realistic vehicle for the tactical training of a much larger unit.

# CHAPTER 2
# INTELLIGENCE TRAINING

## Section I. GENERAL

### 2–1. Purpose

One objective of Aggressor is to emphasize and enhance the various aspects of combat intelligence, counterintelligence, and signal intelligence training. This chapter describes the use of Aggressor in individual and unit intelligence training, the development of intelligence activity during training exercises and the sources of background material designated to stimulate such activity.

### 2–2. Individual Intelligence Training

The employment of Aggressor provides realistic training for the individual soldier in:

*a.* Observation techniques.

*b.* Prompt and accurate reporting of tactical information.

*c.* Air and ground reconnaissance and counterreconnaissance activities.

*d.* Processing captured enemy personnel, documents, and equipment.

*e.* Counterintelligence measures.

*f.* Chemical, biological and radiological (CBR) detection and reporting.

*g.* Electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) procedures and techniques.

### 2–3. Unit Intelligence Training

Aggressor employment provides unit training in intelligence reporting, marking and forwarding documents, tagging and escorting prisoners to the rear, evacuating captured equipment to the next higher headquarters, camouflaging positions, and reconnaissance patrolling.

### 2–4. Intelligence Staff Personnel Training

Realistic development of the Aggressor tactical situation in training exercises affords the intelligence staff the opportunity to supervise and conduct activities relative to the collection of information about the enemy and the production of combat intelligence. Upon receipt of information based upon the Aggressor, intelligence staff personnel can perform realistic intelligence analysis of the situation, which leads to the development of intelligence estimates and proper tasking of sources and agencies to gain further information.

### 2–5. Intelligence Specialist Training

Training in intelligence specialist activities may include:

*a.* Interrogation of prisoners.

*b.* Counterintelligence investigations.

*c.* Imagery interpretation.

*d.* Order of battle collation.

*e.* Reconnaissance, counterreconnaissance, combat surveillance and target acquisition.

*f.* Report writing.

## Section II. INTELLIGENCE TRAINING ACTIVITY

### 2–6. Development of the Intelligence Training Plan

*a.* The intelligence training plan is an outline of intelligence activities to be conducted during a training exercise, and is designed to afford maximum intelligence training to United States military personnel by representing or simulating all possible sources of enemy information. To achieve realism, the information and intelligence that is made available to the United States force engaged in an exercise should be developed logically. The intelligence training plan should be initiated concurrently with other exercise planning, and in sufficient time to permit the logical presence and buildup of the Aggressor forces in the exercise area. FM 21–5, FM 105–5, Army Training Programs and Tests, and Army Subject Schedules in the 30 series provide guidance and assistance to per-

sonnel at all levels responsible for training individuals and units.

*b.* The United States force participating in a particular exercise should be excluded from the planning of intelligence activities. Their foreknowledge of the intelligence plan would reduce the training benefit to be derived from the intelligence training phase.

## 2-7. Phases of Intelligence Activity

*a. Pre-Exercise Phase.* During the pre-exercise or buildup phase, a limited amount of Aggressor information and intelligence is furnished to the participating United States force. Aggressor information normally comes from simulated sources and includes raw order of battle data such as unit identifications, dispositions, strength, equipment and personalities, as well as a summary of recent Aggressor activities. Intelligence is disseminated in the form of reports from higher headquarters. These reports which are both tactical and strategic include intelligence summaries, studies of terrain and weather, intelligence estimates and periodic intelligence reports. In the interests of realism, both information and intelligence pertaining to Aggressor during the pre-exercise phase should be confined to that data which are normally available to a unit about to be committed to combat. Small unit training generally is preceded by a pre-exercise phase of short duration. However, in the case of large-scale exercises, this phase may extend over a period from four to six weeks.

*b. Exercise Phase.* In the actual play of the exercise, intelligence training activity should provide an opportunity for the full play of every aspect of combat intelligence, counterintelligence and signal intelligence. Emphasis should be placed on:

(1) The importance of the role of the individual soldier in collecting and reporting information of Aggressor installations and activities.

(2) The commander's responsibility in the production of all types of intelligence.

(3) Employment of the proper collection means by the intelligence staff to obtain the desired information.

(4) The careful analysis and rapid dissemination of intelligence by intelligence staff personnel.

(5) The importance of staff coordination.

(6) The importance of signal security.

(7) Tactical cover and deception.

(8) The importance of operations security.

(9) The importance of rapid target acquisition in high/mid-intensity conflicts.

## 2-8. Aggressor Background Scenario

*a.* An Aggressor background scenario, based generally upon the history of Aggressor's military campaigns, is written for training exercises of large scale. It provides a logical background for, and a detailed account of, the events and operations leading to Aggressor's presence in an exercise area. The scenario, together with Aggressor order of battle, is the basis for all information and intelligence to be released or made available to the United States force for exploitation during the conduct of an exercise. The scenario should be prepared with imagination and in accord with Aggressor's doctrinal concepts and tactical employment. When properly utilized, it stimulates interest and provides continuous intelligence training for all personnel and units engaged in an exercise.

*b.* The Aggressor background scenario is prepared in two phases, the pre-exercise phase and the tactical phase. The material for each phase should be adapted to requirements of the activities planned for that phase.

(1) The pre-exercise phase describes the invasion and occupation of an exercise area by Aggressor. Normally, the scenario will logically establish the location of the Aggressor force in an exercise area prior to the commencement of an exercise. It may contain information which is used as a basis for training in many aspects of military operations. For example, the scenario may indicate that Aggressor's campaigns of conquest have led to the displacement of large numbers of the civilian populace, thus furnishing a basis for exercise play in civil affairs and military government.

(2) The tactical phase of the scenario includes Aggressor activities in the area during the actual phase of the exercise. This portion of the scenario provides the tactical information upon which intelligence operations during the actual conduct of the exercise are based and developed. The amount of detail in the tactical phase of the scenario is dependent upon the degree to which the Aggressor force is to be controlled.

*c.* Departure from Aggressor history is appropriate for local exercises in which the mere presence of an Aggressor unit is sufficient. It is also appropriate in instances where the desired tactical development of the exercise conflicts

with established Aggressor military history, or where the exercise area does not lend itself to a logical or realistic occupation by Aggressor. In such instances, Aggressor units may be arbitrarily located in the exercise area without regard to previous locations. The scenario then begins with the Aggressor force in the general area of the exercise.

## Section III. MEANS OF STIMULATING INTELLIGENCE PLAY

### 2–9. Uniforms and Insignia

Each Aggressor soldier should wear the Aggressor uniform or the United States Army uniform altered to resemble the Aggressor uniform. This will cause individual soldiers to become accustomed to recognizing enemy uniforms and to reporting their sighting to superiors (app D).

### 2–10. Documents

*a.* Aggressor Armed Forces, like any modern army, use many forms and documents. Among these official papers can be found messages, field orders, administrative instructions and intelligence reports. Most of the forms closely resemble those used by the United States Army. Documents and mail addresses utilize a combination of unit designation and/or code numbers and code names, coupled with area designation.

*b.* Aggressor documents when used in an exercise are an excellent source of information for the United States force. To be most effective as intelligence training aids, all documents should be prepared in foreign languages known to participating intelligence personnel. The documents should be reproduced locally. Personnel with the appropriate language capability who are not planned recipients of the training in the exercise should be tasked to prepare Aggressor documents by the exercise director during the planning phase of the exercise. If personnel with the appropriate language capability are not available locally, it is suggested that necessary assistance be requested from the next higher headquarters.

*c.* The number of documents used in any exercise is limited only by the imagination of intelligence personnel conducting the exercise. However, the documents must be inserted into the problem in as realistic a manner as possible. For example, soldier's identification, pay and service cards (IPS) should be given to all personnel. Other documents such as unit rosters and field operations orders may be caused to be found in abandoned command posts or on Aggressor messengers.

*d.* Signs and military symbols used by Aggressor are illustrated in chapter 21. Captured maps and documents should contain as many of these signs and symbols as possible.

### 2–11. Unit Identifications

*a.* Aids in identifying Aggressor Armed Forces are name of unit, commander's name, code name or code number. For example, the Aggressor soldier may refer to the 151st Medium Tank Regiment in the following ways: by its unit designation (151st Medium Tank Regiment), by the commander's name (ENESCO Regiment), by the assigned code name of the parent unit (ALEKSANDRO Tank Regiment), or by the code number (120422 Unit). Sometimes the commander's name, code name, or code number are coupled together such as ALEKSANDRO ENESCO 120422 unit or ALEKSANDRO 120422 unit.

*b.* Since the origin of Aggressor Armed Forces, units have been referred to by code names for security reasons. These names are given only to Regional Commands, Army Groups, Armies, Divisions and Brigades. Units below brigade level share the code name of their parent unit. Code names are permanently assigned to major organizations.

*c.* For security reasons, Aggressor uses a code number system to identify its units. Each unit at Army level and below is assigned a six-digit code number; a sequential pattern has been determined, and further information concerning the code numbering system may be found in FM 30–103.

*d.* An incomplete analysis of Aggressor code names, code numbers and identified personalities can be found in FM 30–103. These should be inserted in personnel debriefings, documents, and other intelligence-related play. Local fabrication of code names, numbers and personalities is authorized for those units not so identified. Additional Aggressor Order of Battle (AOB) information may be obtained upon request from Commander, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: Office of Doctrine Development, Literature and Plans, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613. (Refer to appendix C for the Aggressor Information Request and Report Formats.)

## 2-12. Equipment

*a.* Items of equipment can be used extensively to provide the basis for reconnaissance patrol and individual observation and spot reporting to train personnel in accurate identification and timely reporting of information. Also, items of equipment can be successfully used to promote technical intelligence play when properly introduced into a tactical exercise. Usage should be based upon developments which have progressed to the extent that they have some practical application for military operations. Any or all of the following elements may be stressed through technical intelligence play:

(1) Design and operation.
(2) Physical characteristics.
(3) Performance.
(4) Operational capabilities.
(5) Limitations of the items.
(6) Storage.
(7) Manufacture.
(8) Maintenance.
(9) Effects of weather, terrain, and environment factors.

*b.* To add realism, vehicles and heavy equipment should be identified with the Aggressor emblem, the Circle Trigon. Other items of equipment such as small arms, machineguns and artillery should be portrayed by the United States Army equipment altered to resemble that of Aggressor. Procurement of Aggressor training aids can be found in appendix D.

## 2-13. Prisoners of War, Casualties, and Deserters

*a.* All Aggressor personnel are subject to capture. To insure that planned information is made available to United States interrogation personnel, selected personnel from the Aggressor force should be trained to portray prisoners of war, casualties, line crossers and deserters. These personnel should speak the same language in which United States interrogation specialists have been trained. All other Aggressor personnel, if captured, should give only name, rank, serial number, and date of birth.

*b.* The Aggressor personnel selected to act as prisoners of war, casualties, line crossers or deserters, should portray the various types of personalities actually encountered in combat. These should include the security minded, talkative, nervous and confused, scared, and arrogant types. So far as possible, the personality and age of the soldier selected should be suited to the type of prisoner he is to portray. His background story should, if possible, contain elements of his personal and military history. His Aggressor name may be a translation or an adaptation of his actual name.

*c.* Selected personnel should be completely familiar with the history, organization, strength, code name, code number, key personalities, and morale of the Aggressor unit they have been designated to represent. Personnel should be instructed to refrain from divulging any information other than that which they could logically be assumed to have. Prepared prisoners of war must also be familiar with the tactical situation which prevails at the time of their capture. They will carry identity pay and service cards, and materials properly filled out in a desired Aggressor language.

## 2-14. Aggressor Agents

*a.* Agents should be assigned missions of espionage, sabotage, subversion, and deception. Agents are used primarily to further counterintelligence play in training exercises.

*b.* In addition to a background story, which will only be revealed upon proper interrogation, personnel selected to portray agents will be furnished with a cover story. Agents' cover identities should be corroborated by fraudulent documents permitting them to gain access to United States installations. These documents should contain errors which may be detected upon close examination. Agents should also carry documents concealed on their person which establish their assumed Aggressor identity. These documents, if discovered and exploited in conjunction with information obtained during interrogation, will furnish the United States force with information and intelligence of counterintelligence interest.

*c.* To add realism to problems, the detection and apprehension of Aggressor agents should lead counterintelligence personnel to a covert apparatus. Aggressor's covert organization may be portrayed in various organizational patterns. It may be organized for intelligence collection only, or it may be the covert apparatus of the insurgent infrastructure (underground). The covert organizational pattern used will vary in accordance with training requirements, but cellular structure and security measures to disguise activities and prevent detection of insurgent personnel must always be considered when developing a covert organization for counterintelligence agencies to target. If an insurgent infrastructure is being por-

trayed, it may contain subversion, espionage, propaganda, intelligence, sabotage, and security cells. If the above cells are portrayed, personnel should be assigned to conduct activities in these areas. When these activities are depicted, tactical forces may be the first to encounter them. Tactical forces should properly identify these activities as being counterintelligence targets and pass them to counterintelligence personnel for exploitation. In a similar manner, counterintelligence personnel may develop information of interest exploitable by tactical forces and order of battle specialists. For example, the unique relationship between an insurgent infrastructure and the military (i.e., guerrilla) forces should allow counterintelligence personnel to gather information on weapons caches, troop locations, etc. This information should be passed to appropriate units in the exercise.

### 2–15. Ground Activities

All logical military activities of the type of Aggressor unit opposing the United States force should be portrayed. These include movement of personnel and equipment as well as tactical and logistical installations close to the front or in rear areas. Each portrayal must be executed carefully and in detail to present a realistic appearance to visual or photographic reconnaissance. All tactical positions should be camouflaged so that they are not obvious to imagery interpretation or aerial observation. The intelligence indicators listed in paragraphs 2–18 through 2–24 should be used to portray the desired effect.

### 2–16. Imagery Interpretation

Aggressor positions, emplacements, and installations should conform to the planned tactical situation. They may be either actually represented on the ground or simulated and marked with identification panels. When physically represented, the construction of Aggressor installations should be so scheduled that progress of Aggressor activity can be discovered through interpretation of repetitive reconnaissance. All Aggressor positions and installations which are not part of the scheme of maneuver should be located outside the tactical area; if this is not feasible, they should be distinctly identified without regard to the tactical situation.

### 2–17. Training in Signal Intelligence, Signal Security, and Electronic Warfare

*a.* Aggressor radio traffic in training exercises provides both a source of information and a training vehicle for signal intelligence personnel. Radio nets in operation should include those of the Aggressor force represented in an exercise as well as certain radio nets of higher and adjacent units which are essential to the logical conduct of the exercise. Similarly, training in signal security is also enhanced when used in conjunction with Aggressor communication and noncommunication operations.

*b.* Actual or simulated Aggressor electronic warfare (EW) measures may also be introduced into an exercise for training purposes. Electronic countermeasures (ECM) should be conducted periodically throughout the exercise, as appropriate, to demonstrate the vulnerability of communication and electronic systems to ECM and their impact on combat effectiveness, as well as to exercise personnel in ECCM procedures and techniques to minimize the occurrence and effects of ECM. Depending on the equipment, missions, and capabilities of the exercised unit, ECM should be directed against communication and noncommunication equipment. ECM can be preplanned or may be conducted as a matter of opportunity. The officer in charge of the exercise is responsible for authorizing the employment of ECM as to timing, type, duration, and intensity.

*c.* Coordination with supporting US Army Security Agency (USASA) unit should be accomplished prior to conducting pseudo-signal intelligence operations. Additionally, the assistance and participation of USASA elements should be sought to insure a realistic electronic warfare environment and to assist in the evaluation of EW proficiency.

## Section IV. INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS OF AGGRESSOR ACTIVITIES

### 2–18. Use of Intelligence Indicators

*a.* In spite of all precautions taken to deceive the enemy about his probable courses of action, Aggressor Armed Forces, like any other army, must inevitably carry out specific activities in preparation for or in conjunction with specific actions. Some of these activities may be essential to the intended mission, others may be dictated by the concept of tactics peculiar to Aggressor military thinking. In many cases,

these activities can be detected and when properly evaluated and interpreted will allow the development of a reasonable estimate of Aggressor's probable courses of action. Aggressor, however, is well aware of this and will often attempt to turn this apparent vulnerability into a good deceptive measure by allowing enemy intelligence to detect activities intended to indicate a course of action which, in effect, may be the opposite of what Aggressor is in reality preparing to do. It must also be remembered that many Aggressor commanders come from a wide variety of schools of military thought and, thus, may not always adopt the orthodox Aggressor tactical principles described in this manual.

*b.* The following paragraphs contain some intelligence indicators with an explanation for each in terms of present Aggressor doctrine. This list of indicators is by no means complete nor is it intended for dogmatic application in all situations. It is primarily a sampling of *typical* indications of *typical* Aggressor activities, suitable for portrayal in exercises to enhance intelligence training.

## 2–19. Attack

Attack may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Concentration of mass toward either or both flanks. | Single or double envelopment normally is attempted in the offense. Tanks and motorized rifle units on either or both flanks may indicate single or double envelopment. |
| Extensive artillery preparation. | Offensive built around the striking power and shock of massed artillery. Preparations of 1/2 to 1 hour normally precede offensive. |
| Artillery positions well forward and concentrated. | Artillery positions for the attack are well forward, with direct fire weapons, artillery pieces, and large numbers of mortars concentrated. |
| Dispersal of tanks and SP guns to forward units. | Tanks accompanying leading waves of assault motorized rifle units. SP guns follow tanks closely by bounds. |
| Medium air defense guns located in forward areas. | Medium air defense guns displaced forward prior to attack to protect assault forces and to facilitate forward displacement during the attack. |
| Clearing lanes through obstacles within own position. | Lanes are cleared and marked through mined areas, and ramps and bridges prepared over ditches and trenches within Aggressor's own position. This is done prior to attack to facilitate forward movement and grouping, particularly at night. |
| Reconnaissance and destruction of obstacles that are part of enemy defenses. | Usually on night preceding attack, Aggressor patrols reconnoiter enemy obstacles to determine plan for clearing lanes. Patrol destroys only such obstacles as will not disclose direction of main effort. |
| Demonstration and feints. | Local, small-scale attacks or demonstrations involving motorized rifle units, tanks and artillery frequently precede a general attack. |
| Conducting drills and rehearsals in rear areas. | Major attacks may be preceded by rehearsals. This is particularly true of attacks against fortified positions or strongly defended river lines. |
| Establishment and strengthening of counterreconnaissance screen. | Counterreconnaissance screens are used to cover possible assembly areas, routes of troop movement, or regrouping of forces to be used in the attack. |
| Movement of units forward. | Prior to launching an attack, troops may be moved to assembly areas from which they can deploy. |
| Location of enemy troops in forward assembly areas. | Troops are assembled in areas from which they can launch the attack. |
| Increased patrolling. | Patrolling by motorized rifle units usually is more active before an attack. |
| Increased activity in rear areas. | Before an attack, supply and administrative activities increase in the rear areas. |
| Location of supply and evacuation installations well forward. | Supply and evacuation installations are usually located well forward for an attack. |
| Increased air reconnaissance. | Air reconnaissance usually is more active before an attack. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Systcmatic air bombardment. | Before the attack, Aggressor may engage in systematic "softening up" of enemy position by bombardment. |
| Massing of motorized rifle elements, tanks, artillery, and logistical support. | Areas of secondary importance are often denuded to mass maximum strength for main effort. |
| Deployment of combat elements (motorized rifle, tank, and antitank) in echelon. | Normal attack formation provides for the second echelon of the regiment to be located 3–6 kilometers to the rear of the first echelon on line; division second echelon 6–8 kilometers to the rear of first echelon; and Army second echelon 15–25 kilometers to the rear of first echelon. |
| Forward units disposed on relatively narrow fronts. | The actual attack zone of a motorized rifle regiment is about 4 kilometers within an assigned frontage which varies from 5 to 8 kilometers. |

## 2–20. Defense

Defense may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Preparation of battalion and company defense areas. | Aggressor believes in a stubborn defense of areas, and the use of counterattacks by tank heavy forces. |
| Extensive preparation of field fortifications. | Aggressor makes extensive use of trenches, prepared positions, and overhead cover in defensive operations. |
| Formation of antitank strongpoints. | Antitank strongpoints are formed along logical avenues of approach for armor. These are made up of motorized rifle, engineer, and antitank gun units with positions strengthened by mines, ditches, and other obstacles. |
| Attachment of additional antitank units to frontline defensive positions. | In areas where there is a serious armored threat, Aggressor will concentrate as many as 25 antitank guns for every 1000 meters of front. |
| Preparation of alternate artillery positions. | In normal defensive operations, three positions are prepared for each firing battery. |
| Employment of roving artillery. | Roving guns are part of normal defensive operations. |
| Large tank units located in assembly areas to the rear. | Tank units are held in assembly areas for employment in counterattack roles. |
| Preparation and occupation of successive defense lines. | In the defense, separate and distinct defense lines are prepared and occupied. |
| Presence of demolitions, contaminated areas, obstacles, and minefields. | Demolitions, minefields and other obstacles are placed to cover approaches to the position. |
| Deployment of motorized rifle units on good defensive terrain. | Dominating terrain that has good fields of fire and is relatively inaccessible to tanks usually is selected for a defensive position. |
| Dumping ammunition and engineer supplies and equipment and fortifying buildings. | Engineer tools and equipment may be used to dig trenches and to erect obstacles. |
| Entrenching and erecting bands of wire. | Digging of trenches and the erection of wire indicate preparations to hold the position. |

## 2–21. Delaying Action

Delaying Action may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Withdrawal from defensive position before becoming heavily engaged. | In the delaying action, units avoid becoming decisively engaged. |
| Successive local counterattacks with limited objectives. | Counterattacks are employed to assist in disengaging first echelon units rather than to restore position. |
| Counterattacks broken off before position is restored. | Same explanations as for successive local counterattacks. |
| Maximum firepower positioned forward; firing initiated at long ranges. | Long-range fires facilitate the delaying action. |
| Frontages up to four times that normally assigned to units on the defensive. | Forces conducting a delaying action are normally assigned frontages in excess of that normal for Aggressor units on the defense. |
| Use of prepositioned nuclear weapons. | Prepositioned nuclear weapons facilitate the delaying action. |

## 2–22. Withdrawal

Indications for withdrawal are generally the same as those for delaying action with the addition of the following:

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Rearward movement of long-range artillery and supply echelons. | In withdrawal, the first units to be withdrawn are long-range artillery and the supply echelons which move back under cover of darkness 1 or 2 days before main withdrawal. |
| Systematic destruction of bridges, communication facilities and other military assets in Aggressor held territory. | Deliberate demolition and scorched-earth tactics may be employed in general withdrawals. |

## 2–23. Reinforcement

Reinforcement may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Movement of additional troops toward the front. | This action would increase the troop strength in the battle area. |
| Increased traffic toward present position. | This increased traffic may bring up additional troops and supplies. |
| Identification of new units in combat zone. | The presence of new units in addition to units already present will increase the troop strength. |
| Additional command posts and supply and evacuation installations. | Presence of additional units would cause an increase in number of these installations. |

## 2–24. Nuclear Weapons

*a.* Presence of nuclear delivery systems may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Heavily guarded movement of supplies and materiel. | Movement of nuclear materiel requires special security measures. |
| Heavily guarded installations. | Sites for storage of nuclear supplies and the locations of delivery units are heavily guarded. |
| Preparation of heavy artillery positions. | Primary and alternate positions for nuclear delivery artillery are prepared prior to movement of the units. |
| Movement or detection of SP launchers. | RAGE and RAKE free rockets, and RANCOR and RAVAGE surface-to-surface missiles have tracked SP launchers. |
| Presence of radars and other electronic equipment. | Surface-to-surface missile systems employ the CLEAVER radar for control. |
| Sudden increase in communication and electronic activities of a nuclear unit. | Aggressor nuclear delivery units are heavily equipped with radios and electronic devices. |
| Movement of small, heavily guarded convoys, including closed vans, with a high percentage of automatic weapons. | Nuclear warheads are moved under heavy security, usually in closed vans. Escort vehicles are equipped with machineguns. |
| Light aircraft circling over moving convoy. | Nuclear warhead convoys often use aerial radio relays to maintain communication. |
| Movement of small groups of heavily armed helicopters escorted by tactical fighters. | Nuclear warheads may be moved by helicopter, with guards and armed helicopters as escort. Tactical aircraft may provide air cover. |
| Movement of pole trailers with rockets or missile bodies. | Pole trailers are used to resupply missile and rocket units. |
| Presence of heavy artillery. | 203-mm gun-howitzer, 310-mm gun (SP), and 400-mm mortar (SP) have nuclear delivery capabilities. |
| Identification of tall slender objects, such as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees, not previously in area. | Ballistic missiles may be camouflaged as towers, chimneys, or narrow trees. |
| Large, well-guarded complexes, including tank trucks, radars, electronic equipment, generators, and maintenance tents, located well to the rear. | Surface-to-surface missile units require extensive ground handling equipment. |
| Heavily guarded closed vans. | Nuclear warheads are normally carried in closed vans that are heavily guarded. |
| Evacuation or exclusion of civilians from specific areas suitable for nuclear storage or delivery sites. | Civilians may be evacuated from areas selected for nuclear storage or delivery sites. |

*b.* Use of nuclear weapons may be indicated by—

| *Activity* | *Explanation* |
|---|---|
| Location of missile and/or free rocket units within striking range. | Missile and free rocket units are located within one-third of their maximum range from the line of contact on the offense, and one-half on the defense. |
| Use of missiles and/or free rockets with high explosive warheads. | Missiles or free rockets may be used to deliver high explosive warheads either in a normal support role or a registration. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Location of heavy artillery within supporting distance of frontlines. | Nuclear delivery artillery is located within one-third of its maximum range from the line of contact on the offense, and one-half on the defense. |
| Registration of heavy artillery. | Registration may be required, using smoke, low charge, or high explosive projectile, prior to firing a nuclear projectile. |
| Special or unusual activity by frontline troops. | Frontline troops may construct special positions, usually deep or covered foxholes, prior to Aggressor's use of nuclear weapons. |
| Limited withdrawal of frontline units without apparent tactical reason. | Frontline units may withdraw for a limited distance to avoid casualties from close-in nuclear explosives. |
| Sudden and energetic digging-in. | Prior to use of nuclear weapons, frontline units may be ordered to dig deeper foxholes or take other individual protective measures. |
| Large concentrations of radios, radars, and other electronic equipment located in the vicinity of suitable sites for guided missile launching. | Concentration of equipment is necessary to guide and control guided missiles, and must be located in close proximity of the launching site. |
| Sudden increase in communications and electronic activity of a nuclear unit. | Increase may be incident to delivery of nuclear weapons; for example, last minute orders and warnings, and use of electronic guidance and control. |
| Use of smoke cover on frontline troops. | Smoke may be used to protect troops against thermal effects of weapons used in close support. |
| Disappearance of known enemy agents from specific areas. | Prior to nuclear attack of an area, agents may be ordered to leave the area. |
| Increased or unusual air activity. | Delivery of nuclear weapons by air may require a temporary degree of local air superiority, special photo missions, and/or practice flight pattern runs by the delivery aircraft. |

## Section V. INTELLIGENCE INDICATORS OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENT ACTIVITIES

### 2–25. General

*a.* Any activities that Aggressor undertakes to influence a country towards revolution will be reflected by some overt occurrences or indications. Aggressor knows that in many countries of the world potential insurgent indicators (demonstrations, strikes, riots, etc.) do occur but do not indicate an organized insurgent movement. If advantageous to the spread of Aggressor power and influence, Aggressor will try to take advantage of such events by manipulating and eventually controlling the people and groups involved, by using such events as a screen for the development of an Aggressor controlled insurgent movement, or by numerous other potential strategies. Aggressor's enemies must determine which activities, if any, are indicators of Aggressor inspired insurgent activity.

*b.* For any occurrence to be considered an *indicator* of organized insurgent activity, the event must be *useful* in determining the *probable future direction* an insurgent's activities will take. An indicator may be a *single event* so distinctive that it strongly suggests the existence of organized insurgency, for example, the capture of a document outlining part of Aggressor's future strategy. An indicator may also be a *series or group of events* which taken together form a *rhythm* or *pattern* of activity. Patterns are used to determine the insurgent's future goals and strategies. Indicators must be evaluated against standard patterns of normal activity for each country. They can aid in determining the strength or level of intensity of Aggressor's insurgent movement. To enhance intelligence training, any portrayal of Aggressor insurgent activities/indicators should meet the above criteria.

*c.* No attempt has been made to provide an all-inclusive list of insurgency indicators. Because of the diverse political, economic, social/cultural, and military backgrounds of the countries Aggressor may target, and the various organizational structures insurgent infrastructures may assume, any attempt to compile such a checklist would be unsuccessful. The lists compiled here are general or typical activities of Aggressor inspired insurgent movements. Many of the activities listed are, taken alone, not definitive indicators. They should be used in developing a rhythm or pattern of activ-

ity. Indicators are divided into population, propaganda, commodity, and environmental areas in both a rural and urban framework. A third section will deal with indicators of insurgent military activities. A more complete list of insurgent indicators is available in FM 30–31.

## 2–26. Type Indicators of Rural Insurgent Activity

*a.* A rural area, for purposes of this section, includes all farming areas, any town or village up to 5,000 people, and any town or village up to 20,000 people with an agrarian-based economy. Population figures are given for guidance only and are not hard and fast rules. In areas such as these, where the interests are so interdependent, insurgency indicators would be similar in both the town and countryside. Current Aggressor theoreticians emphasize that the key to success is the country-side and the rural population, but rural insurgency may be directed by, and will be coordinated with, urban insurgency.

*b.* Aggressor insurgency attempts to gain control of and support from the population. During the development of a subversive insurgency, some of the first indicators of latent or incipient insurgency will appear among the rural population. Some of these indicators are—

(1) New residents in the community.

(2) Unusual gatherings among the population.

(3) Refusal of peasants to pay rent or taxes, or unusual difficulty in their collection.

(4) Trend of hostility on the part of the population towards the government forces.

(5) Reports from the population that recruitment approaches are being made to them.

(6) Unexplained disappearance or dislocation of young people.

(7) Unusual short absences of government employees.

(8) Failure of police and informant nets to report properly.

(9) Unexplained destruction or loss of government identification papers and increased forgeries thereof.

(10) Murder and kidnapping of local government officials.

*c.* Propaganda indicators of an existing insurgency should be apparent in every society. Extent of propaganda is a potential indication of insurgent intensity. The following indicators should serve as a guide and aid in recognizing the existence of similar indicators.

(1) Dissident propaganda from unidentified sources.

(2) Intensification of religious unrest.

(3) Circulation of petitions advocating standard insurgent demands.

(4) Reports from other countries that the country is on the verge of revolution.

(5) Discrediting attacks causing embarrassment and ridicule of national or public officials.

(6) Characterization of government leaders as puppets and tools of a foreign government.

(7) Rumors resulting in public acceptance of untruths about the government, its programs and its leaders.

(8) Attacks to embarrass or ridicule military officials.

(9) Exhortations to youths to refrain from joining the military service or similar exhortations to soldiers to desert, with the resultant rise in the number of absent soldiers or a decline in the enlistment rate.

(10) Civilians avoiding or failing to cooperate with the military.

(11) Charges by students and others that the educational system is not adequate and is only training the youth of the nation to do the government's bidding.

*d.* Commodity indicators deviating from the normal pattern in the manufacture, processing, and distribution of goods, which may indicate that a subversive insurgency is operating in the area or is making preparation for future operations, are:

(1) Unexplained decrease in the production of a given crop.

(2) Farmers marketing a crop that is smaller than usual, yet showing no signs of subsequent financial difficulty.

(3) Unexplained fluctuation in crop prices.

(4) Diversion of meat from the market.

(5) Reports of loss of hides or diversion of hides from the market.

(6) Disappearance of wild game from an area in which it was previously plentiful.

(7) Increased loss of weapons by military and police forces.

(8) Discovery of arms caches.

(9) Unexplained attacks on patrols resulting in loss of weapons and ammunition.

(10) Unusual scarcity of any type of material that could be used for footwear (hides, old tires, and manufactured footwear).

(11) Discovery of caches of clothing or of

materials which may be used in the manufacture of clothing or uniforms.

(12) Scarcity of herbs and plants used as drugs.

(13) Large-scale purchasing or theft of drugs and of the herbs used in their manufacture.

(14) Unusual increase in communications traffic in amateur radio operations.

(15) Discovery of caches of communications equipment.

*e.* An environment indicator could result from any manmade change, purposeful or accidental, in the natural environment. The following indicators may be apparent:

(1) Increased travel within and into remote or isolated areas.

(2) Unexplained trails and cold campsites.

(3) Concentration of dead foliage in an area; possible indication of camouflage.

(4) Unusual smoke.

## 2-27. Type Indicators of Urban Insurgent Activity

The prime targets for subversive insurgency are the institutions and political processes peculiar to urban areas. Indicators of urban insurgent activity will be placed in the four categories of population, propaganda, commodity, and environment indicators.

*a. Population Indicators.* Urban insurgent leadership is especially selected because of its ability to persuade and manipulate people and operate in an atmosphere of intense security. The insurgents must reach beyond themselves for growth. The insurgency indicators appear as a product of the resulting involvement with the public and the necessary popular recruiting to achieve this growth.

(1) Increase in size of pro-insurgent oriented embassy or consulate staffs in country of concern.

(2) Increased travel by suspected subversives or other elements of the population to pro-insurgency oriented countries or to countries notably under insurgent influence.

(3) Reports of locals being trained in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(4) Return of nationals from travel or study in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(5) Establishment of organizations (even very small) of unexplained origin and of unclear or nebulous aims.

(6) Infiltration of student organizations and unions by known agitators.

(7) Appearance of professional agitators in demonstrations that result in violence.

(8) Reports of insurgent lists of targets for planned terroristic acts.

(9) Reported incidents of attempted recruitment of people to join new movements or underground organizations.

(10) Habitual criminals and formerly unruly youths who seem to be acting with new purpose.

(11) Disappearance of young men from the city.

(12) Increased unrest among laborers, especially union members.

(13) Reports of attempts to bribe or blackmail government and law enforcement employees, to include sudden changes in working and living patterns and financial status of these employees.

(14) Failure of government raids on suspected subversive meetings or headquarters apparently because of forewarning.

(15) Increased student activity against the government and its policies, or against minority groups, foreigners, and the like.

(16) Unexplained disruptions of public utilities, or strikes occurring in critical areas, which cast doubt on the government's ability to provide for the needs of the people.

(17) An increased number of articles or advertisements in newspapers criticizing the government, or purporting to contain classified information which might discredit the government.

(18) Anonymous threats addressed to or terroristic acts committed against government and business leaders.

(19) Attempts to gain classified information and documents from government sources.

*b. Propaganda Indicators.* When the first concrete urban propaganda indicators appear, it can be taken as a probable sign that the minimum underground insurgent organization has been established. The initial propaganda goal will be that of attempting to bring the normal pattern of background dissension to a predetermined level and maintaining that level until an opportune moment. The secondary goal will be to broaden the base of popular support with especially designed campaigns. A third goal may be to disseminate and lend credibility to Aggressor cover and deception activities.

(1) Initiation of letter-writing campaigns to newspapers and government officials deploring undesirable conditions and blaming individuals in power.

(2) In-country dissemination of antigovernment slogans and pronouncements by word of mouth, wall scribblings, and crude posters and leaflets.

(3) Proliferation of slogans pinpointing specific grievances.

(4) Increased appeals directed at intensifying general religious unrest in countries where religious competition exists and the religious composition of the urban population is heterogeneous.

(5) Clandestine in-country radio broadcasts worded to appeal to those with special grievances or to underprivileged ethnic groups.

(6) Propaganda from foreign countries aimed at the country of concern denouncing its allies for imperialistic and expansionistic designs on that country.

(7) The spread of ideas that the government is corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.

(8) Character assassination of chief executives and their advisors.

(9) Strikes or work stoppages called to protest government actions.

(10) Deliberate acts during demonstrations or strikes to provoke police reprisal.

(11) Accusations of police brutality or ineffectiveness or claims that government forces incited violence when demonstrations end in riots.

(12) The spread of ideas that the military and police are corrupt and completely out of touch with the people.

(13) Student unrest manifested by new organizations, proclamations, demonstrations, and strikes against authority.

(14) Clamor for key personnel changes in the educational system.

*c. Commodity Indicators.* In an insurgency that is both rural and urban, the primary function of the urban section is the financing and supplying of the movement.

(1) A scarcity of food supplies in the city when there is no report of natural impediments to agriculture, indicating that food is being diverted.

(2) Large-scale purchasing of foodstuffs on the market by sources not previously identified as wholesale buyers, possibly indicating purchasing agents for an insurgent movement.

(3) Increase in theft and purchases of arms, explosives, and ammunition.

(4) Discovery of arms, ammunition, and explosives being clandestinely manufactured, transported, or cached.

(5) Increase in demand for small arms and ammunition in open market.

(6) Appearance of arms manufactured in pro-insurgency oriented countries.

(7) Unusual systematic purchase of clothing materials, possibly indicating the creation of factories for the manufacture of insurgent uniforms or footwear.

(8) Large distribution of clothing to underprivileged classes by organizations of recent or suspect origin.

(9) Scarcity of drugs and medical supplies on the market or black market.

(10) Large-scale purchase or theft of drugs and other medical supplies from warehouses and distributors.

*d. Environment Indicators.*

(1) Slogans written on walls, bridges, and streets.

(2) Isolated terroristic acts directed at the destruction of government buildings and installations and the homes and businesses of community leaders.

(3) Apartments and houses apparently being used for purposes other than residences.

(4) Appearance of abnormal amounts of counterfeit currency in country of concern.

(5) Marked increases in equipment failures and a decline in product quality in essential industries.

(6) Escalation of peaceful strikes to violence against property and non-striking personnel.

## 2-28. Indicators of Insurgent Military Activities

*a.* In spite of all precautions taken to deceive the enemy about their probable courses of action, the Aggressor insurgents, like any other armed force, must carry out specific activities in preparation for or in conjunction with planned military actions. In many cases, these activities can be detected and when properly analyzed will allow the development of a reasonable estimate of Aggressor insurgent's probable course of action.

*b.* Since the type of operation emphasized by Aggressor is the attack against fixed and mobile objectives, the indicators contained in the following paragraphs have been developed to aid in determining that a given objective has been targeted by Aggressor for an attack.

## 2-29. Indicators of Insurgent Attack

*a. Activities within the Area of the Objective.*

(1) Unusual behavior of civilian and government military personnel within the objective area.

(2) Sudden increases in the desertion of government military personnel.

(3) Insistent request by civilians that they be allowed to leave the area.

(4) Since insurgents always attempt to recruit personnel within the objective to aid the attacking force, a discovery of such recruiting attempts may indicate that the area has been targeted for an attack.

(5) Arrival of insurgent defectors and informers with information and documents is a known standard Aggressor procedure. Aggressor sends in bogus defectors with fake documents to draw the attention of government forces away from the Aggressor's intended objective.

*b. Activities in the Immediate Area (one kilometer radius) of the Objective.*

(1) Unusual behavior by civilians living around the objective can be detected by the sudden disappearance of local inhabitants. This may indicate an attempt on their part to remove themselves from what they know is about to become a battlefield.

(2) Detection of the presence of insurgent main force reconnaissance patrols in the vicinity of a likely objective, especially if engaged in specific reconnaissance activities, is a primary indicator of attack.

(3) In preparation of attack positions, attacks are often preceded by intense digging of trenches, foxholes, and mortar positions. Some of these positions have been found as close as 200 meters from their objective.

(4) In addition to sending bogus informers and deserters with false information into the objective, insurgents have at times planted false documents in the immediate vicinity of the objective.

*c. Activities in the Vicinity (one to ten kilometers radius) of the Objective.*

(1) The observation and/or capture, in the vicinity of an objective, of Aggressor insurgent personnel wearing uniforms and unit designations of the government forces manning the objective has often preceded an insurgent attack.

(2) Preparation of the battlefield involves establishment of close-in facilities both tactical and logistical. This preparation includes ammunition and food dumps, medical facilities, and the preparation of mass graves.

(3) The local populace living in what may be considered the immediate rear area of the insurgent's planned operation will also become involved. Thus, the insurgents will engage in such activities as agitation to win local active support to enable recruitment for such tasks as transporting supplies, digging mass graves, billeting the insurgents, and collecting detailed intelligence data about the intended objective.

(4) Aggressor's insurgent main or regional forces may move away from the objective during daylight hours only to double back at night. Insurgent units must move to the vicinity of the objective bringing forward all heavy weapons. According to Aggressor doctrine, they must mass near the objective at the last possible moment.

(5) Aggressor insurgent doctrine underlines the need for an attack to be preceded by artillery preparatory fires. This may also include mortars, bazookas, and recoilless rifles.

*d. Aggressor Insurgent Operational Planning and Training for the Attack.* Insurgent unit commanders and their subordinate officers are always thoroughly briefed on planned operations. The troops are then instructed and undergo a period of rehearsal and training keyed to the future operation. The capture of personnel who have trained and rehearsed for a specific operation, regardless of distance from objective, could be a valuable indicator.

# PART TWO
# AGGRESSOR DEVELOPMENT AND MILITARY STRUCTURE
# CHAPTER 3
# THE AGGRESSOR DEVELOPMENT

## Section I. HISTORY OF THE AGGRESSOR

### 3-1. General

"Aggressor, The Maneuver Enemy," totalitarian and militaristic, has been developed with an assumed national background, history, government, military organization, society, and political ideology. Aggressor's military forces employ doctrine, tactics, techniques, and weapons with capabilities tailored to depict a realistic enemy force. The location of the Aggressor Homeland is deliberately unspecified, and elements of the Aggressor Armed Forces are fictitiously based in known geographical areas throughout the world to facilitate introduction into exercises, maneuvers and classroom instruction. The Aggressor government is dominated by a political body known as the "Circle Trigon Party (CTP)." The Party's political aims are opposed to those of the United States, and internationally, with the exception of a split in theory and practice between the Aggressor Homeland and another major nation, Hostilonia, the ultimate goal of the militant Circle Trigon Party—inevitable world domination remains unchanged. This chapter will briefly discuss the Aggressor Homeland, its satellites, its relationship with Hostilonia, the government and party organization, and the people of Aggressorland, as a prelude to a discussion of the Aggressor military forces.

### 3-2. The Aggressor Homeland

*a.* The Aggressor nation, as it is known today, arose out of the chaotic conditions which characterized many areas of the world at the end of World War II. The collapse and surrender of the Axis powers was followed by large-scale withdrawals of Allied troops from the areas of recent conflict. Such withdrawals produced almost immediately a military and political vacuum. The entire fabric of the socio-economic life was a source of dissatisfaction; unrest and discontent were widespread among the people. Into this situation stepped a small group of ambitious men, determined to seize control over these torn, unsettled areas and to use them as a springboard for eventual conquest of the entire world. To obtain their objective they created a political party based upon the social, economic and political theories of a late 19th century radical, Akilo PETROVANSI. During subsequent general elections, the Circle Trigon Party (as they called themselves) managed to get many of their candidates elected to the Chamber of Councilors. Though they fell far short of a majority, the Circle Trigon Party represented the only single group with undivided loyalty to a common aim. In short time, the Circle Trigon Party, with its disciplined organization was able to take over the central government in a bloodless coup.

*b.* During the following winter, the party leaders proceeded to consolidate their positions in the large land masses of the Homeland. Control of the government, the secret police and the Armed Forces enabled the Party to direct the national effort toward the strengthening of an already powerful fighting machine. Party control extended to industry, commerce, agriculture, organized labor, the fields of education, the information media, and the arts and sciences.

*c.* According to the makeup of the Party organization, the powerful Central Committee was expected to elect a triumvirate to serve at the helm of the Party. It was not long before the elected Triumvirate gained uncontested control and exercised absolute power within the Circle Trigon Party. Once the Circle Trigon Party became the only political party in the Aggressor Homeland, it had complete control of the government and, in pursuing their objective of world domination, Aggressor leaders redoubled




*Figure 3-1. Relationship of Aggressor CTP Organizations.*

their efforts toward military preparedness. These leaders firmly believed that the mere existence of a powerful nation such as the United States was a serious obstruction in their

path and would have to be conquered. During this time, Europe was in great turmoil and the United States was occupied with the problems of demobilization. Attempts by colonial powers to reestablish colonialism in Asia caused instability in many countries, and revolutions occurred in Africa, Central America, and South America. Realizing that these chaotic conditions provided excellent opportunities for political expansion, Aggressor drew up a program for world domination. Basically, this policy consisted of initially acquiring a buffer zone of satellite nations by the use of direct military action, threat of military action, political subversion, or a combination of these strategies. Expansion was furthered by promoting the establishment of Circle Trigon Central Committees in every country of the world, and eventually acquiring additional territory by various political and military means. To accomplish this objective, several directorates corresponding to the large land masses of the world were formed at the headquarters of the Circle Trigon Party. The Directorates established the Circle Trigon Party headquarters (known as the in-country Central Committee) in each of the countries located within their respective areas of responsibility. These in-country Central Committees also became a nucleus for the Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Service (ACIS), the Aggressor's intelligence collection organization.

### 3-3. Aggressor Satellite Nations

*a.* As a result of its conquests, the Aggressor nation exercises almost complete control over several former national powers throughout the world and has relegated them to the role of satellites. The Aggressor Homeland CTP establishes policy for the satellite nations through the secretaries of the CTP in the satellite nations. These nations, having governmental/party structures similar to the Aggressor Homeland, react to policy promulgated. In most of its satellites, the Homeland CTP has insured continuing obedience by installing high ranking members of the Party at the executive level, and by stationing elite army units throughout these areas.

*b.* The armed forces of these satellites have received equipment, only a small portion of which is of the latest design, and technical assistance from Aggressor. The resulting organizational and tactical doctrines of these forces are very similar to Aggressor's.

### 3-4. Nonsatellite Nations

In nonsatellite nations, the Circle Trigon Party is prepared to function overtly or covertly, depending on its legal status within the nonsatellite nation. Where outlawed, its activities are covert and its membership is carefully concealed. Any overt activities will be carried on through front organizations. Where it may lawfully exist, its activities are more-or-less overt, depending on its degree of influence and the attitude of the populace toward it. Generally, there is an identified and recognized overt membership backed up by a covert or hidden membership. Additionally, in these countries, there will exist a number of organizations which openly and identifiably support the CTP as well as a number of organizations whose support for CTP causes will be concealed and directed. Where possible, membership in the CTP is offered as being highly desirable and is open to persons in all categories of employment and social status. It is the CTP covert membership that provides the manpower pool from which Aggressor selects personnel to direct missions in the fields of subversion, espionage, sabotage, and guerrilla activity. In these nations, there is extensive liaison between the CTP and the Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Service (ACIS). (Figure 3-1 depicts the relationship thus far explained.)

### 3-5. Survey of Aggressor Worldwide Influence

*a.* The 1945 map of Europe resembled that of a thousand years ago when the Slavs advanced to the Elbe and Saale. Western Europe had lost not only its geo-political balance, but also its independence. The Aggressors made use of the territory conquered in World War II as a base from which to intimidate Western Europe. The Aggressors knew well that Western Europe, without building a united counterbalance of forces, could not stand since its bastions in the Near East and Mediterranean had collapsed. This situation presented an opportunity which historically had not been offered the Aggressors before. Prior to World War II, the Aggressor Homeland was building an empire which, despite its great expanse, was politically isolated from the rest of the world. In a relatively short span of time—20 years—the Aggressors had extended their sphere of influence to the doorstep of the United States, and had politically infiltrated the Arab world, Africa, India, Southeast Asia, and South America. At the same time, the

Aggressor zealously built bases of operations in the Mediterranean and in Asia Minor—points of great strategic value which the old colonial powers so lightly and hastily abandoned. This Aggressor penetration in the Mediterranean had been obtained without combat under the cover of peaceful coexistence. The conquest of central Europe and the appearance of the Aggressor naval power south of the Dardanelles carried the signs of a true turn in history.

*b.* Aggressor Asia is a vast expanse which borders for nearly 3,000 miles on Hostilonia. The Aggressor Homeland and Hostilonia have had a difficult relationship for over three centuries. More recent history indicates that Aggressorland's objective has been to make Hostilonia a major satellite subservient to her. There is a contested area which is populated largely by Hostilonic peoples who historically gave allegiance to Hostilonia. There is a definite insistence that these peoples belong to Hostilonia, and her territorial claims in the area are immense. The lands along the Hostil-Aggress border are under-populated and thus ideal for Hostilonian expansion. The Hostilonians under the leadership of SHEI CHAO MONG have become the Aggressor's chief rival in Asia. The Aggressor Homeland has underplayed the clashes with Hostilonia and has avoided giving her occasion for provoking further disputes. The Aggressors have continued to campaign to prove that the Homeland is a legitimate Asian power as well as a European one. The straining of Aggressor-Hostilonian relations began again as early as the late 1950's and, within the headquarters of the Circle Trigon Party, the Asia Directorate gradually lost control of its area of responsibility. A resurgent nationalism among the peoples of Hostilonia, who had been dominated by the Aggressor Homeland regime, added to the growing hostility that had gained momentum during the period of the Hostilonian Home Guard movement. Hostilonia had reached the stage of expansion, and the logic of its revolution was pushing it towards a military confrontation. Indeed, since then the public dispute has followed a cyclical course of escalation and partial detente. Each cycle has worsened relations and has given other Circle Trigon parties more autonomy from the Aggressor Homeland. The split of the Aggressor-Hostilonia axis has become an accepted fact in international affairs. It is a very important development in contemporary world politics and its influence prevails over every aspect of the current international situation. In spite of the struggle for world Aggressor leadership, the Aggressor-Hostilonia conflict is still contained within the framework of the Circle Trigon Party. The objectives of the Aggressor Homeland and Hostilonia reflect the difference in their status as world powers, their positions within the Circle Trigon Community and their views of the world. The Aggressors and the Hostilonians have stressed their endorsement of "just civil wars," especially in developing countries. To Circle Trigonists of all persuasions, most civil wars of the type described variously as revolutionary war, people's war, internal war, national wars of liberation, insurgency or counterinsurgency, are as justified as the Crusades were to the Knights Templar. Aggressor and Hostilonian agreement on doctrine, however, finds erratic reflection in practice. The Aggressors and the Hostilonians often disagree on where and when revolutionary war should be fought, the way it should be fought, and especially the risk of escalation to be tolerated. These disagreements stem from differences in national objectives, attitudes toward war, experience with revolutionary war and interpretation of its nature. The Aggressor-Hostilonian split must be viewed partly as a doctrinal disagreement and partly as a disagreement about practical politics. Today's Hostilonian concept has been in practice a return to the concept of revolutionary warfare once propagated by the Aggressor Circle Trigon Party. This is unacceptable within the structure of the concept as known in the Aggressor dominated world. In the last two decades, the national liberation struggles of the peoples of Asia and Africa have scored many victories. Dozens of independent states have appeared in the place of colonial empires, clearly showing that the people of these areas are determined to throw off the colonial and imperialistic yoke of exploitation. In the light of these facts reflecting the far-reaching social and economic processes in our era, the existence of territories which are still under colonial rule becomes all the more intolerable. Aggressor's military experts are skeptical of the Hostilonians' reliance on people's wars because of the emphasis on political force rather than industrial sufficiency. However, the doctrine of revolutionary war results from the failure of the Aggressor Homeland to give Hostilonia enough assistance to develop an industrial base from which to organize a military establishment along conventional lines. Hostilonia poses three fundamental issues which can be separated for

purposes of analysis, but which in practice blend into one another. First, Hostilonia is the most powerful nation of the Mainland and potentially the most powerful nation in the world. Second, Hostilonia has been for at least a millennium a great power of a peculiar kind in that its outlook on, and relations with, the outside world have been different from those of other great powers. Third, Hostilonia is today the fountainhead of the most virulent kind of aggression proclaiming the inevitability of armed conflict and supporting Circle Trigonist subversion throughout the world. Hostilonian foreign policy under the Circle Trigon Party has been generally realistic and restrained. There is above all, a determination to reassert Hostilonia as a leading world power whose voice will be heard and heeded on all major world issues. Thus, emerged a second major Aggressor power to be considered, which challenges the Aggressor Homeland for world Circle Trigonist leadership. The outcome of this power struggle remains unresolved.

*c.* Aggressor policy toward the Middle East was tempered only after the Six-week War in June 1969. Chastened by the turn of events for which its unilateral backing of radical regimes was partly responsible, the Aggressor Homeland since has posed as the friend and protector of all Arab states. Accordingly, it has sought to improve relations with other Middle Eastern countries to win support for a political solution to the conflict. Aggressor's efforts to improve relations with moderate states in the immediate area and with Iran and Turkey were clearly undertaken to disengage the Aggressor Homeland from too exclusive a reliance on the Arab states. Right after the June 1969 war the Aggressors were outspoken in condemnation of Arab extremism. But within the year, the Aggressor Homeland shifted to an unenthusiastic acceptance of the Arab guerrillas. This changed attitude toward extremism is undoubtedly due to the fear that Hostilonia might gain too much influence with that segment of Arab opinion. In early 1970, the Aggressor Homeland endorsed the militant resolutions of the International Congress on Arab Affairs, which recognized the legality of the guerrilla resistance. Radical Arabs, however, realized that this was merely a verbal, tactical concession. During a high ranking Aggressor official's visit to the Middle East in late 1970, several Arab leaders still felt it necessary to plead with the Aggressors to recognize the right of the guerrillas to self-government.

*d.* In Africa, Aggressor strived to be on good terms with all the established regimes regardless of their political philosophy. It wooed not only the moderate states but also the least revolutionary states. Aggressor relations with the radical states, once regularly cited as "progressive" models for the rest of the world, went sour. Their radicalism became less attractive when several countries instituted drastic "reform" that ruined their economies and then demanded in the name of revolutionary internationalism that the Aggressor Homeland bail them out with additional aid. Instead of championing the radical states, the Aggressors backed the Modern Organization of African States (MOAS). To undercut Hostilonian influence, the Aggressor Homeland championed the African states' demands that aid to the liberation movements in the still existing colonies be channelled through the MOAS. In this manner, the Aggressor Homeland was able to exert greater political influence upon the liberation groups on the African continent and bring them into line with the Aggressor objectives.

*e.* In Central and South America, the Aggressor Homeland sought an image of respectability through expanded diplomatic and trade relations. Influence was sought not through reliance on revolutionary action on the part of the local Circle Trigon parties, but rather by encouraging neutralism and economic nationalism. At first, because of the Hostilonian and other challenges from the left, the Homeland could not combine its new preference for regular channels with its traditional emphasis on revolution. At the Conference on Liberation of American Peoples, held at Santiago, Chile, in January 1966, they felt they could not formally dissociate themselves from the militant call to Latin Americans to sweep away their governments by violent revolution. But subsequently, according to press reports, Aggressor diplomats hastened to assure various Latin American regimes that the Aggressor Homeland did not really support the conference declarations. By then the Aggressors were so intent on increasing contacts with the established regimes that one of the Latin American government's vigorous campaigns against the pro-Aggressor guerrillas did not deter the Aggressor Homeland from gaining diplomatic recognition from that government through attractive trade offers. Moreover, the Aggressors deemed it unnecessary to offer any explanation to the guerrillas or the political opposition in that nation.

*f.* Militarily, the Aggressors secured more de-

pendable means of influence. The Aggressor offered arms assistance whenever the Western powers refused to do so, and acquired numerous quick footholds throughout the world. Increasingly, the Aggressors used foreign airports and harbors to extend the reach of their power. This manifested ability to project military power was preceded by years of a patient build-up of strategic facilities under the guise of economic assistance. The Aggressor drive to establish a presence along important air and maritime routes suggested a search for bases (not necessarily military bases but rather, refueling, repair and landing facilities) that gave the Aggressor Homeland far more tangible advantages in preparation for the attack on the Western powers than the mere equipping and training of the local armed forces.

## Section II. GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE

### 3-6. General

The Aggressor government is totalitarian with control highly centralized in a triumvirate. The "Triumvirate" has complete authority over the Circle Trigon Party and the Aggressor Government. This domination is achieved by the interlocking directorate (fig 3-2), which gives the Circle Trigon Party a firm grip on the Aggressor Government and Armed Forces.

### 3-7. Form of Government

*a.* The titular head of the Aggressor nation is the President. He is formally elected by the single legislature—the "Chamber of Councilors"—but actually handpicked by the Triumvirate. The presidency has been invariably handed to a veteran Circle Trigonist. Such was the case in February 1963 when the current President, Henri WUDMANSK (DOB 1907), was installed. Recalled from anonymity, but remembered as an early adherent of Petrovansism, he has no governmental powers and merely represents the nation at official and ceremonial functions.

*b.* The chief executive of the government is the Minister President, who is nominated by the President. The actual selection is made by the Triumvirate and dictated to the President. Approval of the appointment by the Chamber of Councilors, as required by the Aggressor Constitution, is a formality. The Minister President is usually a high ranking member of the Party's Central Committee. It has long been rumored that Ch-hung MO, who occupied this position from 1946 to 1956, suddenly became homesick and departed for his "homeland." It is presumed that he is buried in the land of his ancestors. He was succeeded by Vasily KROSTYCHOVIC, formerly 1st Secretary of the Directorate. The Chamber of Councilors approved the selection of KROSTYCHOVIC in less than two hours.

*c.* Based on the ratio of 1 to 100,000 representation, elections for the 2500 membership of the Chamber of Councilors are held every 3 years. Nomination for one of these seats is proposed by the local Circle Trigon Party. One or more names are forwarded to the Capital of the Aggressor Homeland and one name is returned to the area. The voters have only one name on which to vote. In the past, most names have received 99.4 percent approval of the electorate. At the first combined meeting of the "elected" members, the President is selected by the gathering.

*d.* Within the Council of Ministers, who are appointed by the Minister President, there are three who control practically every segment of the nation's economic and manpower resources. The Minister of Industry (Demil SHELENKO), for instance, controls the nation's industrial output and channels a large percentage into the military effort. The Minister of the Armed Forces (Marshal Charl W. LODER) directs the mobilization, training and use of the nation's armed manpower in Aggressor's scheme for world domination. In addition to its conventional functions, the Minister of Internal Affairs (Kaily K. BAKHTOV) exercises police powers, controls the security forces and the Agency for Strategic Operations, and operates forced labor camps and penal colonies. These three along with two others sit on the all-powerful Central Committee, while the other seven Secretaries of Directorates are candidates for the Central Committee of the Circle Trigon Party.

*e.* A prominent feature of most totalitarian societies is the existence of a dual military apparatus. In the past, totalitarian powers have refused to rely solely on the regular military establishment. Instead they have activated military groups fanatically loyal to the ruling party and not subject to control by the armed forces. The Aggressor has the Security Forces that fulfill this role. Controlled by the Minister of Internal Affairs, they guard the borders of the




*Figure 3-2. Interlocking Directorate of the Aggressor.*

Homeland, maintain internal security, guard political prisoners, and protect the important government, party and industrial buildings in the occupied areas. As the ultimate defenders of the regime, they provide the force necessary to insure the internal stability of the Homeland and to suppress uprisings by any segment of the populace.

*f.* The Supreme Councilor of the Judiciary is also appointed by the Minister President. Hya H. SAKUN, present holder of this post, was elevated, from being merely a minor instructor in American jurisprudence, by KROSTYCHOVIC in January 1965. The Judiciary, since it enjoys no independence, can be employed only to further the political ends of the state, such as giving judicial approval to purging political enemies of the Circle Trigon Party. Trial by jury is unknown.

## 3-8. Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Service (ACIS)

*a.* The Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Service is responsible for all covert and clandestine intelligence activities. It is divided into two agencies: the Agency for Strategic Operations and the Agency for Special Operations.

(1) The Agency for Strategic Operations, under direct control of the Minister of Internal Affairs, is responsible for espionage, propaganda, and sabotage activities through its close relationship with the Directorates of Land Masses of the Central Committee; it controls the collection of strategic intelligence information in such categories as sociological, economic, political and limited biographical data on immediate as well as potential Aggressor enemies. It is also responsible for the internal security of the Aggressor Homeland and its satellite countries, for assuring the political reliability of CTP members in these countries, and for counterintelligence functions in the military. As a result, the CTP is able to tightly control the military.

(2) The Agency for Special Operations is responsible for the collection and production of military intelligence for Aggressor. Its Chief, a member of the General Staff Directorate of the Aggressor High Command, reports directly to and is under direct control of the Minister of the Armed Forces who, in turn, is responsible to the Triumvirate for the activities of the Agency for Special Operations. Detailed information on the organization, purpose, and activities of the Agency for Special Operations is provided in chapter 6.




*Figure 3-3. Organization of ACIS.*

*b.* Personnel of these two agencies are members of the Homeland Circle Trigon Party and native-born Aggressor Homeland citizens. All members of the Agency for Special Operations are active military personnel, while those in the Agency for Strategic Operations are mostly recruited from the civilian population, although there are many active and retired military members.

*c.* Both agencies maintain close liaison with the Circle Trigon Party in the satellite countries and in countries openly friendly to Aggressor. The Headquarters of the Agency for Strategic Operations is responsible for overall direction and control of the next lower echelon, the Area Control Elements, which are generally

located in satellite countries. Area control elements direct and control National Control Elements, located in or near the capital city of the target country. A target nation may be further subdivided into regions providing a regional control element. The Regional Control Elements direct the activities of the Population Center Control Elements, which in turn direct cell efforts. The cells, consisting of from two to six individuals are the working echelons. Additionally, members of ACIS are believed to operate from within all Aggressor Embassy Staffs. (Figure 3-3 depicts the ACIS control chain.)

### 3-9. Circle Trigon Party

*a.* It must be emphasized that the party is the true focus of power, although there is no clear dividing line between the party and the government. It ruthlessly pursues its main objectives of internal consolidation and world domination. To attain the former, the party has employed brute force, exploited age-old traditions and nationalistic feelings, offered blandishments, and instilled fear and distrust in the Aggressor people. In aiming for world domination, Aggressor wages military campaigns, preceded by political and economic penetration.

*b.* In the Homeland, membership in the Circle Trigon Party is confined to a hard core of party stalwarts, amounting to no more than 10 percent of the population. The populace, however, is thoroughly indoctrinated with the Aggressor political philosophy and supports it by reason of fear or conviction. The Circle Trigon Party of the Homeland controls the activities of the Circle Trigon Parties of other nations in furtherance of its political and military objectives. Strict adherence to the "party" line is expected from all foreign parties. Dissenters at home or abroad are disciplined or purged.

*c.* Members of the present Triumvirate (Vasily KROSTYCHOVIC, Henry R. LORMIN, Andro V. PELSAKOV) and other Circle Trigon "heroes" are admired and often idolized. Particular reverence is shown to Akilo PETROVANSI whose political theories outlined the fundamentals of the Circle Trigon movement. From 1945 until his death in 1955, Emilo GRANDAFRATO established himself as the ruling member of the Triumvirate and virtual dictator of the Aggressor nation. By concentrating power in his hands, he almost wrecked the Party. The power struggle within the Central Committee that followed GRANDAFRATO'S death resulted in the final emergence of Vasily KROSTYCHOVIC as the new strong man. Once the power struggle was resolved, KROSTYCHOVIC lost no time in replacing certain key members of the Central Committee, governmental personalities, and promoting various military figures who had backed him in his move for power. During the stalemate which developed in the war, there was increasing public opinion in the Homeland favoring cessation of hostilities in the US. Student demonstrations of the NUVO Petrovansi (New Petrovanist) Union, called for party reform. Referring to KROSTYCHOVIC's declaration following the 1963-64 Geneva summit meeting (in which he stated that "armed conflicts were no longer considered means to an end"), the students demanded that troops be withdrawn from the US. Because of the political upheavals in the Homeland, KROSTYCHOVIC made several concessions to the liberal factions, including the enaction of a social and economic reform. To conciliate the long suffering populace, he modified the powers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs which resulted in certain economic concessions. In introducing these large-scale reform movements, he attempted to restore the influence of the Party and adapted Petrovansism to the new conditions. In late 1966 he came under fire, predominantly by Shei Chao MONG (hard core Hostilonian) backed by powerful Marshal Charl W. LODER (Minister of the Armed Forces), for increasingly liberal policies and for his backing of liberal extremists. During 1967 the rift between MONG and KROSTYCHOVIC supporters became more pronounced and threatened to destroy party unity. In December 1967, KROSTYCHOVIC did a complete about-face, and allied himself with Marshal LODER in order to unify the party and to demonstrate to the world that he had not lost his power. To convince the free world that it had nothing to fear from the economic and military expansion of the Aggressor nation, that the war being fought is strictly defensive, he convened numerous conferences stressing the theme that Aggressor is only trying to defend itself and is willing to restore peace. In an unprecedented move, KROSTYCHOVIC, with moderate support from LODER, yielded to the liberals and, on 10 July 1969, ordered his armies out of the continental US. He also attempted to arrange a summit meeting with the leaders of other nations. Continuing the "Big-Lie" technique, KROSTYCHOVIC claims Aggressor is being attacked by the US.

## Section III. ECONOMIC STRUCTURE AND THE PEOPLE

### 3–10. Economic Structure

*a.* The Aggressor economy is completely controlled by the state. All industrial and commercial establishments are state-owned and private individuals are prohibited from owning any means of production or distribution. Collectives and state-controlled cooperatives dominate the agricultural field.

*b.* Industrial and commercial facilities are either manufacturing or transporting implements of war or else can be converted to support the war effort at short notice. The Aggressor civil air fleet, for example, is under quasi-military control and in case of military necessity can be diverted to the armed forces. All passenger and cargo aircraft conform to military standards and specifications, so that transfer from civilian to military usage poses no problem. The same is true of tractors used in agriculture and of commercial trucks.

*c.* Stockpiling of strategic materials also serves to promote the Aggressor war effort. Although the armed forces control and maintain their own central depots in the various military districts of the Homeland and overseas, they can draw on the reserves of the civilian economy. Such reserves, known as the "state reserves" and administered by the Minister of Industry, comprise large stockpiles of food products, petroleum, coal and coke, strategic metals, tools and instruments, chemicals, heavy industrial equipment and various means of transportation.

*d.* To maintain and increase the war-making potential of the Aggressor economy, the government supports a huge research and development program. Aggressor advances in space, the production of nuclear materials and weapons, guided and ballistic missiles, and electronic equipment provide evidence of the success of this program.

### 3–11. Monetary System

*a.* The currency of the Aggressor is based on a gold standard and uses the decimal system. Rates of the present exchange to the United States dollar are as follows:

| *Metal coins of the Aggressor* | *US equivalent* |
|---|---|
| 1 Cento | ¾¢ |
| 5 Cento | 3 ¾¢ |
| 10 Cento | 7 ½¢ |
| 20 Cento | 15¢ |
| 50 Cento | 37 ½¢ |

| *Paper notes of the Aggressor* | *US equivalent* |
|---|---|
| 1 Fralmato | 75¢ |
| 5 Fralmato | $ 3.75 |
| 10 Fralmato | $ 7.50 |
| 50 Fralmato | $ 37.50 |
| 100 Fralmato | $ 75.00 |
| 500 Fralmato | $375.00 |
| 1000 Fralmato | $750.00 |

*b.* In Aggressor-held territories rigid controls are imposed upon the populace. A complicated list of currency regulatory laws exist. The regional commanders of the Aggressor Armed Forces have the authority to state whether Fralmato or local currencies shall be used.

### 3–12. The Aggressor People

The population of the Aggressor homeland surpassed the 250 million mark in 1964. Since then, the growth of the population has continued because of the increasing birth rate and the continuing acquisition of new territory. Although the Aggressor people comprise a large variety of ethnic and religious groups, the national objectives proclaimed by their ruler have instilled into them a national unity.

### 3–13. Manpower Policies

*a.* Aggressor ideology holds that the personal aspirations of the individual are identical to the interests of the state. Therefore, any actions taken against Aggressor are crimes against the people. Consequently, the government exploits each individual in order to advance the economy and promote the war effort.

*b.* Political reliability and loyalty to the Circle Trigon Party are criteria for positions of responsibility in the armed forces and other than menial positions in industry, commerce and agriculture. Persons known to be actively or passively opposed to the Party are arrested by the Security Forces, subjected to secret trials and sentenced to terms in forced labor camps or penal colonies. The exploitation of forced labor greatly contributes to maintaining the Aggressor economy at its present level.

*c.* All young men and unmarried women are subject to military service. Exemption is granted to most university students, persons possessing certain technical skills in industry and agriculture, and the physically unfit. The latter, are generally required to serve in labor battalions. Women inducted into the armed forces perform clerical and housekeeping func-

tions or serve in the various technical and administrative forces, e.g., signal and medical. All other unmarried and many married women work in industry, commerce and agriculture, where they perform duties ranging from hard menial labor to highly specialized positions.

### 3–14. The Individual Soldier, Background, Characterization, and Training

*a.* The Aggressor population is too heterogenous and dispersed to permit an easy generalization as to the character of the people. As in any society, however, there are common factors—economic, social and political—that tend to produce a degree of uniformity. Most of the population is of peasant stock, disciplined from generations of hard manual labor. The agricultural or collective farm laborer, even today, lives in a sod hut or rough-hewn cabin, the same as his forebears have done over the centuries. The young city man usually lives with his family in small rooms, located in utilitarian apartment houses. He is physically hardy as a result of participation in outdoor sports, sponsored by the Aggressor cultural program. Whatever his background, the young Aggressor male has known few comforts and no luxuries.

*b.* The Aggressor soldier, because of his background, is willing to accept severe regimentation and restricted movement as a normal part of military life. With such an amenable attitude he often finds army living and working conditions superior to those in civilian life. The Aggressor soldier, who has endured hardships in civilian life, usually shows great aptitude in infiltration, tactical ruses, deception and improvisation.

*c.* The official portrayal of the ideal Aggressor soldier is not a reliable guide. It is stated that he is a dauntless fighter and capable of withstanding any hardship and that no task is impossible for him, no difficulty insurmountable. He is prepared to fight and die and to lead others to do the same, all for the glory of the Homeland and the aims of the Circle Trigon Party. Reality has shown that the average Aggressor soldier is relatively uneducated, uninformed, apathetic toward Aggressor political doctrine, and lacking in personal initiative; but he is fanatically convinced that he is fighting for his country, and he has complete trust in his military superiors.

*d.* There are marked variations in the fighting capabilities of the various ethnic groups in the Aggressor Army. The weaknesses apparent in these inherent variations are overcome by systematically mixing the nationalities in military units.

*e.* Collectively, the Aggressor soldiers have been found to be formidable fighters highly disciplined and superbly trained. They are efficient, flexible and able to use their modern equipment. In battle they can be expected to be tough, calloused, inured to hardship and righteously convinced of their cause.

*f.* Training in the Aggressor Armed Forces is characterized by constant repetition under strict supervision, a minimum of freedom, and intense political indoctrination. Initiative for the most part is not stressed, and it is within this area that the average Aggressor soldier is weak.

*g.* Basic training in the Aggressor Army consists of both preinduction and postinduction training. By law, all males are required to attend classroom training during the last 3 years of secondary schooling. Inasmuch as most farm children do not get past fourth grade, a 2-week preinduction training program is mandatory in the last year prior to induction, and is conducted in rural training camps. Postinduction quarantine training lasts 2 months and is similar in subject matter to our basic training. After quarantine training those with technical aptitude may be selected to attend specialist training, all others are assigned to a unit and receive advanced training with that unit. Unit training in the Aggressor Army is arranged to conform to a yearly training cycle, which is conducted in two phases—summer and winter.

*h.* There are few volunteers for NCO schools because of the deemphasized incentive. Therefore, those with leadership qualities are ordered to attend. Most divisions have their own NCO school, and, upon completion of nine months of training, graduates are promoted to junior sergeant or higher depending on class standing.

*i.* Aggressor maintains a backbone of high-caliber, professional officers through a complex network of schools and academies. Military preparatory schools are from five to seven years long depending on the background of the individual, and cadets receive an above-average formal education in addition to their military education. Graduates may elect to go into industry or on to further professional schooling. Those who elect to make the military a career are sent to OCS. Outstanding students are as-

signed to the branch of their choice. Each arm and service conducts its own OCS, and courses last from two to three years according to branch. Each branch has its own academy or advanced course for senior officers. These courses are from three to five years in duration.

# CHAPTER 4
# ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

## Section I. THE HIGH COMMAND

### 4-1. General

*a.* Constitutional jurisdiction of the Aggressor Armed Forces is vested in the Chamber of Councilors. Authority is exercised through this body by the President; theoretically, the principal executive of the Aggressor Homeland.

*b.* Actual control of the Armed Forces lies in the Triumvirate and in the Central Committee of the Circle Trigon Party. The party influences and directs the military services through the Council of Ministers and through its direct authority over the political structure within the armed forces. (Figure 4-1 depicts the organization of the Aggressor High Command.)

### 4-2. Minister of the Armed Forces

*a.* The Minister of the Armed Forces, an active army officer, has supreme control of the Aggressor land, sea, and air forces. As a member of the Council of Ministers, The Minister of the Armed Forces is appointed by and is technically answerable to the Chamber of Councilors. In practice, he is responsible to the Central Committee of the Circle Trigon Party, and its Triumvirate. The Minister has authority over all military matters, and his ministry fulfills a broad spectrum of activities, both administrative and operational.

*b.* The Minister of the Armed Forces is responsible for policy making, planning, coordination, and control of the Aggressor Armed Forces. He works primarily with the General Staff Directorate, which is the most important of the four agencies of joint policy and control. Others are the Chief Inspectorate, Main Political Directorate, and the Directorate of Rear Services.

*c.* The Ministry of the Armed Forces also includes administrative and technical main directorates, main directorates of force components and major operational commands.

*d.* Personnel assigned to the Ministry drop their basic branch while serving at this level and assume the High Command insignia.

### 4-3. Armed Forces General Staff

The Armed Forces General Staff assists the Minister of the Armed Forces by promulgating and supervising the execution of operational and joint training policies of the Armed Forces. The general staff is composed of two main directorates—operations and intelligence—and a number of other directorates which include communications, mobilization, transportation, topography, cryptography, military history, and probably others that are unknown.

### 4-4. Chief Inspectorate

The Chief Inspectorate determines the status of training and combat preparedness of units and individuals. It is not concerned with morale, grievances or fiscal matters.

### 4-5. Main Political Directorate

*a.* A vital element in the Circle Trigon Party's control of the armed forces is the Main Political Directorate. It is responsible for the political indoctrination and surveillance of the troops; control of the appointment, assignment, promotion and elimination of all general officers and high command officers (including Marshals); morale of the armed forces; propaganda; and in coordination with the Main Directorate of Personnel, control of the original appointment of all officers.

*b.* To accomplish this mission, the directorate's political apparatus is integrated in all units of the Armed Forces down to battalion level. In each unit the political officer normally is the deputy commanding officer. In addition, the directorate maintains a network of informants. Although Aggressor adheres generally to the principle of unity of command, these political officers have access to confidential channels not available to the commanders. In a controversy with his commander, it is possible for a junior political officer to be upheld by higher authority. At times this system may seriously




*Figure 4-1. Aggressor High Command.*

disrupt command unity and reduce the effectiveness of units.

### 4-6. Directorate of Rear Services

*a.* This organization is responsible for all logistics functions common to the armed forces. At Ministry level, the Chief of the Rear coordinates logistical aspects of high-level planning and prepares the administrative and logistical portions of all programs developed by the Armed Forces General Staff. The Chief of the Rear, in addition to his responsibilities concerning the distribution of supplies and equipment to all force components, controls the medical, veterinary, military trade (PX), and military police facilities for all services. He is also charged with all budget, pay and accounting activities for all services.

*b.* Although the Chief of the Rear is responsible for all supplies in the Aggressor Armed Forces, the various arms and services are responsible for the procurement and issue of equipment and supplies peculiar to them. For example, the Directorate of Tank Troops, subordinate to the Ground Troops Directorate of Force Components (fig 4-1), would coordinate with the Technical Main Directorate-Tank for the procurement of armored tank vehicles. However, the Chief of the Rear would be responsible for the procurement and issue of fuels and lubricants to be used by the Tank Troops, as fuels and lubricants are considered an item of common use.

*c.* A complete discussion of Aggressor Combat Service Support activities may be found in chapter 7.

### 4-7. Administrative and Technical Main Directorates

Among the several known main directorates of this category are Personnel, Schools, Legal, Combat Training, Artillery, Tank, Motor Vehicle Tractor and Construction. Directly responsible to the Minister of Armed Forces, they deal with specialized procurement, personnel, construction, research and development, and training which affect more than one major component of the Aggressor Armed Forces.

### 4-8. Main Directorates of Force Components

*a. Ground Troops.* The Ground Troops Main Directorate has seven troop directorates; namely, Artillery, Airborne, Tank, Chemical, Engineer, Signal and Guerrilla. Coordinating with other directorates of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, it is responsible for the basic tactical doctrine, organization, manning, training, administration and logistical requirements for elements of each of the subordinate arms and services. Each of the chiefs of the various directorates is also the commander of the troops concerned. The absence of a directorate for infantry troops is explained by Aggressor's theory of combined arms. Infantry troops fulfill the main role in combined arms and the action of all other arms is organized in their interests. The Office of the Chief of the Ground Troops Main Directorate handles the overall activities of the combined arms.

*b. Air Force.* This agency has three directorates which are Long-Range, Tactical Air, and Troop Carrier. Each component has a specialized air role, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

*c. Navy.* The commander of the Navy Main Directorate participates in the formulation of policy and is responsible for the training and maintenance of the naval forces. The naval directorates of fleets, coast defense, submarines and the navy air arm supervise the administrative and support functions necessary to maintain an always-ready combat force.

*d. Air Defense.* This main directorate is the headquarters of an activity rather than that of an arm or branch of service. It has overall responsibility for organizing defense against attack by aircraft or guided missiles within the Homeland. All personnel and units are provided by other force components. The air defense system includes fighter-interceptor aircraft, surface-to-air guided missiles, and an elaborate radar warning network. With the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile, scientists in the Aggressor Homeland are heavily engaged in the design and development of an anti-ballistic missile system to complement the air defense forces.

*e. Strategic Rocket.* The Strategic Rocket Main Directorate is responsible for guided missile and rocket research and development, training, testing, manning and administration of those units engaged in these activities. Operational control of the long-range ballistic missiles rests with the Minister of the Armed Forces, but it is believed that the final decision concerning their use in a strategic attack role would rest with the Triumvirate.

### 4-9. Regional Commands

Regional commands, which are considered to be administrative rather than tactical headquar-

ters, are organized to control operations in a particular geographic area. They are the highest field commands in the Aggressor chain of Command and are directly subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces. They will contain from two to four army groups and a number of the various types of service units depending upon the area of operations.

## Section II. AGGRESSOR GROUND FORCES

### 4-10. Arms and Services

The Aggressor Ground Forces are divided basically into combat and noncombat branches. While the combat branches are administered by the Main Directorate of Ground Troops through its various troop branches, the other services within the Aggressor Ground Forces are administered through the various main directorates responsible for joint policy and control.

*a. Combat Branches.* Aggressor ground combat branches include infantry (the basic branch) and airborne infantry, tank, artillery (includes air defense artillery), engineer, signal, chemical, and strategic rocket. Activities of these branches, with the exception of infantry and strategic rocket, are subordinate to the Ground Troops Main Directorate. Infantry troops which are assigned principally to rifle and motorized rifle units do not have a separate headquarters; as previously explained, their activities are administered directly by the Ground Troops Main Directorate. Strategic rocket troops are controlled by the Strategic Rocket Main Directorate; their mission is manning missile sites within the Homeland. There also exists a Directorate for Guerrilla Troops within the Ground Troops Main Directorate; however, it is unknown at this time how this particular directorate functions.

*b. Noncombat Branches.* Noncombat branches include intendance, medical and veterinary, military police, transportation, justice, administration, intelligence and propaganda. These branches are controlled by various elements within the Aggressor High Command Structure.

(1) The Directorate of Rear Services controls the activities of the intendance, medical and veterinary, military police, transportation, justice and administration branches throughout the Aggressor Armed Forces. These service type organizations are centrally controlled to insure their responsiveness to the commander's needs.

(2) There is no intelligence branch per se. Officers and enlisted men are selected for assignment to intelligence units from the combat arms, but they always maintain their identity with the combat arms. Their training and assignments are centrally controlled by the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff, under the Minister of the Armed Forces.

(3) Propaganda troops are controlled by the Main Political Directorate, and are used extensively in communicating the Circle Trigon Party themes, as well as capitalizing on immediate themes within a zone of military contest.

(4) There is no separate ordnance branch. Logistics functions relating to weapons and vehicles are controlled by the Administrative and Technical Directorates for Artillery, Tank and Motor Vehicle-Tractor.

### 4-11. Doctrine

Doctrine for rifle and motorized rifle units is developed by the Ground Troops Main Directorate. The chiefs of the other branches are responsible for the development of specialized doctrine and for the supervision of procurement, storage, issue and maintenance of specialized equipment and supplies applicable to their branches.

### 4-12. Principles of Tactical Organization

*a.* Aggressor maintains, under control of the Ministry of Armed Forces, a large number of units. These units, designated GHQ, are allotted by the General Staff to tactical commands on a permanent or temporary basis. Available units in this category include rifle, motorized rifle, tank, artillery, air defense, antitank, rocket, surface-to-surface missile, surface-to-air missile, general engineer, amphibious engineer, engineer ponton, signal, chemical, motor transport, intelligence, medical and propaganda.

*b.* Army groups, armies and divisions are both administrative and tactical in nature. The army group and army organizations are flexible and capable of forming many subordinate units into well-balanced teams. On the other hand, divisions and smaller units normally have fixed tables of organization and equipment.

*c.* Most brigades, regiments and battalions have a standard organization. For example, the motorized rifle regiments of the motorized rifle




1Performs a dual function as commander and staff officer.

*Figure 4-2. Division or larger unit staff organization.*

and tank divisions are identical in structure as are the separate artillery brigades and those artillery brigades subordinate to artillery divisions.

*d.* The organization and tactical employment of these "types" units will be found in part three.

## 4-13. Fusilier Units

The term "fusilier," a designation of elite troops, is awarded to any type unit (except airborne, already considered elite) of division size or smaller which distinguishes itself in battle and has been awarded the Star of the Fusiliers. "Fusilier" is combined with words indicating both size and type of unit, such as 23 Fusilier Regiment, 496 Fusilier Engineer Battalion, or 98 Fusilier Artillery Brigade.

## 4-14. Staff Organization

*a.* The commander of a division or larger unit usually is a senior combat arms officer, and he is responsible for direct personal control of operations. He is assisted by a chief of staff, who is the assistant commander. Most of the planning and execution of plans are done by the chief of staff or by the unit staff under his supervision. It must be pointed out that the staff in the Aggressor Ground Forces serves as an advisory group to the chief of staff and not to the commander. The primary function of the staff is to organize and insure uninterrupted coordination between all sections and all arms and services through all phases of combat. Figures 4-2 and 4-3 depict the staff organizations of division and higher level units, and regimental and battalion staffs respectively. As illustrated, larger unit staffs may be broken down into four principal groups.

(1) *The Chief of Arms and Services.* The Chief of Arms and Services performs a dual function within the Aggressor staff organization. First, he commands all units of his branch which are not attached or assigned to subordinate elements, and is responsible for administering and planning the employment of these units. While directly subordinate to the commander of a unit, he is also responsible to his




*Figure 4-3. Regimental and battalion staff organization.*

counterpart at the next higher echelon for certain technical and logistical matters pertinent to his arm or service. Second, he is a staff officer; in this capacity, he is the principal advisor to the unit commander in all matters pertaining to his arm or service. As a commander, the Chief of Arms and Services has direct access to the commander; however, he normally performs his staff functions under the supervision of the Chief of Staff and in close coordination with the Chief of the Rear.

(2) The staff section, working directly for the chief of staff, contains subgroups which perform duties similar to the G1, G2, and G3 within the United States Army. The operations section is the leading section within the staff, and all other sections must coordinate their activities with it. The functions of these various subgroups are self-explanatory.

(3) The political section, headed by a deputy commander for political affairs, is charged with political indoctrination of the troops, assuring the political reliability of CTP members within the unit, raising the morale of the unit, improving its combat ability, and propaganda. The influence of the political section is significant considering that advancement within the armed forces is dependent upon the political reliability of an individual. The Deputy Commander for political affairs has direct access to the unit commander, but in political matters he is subordinate to his counterpart at the next higher

echelon. Thus, it is possible for a political officer at any level to overrule a political decision made by his immediate commander.

(4) At all levels of command down to regimental level, there is a chief of the rear responsible for the various combat service support functions within that unit. This section is comparable to the G4 section within the United States Army, with the exception that the Chief of the Rear in the Aggressor Armed Forces does not necessarily work under the supervision of the chief of staff. Additionally, the Chief of the Rear is also responsible to his counterpart at the next higher level for logistical matters.

*b.* This overview of the Aggressor staff organization points to the fact that there exists a dual channel of communication within the Aggressor staff for political and technical/logistical matters. Of special significance is the chain which exists for political affairs. Extending from the Main Political Directorate at Ministry of Armed Forces level down to battalion level, this comprehensive political apparatus is a vital element in the Circle Trigon Party's control of the armed forces. Since the unit political officer has the power to overrule a commander's decision, this system may tend to erode the principle of unity of command which is vital to successful combat operations. The separate channel which exists for technical and logistical matters, to include the Chief of Arms and Services being directly involved in logistical affairs, points to the importance placed by Aggressor on his combat service support activities. Experience has proven that this direct communication with the officer or agency responsible for logistical affairs has greatly assisted Aggressor in improving service support responsiveness.

### 4–15. Theater of Operations

Unlike most armies, Aggressor does not divide the theater of operations into a combat zone and a communication zone. As the army groups advance, their former service areas are organized into zones of military administration. Occupied territory in the rear of the army groups is administered by military units which are controlled by the Chief of the Rear.

### 4–16. Zone of the Interior

The Homeland is divided into military districts. Military district commanders are responsible to regional commanders for the training of all units within their districts, except for air defense units which are controlled by the Main Directorate of Force Components, Air Defense. The district commander is also responsible for conscription and mobilization within his district. If the Homeland should be attacked, commanders of military districts in the combat area would become tactical commanders and direct the defense of their districts.

### 4–17. Mobilization

Since Aggressor is always on full-time emergency alert, mobilization is accomplished by the military districts in pre-planned programs consisting of two phases. The first involves assembling trained reserves to bring existing field units of all types to organizational strength and also the organization of new units. This can be completed within a 15-day period. The second phase involves inducting, assembling and training men who, for the most part, are without previous military service.

## Section III. AGGRESSOR NAVY

### 4–18. General

Operational control of all Aggressor Naval Forces rests with the Chief of the Naval High Command. The Aggressor Navy is composed of fleets, coastal defense units, submarines, and the naval air arm. At the Navy High Command there are separate directorates for each activity charged with the administration, manning, training, and procurement of specialized equipment. The Navy is equipped with the latest type warships (except battleships and aircraft carriers), auxiliary ships, and patrol craft. The cruisers and destroyers are nuclear-powered and fitted with guided missiles. Most of the Aggressor submarines, as well as the new classes of transport vessels, are also nuclear-powered.

### 4–19. Fleets

*a.* Fleets do not have a fixed organization but are organized according to their mission by the High Command. They may comprise any number of warships and auxiliaries, and their composition may change on short notice. A typical fleet is built around a nucleus of five to ten missile-firing cruisers supported by one or

two helicopter-carrying cruisers, forty to fifty destroyers, up to one hundred submarines, and necessary support ships. The cruisers provide the bulk of the fleet firepower against both land and sea surface targets. Close-in defense for the cruisers against surface, subsurface, and air threats is provided by the destroyers supported by helicopters from the helicopter-cruisers which aid in antisubmarine defense. Fleet submarines give long-range protection against both surface and subsurface threats. Aggressor fleets operate in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Indian Oceans and a flotilla, or small fleet, operates in the Mediterranean Sea.

*b.* A naval infantry arm has recently been created within the Aggressor Navy. Naval infantry units, possibly up to regimental size, are assigned to each of the Aggressor fleets, but little is known of their organization. The mission of these elite units is to conduct limited amphibious operations and, as required, to train conventional ground forces in the techniques of amphibious warfare. They are also responsible for developing amphibious warfare doctrine and testing equipment.

## 4–20. Coast Defense

Coastal defense commands are organized in the maritime areas of the Homeland for the protection of coastal areas, navigable rivers and insular possessions. These coastal commands have no fixed organization, but are equipped with patrol craft, torpedo boats, coastal artillery, and cruiser missiles, as required.

## 4–21. Submarines

Submarines are considered the principal offensive arm of the Aggressor Navy. They may operate under direct control of the Navy High Command or be assigned to either fleets or coastal defense commands. Their missions include interdiction of enemy sea lanes, protection of Aggressor convoys and strategic attacks against enemy territory. Emphasis is being placed on submarine warfare. More nuclear-powered submarines are entering the Aggressor naval inventory, and many are capable of launching nuclear missiles. Aggressor nuclear submarines include missile launchers and torpedo attack submarines, both capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

## 4–22. Naval Air Arm

*a.* The naval air arm is much smaller than the tactical air force, but is equipped with the same types of aircraft in order to simplify procurement, supply, and maintenance. Aggressor naval aviation consists of regiments and smaller independent units of light and medium jet bombers, heavy turbo-prop bombers, and transports, together with helicopters assigned from transport aviation of the Air Force. Small units of seaplanes, helicopters and utility aircraft are also assigned to naval aviation for use in antisubmarine operations. Nearly all of the above aircraft can also be found in reconnaissance versions.

*b.* The organization, training, and tactical operation of the naval air arm is controlled by the Navy High Command which coordinates closely with the Air Force. Naval aviation units are operationally subordinate to the naval fleet to which they are attached. A fleet air force, composed of air divisions, regiments, squadrons, and detachments, is attached to each fleet. Naval air units assigned to coastal defense commands are primarily defensive in nature while those assigned to fleets provide both offensive and defensive support.

*c.* The primary mission of naval aviation is to defend against enemy naval forces, especially aircraft carriers and submarines. Emphasis has been placed on the need to intercept and destroy such forces at long distances from the Homeland. Of late, however, the mission of naval aviation appears to have been shifted from a defensive role to a more offensive role which includes: the destruction of hostile surface forces far out at sea, especially the fast carrier task forces; the reconnaissance of surface forces with the objective of observing their movement and pinpointing their location if destruction becomes necessary; and a vigorous antisubmarine warfare program.

*d.* While most of the naval aircraft is land-based, Aggressor does have a limited number of helicopter carriers, configured to operate helicopters in an antisubmarine role; these helicopters could be used to provide amphibious support through heliborne operations in conjunction with the landing of amphibious forces. Research is continuing on a project to convert these carriers to support VTOL aircraft; additionally, efforts are also being directed to the development of an aircraft carrier capable of supporting conventional jet attack aircraft. If such an aircraft carrier does enter the inventory, it is believed that current naval aircraft could be modified to permit operation from carriers. The current jet attack aircraft found in the naval aviation inventory are all land-

| | | Displacement (tons) | Dimensions (M) | | | Power | Radius /Cruising Speed | Armament (mm) | Aircraft | Complement | Number Operational |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Length | Beam | Draught | | | | | | |
| CRUSHER | Guided missile cruiser | 18,000 | 242 | 33 | 11 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | 410,000 miles at 34 knots | Rancor Rebel Raider | 4 Heathen-B 1 Hector-B 1 Hoodoo-C | 943 | 18 |
| HECKLER | Helicopter cruiser | 18,000 | 237 | 33 | 11 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | 410,000 miles at 34 knots | Unknown | 50 Hector-B | 1184 | 6 |
| DRIVER | Guided missile destroyer | 5,000 | 146 | 21 | 7 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | 364,000 miles, 41 knots | Rancor Ravage Raider | 2 Hector-B | 417 | 153 |
| SHAKER | Ballistic missile submarine | 5800 6300* | 150 | 13 | 12.5 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | Unknown | Urge (22) 826 torpedo tubes (6) | None | 84 | 78 |
| ABATER | Attack submarine | 3400 3700* | 105 | 9 | 6 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | Unknown | 826 torpedo tubes(10) | None | 63 | 294 |
| PURGER | Guided missile patrol boat | 220 | 43 | 8.5 | 2.2 | Diesels (4) | Radius Unknown speed 45+knots | Rage (4) | None | 8 | Unknown ( 100 +) |
| TRIBUTE | Troop/ cargo transport | Unknown | 304 | 46 | 14 | Water cooled nuclear reactors | Unknown | Unknown | 2 Heathen-B 2 Hector-B 1 Hoodoo-C | Unknown transports 3 regt's & equip | 67 |

* Submerged

*Figure 4-4. Aggressor Vessels.*

based in the Homeland and in occupied territories.

### 4-23. Employment of Naval Forces

*a.* The shift in emphasis in the role of the Navy from basically a defensive to primarily an offensive arm has necessitated changes in organization and doctrine of employment. Aggressor emphasizes that in any war the Navy must be prepared to engage in battle on the high seas far from its bases, as well as in the coastal waters of the Homeland. One major hindrance to the Aggressor naval threat at the present time is the lack of a widespread system of naval bases. The problem is mitigated to some extent by the use of harbors and port facilities in Aggressor-occupied territories, but the search for new bases continues. In return for military and economic assistance to various neutralist nations around the world, the Aggressor has been given long-term leases for naval bases along some of the world's principal maritime trade routes. It must be assumed that this will lead to a projection of Aggressor military power, and the acquisition of foreign ports and harbors will alleviate current naval logistical problems.

*b.* The mission of Aggressor naval forces in a mid- or high-intensity conflict is to:

(1) Attack enemy oceanic lines of communications by destroying enemy naval forces and shipping.

(2) Defend Aggressor coasts and coastal waters against hostile intrusion and the interior of the Homeland against sea-launched air or missile attack.

(3) Conduct strategic attacks against enemy nations using submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

(4) Support the ground forces by conducting amphibious operations, and providing naval gunfire and tactical air support, as required.

The highest priority will be given to the detection, location, and destruction of enemy missile submarines at the very outset of a war. This will be accomplished using a combination of surface ships, submarines, and aircraft operating at ranges up to 2500 nautical miles from the coast.

*c.* In a low-intensity conflict, the mission of Aggressor naval forces is limited to providing both overt and covert logistical support and advising insurgent forces on naval sapper operations. Aggressor submarines have occasionally been identified in the coastal waters adjacent to areas of low-intensity conflicts and are thought to be operating in the logistical support role.

### 4-24. Naval Vessels

The Aggressor Navy has a large nuclear-powered fleet equipped with both missiles and conventional naval weapons. Although the guided missile cruisers and destroyers provide the Aggressor Navy with considerable firepower to conduct operations in support of ground troops or against enemy surface ships, the submarine must be considered as its principal offensive and defensive weapons system. The Aggressor now leads the navies of the free world in numbers of submarines, mostly nuclear-powered and missile armed. The missile-armed fast patrol boats, found in large numbers in the coastal defense forces and sometimes in the fleets, carry surface-to-surface guided missiles which give them a striking power and weapon range far beyond that of conventional craft of this type. The helicopter-cruiser is a relatively new addition to the Aggressor fleet and indicates an interest in improving the capabilities of the Naval Air Arm. Although used exclusively in an antisubmarine role now, the helicopter-cruisers also have great potential for use in amphibious operations. The major characteristics of typical Aggressor vessels are shown in figure 4-4.

## Section IV. AGGRESSOR AIR FORCE

### 4-26. General

At the High Command level the Aggressor Air Force is organized into Long-Range, Tactical Air, and Troop Carrier Directorates. These directorates are headed by an Air Marshal who exercises control over them and also coordinates with the Main Directorate of the Navy on matters peculiar to the Air Force and Naval Air. Equipment used by all air elements is similar in design to simplify procurement and supply. For example, fighter and attack planes can be altered for photographic missions.

### 4-27. Long-Range Directorate

The mission of the Long-Range Directorate is to attack strategic targets in enemy territory. To accomplish this mission, fighter and bomber regiments are formed into divisions. These divisions, under control of the Directorate, are deployed throughout the Homeland on 15-minute

alert status in order to be prepared in the event of hostile strategic attack. Bomber aircraft are modified to carry conventional and nuclear armament; fighter aircraft can carry air-to-surface missiles in addition to conventional ordnance. Long-range aircraft, since they are under the direct control of the Air Force Directorate, can be used in direct support of Regional Command ground operations, when such support is compatible with its primary mission.

### 4–28. Tactical Air Directorate

This directorate supervises the administration of the various air armies which are assigned to army groups to provide tactical support for the ground forces. This general mission of providing air support for ground operations may be further broken down as follows:

*a.* To gain and to maintain air superiority in the decisive area of operations.

*b.* To isolate the battle area and to restrict movement of enemy troops, equipment, supplies and reserves.

*c.* To provide close air support to the ground forces.

*d.* To provide air reconnaissance for the ground forces.

*e.* To provide the ground forces with a tactical airlift capability, including helicopter transportation and other support required for heliborne operations.

The employment of tactical aviation is discussed in paragraph 4–37.

### 4–29. Troop Carrier Directorate

Responsibility for the aerial transport of personnel and supplies is vested in the Troop Carrier Directorate. Most of the transport regiments, both fixed and rotary, are assigned to air armies; however, some are retained under the control of the Directorate. These units are attached to military districts for training purposes and for further attachment to air armies whenever a need for additional transport capability develops. Military transportation aviation regiments of the air armies allocate necessary helicopters to ground unit commanders to conduct airmobile operations.

### 4–30. Fighter Aviation of Air Defense

Another category of aviation which must be taken into account is the fighter aviation of air defense, composed of regiments of fighter-interceptor aircraft. This organization is somewhat unique in that there exists no directorate within the Air Force High command which directs the employment of these units. Instead, fighter units of air defense are subordinate to the Main Directorate of Force Components-Air Defense. Normally, these units are located throughout the air defense districts of the Aggressor Homeland, and form an integral part of the air defense system for strategic protection of the Homeland.

### 4–31. Organizations

*a.* The largest tactical unit in the Aggressor Air Force is the air army. One air army is assigned to each army group. Air armies vary in organization, composition and strength according to their missions. A typical air army is shown in figure 4–5. It contains air divisions, separate regiments (both fixed wing and rotary), and service elements. A division is normally composed of three regiments; the triangular basis is also used below the air division, with three squadrons per regiment, and three flights per squadron. The organizational chain of command runs from the air army through the air division, air regiment, air squadron, to the air flight. Control of the air army is usually retained at army group level, but may be passed to the forward ground unit commander during exploitation and pursuit phases of an operation.

*b.* Air divisions are designated fighter, bomber, or ground attack according to the type aircraft with which their subordinate regiments are equipped. All types of air divisions have similar organizations and each division is equipped with only one kind of operational aircraft.

*c.* The air regiment is the basic tactical unit. It may be organized according to a set table of organization and equipment, and may be composed of a single type of aircraft—fighter, bomber, fighter-bomber, or reconnaissance. However, the number of aircraft in a regiment will vary depending on type of regiment. All air regiments also have similar organizations. They normally are composed of three aircraft squadrons, but may have as many as five; a technical squadron may also be found in the regiment to provide organic maintenance, supply, and service support. Transport and reconnaissance regiments are employed in support of the entire army group, while units of the artillery observation regiments are attached as needed to the various artillery elements within the army group.




Note 1: Strength of bomber regiments is about 125 more personnel than fighter and ground attack regiment.

Note 2: Number of squadrons may be increased to five.

Note 3: Same organization as heavy helicopter regiment.

Note 4: Same organization as companies in the heavy helicopter regiment.

*Figure 4–5. Typical air army.*

*d.* Each air squadron is composed of three flights. The flight, which consists of four aircraft, is the smallest tactical element found within the air force.

*e.* Helicopters are organized into regiments according to the type of helicopter employed. Their mission includes the airlift of personnel during tactical operations and the transport of supplies, equipment, and personnel under other than combat conditions. All helicopter regiments are organized in a similar manner except the light helicopter regiment which has a company of utility helicopters in each of its subordinate battalions.

*f.* A typical air army has two or more reconnaissance regiments which provide tactical air reconnaissance in support of both air and ground operations. The mission of these regiments is to obtain tactical intelligence by visual, photographic, and electronic means. They are capable of providing sustained, near all-weather, day or night reconnaissance of routes, zones, and areas. Reconnaissance versions of the FIENDISH and FRACTURE aircraft perform deep penetration missions while the FURY surveillance aircraft provides coverage nearer the forward elements of the battle area for divisions and lower echelons. The FIENDISH has a day photo capability only while the FRACTURE and FURY have day/night multisensor capability, including side-looking radar, infrared, and photo. The FURY can operate from unimproved forward airstrips. A reconnaissance regiment has three squadrons, each of which has twelve aircraft. The day photo squadron is equipped with FIENDISH aircraft; the day/night reconnaissance squadron with FRACTURE aircraft; and the division reconnaissance support squadron with FURY aircraft. Each reconnaissance regiment also has an imagery processing and interpretation battalion.

## 4–32. Aircraft

The rise of Aggressor air power can truly be said to be phenomenal. Giant strides were made from the piston-powered aircraft of the late 40's to the jet fighters, jet bombers, and helicopters to be found in its arsenal today. Performance, load capacity, powerplant, design, etc., are constantly being improved. Development of manned aircraft continues with research currently geared to the development of a VTOL aircraft for use on current helicopter carriers as well as in combat areas. But attention is also focused on the aerial prototypes that Aggressor can be expected to produce and introduce into operational units. These consist of hovercraft, aerial weapons and personnel platforms, pilotless bombers, pilotless reconnaissance aircraft, super-perfected intercontinental ballistic missiles, and anti-missiles.

*a. Fixed-Wing.* Aggressor has aircraft capable of meeting all proven military requirements. The principal characteristics of representative aircraft are as illustrated in figure 4–6.

*b. Rotary-Wing.* Aggressor makes great use of helicopters realizing that the requirement for mobility dictates use of this tactical means of delivering combat troops, weapons and cargo into battle. All of their helicopters are well suited to perform highly versatile missions at sea and on land, over a wide range of atmospheric conditions. Figure 4–7 illustrates the characteristics of the current helicopter inventory.

## 4–33. Aviator Training

*a.* Aggressor aviators are selected for their high physical and mental capacities, and are subjected to a continuous screening process. Their training lasts approximately three years, including engineering subjects, pilot training, and courses in military theory and tactics as related to the air support of ground troops. After-school training, pilots receive operational training with regular air units found in the military districts of the Homeland before being assigned to a tactical air army. This training includes tactical formation flying, aerial gunnery, and tactical instrument flying. The objectives of all this training are to emphasize the necessity for air units to work as a single combined force, and to teach air officers staff functions, particularly the detailed coordination required between air and ground forces.

*b.* Although pilots are trained for the main mission of those units to which they are to be assigned, Aggressor employs an elaborate system of cross-training. For example, a pilot assigned to a fighter division would also be trained in intercept techniques, reconnaissance, and the principles of military air transport. Although much training is devoted to actual flight training, ground training is also considered important. Pilots receive continuous training in such subjects as flight planning, tactics and techniques, and they spend much time in ground-instrument trainers. Political indoctrination is also an indispensable facet of aviator training.

| Name | Type | Powerplant | Maximum Speed (km per hr) | Operating Radius (km) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FIENDISH | Fighter | Single jet | 1390 | 1200 | Can be used for day photo reconnaissance; armed with air-to-ground rockets. |
| FRACTURE | Fighter/Intercepter | Single jet | 1640 | 1370 | Can be used for day/night multisensor reconnaissance; armed with air-to-ground and air-to-air missiles. Can carry nuclear and CB bomb loads. |
| FORFEIT | Ground Attack | Twin jet | 1050 | 1400 | Can carry nuclear and CB bomb loads, armed with air-to-ground missiles. |
| FRENZY | Tactical Bomber | Twin turbojet | 2100 | 2500 | Can carry nuclear and CB bomb loads, armed with air-to-ground missiles (with nuclear or conventional warheads). |
| FRUGAL | Assault Transport | Twin turbojet | 900 | 3200 | Maximum payload; 15350 kilogram or 65 combat equipped troops. |
| FRUGAL -A | Assault Transport | Four jets | 1000 | 9000 | Maximum payload; 25000 kilogram or 200 combat equipped troops. |
| FURY | Artillery Observation/ Surveillance | Twin engine turbo-prop | 500 | 2,500 | See surveillance equipment. Operates from unimproved forward airstrip. |
| FUTILE | Observation/ Liaison | Single piston | 250 | 800 | |

*Figure 4–6. Aggressor fixed-wing aircraft.*

| Name | Type | Maximum Speed (km per hr) | Maximum Range (km) | Maximum Payload (kilogram) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| HEATHEN-A | Observation | 220 | 500 | | 1. Pilot only ; can land on water. |
| HEATHEN-B | Observation | 280 | 500 | 550 | 2. Can carry observer.<br>3. Can be equipped with floats for water opns.<br>4. Normally has machine guns. |
| HECTOR-A | Utility | 220 | 550 | 1,200 | Remark 4.<br>5. Primarily employed as air ambulance.<br>6. Can carry 2 troops. |
| HECTOR-B | Utility | 300 | 750 | 1,350 | Remarks 3 and 4.<br>7. Can be armed with rockets, homing torpedoes, or cannon.<br>8. Can carry 4 troops. |
| HOODOO- A | Light transport | 280 | 700 | 1,500 | Remarks 3,4 and 7.<br>9. Equipped with rear doors for rapid loading and unloading.<br>10. Can carry 28 troops. |
| HOODOO-B | Medium transport | 300 | 600 | 9,000 | Remarks 3,4,7 and 9.<br>11. Can carry 48 troops. |
| HOODOO-C | Heavy transport | 200 | 400 | 11,500 | Remarks 4 and 7.<br>12. Can carry 100 troops. |

*Figure 4-7. Aggressor helicopters.*

## 4-34. Air-Ground Planning

*a.* Planning of air support is started as soon as the concept of the offensive is known. Upon receipt of a mission, the army group commander confers with the air army commander on the role that air units are to play in the operation and assigns specific responsibilities. Matters which are decided during this phase are:

(1) The type and degree of air support required for each phase of the operation.

(2) Priority of execution of air missions during the operation.

(3) Areas and sectors to be covered by aerial reconnaissance.

(4) Amount and type of support to be provided by units outside the zone of the main effort.

(5) Assistance the ground forces will render the air army in terrain reconnaissance, capture and construction of forward airfields, and general defense of air installations.

*b.* The operational plans of the air army are not drawn up by its commander, but by the army group commander. The army group and air army staffs work closely together in preparing the necessary plans and orders. The army group staff, to include air officers, plan and coordinate the details of the future operation, paying particular attention to the precise coordination of all arms. This includes determination of lanes, frontline crossing points, airspace coordination, radio and supplementary air-to-ground communications, and target designation. Effective air cover for mobile troops during all phases of combat is stressed.

*c.* In addition to these matters of joint interest, the air army staff works out the operational and logistical requirements of its own units for executing their assigned tasks. Plans include specific assignment of air units, assignment of operational airfields to air units, and other instructions relating to the establishment of communications with the supported units.

## 4-35. Air-Ground Control System

*a.* The Army Group Commander normally will locate an advanced command post near one of his combined arms armies from which he can direct the main effort in a large-scale offensive operation. The air army commander will also set up an advanced command post in the same general vicinity from where he will control the subordinate air divisions and regiments in support of the main effort.

*b.* Command of air units is exercised by the air commander through the preparatory period. After the offensive starts, command is decentralized to the extent necessary to insure full and immediate coordination between ground units and the supporting air units. Commanders having air army units in support assign missions to the supporting air units.

*c.* Air-ground cooperation is insured by having the supporting air commander direct his operations from the command post of the supported ground unit or by having air liaison officers from the supporting air unit with the supported ground unit.

*d.* Control of tactical air support is exercised through an extensive network of ground control stations. Joint air-ground control posts are located at all supported battalion and higher command posts. Air-ground control posts can also be attached to motorized rifle or tank companies making the main effort. Air-ground control posts control air attacks on targets within their sectors, coordinate their attacks with adjacent control posts, and may designate new targets in case of changes in the tactical situation. Requests are forwarded by the air liaison officer located in the ground commander's CP through these ground control stations to the Army Tactical Operations Center, using an extensive radio communications system which links all echelons.

*e.* Extensive use is made by Aggressor of preplanned aerial reconnaissance, tactical airlift, and attack sorties. Preplanned requests are submitted as early as the tactical situation permits to allow sufficient coordination, permit the proper selection of aircraft and armaments, and to enhance control during the actual flight. Normally, a portion of the air army is held in reserve in order to respond to immediate requests from ground commanders. Immediate requests do not provide enough time for detailed planning and coordination, so Aggressor in his planning sequence tries to account for all unforeseen contingencies. If the reserve is not sufficient enough to meet all immediate requests, requirements for immediate support can be met by diverting low-priority preplanned missions or by diverting aircraft engaged in other operations.

## 4-36. Concept of Air Support

*a.* Aggressor air armies are used to assist ground forces in accomplishing their missions. Tactical air armies are organized for combat to

permit ready attachments of subordinate units to or in support of ground forces.

*b.* In carrying out its close support mission, the tactical air army also uses fixed and rotary-wing aircraft to execute such missions as reconnaissance, artillery observation, transport, communication, liaison, and medical evacuation.

*c.* Aggressor recognizes that part of its air effort will be initially required to obtain local air superiority. Fighter units of the air army have the dual mission of providing air defense and close support for Aggressor ground forces. Attack and bomber units are used to engage targets beyond the range of artillery and to reinforce artillery fires on selected targets and targets of opportunity. A combined bombardment of bombers and ground attack aircraft is coordinated with artillery preparatory fires. After the ground attack has begun, tactical air flies close support missions for the ground elements. Priority tasks for tactical air are the destruction of enemy nuclear delivery means and the neutralization of targets not completely destroyed by nuclear attack.

## 4–37. Employment of Units

*a.* Fighter units patrol the battle area and enemy forward airfields. They provide close support for ground forces, especially tanks and motorized elements, and execute photographic and visual reconnaissance. As a secondary mission, they provide escort to bomber and attack aircraft. In providing close support, fighter units normally maintain air cover over ground troops in the main effort employing standard techniques of counterair and air interdiction to maintain local air superiority and provide air defense to the ground troops. Fighter units can also deliver nuclear weapons.

*b.* Bomber units execute medium- and low-level bombing attacks in close support of advancing troops and deliver nuclear fires. Bombers are employed singly or in groups in horizontal, glide, or dive-bombing attacks in daylight and in horizontal or glide-bombing attacks at night.

*c.* Attack units are used against enemy forward areas in coordination with motorized rifle and tank units. Attack aircraft are used for low-level close support, and can also perform visual and photographic reconnaissance.

## 4–38. Air Support of Offensive Operations

*a. Preparation for support of an offensive.* Preparation for an offensive may be divided into four phases:

(1) Buildup of aircraft and supplies. Operations are cut to a minimum, but reconnaissance is continued and diversionary attacks are conducted on adjacent fronts. Fighter effort is devoted to blocking enemy air attacks.

(2) Bomber and attack sorties are used against the enemy to a depth of 600 kilometers or more. Reconnaissance is increased. Fighters operate against enemy air with greater intensity.

(3) Transition from operations against the enemy rear to attacks against targets in the immediate battle area. Attack aircraft and fighters step up the tempo of their operations.

(4) Attack and bomber operations are curtailed while fighters intensify their effort against enemy air to conceal the final preparations for the offensive and the concentration of ground forces.

*b. Air support of the artillery preparation.* Before the firing of the artillery preparation, fighter aircraft reduce the effectiveness of the enemy air effort so that it cannot interfere with the air assault that accompanies the artillery preparation. During the artillery preparatory fire, the air army attacks targets that are out of artillery range or cannot be fired upon from the ground. Aircraft concentrate on the enemy's forward defenses immediately prior to infantry and tank assaults. The air attack, supplementing the artillery fire, is of short duration. Specially detailed artillery batteries neutralize enemy air defense guns during the air attack.

*c. Air support of the attack.* Once the attack is launched, bombers attack rear area installations; attack aircraft execute strikes against targets whose destruction or neutralization assists ground assault units; and fighters supplement the bombers and attack aircraft and protect air and ground units from hostile air attack. Ground units call for support through liaison officers and air-ground control posts. As the attack progresses into the depths of the enemy defensive system, small formations of planes remain constantly in the air to attack, either on their own initiative or on instructions from the ground forces, those targets that impede the attack of the motorized rifle and tank units.

*d. Support of the exploitation.* During the exploitation and pursuit, the available air

strength is used for attacks on the retreating forces and on advancing enemy reserves. The air effort adds impetus to the pursuit and helps prevent the enemy from establishing new defensive positions.

## 4–39. Air Support in the Defense

*a.* The tactical air armies in the defense use the same tactics as the offense. However, different types of missions are emphasized. In supporting the defense, air armies carry out the following specific missions:

(1) Reconnaissance to locate enemy dispositions and to obtain early warning of the direction and strength of attacks.

(2) Counterreconnaissance.

(3) Destruction of enemy nuclear or chemical delivery systems.

(4) Destruction of enemy airbases.

(5) Attacks on enemy concentrations to include delivery of nuclear or chemical fires.

(6) Airstrikes in close support of forces in contact.

(7) Attack of enemy penetrations.

(8) Support of counterattacks.

*b. Coordination and Priorities.*

(1) Air ground control posts are established in the same manner as in the offense.

(2) Priority of air support is established by the army group commander, and each ground commander having air units in support. Priority normally is given to those units in the path of major enemy forces.

(3) Sorties to be flown within range of artillery fire are coordinated with the army artillery commander.

(4) Participation by tactical air army units in the counterpreparation and counterattack are coordinated by the army commander.

(5) Air units supporting counterattacking forces are committed to action on direction of the air liaison officers to the force commander.

## 4–40. Air Support of Retrograde Operations

The Aggressor air force actively supports retrograde operations by providing air cover; reconnaissance of enemy activities, especially those threatening the flanks of the retreating forces; delivery of airstrikes against the enemy's main grouping and his flanking forces; interdiction of enemy attempts to block the withdrawal by use of amphibious landings, airborne, or air-landed forces, destroying on the ground any such forces that have succeeded in landing; and disruption of the enemy's lines of communication.

# CHAPTER 5
# AGGRESSOR TACTICAL CONCEPTS

## Section I. BASIC TACTICAL DOCTRINE

### 5–1. General

*a.* Aggressor teaches that the outcome of any conflict can be decided only by the combined efforts of all components taking advantage of technological advancements and employing the most modern weapons systems. Basically, Aggressor forces refuse to rely on any single weapon, stressing the impossibility of waging warfare successfully without highly organized coordination among air, ground, air defense, strategic rocket, and naval forces. Great emphasis is placed on direct tactical support and on air support of the ground forces. In combat, wide variations have been caused by such factors as terrain; weather; time of day and year; availability of troops; organization, strength, and deployment of opposing forces. Aggressor experiments freely in the employment of units and formations to develop further offensive tactical doctrine and achieve surprise. Therefore, the depths and frontages for tactical operations are general guides.

*b.* In Aggressor's effort to devise tactical principles which will fulfill the requirements of the nuclear age and to adapt its organization accordingly, Aggressor has developed a modern, highly mobilized, and well-balanced fighting force. For the nuclear battlefield Aggressor has emphasized surprise, speed, and dispersion while retaining the form of its conventional tactics. These, in turn, are a blend of the envelopment, in its several variations, and rapid, deep armor penetrations.

*c.* An Aggressor standard procedure when advancing is to bypass or envelop strongly held points or areas. Only when a strongly defended area has no readily assailable flanks does Aggressor use breakthrough tactics tailored to destroy the estimated resistance.

*d.* As a part of the effort to accelerate operations and to avoid presenting lucrative targets for nuclear weapons, Aggressor emphasizes speed in overcoming natural and manmade obstacles, such as rivers and artificial obstructions. Aggressor forces attempt to cross water barriers in stride, without interrupting the momentum of advance by halting for a buildup. Where heavy defenses require a concentration of force, Aggressor minimizes the presentation of a target by rapid assembly from dispersal areas for a surprise assault at a point of main effort and continues the advance on a broad front after enemy defenses are breached. Aggressor commanders assemble for the task the amount of force they estimate will give them a high probability of success, usually at least a three-to-one ratio of combat power over the enemy at the point where a decision is desired.

*e.* The predominant tenet of Aggressor tactical doctrine is that decisive results are achieved only through offensive action. Aggressor, however, recognizes the defense as a necessary form of combat which, at times, might be profitably adopted to gain time while awaiting the opportunity to resume offensive action, or to economize forces in one area in which an immediate decision is not being sought, so as to be able to use a greater force in another area. When circumstances and enemy action force an Aggressor commander to assume a defensive posture, he is expected to seek every opportunity to seize the initiative and resume the offensive.

*f.* Aggressor holds that seizing and maintaining the initiative is an indispensable ingredient of success in battle. Great emphasis is also placed on the achievement of surprise as a means of shifting the balance of combat in Aggressor's favor. Commanders are expected to seize every opportunity to strike the enemy when, where, and in a manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential, Aggressor feels, for the enemy to be taken unaware, but only that he becomes aware too late to react effectively.

*g.* Aggressor doctrine calls for consideration of the use of cover and deception in every situation and at every level of command. When-

ever it is to his advantage to do so, Aggressor employs cover and/or deception to facilitate his operations and to dissipate the enemy's firepower and maneuver assets. Aggressor relies heavily on cover and deception to gain surprise and to shift the balance of combat power to his favor. He uses economy of force in one area to mass his forces at the point where a decisive victory is desired. Every plan will consider whether cover and deception can be used to Aggressor advantage. Methods of cover include extensive use of camouflage and smoke. Preferred methods of deception include electronic, visual, and sonic. Aggressor efforts at cover and deception are greatly enhanced by his very aggressive and effective counterintelligence and by his extensive training in these concepts. Aggressor's success in cover and deception activities is caused largely by strict application of security measures which keeps the opposing force uninformed and lulls him into inactivity. After using security to create a favorable situation for deception, Aggressor then expends great amounts of time and effort to distract attention from his real intentions or create doubt as to his true intentions so the opposing force will take the wrong action or will take no action at all.

## 5–2. Doctrine for Employment of Combat Arms

*a. Combined Arms.*

(1) Aggressor considers that successful military operations depend on the integrated combat employment of all branches. The basic tactical unit for sustained operation is the motorized rifle division, an integrated combined arms team of motorized infantry elements, tank elements, and artillery, supported by other services. Nuclear weapons, aircraft, and attached artillery augment the motorized rifle division's firepower, and the tank forces provide maneuver, massive fires and violent action.

(2) Aggressor units are rarely employed without reinforcements or attachments. Attachments are made as required; i.e., tank units to motorized rifle units, motorized rifle units to tank units. The mission, enemy, terrain, and forces available determine the amount and type of reinforcements or attachments.

*b. Infantry.*

(1) The infantry is still considered by Aggressor to be the basic and most versatile arm of its armed forces. Aggressor doctrine considers infantry to be capable of employment under any condition of climate or terrain and at any time.

(2) Aggressor does not feel that nuclear warfare has diminished the significance of the infantry's role. Aggressor has, however, completely motorized this arm to achieve great mobility, and has improved its fire power and communications.

(3) Contrary to popular belief, Aggressor does not employ infantry as a "human sea" to overwhelm the enemy. Aggressor infantry is seldom employed without strong artillery, armor, and engineer support.

(4) Aggressor infantry is a critical and valuable element of the Aggressor combined arms team, seizing and consolidating key terrain in the offense, effectively defending the ground it occupies in the defense.

*c. Armor.*

(1) Armor is employed both in small groups, for direct support of infantry, and in large formations such as the tank army. Armor is found at all tactical echelons and is used in cooperation with other arms.

(2) Exploitation is the principal role of Aggressor armor. In the offense it is often employed in mass, supported by nuclear weapons, to seize deep objectives. Once committed, armor attempts, with maximum force in the minimum time, to secure its objective before the enemy can take effective countermeasures.

(3) In the defense, armor is normally held in reserve to be utilized in counterattacks to destroy enemy penetrations.

(4) Armor may be used in a fire support role employing either direct or indirect fire, in the latter case, by positioning tanks on reverse slopes to achieve desired elevation. Tank versus tank combat is now an acceptable tenet of Aggressor doctrine especially in the defense.

*d. Artillery.*

(1) Artillery is a major component of the combined arms team and is found at all tactical echelons. Aggressor artillery provides conventional as well as nuclear fire support to the ground forces. Aggressor usually employs artillery in very large numbers. With few exceptions, all Aggressor offensives include an artillery preparation.

(2) Aggressor artillery fire support is characterized by a tendency to saturate areas with massive barrages intended to insure that no likely target escapes their fire. Aggressor artillery theory employs the concept of fire strike which is a severe and intense bombardment by all artillery weapons to defeat the enemy without the use of ground troops. Direct fire is extensively used on targets of opportunity, on

fortifications, and to support infantry and armor attacks. Aggressor doctrine has recently changed to the extent that it no longer masses weapons but achieves massed fire effects through better fire direction procedures and greatly improved weapons.

(3) In offensive action, Aggressor frequently covers the advance by continuously laying a heavy volume of fire in front of his troops. In the defense, the enemy is taken under fire by artillery at extreme ranges and is held under increasingly heavy volumes of fire as he approaches Aggressor defensive positions.

(4) Aggressor employs air defense artillery in its intended role for the most part, but has been known at times to use it in an infantry support and antitank role.

(5) Aggressor considers antitank artillery as the most efficient means to combat tanks; thus, Aggressor makes primary use of antitank artillery against enemy armor. Aggressor employs antitank artillery as field artillery when no immediate enemy armor threat exists. Normally, a portion of Aggressor antitank weapons is held in reserve for repelling unexpected tank attacks.

*e. Unit Structure.* Aggressor units are designed to facilitate the Aggressor concepts of mass and maneuver. Organically, each unit is a combined arms team heavily weighted with tanks, artillery, and automatic weapons to provide greater firepower. The unit structure is designed to be adapted readily to changing combat requirements by the attachment of large numbers of supporting units, including nuclear artillery, tanks and engineers. It can also be divided into task groupings as required to provide the violent action and overwhelming mass of fire necessary to destroy the enemy. Aggressor's transportation is suitable for battlefield maneuver and supports Aggressor's tactical concepts.

*f. Echelons and Reserves.*

(1) Aggressor normally employs his forces in echelons, both in the offense and defense. Each unit, from army group down through company, determines from the situation the number of echelons that is required for a particular operation. Each echelon is then given a mission which will assist in accomplishing the overall unit mission.

(2) In the offensive, two echelons are normal. As a unit attacks in echelons, each with a preplanned scheme of maneuver and objective, the resulting offensive appears to the defender to be a series of attacking waves. One echelon, all subordinate groups in line, is used when the enemy is very weak, the area of operations is wide, and nuclear weapons are plentiful. Three echelons, subordinate groupings in column, are used where the enemy is very strong, the area of operations is very narrow, and few nuclear weapons are available.

(3) In the defense, two echelons are normal. Aggressor defends in one echelon only when the front is very wide, insufficient forces are available, enemy attack is considered weak, or the terrain dictates. Similarly, he defends in three echelons when the following conditions exist: very narrow defense front, exceptionally strong attacking force, and sufficient forces are available. These echelons in defense appear to the attacker as a series of defensive positions echeloned in depth.

(4) In addition to the second (or third) echelon, Aggressor normally retains a reserve, except at company level. This may consist of motorized infantry or tank units and reserves of artillery (field, antitank, and air defense) engineers, chemical troops, or other units as required by the situation. The size of the reserve varies considerably depending upon how the commander evaluates the threat, but the unit reserve is normally relatively small, corresponding to a platoon at battalion level, a company at regiment, a battalion at division, or a regiment at army. At army group a motorized rifle division may be held in reserve. In the offense, the commander may hold out his tank unit as an exploitation force and not preplan its commitment as part of the second echelon, in which case it is considered to be his tank reserve. The reserve is considered the commander's contingency force, which he uses to replace units destroyed by nuclear fire, to repel counterattacks, or to provide local security against airborne and unconventional attack. The tank reserve is the commander's exploitation force and is used to influence the outcome of the operation.

(5) In the defense, tank units are not normally considered a part of the second echelon, and usually constitute the counterattack force.

## 5-3. Aggressor Tactical Principles

*a. Offense.*

(1) Decisive victory is achieved by offensive action only.

(2) Speed and shock effect are preferred over fire and maneuver as means of developing combat power. Therefore, all motorized rifle and

tank units are included in the maneuver force with less emphasis on a "base of fire."

(3) Heavy losses and isolated units must be accepted as normal.

(4) Flank security is best obtained by aggressive advance.

(5) Chemical, flame, electronic countermeasures, biological, and radiological operations are employed in a variety of ways to support offensive action.

(6) The proper use of nuclear weapons is considered decisive.

(7) Aggressor conducts large-scale offensives by employing one or more army groups to capture objectives that may be more than 500 kilometers away, and, if the situation permits, continues the advance an additional 500 kilometers. The offensive takes the general form of deep tank thrusts, preferably through the weakest part of the enemy defenses, combined with wide encirclements designed to trap and destroy large enemy forces and cause the collapse of resistance on a wide front.

(8) When the enemy forward defenses have been breached by combined arms armies by either penetrations or flank attacks, the offensive is continued by tank armies and combined arms armies. These tank and combined arms armies defeat in detail those enemy reserves that can influence the battle or relieve enemy forces isolated in the forward areas.

(9) The width of the attack zones and depth of the attack formation are essentially the same for nuclear and nonnuclear conditions.

(10) Aggressor will employ any of the basic maneuvers described in paragraphs 5–4 through 5–13 or variations and combinations thereof in order to ultimately surround and then destroy the enemy.

*b. Defense.*

(1) Aggressor initiates defensive action only to gain time or to economize in one area to provide forces for another area. Aggressor emphasizes the temporary nature of any defense posture and the constant need to seek the opportunity to seize the initiative and switch over to the offensive.

(2) Defensive operations are characterized by a stubborn defense of prepared positions, across the enemy's axis of advance, combined with strong counterattacks. Their purpose is to hold terrain and destroy attacking enemy forces.

(3) A planned antitank defense is basic to Aggressor's defense concept. Antitank fires provide the basis for Aggressor defensive fires. Aggressor uses every possible means of antitank protection, including obstacles and mobile antitank task groups, in the firm belief that if the tank element of an attack can be stopped the attack has been defeated.

(4) Recent Aggressor doctrine emphasizes the need to avoid establishing any set pattern and it calls for changing the pattern of defensive deployment as often as possible. In general, however, Aggressor defense is organized in a series of defensive belts, which are a combination of fixed defensive positions in the forward area and mobile counterattack forces in the rear. The defensive positions are prepared so as to block the main axis of enemy advance, and alternate positions are provided to be utilized, as the situation develops, to shift the main defensive effort to counteract eventual shifts in the enemy's attack effort. Great emphasis is placed on elaborate trench systems, heavy fortifications and extensive employment of obstacles. While engaged units defend their assigned areas, adjacent units may be employed against the flanks of the attacking enemy.

(5) Eventual enemy penetrations are first delt with by employing local counterattacks. If these prove unsuccessful, the defending units continue their efforts to keep the enemy deployed and attempt to lead him into preselected areas where he will be subjected to nuclear or chemical weapon fires and counterattacks by strong armored elements.

(6) Echelons are used in the defense. Normally, two echelons are organized for each unit down to company level. To the attacker, this results in Aggressor defense appearing as a series of defensive positions echeloned in depth.

(7) In addition to the second or third echelon, when used, except at company level, Aggressor normally retains a reserve. The size of the reserve varies but is normally relatively small, on the order of a platoon at battalion, a company at regiment, a battalion at division, and a regiment at army. It is the commander's contingency force, which is used to replace units destroyed by nuclear fire, to repel counterattacks, or to provide local security against airborne and unconventional attacks.

*c. Mass.* Aggressor achieves mass in decisive areas by rapid concentration of men, materiel, and firepower. His ability to mass conventional fires and small-yield nuclear weapons in the forward battle area is supplemented by large-yield nuclear fires for the attack of deep targets. The concentration of assault units and supporting arms usually is made under cover of dark-

ness or reduced visibility by moving rapidly from march columns. This concentration is maintained only for the minimum necessary time. Large-scale concentrations of forces and equipment are avoided.

*d. Dispersion.* When not concentrated for a specific tactical mission, Aggressor units are dispersed to the maximum consistent with the terrain and anticipated employment. Battalion assembly areas are separated by a minimum of two kilometers whenever possible.

*e. Surprise.* Surprise is sought at all times to paralyze the enemy's will to resist and deprive him of the ability to react effectively. Surprise is achieved by—

(1) Strict security measures.

(2) Concealment and rapid concentration of forces and materiel at the decisive point.

(3) Use of airborne or airlanded forces.

(4) Sudden employment of mass fires, that may or may not be limited to nuclear fires, followed by rapid offensive action.

(5) Exploitation of unfavorable weather and terrain.

(6) Application of new combat methods.

(7) Detailed tactical cover and deception measures.

(8) Rapid introduction of large tank forces in battle.

(9) Infiltration tactics.

(10) Use of electronic warfare.

*f. Command.*

(1) Unity of command is practiced at all echelons, but the existence of the political officer system, at times, exerts a disruptive influence. A combined arms force is commanded by the senior combat arms officer present. Air armies supporting ground forces are under the command of army group commanders.

(2) All commanders, up to and including those of the motorized rifle division, are required to make detailed personal reconnaissances. All commanders exercise close personal supervision of critical actions, issue very detailed orders, and closely control the actions of subordinate units. Aggressor has fewer staff officers at each echelon than does the US Army, and they have much less freedom to act for the commander.

(3) Commanders are permitted some latitude in the execution of orders provided the intent of the higher commander is not violated. In a sudden change in the situation where it is not possible to receive new instructions, the commander may make a new decision on his own initiative.

*g. Control.*

(1) The Aggressor system of command posts and communications is designed to insure continuity of control regardless of enemy action.

(2) Aggressor believes in detailed and thorough planning and, when time is available, will leave nothing to chance. Coordination is stressed. When little time is available for planning or reconnaissance, Aggressor deploys quickly in standard formation. Aggressor feels that in a rapidly changing situation it is more important to move mass forward rapidly than to delay for preparing and coordinating a detailed plan.

(3) Aggressor requires each division level unit and larger to have a main command post and an alternate command post at nuclear-safe distances from each other, both fully manned and in continuous operation. In practice, due to the limited number of staff personnel, divisions man their alternate command posts with a reduced skeleton force. An alternate command post takes over on order or automatically when the main command post is rendered inoperative.

(4) Duplicate communication systems are mandatory. Radio and wire communication nets are established on a multilateral network basis to insure that the maximum number of alternate channels is available. Sufficient equipment is provided to permit the establishment of complete back-up nets.

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 5-4. Types of Offensive Action

Aggressor considers that there are three major types of offensive action: the meeting engagement which includes advance to contact; the breakthrough; and the pursuit.

### 5-5. Meeting Engagements

*a.* Aggressor believes that the meeting engagement will become increasingly common on the nuclear battlefield. Combat zones now extend over vast areas and often the opposing forces are fighting throughout the depth of the zone.

*b.* The principal difference between meeting engagements and other types of offensive action is that in the former at least one of the combatants meets the enemy in an unexpected manner, or both forces come into violent contact with little or no advance warning. Considering the

fluid nature of the combat action and the resulting confused situation, Aggressor believes that speed of reaction is vital and the commander who can regain the initiative first will have a decisive advantage over his opponent.

*c.* The meeting engagement is characterized by rapid changes in the situation and fluid operations on a wide front, rapid changes in combat formations, and open flanks for friendly and enemy forces. Aggressor teaches that success in a meeting engagement is achieved by rapid and aggressive action and the coordinated use of all arms despite the lack of detailed knowledge of enemy dispositions. The goal is to disorganize and divide the enemy, and destroy the divided forces. This may be accomplished by a smaller force if it acts aggressively and launches a coordinated attack faster than the larger force. When employing this method of operation against overextended defenses or unprepared positions, Aggressor will deploy from the march column and attack without halting in the belief that the disadvantage of a hastily planned and uncoordinated attack is more than offset by the advantage of striking an enemy who has had no time to prepare adequately.

## 5-6. The Breakthrough

When the enemy has established a defensive line, either hastily or deliberately, Aggressor generally places primary emphasis on breaking through it so as to carry the battle to the enemy rear, rather than seizing and consolidating on terrain objectives. The assault will not necessarily be directed to the seizure of key defensive terrain; instead, attacking units will attempt to push through weakly defended or unoccupied areas to create gaps that will permit the exploitation forces to strike deep into the enemy rear. The capture of strongpoints and key terrain is left to succeeding echelons. Once the breakthrough is accomplished, Aggressor considers that the subsequent action, leading to the encirclement and destruction of the penetrated enemy defenses, will be characterized by a series of meeting engagements. The basic organizational concept for breakthrough operations provides for two echelons of attack forces. This type of operation is conducted against a deployed enemy's weak point(s) along his defense line. Surprise, violent action, and speed are emphasized.

## 5-7. Pursuit

*a.* Aggressor considers pursuit as an offensive operation designed to complete the destruction of the enemy. Rather than following a retreating enemy, Aggressor, by moving along routes parallel to the enemy's retreat, attempts to outdistance portions of the enemy force and to cut the withdrawing columns into segments and destroy them. Nuclear and chemical fires are employed on enemy concentrations, defiles and possible enemy defense areas. Control of small-yield mobile nuclear delivery systems may be delegated to division commanders. Airborne or airlanded forces may be used to seize critical terrain and block or slow down the enemy's withdrawal.

*b.* Planning for the pursuit is started before the attack. Plans include consideration of possible enemy routes of withdrawal, determination of schemes of maneuver best suited to the particular situation, composition of pursuit forces, and allocation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

*c.* The pursuit is initiated at the first opportunity by regiments and higher units. The pursuit is terminated only on orders of army or higher commanders. Normally, orders to terminate pursuit are issued when the enemy has been completely destroyed, or when pursuing elements have outdistanced their logistical support or are overextended and in danger of being cut off, or when the enemy has succeeded in establishing a strong defensive position. When the pursuit ends, units are regrouped and redeployed for the next operation. Artillery, air, tank, and transportation units are brought back under centralized control.

## 5-8. Basic Maneuvers

Aggressor employs two basic offensive maneuvers with supporting attacks; the envelopment and the penetration. Variations of the envelopment are the single and the double envelopment. The penetration is characterized by a strong single thrust by an Aggressor force; variations are the multiple penetration, and the pincer. The multiple penetration and the pincer movement are normally only used at Army and Army Group level. The other maneuvers may be used by forces of any strength, and Aggressor selects the specific type in relation to the enemy's defenses and the capabilities of available Aggressor forces. Nuclear fires are planned to facilitate all maneuvers. The various offensive maneuvers are described in detail below.

## 5-9. Single Envelopment (fig 5-1)

The single envelopment is used when there is an opportunity to pin hostile forces against an




*Figure 5–1. Single envelopment.*

obstacle. This maneuver permits concentration of effort in one direction, thus helping to insure combat superiority over the enemy in the decisive area. Aggressor doctrine differs from US doctrine (the main attack normally being directed toward a decisive objective) in that the attacking units will attempt to push through weakly defended or unoccupied areas to create gaps that will permit the exploitation forces to strike deep into the enemy rear. As depicted in figure 5–1 the supporting attack would be developed by succeeding echelons to exploit a break in the defenses and through subsequent action encircle and destroy the enemy.

## 5–10. Double Envelopment (fig 5–2)

Aggressor believes this to be the most decisive maneuver contributing most effectively to the encirclement and destruction of the enemy. It is used only when Aggressor has a preponderance of force and there is little risk of defeat in detail.

## 5–11. Penetration (fig 5–3)

Aggressor conducts penetrations through overextended enemy positions in order to destroy enemy reserves. This maneuver will divide continuity of enemy defenses and allow the enemy's defeat in detail. The penetration is conducted by Aggressor positioning the bulk of his combat power on a narrow front. One or more supporting attacks will be conducted for the purpose of deceiving the enemy as to the location of the main attack. This forces the enemy to fight in two or more directions at once, eliminating the enemy's maneuver capabilities. This maneuver is well suited to Aggressor's concept of mass because it permits concentration of force in one direction and makes possible defeat of the enemy in detail.




*Figure 5–2. Double envelopment.*




*Figure 5–3. Penetration.*




*Figure 5–4. Multiple penetration.*

## 5–12. Multiple Penetration (fig 5–4)

When double envelopment is not possible, Aggressor may resort to multiple penetration if its forces are sufficiently strong. This maneuver consists of a series of penetrations to the depth of the enemy corps reserves with subsequent encirclement and destruction of the separated enemy forces. Large forces are required for this maneuver as encirclement of the divided enemy leads to considerable dispersion. This maneuver destroys the continuity of the hostile defense, leads to the collapse of the defenses in areas large enough to provide ample maneuver room for further operations, and reduces the effectiveness of hostile counterattacks. The availability of large numbers of nuclear weapons facilitates this maneuver.

## 5–13. Pincers (fig 5–5)

When faced with an enemy whose flank appear to be unassailable, Aggressor may resort to the pincers maneuver. This consists of two penetrations made to create assailable interior flanks. Mobile forces attack through the gaps created by the initial penetrations, make a deep envelopment to include corps reserves and then, upon meeting at the enemy's rear, face outward to prevent relief of the forces thus encircled. Other forces, forming the inner pincers, operate within the perimeter thus created to divide and destroy the trapped enemy forces. Inner pincers often try to compress the encircled enemy into lucrative targets for low yield tactical nuclear weapons.




*Figure 5-5. Pincers.*

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 5-14. Planning the Defense

The army group normally prescribes the general location of the forward edge of the main defense belt and the limits of the combined arms army zone of defense. The combined arms army designates the more important areas in the main defense belt that are to be defended, prescribes the antitank defense through the depth of the area, and establishes the counterattack plan. The combined arms army also plans for possible withdrawal of forces from forward positions in the main defense belt when close-in Aggressor nuclear fires are used. Division commanders select the exact trace of the forward edge of the main defense belt. Division defense plans include the organization of the defense, allocation and use of artillery, antitank defense, use of air support, counterattack by division forces, and priorities for the preparation of defensive works.

### 5-15. Organization of the Defense

*a.* The defense is organized in successive belts designed to provide depth to the defended area. Normally these consist of a security zone, a main defense belt, a second defense belt, and a third defense belt. Figure 5-6 depicts the schematic representation of Aggressor defense belt concept and figure 5-7, the schematic representation of Aggressor large-scale defensive operations.

*b.* Each defense belt consists of a series of mutually supported, self-sufficient battalion defense areas designed to be manned by motorized rifle battalions with artillery, mortar, and tank support. A large mobile reserve is held in assembly areas for each defense belt.

*c.* Obstacle belts are constructed forward of and within defense positions of each belt to hinder enemy advance, to canalize him into areas favorable to the defenders, or to cause

# AGGRESSOR DEFENSE BELT CONCEPT

*GENERAL:*

Aggressor initiates defensive action only to gain time or economize in one area to provide forces for another area.

Oefensive operations characterized by stubborn defense of prepared positions.

Planned AT defense is basic concept.

Oefense is organized in successive belts designed to provide depth to the defended area.

Two echelon defense organized down to company.

Reserve varies, but normally a company at battalion a battalion at division and a regiment at army.

Aggressor conduct of defense is not stereotyped nor does he always use the same groupings of forces and weapons.

Aggressor defense against nuclear burst is much the same as defense by US forces. Particular attention is given to dispersal of forces to preclude destruction of large concentrations by a single nuclear blast.

*DEFENSIVE BELT CONCEPT:*

Security Zone: Halt or delay enemy by forcing early deployment.

Main Oefense Belt: Bulwark of aggressor defense.

Second Defense Belt: Intended to contain enemy until counterattack from Third Oefense Belt can be launched.

Third Oefense Belt: Forces herein prepare to mount counterattack.




*TANK UNITS IN DEFENSE*

Tank Army is Army Groups primary counterattack force. Tank division normally employed as counterattack force but may be used to defend second def belt. Tank battalion area is normally 2000–3000 meters wide and 2000–4000 meters deep.

*ARTILLERY IN THE DEFENSE*

Aggressor employs all available artillery, including tank mounted guns, rockets and missiles.

Preparation of fires consists of fire strikes by all delivery means against likely approaches, creating zones of continuous fire in front, on the flanks and in depth of the defense and of concentrating fires on any threatened axis or defensive sector.

Artillery plans are prepared at the highest artillery echelon consistent with the tactical situation.

*ORGANIZATION AND CONDUCT OF ANTITANK DEFENSE*

Aggressor deploys antitank weapons so as to insure interlocking fire along the front and in depth; to insure the possibility of switching fires rapidly; insure coverage of flanks and most likely axes of advance; aggressor never deploys antitank weapons frontally in line.

Aggressor antitank defense plans include:

Locating positions on terrain unfavorable to the operation of armor.

Attachment of additional antitank units to frontline positions to cover most dangerous avenues of approach. (In areas of a serious armor threat, 25 AT guns for every 1000 meters of front may be used.)

Placing extensive minefields on avenues of approach.

Destroying enemy armor with nuclear fires while in rear areas and in attack positions.

Concentrating artillery fire on enemy tanks and separating accompanying infantry.

Using artillery, ATGM, antiaircraft artillery, tanks and SP guns in direct fire on tanks that have penetrated the defensive position.

Counterattacking armored penetrations with tanks and SP artillery.

*Figure 5–6. Schematic representation of Aggressor defense belt concept.*

him to mass into profitable nuclear or chemical targets.

*d.* In the organization of the defense, emphasis is placed on protection of troops and materiel from the effects of nuclear fires. In selecting defensive areas, a major consideration is given to terrain features offering best cover and concealment.

## 5–16. Security Zone

*a.* The purpose of the security zone is to halt the enemy or to delay him by forcing him to deploy before reaching the main defense belt.

*b.* The security zone extends forward of the main defense belt. It is at least deep enough to prevent the enemy from delivering fire on the main and second defense belts with divisional weapons. Usually it is 20–30 kilometers deep, but it may be twice that deep if space and troops are available and delaying action can be employed.

*c.* The security zone is established and manned by the combined arms army. The second echelon motorized rifle units and the tank reserves of the combined arms army, reinforced with artillery and engineer support, establish and man delaying positions. These are the most forward positions of the security zone.

(1) Delaying forces are disposed on a frontage up to four times as wide as their normal frontage for area defense. This means that there is an average of one Aggressor battalion every 8–12 kilometers along the delaying positions. Naturally, terrain and enemy are considerations which will vary this pattern. These forces are known as the contact and delay, or security force of the combined arms army and they normally are the only forces available to delay the enemy or to cover the preparation and occupation of the defense belts by the motorized rifle division.

(2) In deploying his forces in delaying positions, Aggressor concentrates most of the combat power in the first echelon with tank reserves being retained primarily to assist in the disengagement of the first-echelon force.

*d.* When not in contact with the enemy, the motorized rifle divisions manning the main defense belt establish general outposts in the security zone as much as 25 kilometers in front of the main defense belt. This is in addition to the combined arms army security force. Normally the division's second echelon (a motorized rifle regiment) is employed in this task. As in the case of the contact and delay force, probable deployment of the general outpost force would be in the order of one Aggressor battalion for each 8–12 kilometers of frontage.

*e.* First echelon regiments of the main defense belt establish a system of combat outposts in the security zone 3–5 kilometers in front of the forward battalions. Their mission is to protect the main defense belt against surprise attack, prevent enemy reconnaissance, locate hostile artillery fire on the main defense belt, deceive the enemy as to the true location of the forward elements in the battle area, and prevent the enemy from clearing obstacles.

(1) Combat outposts are manned by regimental second echelon units. Generally, a motorized rifle battalion is disposed along each 15 kilometers of the combat outpost line. It employs its forces to establish security outposts along the outpost line. An outpost may consist of a motorized rifle company reinforced by machineguns, mortars, antitank guns, recoilless guns, tanks, and engineers.

(2) The main body of an outpost is deployed across the primary approaches to the battalion defense area and occupies an area up to 1200 meters wide. Areas not physically occupied are covered by patrols and observation.

*f.* Local security is established by the first-echelon battalions of the main belt division's first-echelon regiments. Observation posts, security posts, and patrols are used in front of the main defense belt and in gaps between units. Normally, local security is provided up to 660–880 meters beyond the unit being secured.

## 5–17. Main Defense Belt

This belt is the bulwark of the defense. It is selected to take advantage of natural defensive terrain that affords the maximum passive defense against nuclear attack and the target acquisition capability of the enemy. If possible, it is located behind a natural obstacle. It is designed to stop a hostile attack and destroy the attacking forces. This belt is up to 15 kilometers deep and is manned by the motorized rifle divisions comprising the first echelon of the combined arms army. Within the main defense belt are those forces necessary to conduct the defense, including tank, artillery, antitank and air defense units; the division reserves; and the division main and alternate command posts.

## 5–18. Second Defense Belt

*a.* The second defense belt, up to 10 kilometers deep, is located 8–10 kilometers to the rear of the main defense belt, and it usually has prepared but unoccupied defense positions in its

forward area. This defense belt is intended to contain the enemy, if he breaks through the main defense belt, until counterattacks from the area of the third defense belt can be launched. The second defense belt is established and defended by the combined arms army's second echelon motorized rifle divisions and reserves to include the tank division which deploys to assembly areas in the second defense belt after completing its mission in the security zone. The tank divisions may also be given a secondary mission of being prepared to establish defense positions in the second defense belt.

*b.* The army's main and alternate command posts, some artillery, and portions of the army's reserve are located in the second defense belt.

## 5–19. Third Defense Belt

*a.* The third defense belt, 8–10 kilometers to the rear of the second defense belt, is approximately 10 kilometers deep. Located in or near this belt are the combined arms army's reserve, usually a reinforced regiment from a first-echelon division; and the army group's second echelon forces, usually consisting of elements of the tank army, reserves available to army group, and possibly a combined arms army, dispersed over a very wide zone.

*b.* The mission of the third defense belt forces is to prepare to mount a counterattack. In the event a counterattack cannot be mounted, they will man prepared defense positions and attempt to stop the enemy's advance. Army group counteroffensives are launched from the area of the third defense belt.

## 5–20. Antitank Defense

*a.* Antitank defense is basic to the Aggressor defense concept. Overall antitank defense usually is planned and coordinated at army level but its specific planning is considered one of the most important duties of commanders at all levels.

*b.* Divisional and regimental antitank defenses are organized throughout the depth of the defense zone, mainly along avenues of approach vulnerable to tanks.

*c.* The Aggressor system of antitank defenses includes unit strongpoints with antitank weapons; firing positions prepared for occupation by tanks and antitank reserves; preplanned artillery concentrations on vulnerable avenues of approach; extensive use of antitank mines and other obstacles.

## 5–21. Organization and Conduct of Antitank Defense

*a.* Aggressor deploys antitank weapons so as to insure interlocking fire along the front and in depth; to insure the possibility of switching fire rapidly; also to insure thorough coverage of flanks and of most likely and/or actual axis of advance of enemy tanks. Aggressor never deploys antitank weapons frontally in line.

*b.* Aggressor antitank defense plans include:

(1) Locating defensive positions on terrain unfavorable to the operation of armor.

(2) Attaching additional antitank units to frontline defensive positions to cover the most dangerous avenues of approach. (In areas where there is a serious armored threat, 25 antitank guns for every 1,000 meters of front may be used.)

(3) Placing extensive minefields on avenues of approach.

(4) Destroying enemy armor with nuclear fires while in rear areas and in attack positions.

(5) Concentrating artillery fire on enemy tanks as they approach the defensive position and separating accompanying infantry.

(6) Opening fire with antitank guns on enemy tanks as they approach within effective range.

(7) Using artillery, antitank guided missiles, air defense artillery, tanks and SP guns in direct fire on tanks that have penetrated the defense position.

(8) Counterattacking armored penetrations with tanks and SP artillery.

## 5–22. Employment of Mines and Obstacles

*a.* Aggressor makes extensive use of high explosive (HE) and chemical mines and obstacles in the offense and in the defense. In the offense, mines are used to cover positions held by reorganized troops or to protect flanks. Their greatest employment is in the defense against tanks, vehicles, and personnel. Antitank minefields are laid with a minimum average density of one mine per meter of forward area. Because the average distance between mines is 3 meters, three rows of mines are required for minimum density. Minefields are laid in great depth.

*b.* In the defense, antitank minefields normally are placed in belts across likely tank approaches about 400 meters in front of the forward defenses, across approaches to

strongpoints, and across approaches to the division artillery areas. Controlled HE and chemical mines, detonated by concealed observers, are placed in gaps in standard minefields that are used by Aggressor units traversing the minefield. Delayed action mines are used along railroads, at road intersections, at destroyed bridges, in probable assembly areas, and in other localities where enemy concentrations might take place. Antipersonnel, HE, and chemical mines are laid on the approaches to and within antitank minefields.

*c.* Obstacles other than mines are placed to cover all probable enemy avenues of approach. Extensive improvisation is used. Local civilian resources are used extensively in construction of obstacles. Principal obstacles are antitank ditches, tank traps, abatis, and chemical contamination. Obstacles and minefields are covered by fire whenever possible.

## Section IV. RETROGRADE OPERATIONS

### 5-23. General

*a.* Local withdrawals, as directed by higher headquarters, are normal to Aggressor's area defense and are employed to reduce vulnerability to nuclear fires, to canalize or ensnare the enemy into suitable target areas, or to regroup forces for more effective containment of an enemy penetration. Aggressor rarely executes a general withdrawal, preferring to conduct delaying actions.

*b.* Aggressor employs three types of defensive operations in retrograde movements. They are the delaying action, the withdrawal, and the retirement.

*c.* Aggressor disengagements for withdrawal when under heavy enemy pressure are preceded whenever possible by airstrikes, as well as conventional artillery, and at times by nuclear artillery fires.

*d.* Aggressor assigns reinforced motorized rifle and tank units to cover the disengagement of the main force. These units remain in the defensive positions of the main force and continue to conduct defensive operations with the intent to confuse and deceive the enemy so as to conceal from him the fact and extent of the main force's disengagement for as long as possible. These same units may subsequently be used to relieve or reinforce rear guard units covering the withdrawal.

*e.* Aggressor places great emphasis on reconnaissance activities in retrograde operations. A major Aggressor preoccupation is the fear of enemy outflanking and enveloping movements. Consequently, the primary efforts of reconnaissance activities during retrograde operations are directed at ascertaining the enemy's intent and capability to threaten the flanks of the withdrawing forces. A constant watch is also kept on adjacent friendly units for the continued presence of a mutual support capability. Reconnaissance is also conducted toward the rear to retain continuous awareness of the conditions of withdrawal routes.

### 5-24. Delaying Action

*a.* Aggressor employs delaying action to trade space for time and to inflict maximum punishment on the enemy without becoming decisively engaged in combat. Opportunities are constantly sought to set up ambushes and traps for the advancing enemy. Delaying forces offer sufficient continuous resistance to prevent infiltration and to force the enemy to concentrate for deliberate attacks.

*b.* To facilitate the delay, long-range fires, prepositioned nuclear weapons, flame and chemical mines, and obstacles and ambushes in depth may be used. At times long-range fires may be deliberately withheld for deception purposes.

*c.* First-echelon forces, which constitute the bulk of available combat power, engage the enemy at long ranges to cause casualties and to force him to execute time-consuming deployments. As the enemy advances, he is subjected to repeated flank attacks by small mobile units. As he comes within range of additional weapons, the total volume of fire is increased. Every effort is made to inflict maximum casualties on the enemy, disorganize him, and force him to reorganize or mass for an assault. A concentrating enemy is attacked and destroyed by fire and where appropriate, exploited by maneuver. The effective use of obstacles, particularly when covered by fire, reinforces the delaying capability of a unit. The availability of low-yield nuclear weapons and precision delivery systems will assist disengagement, and may permit the delaying force to accept closer engagement than would otherwise be practicable.

*d.* Second echelons and tank reserves are employed in counterattacks or covering forces to assist in the disengagement of the first-

echelon forces. Low-yield nuclear weapons may also assist in this action.

*e.* When threatened with decisive combat, the delaying force disengages and executes a withdrawal.

## 5-25. Withdrawal

*a.* Aggressor executes a withdrawal when it is necessary to disengage his forces from the enemy. The disengagement normally takes place from rear to front in a manner similar to that used by US forces. The first units to withdraw are rear service units and army group artillery. These units usually move back under concealment of darkness one or two nights before the withdrawal of the forward armies.

*b.* A general withdrawal is planned in as much detail as time permits. Demolition and scorched earth plans are prepared prior to initiating a withdrawal. Withdrawals normally take place on a broad front in darkness or under cover of smoke and artillery fires, including nuclear fires. Limited tank counterattacks may also precede withdrawals.

*c.* Rear guards are always utilized by Aggressor to cover withdrawals. Rear guards normally consist of motorized rifle units reinforced by tank and engineer units and forming strong, aggressive and highly mobile groups capable of independent operation.

*d.* Rear guard elements hold, in succession, a series of defensive lines and fall back from line to line as the enemy pressure increases, in each instance managing to force the enemy to deploy, thus delaying him and gaining time for the withdrawing main force. As the rear guards fall back, they execute previously prepared plans to slow the enemy's advance by carrying out demolition missions, destroying bridges, and blocking side routes and parallel routes as well as the main route of enemy advance. They may also, if the nature of the terrain is appropriate, detonate prepositioned nuclear devices, flame or chemical mines, to create major obstructions to the enemy's progress.

*e.* Aggressor makes extensive use of flank security forces in order to block outflanking and enveloping attempts by the enemy. These forces, normally tank and motorized elements reinforced by antitank artillery and engineer elements, move out along the flanks of the withdrawing force to intercept and delay long enough to allow friendly forces to withdraw safely.

*f.* Missile and conventional artillery support rear guard operations and, in addition, deliver interdicting fires to assist in blocking enemy flank and enveloping threats. Enemy armor is their primary objective.

*g.* All key terrain features along the route of withdrawal, to include defiles, bridges, crossings, and road junctions, are occupied and held by elements of the withdrawing forces until the main body has passed through them and the rear guard has reached them. The rear guards take over and carry out their mission of delay and destruction and in turn withdraw.

*h.* Engineers assist in setting up obstacles, supporting the rear guard, and maintaining crossings and roads along the routes of withdrawal long enough to allow friendly forces to use them for retrograde movements.

## 5-26. Retirement

*a.* Aggressor considers retirement as a defensive operation allowing Aggressor forces, after a successful disengagement, to move away from the enemy without direct pressure.

*b.* Retirement consists of a withdrawal followed by a tactical road march. The tactical road march begins after the main force has disengaged from the enemy and march columns have been formed.

*c.* The tactical road march, which constitutes the actual movement away from the enemy without pressure, is conducted in a manner similar to the advance to contact.

(1) A strong rear guard is employed and it generally maintains contact with the enemy.

(2) The direction of movement is away from rather than toward the enemy.

(3) The ultimate destination of the force is an assembly area or location from which to prepare for a subsequent mission rather than contact with the enemy.

# CHAPTER 6
# AGGRESSOR COMBAT SUPPORT

## Section I. ARTILLERY, AIR DEFENSE, AND ANTITANK OPERATIONS

### 6–1. General

*a.* Aggressor considers field artillery, air defense artillery, antitank weapons and mortars 120-mm and larger as artillery. These weapons are organized into units which are assigned as support units at all tactical echelons.

*b.* Aggressor artillery pieces are classified as follows:

(1) light—119-mm and less.

(2) medium—120-mm–160-mm.

(3) heavy—greater than 160-mm.

*c.* Aggressor emphasizes the massing of artillery fires to influence the course of battle.

*d.* Artillery divisions and brigades are administrative commands. Their battalions and regiments normally are allocated to subordinate units or provisional groups as required; however, both headquarters may be used for tactical control.

*e.* Artillery planning is detailed, particularly in the preparation and assault phase of offensive operations. Aggressor does not emphasize procedures for fires on targets of opportunity, as the speed and simultaneous advance of assault troops make direct fire better suited for attacking targets that develop during the offensive. Control of fires is as centralized as the situation permits.

*f.* Control of nuclear fires regardless of the allocation of delivery units is retained by the army group commander, unless specifically delegated to armies. Weapons having a nuclear capability are sited approximately one-third of the maximum effective range from the leading Aggressor elements in the offense, and one-third to one-half of the maximum range in the defense.

### 6–2. Artillery Conventional Weapons Systems

*a. Mortars.* Mortars are considered an important source of firepower and Aggressor uses them as infantry support weapons and as field artillery weapons. Both the 240-mm and 400-mm mortars can supplement artillery fire with either close-support or long-range fire. Also, both can fire nuclear or chemical/biological warheads.

*b. Cannon.* All weapons in this category are capable of delivering chemical/biological fires and cannons of 152-mm and above are assumed to have a nuclear capability.

*c. Antitank Weapons.*

(1) Aggressor continues to improve his high-velocity antitank weapons. The development of more powerful armor penetration ammunition has contributed to the effectiveness of antitank artillery. The 82-mm recoilless gun used as an antitank weapon is gradually being withdrawn from active service and is being replaced by the "RIPPER" antitank missile.

(2) The RIPPER is an Aggressor antitank guided missile weapon. The missile, which is wire guided, has appeared on a triple launcher mounted on a modified motorized rifle transporter (MRT–4). Two other launching systems have been reported. One is a sextuple launcher mounted on a modified MRT–4, and the other is a single launcher which is man-packed and placed on the ground for firing.

(3) RIPPER 1–A is an improved antitank guided missile. The missile which is infrared guided, is fired from a quad launcher also mounted on a modified MRT–4.

(4) All Aggressor antitank artillery guns can be employed for indirect fires. Recoilless weapons fire high explosive as well as high explosive antitank ammunition. The Aggressor recoilless guns are *not* rifled and therefore, should *not* be referred to as recoilless rifles.

*d. Air Defense Artillery.* Aggressor air defense artillery consists of cannon artillery and surface-to-air missile artillery as well as air defense machineguns. Air defense artillery weapons are organic at all levels down to battalion.

*e.* Figure 6–1 summarizes the main characteristics of Aggressor artillery weapons.

| Weapon | Principal Use | Practical Rate of fire (rd per min) | Maximum Range (meters) | | Armor Penetration at 500 Meters, 0° (centimeters) | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | Horizontal | Vertical | | |
| 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | AD | 175 per tube | 2400 | 1450 | 4 | Mounted on MRT-3 chassis. |
| 14.5mm AD MG (Quad) (SP) | AD | 175 per tube | 2400 | 1450 | 4 | Mounted on MRT-3 chassis. |
| 23mm AD Gun (Dual) | AD | 225 per gun | 3500 | 1800 | 3 | |
| 23mm AD Gun (Quad) (SP) | AD | 225 per gun | 3500 | 1800 | 3 | On-carriage fire control radar. |
| 57mm AD Gun | AD | 70 | 14000 | 12000 | 14 | |
| 57mm AD Gun (Dual) (SP) | AD | 70 per tube | 14000 | 12000 | 14 | Mounted on medium tank chassis. |
| 57mm AT Gun (ATAP) [1] | AT,Asit | 20 | 9400 | ----- | 14 | Auxiliary motor mounted on carriage. Steer by wheel on trail. |
| 76mm MT Gun - How | FA | 30 | 14500 | ----- | 10 | Pack transportable. |
| 82mm Rcl Gun | AT | 9 | 420 | ----- | 32 | Fired from wheeled mount or tripod. Mtr transported. |
| 85mm Gun | FA | 22 | 17000 | ----- | 22 | |
| 85mm AT Gun (ATAP) [1] | AT,Asit | 24 | 16500 | ----- | 16 | Auxiliary motor and wheel for steering mounted on trail. |
| 85mm AD Gun | AD | 15 | 17800 | 14000 | 16 | |
| Ripper | AT | 3 per 5 min | 2500 | ----- | 32 | Wire-guided. Mounted on MRT-4 chassis. 3 launcher rails. |
| Ripper 1-A | AT | 4 per 5 min | 2750 | ----- | 36 | Infrared guidance. Mounted on MRT-4 chassis. 4 launcher rails. |
| 100mm AT Gun (SP) | AT,Asit | 15 | 22000 | ----- | 18 | Mounted on medium tank chassis. |
| 100mm AD Gun | AD | 20 | 22000 | 17700 | 18 | |
| 107mm Rcl Gun | AT,Asit | 8 | 7250 | ----- | 40 | Fired from wheeled mount or tripod. |
| 120mm Mort | FA | 16 | 6000 | ----- | -- | |
| 122mm How | FA | 8 | 12800 | ----- | -- | |
| 122mm Gun (SP) | AT,Asit | 6 | 23000 | ----- | 24 | Mounted on heavy tank chassis. |
| 122mm RL [2] | FA | 1 | 17000 | ----- | -- | Single stage. Indications that booster motor is available to increase range. |
| 130mm Gun | FA | 8 | 28600 | ----- | -- | |
| 140mm MRL (16 tubes) | FA | 16 in 3 min | 10000 | ----- | -- | Mounted on truck chassis. |
| 152mm Gun - How | FA | 6 | 18800 | ----- | -- | Nuclear capability. |
| 152mm Gun (SP) | AT,Asit | 4 | 18800 | ----- | 18 | Nuclear capability. Mounted on heavy tank chassis. |
| 160mm Mort | FA | 4 | 9070 | ----- | -- | Breech loaded. |
| 200mm MRL (4 tubes) | FA | 4 in 4 min | 20300 | ----- | -- | Mounted on truck chassis. |
| 203mm Gun - How | FA | 1 | 31250 | ----- | -- | Nuclear capability. |
| 240mm Mort | FA | 2 | 10000 | ----- | -- | Nuclear capability. Breech loaded. |
| 240mm MRL (12 tubes) | FA | 12 in 4 min | 25000 | ----- | -- | Mounted on truck chassis. |
| 310mm Gun (SP) | FA | 1 | 32400 | ----- | -- | Nuclear capability. Mounted on modified heavy tank chassis. |
| 400mm Mort (SP) | FA | 1 | 22000 | ----- | -- | Nuclear capability. Mounted on modified heavy tank chassis. |

[1] ATAP - Anti-Tank, Auxiliary Powered

[2] Used for irregular warfare

*Figure 6-1. Aggressor artillery weapons.*

## 6-3. Allocation of Artillery

*a.* Reserve artillery from General Headquarters (GHQ), if available, is allocated to army groups by the Regional Command.

*b.* All commanders having assigned or attached artillery, allocate a portion of their artillery to subordinate units commensurate with the enemy situation and the mission assigned. The artillery that is retained at each echelon is formed into provisional artillery groups as an artillery reserve, and it has the following general missions:

(1) Long-range fires.

(2) Counterbattery fires.

(3) Block with fire those areas that have been subjected to nuclear fires.

(4) Support the commitment of the second echelon.

(5) Air defense protection.

(6) Reinforce the fires of the first-echelon artillery.

*c.* Each provisional group is tailored for specific missions. The composition of these groups may vary several times during an operation, as allocation of artillery is one means that the commanders have of influencing the battle. On completion of an operation, artillery groups are reorganized into new provisional groups for different missions.

*d.* A provisional group is commanded by the senior artillery commander of the units composing the group. His headquarters acts as the group headquarters. Battalions in provisional artillery groups are used to replace artillery battalions of subordinate units rendered ineffective by nuclear fire.

*e.* Allocation of artillery by ground combat commanders will be discussed in part III.

## 6-4. The Artillery Offensive

Aggressor artillery support is based on the concept that an artillery offensive is the continuous support of motorized elements and tanks with concentrated artillery, rocket, and mortar fire. This concentrated fire precedes these units from one objective to the next. Artillery fires are laid down with such weight, volume, and accuracy that the artillery fire itself is an offensive. The artillery offensive, including nuclear fires, is coordinated with the air offensive to destroy or neutralize enemy weapons, units, defense installations, and to support advancing motorized rifle and tank units. It constitutes a distinct part of an Aggressor offensive. The artillery offensive is divided into three phases; preparatory fires, fires supporting the assault, and fires to accompany motorized rifle and tank units through the enemy defenses.

## 6-5. Preparatory Fires

*a.* Preparatory fires are used to destroy enemy defensive installations, disorganize control and observation facilities, disrupt defensive fire systems, and make passages through enemy obstacles.

*b.* Usually nuclear fires immediately precede the nonnuclear fires of the preparation. When nuclear fires are used in the preparation, nonnuclear preparatory fires normally will not last more than 20 minutes. When nuclear fires are not used in the preparation, the length of the preparation may vary from 40 minutes to 1 hour or more.

*c.* Nuclear fires may be delivered from the forward edge of the enemy's defensive positions to his most rearward installations or units. Nonnuclear (to include chemical) artillery and rockets will be used to supplement the nuclear fires. Patterns of fire are varied, and false preparations are used for deception.

*d.* Where time permits, the preparation is planned in great detail. It is based on painstaking reconnaissance of enemy dispositions and installations, a thorough study of the plan of attack, and the coordinated effort of the artillery, motorized rifle, and tank elements. Control of the artillery, to include battalion and regimental artillery, is highly centralized during the preparation.

## 6-6. Fires Supporting the Assault

*a.* Prearranged and on-call fires normally are used in support of motorized rifle and tank units after the preparation. When the assault is launched, fires shift from the forward defenses to preplanned targets that would affect the success of the assault. On-call fires are delivered when required by the supported units. These fires are planned on the basis of the probable action of the supported units at each stage of the battle.

*b.* This phase of the artillery offensive starts with the assault of motorized rifle and tank units. Normally, it includes only those fires required to support the attack through the initial enemy defensive positions. Control of fires is still centralized, though regimental and battalion artillery revert to control of parent units, and request for on-call fire may be made directly to artillery battalions and groups.

## 6-7. Fires Through the Depth of the Enemy Defenses

*a.* Fires for protection of units advancing through the enemy defenses are planned to give uninterrupted support during the seizure of successive objectives and for protection on capture of the final objective. The planning for these fires involves the integration of indirect fires of artillery units with the direct fire of accompanying self-propelled guns. Displacements normally are required during this phase, and are made so that not more than one-third of the artillery is out of action at any one time. When motorized rifle and tank units have advanced as far as the enemy regimental reserve and main artillery areas, control of artillery is decentralized. Regimental artillery groups come under the control of the supported regiments, which then control their displacement.

*b.* Use of supporting artillery during the exploitation phase is similar to its use in a meeting engagement.

## 6-8. Artillery in the Defense

*a.* Aggressor believes that an effective defense is based on powerful fire strikes delivered with all available artillery including mortars, tank mounted guns, rockets, and missiles, as well as on broad maneuver of weapons and fires through carefully prepared fire plans. Objectives of the defense are achieved by a well planned system of fire, above all against tanks, and by the ability to restore quickly a system of fire which has broken down.

*b.* Aggressor's concept of fire maneuver consists of concentrating artillery fires against the enemy's most important grouping of forces for the attack, against vital objectives in the enemy's rear, as well as in covering the flanks of one's own units. An essential part of fire maneuver is the ability to shift fires as rapidly as the enemy's maneuvering causes a shift in the location of the most important targets. Aggressor believes that effectiveness of fire in the defense is achieved by accurate, massed and surprise use of artillery fires.

*c.* The employment of nuclear weapons does not obviate the need for the ability to rapidly mass forces and fires against the enemy's most important axis of advance. Nuclear and chemical fires are integrated into the overall scheme of defensive fires. Nuclear delivery weapon systems are generally sited at a distance from the forward edge of the battle area equal to approximately one-third to one-half of their maximum range. The employment of nuclear warheads is rigidly controlled.

## 6-9. Fire Missions

*a.* Aggressor's system of fire in the defense consists of the preparation of fire strikes by all available delivery means against the likely approaches to defensive positions, of creating zones of continuous fire in front of the forward edge, on the flanks and in depth of the defense; and of concentrating fires quickly on any threatened axis or defense sector. Close collaboration is stressed among nuclear, chemical, and conventional artillery and aircraft delivery means.

*b.* Fire missions must support the mission of the force. Fire missions, generally in accordance with the following sequence, are directed to achieve:

(1) Destruction or neutralization of enemy nuclear and nonnuclear means. Counterpreparations and counterbattery fires are within this scope.

(2) Neutralization of enemy command and control facilities.

(3) Neutralization of enemy march columns and troop concentrations.

(4) Interference with the deployment of the attacking enemy.

(5) Support of friendly units in forward positions.

(6) Neutralization of the enemy in front of the forward defenses.

(7) Neutralization of enemy units that have penetrated the defenses.

(8) Delivery of preparatory fires in support of counterattacks and counteroffensives.

(9) Covering by fire of gaps and flanks in friendly sectors, and of engineer obstacles and natural obstructions.

(10) Contamination of terrain and obstacles.

(11) Firing of smoke rounds against enemy observation posts.

(12) Battlefield illumination during night attacks.

## 6-10. Planning and Control

*a.* Artillery plans are prepared at the highest artillery echelon consistent with the tactical situation. The plans are based on continuous zones of fire forward of the leading defense areas. Fires are also planned throughout the depth of the defenses, including plans for massed fires on probable enemy penetration areas.

*b.* The artillery commander develops a fire plan for each sector covering all phases of the defense. This plan includes:

(1) Fires by long-range artillery and other nuclear delivery means on enemy artillery positions and nuclear weapon delivery systems, approach routes, defiles, troop concentrations, and important installations in the enemy rear.

(2) Massed fires on enemy tanks, assembly areas, command posts, and observation posts.

(3) Final protective fires in front of the forward defense areas and in the depth of the main battle position.

(4) Direct fire against tanks that have penetrated the position.

(5) Fires in support of counterattacks.

*c.* Fire plans include a counterpreparation. The counterpreparation, controlled by a carefully prepared fire plan and detailed time schedule, usually starts on army order when the enemy moves into forward assembly areas and begins attack preparations. To obtain complete surprise, registration fires may be prohibited. Nuclear fires normally precede nonnuclear artillery counterpreparations.

*d.* Commanders of battalions and larger units have the authority to call for defensive fires and final protective fires to be laid down in front of their respective units by supporting artillery and tanks.

## 6–11. Organization for Combat

*a.* The organization for combat of artillery in the defense is basically similar to that for the offense. Groups are located so that they may execute their primary mission and yet be capable of massing fires in support for forward defense positions, particularly against armor attacks. Each artillery battery, and whenever possible each piece, prepares primary, alternate and night firing positions.

*b.* Artillery weapons are deployed in concealed and dispersed positions so that flanking fires, cross fire, and surprise fire at very close range and of great intensity can be brought to bear on the enemy. In order to confuse the enemy about the deployment and fire plans of friendly artillery, Aggressor makes use of roving guns and roving batteries.

*c.* Artillery engages enemy forces as soon as it is apparent that the attack has begun. Artillery places fires on the advancing enemy and covers the withdrawal of the security outposts as the latter are forced back. As the enemy approaches the main defense belt, he is subjected to continuous heavy fires from all available means. The intelligence effort is concentrated on determining enemy formations, location of nuclear delivery means, and location of attack positions, so that artillery may react accordingly.

*d.* Counterpreparatory fires are readied and fired on the order of the army commander. Nuclear fires may be included. When the counterpreparation is fired to destroy an attacker in his attack position, a first-echelon battalion may make a limited objective attack to capitalize on the expected disruption of the attacking forces. Counterpreparatory fires are shifted to preplanned counterattack targets to support the attack.

*e.* In the event enemy forces succeed in penetrating the Aggressor defense, commanders make extensive use of their on-call fires. Additionally, artillery weapons may be used in a direct fire role, if appropriate.

## 6–12. Air Defense Artillery

*a.* Air defense artillery consists of cannon, surface-to-air missile artillery, and air defense machineguns. Conventional air defense artillery support is provided tactical units by 57-mm towed guns and the 14.5-mm AD MG; characteristics of these weapons may be found in figure 6–1. One battery of the 57-mm towed guns is also found in each of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) battalions organic to the SAM brigades of the armies and army groups. Characteristics of Aggressor SAM systems may be found in figure 6–2.

*b.* Aggressor ground launched missile and air defense units are considered artillery, and are controlled by the artillery commander of the unit to which attached.

*c.* Aggressor air defense doctrine emphasizes the importance of early detection of impending enemy air attacks as well as prevention of enemy air attacks by destroying the enemy's air capabilities, such as airfields and fuel storage area in the rear areas, through the use of long-range missile fires and airstrikes.

*d.* The employment of air defense artillery in the defense and the offense differ little. Generally, air defense missiles and guns are deployed in accordance with the capability of available weapons systems to afford the best protection to the target being defended. Deployment and fire plans are so drawn up as to insure complete cover of all sectors with as much overlap as possible.

*e.* Air defense is set up to provide:

(1) Area defense, conducted through a com-

| System | Type | Range (meters) | | | | Mount | Propellant | Ammunition[2] | Guidance | Emplacement Time | Rate of fire | Average miss distance | Single shot kill probability | | Associated equipment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Vertical | | Horizontal | | | | | | | | | non-nuclear | nuclear | |
| | | Minimum | Maximum | Minimum | Maximum[1] | | | | | | | | | | |
| RAIDER | SAM 1 Low altitude | 5 | 5,000 | | 6,000 | Amphibious armored carrier May be mounted in light trucks for airborne operations 3 launchers per mount | Single-stage, solid fuel propellant | HE | Radar control-homing | 20 minutes | 3 missiles/ battery per minute<br>Battery can engage 3 targets simul-taneously. | 15m | .6 | — | Missile trailers, capacity 3 missiles.<br>Computer vans.<br>Fire direction vans.<br>CARNAGE A3 radar<br>Small and medium generators. |
| REGENT | SAM 2 | 600 | 1,800 | 600 | 50,000 | Trailer-erector-launcher | Two-stage solid fuel propellant | HE, CB,[4] nuclear | Radar control-command | 1.5 hours | 4 missiles per battery per 4 minutes.<br>Battery can engage 1 target at a time | 30m | .6 | .9 | Missile trailers, capacity 1 missile.<br>Computer vans.<br>Fire direction vans.<br>CARNAGE B radar.<br>Small and medium generators.<br>Medium cranes. |
| RAMMER | SAM 3 | 900 | 2,340 | unk | 36,000 | Medium tank chassis, dual mount | Single-stage, solid fuel propellant | HE | Radar control-command | 30 minutes | 4 missiles/ battery per minute<br>Battery can engage 4 targets simul-taneously. | 25m | .7 | .9 | Missile trailers, capacity 2 missiles.<br>Computer vans.<br>Fire directions vans.<br>CARNAGE A3 radar<br>Small and medium generators.<br>Medium crane. |

*Figure 6–2. Aggressor surface-to-air missile systems.*

| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RASCAL | SAM 4 High altitude long range | 300 | 30,000 | 6,000 | 60,000 | Trailer-erector-launcher | Two-stage, solid fuel propellant | HE, CB,[4] nuclear | Radar control-command | 3.0 hours | 4 missiles per battery per 8 minutes. Battery can engage 1 target at a time. | 30m | .7 | .9 | Large missile trailers, capacity 1 missile. Computer vans. Fire direction vans. Warhead check-out vans. CARNAGE C radar. Large and medium generators. Large cranes. Large maintenance tents. |
| ROVER | SAM 5 Low altitude | 7 | 120 | 270 | 234 | Medium tank chassis QUAD | Single stage solid | HE | Infrared Homing | 10 min | 16 msl/plt/per 2 min. | 3m | .4 | | EW RADIO |
| ROGUE | SAM 6 Low altitude | 7 | 900 | 20 | 150 | Shoulder | Single stage solid | HE | Infrared homing | 2 min | 1 msl/launcher/10 sec. | N/A | .4 | | EW RADIO |

1 Maximum horizontal range for surface-to-air fires decreases as altitude of target increases.
2 See figure 6-4 for nuclear yields
3 No surface-to-surface capability.
4 Surface-to-surface, known or suspected.

*Figure 6-2—Continued.*

bined and closely coordinated effort of manned interceptors and guided missiles.

(2) Direct cover of troops and/or installations, provided by missile and cannon air defense artillery organic or attached to units being protected.

## 6–13. Command and Control

*a.* Control of the air defense effort in other than first echelon divisions is centralized under army group. The commander of the air defense artillery is subordinate to the air defense commander of the group. The air defense artillery commander coordinates the fire of his elements with the activities of the other elements sharing responsibility for air defense. The artillery commander, not the air defense commander, normally has the authority to change the missions of the air defense artillery elements to a ground support role. The commander of air defense artillery maintains communications with the artillery commander. At each level, the commander of the organic air defense artillery element is responsible for the establishment of appropriate air defense warning services to be tied in with the overall air warning net.

*b.* During combat operations, divisional and regimental commanders assign missions directly or through the air defense officer to air defense units in their command. Control of air defense units is decentralized when the enemy executes surprise low altitude attacks, and when radar coverage is insufficient to maintain centralized control. In case of surprise air attacks, units open fire independently.

## 6–14. Tactics

Air defense artillery tactics are not stereotyped or passive. Based on enemy tactics and habits, the air defense artillery commander maneuvers his batteries, employs ruses, and, in cooperation with light aviation, lures enemy aircraft into firetraps.

## 6–15. Fire Control

*a.* In tracking targets, an air defense artillery battery fires as a unit from data computed by a rangefinder and director or by radar and computer.

*b.* Aggressor uses manual control, air defense directors and radar (fig 6–3) to direct air defense fire. Except for first-echelon division areas, air defense artillery cannon and surface-to-air missiles are integrated into air defense blocks, with control centralized at army group.

*c.* In direct fire against land targets, fire is controlled by individual gun commanders. When massed fire is desired, a battery is used as the firing unit.

*d.* Missile battery fire control systems utilize radars and computers in a manner similar to United States forces. Improved radars and electronic equipment permit centralized control of integrated weapon systems at army group or army level.

## 6–16. Employment in Forward Areas

*a.* In forward areas, air defense artillery protects troop concentrations, forward area installations, and lines of communications. Air defense artillery is also used for ground fires, primarily for direct fires.

*b.* In protecting troops deployed in forward areas, air defense artillery usually is deployed in lines. Air defense machineguns are used by platoons from 300–500 meters in rear of the protected elements. Light air defense guns (57-mm) are emplaced by batteries on a line approximately 2,000–3,000 meters from the forward elements. The distance between batteries is approximately 2,000–3,000 meters, and the distance between individual pieces is at least 30 meters. Medium air defense guns (85-mm) are emplaced by batteries, either on a line or in rectangle, approximately 5,000 meters from the forward elements. The distance between batteries is approximately equivalent to one-third the maximum range of the weapons, and the distance between individual pieces is at least 40 meters. If fire against ground targets is anticipated, special dual-purpose emplacements are prepared.

## 6–17. Employment in Rear Areas

*a.* Air defense artillery weapons protect troop assembly areas, lines of communication, logistical installations, artillery position areas, missile sites, and other area installations. Air defense units are dug in and camouflaged. Alternate and dummy positions are prepared. If fire against ground targets is anticipated special dual purpose emplacements are prepared. Heavy air defense guns are usually not employed farther forward than army artillery group positions.

*b.* RAMMER missile units furnish medium range, high-altitude protection for critical installations within the army group area. A distance about two-thirds of the maximum range of the weapon separates the batteries. Only one battery at a time is out of action during move-

| Name | Type | Power | Frequency | Maximum Range | Allocation | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| CALLOUS | Fire control (AD cannon). | 250 KW | 3,000 MHz | 250 km | 1/AD btry | Truck mounted. Emplacement time—2-3 hr. |
| CARNAGE A-3 | Fire control, Raider (SAM) and RAMMER (SAM) | Unk | Unk | Unk | 1/RAIDER btry and 1/RAMMER btry | Mounted on 2 trailers, emplacement time—20 min. |
| CARNAGE B | Fire control REGENT (SAM) | 750 KW | 2,000 MHz | 165 km | 1/ REGENT bn | Mounted on 3 trailers, emplacement time—1-1/2 hr. |
| CARNAGE C | Fire Control RASCAL (SAM) | 1.5 MW | 2,000 MHz | 250 km | 1/bn RASCAL | Mounted on 3 trailers, 2 vans emplacement time—3 hr. |
| CHALLENGER | Height finding | 500 KW | 3,300 MHz | 56 km | 3/AD bn | Truck mounted, emplacement time—1 hr. |
| CHARLATAN | Early warning | 200 KW | 1,000 MHz | 550 km | 1/AD bn | Truck mounted, emplacement time—2-3 hr. |
| CHOPPER | Early warning | 1,000 KW | 200 MHz | 900 km | 1/SAM bn | Trailer mounted, emplacement time—6-8 hr. |
| CLEAVER | Command guidance (SSM) | 200 KW | 2,500 MHz | 1,300 km | 1/SSM bn | Truck and trailer mounted, emplacement time—12 hr. |

*Figure 6-3. Aggressor air defense radars.*

ment to new positions. These missiles are believed to have a surface-to-surface capability.

*c.* RAIDER missile units are deployed throughout the army area to provide low-altitude protection for critical installations and troop assembly areas and to complement RAMMER missile units. RAIDER missile units normally are deployed in two lines. The first line is near the rear of the main defense belt and the second line is located in the second defense belt. Forward displacement is by battery, with batteries moving about 40 to 60 kilometers in each bound. No more than one-sixth of the missile units displace at one time. During withdrawals displacement is by battalion. Defensive fire power is maintained at all times. Movements and preparation of emplacements are accomplished at night or during times of reduced visibility.

## 6–18. Support of Tactical Operations

*a.* In the offense, air defense artillery protects march columns, units and materiel in assembly and deployment areas, and supports the assault by fires against ground targets. During the artillery preparation for the assault, air defense artillery, in addition to its primary mission, is used to fire against enemy fortifications, firing positions, and observation posts. During the assault, light air defense artillery guns and machineguns accompany the assault teams to protect them against air attacks. Usually air defense weapons are concentrated in the sectors where the assault is most successful.

*b.* In the defense, priority for air defense protection is given to major rear installations and rail centers. Divisional air defense units protect only selected installations or positions within the division area. Priority in the division is division artillery, second-echelon forces, forward positions, and support of counterattacks. Reinforcing or attached air defense artillery units assist in protection of first-echelon forces and in support of counterattacks. Direct and indirect observed fire against ground targets is used as part of artillery counterpreparations. Air defense artillery guns are assigned targets whose destruction requires high velocity projectiles. Observed indirect fire is controlled in the same manner as field artillery.

## 6–19. Antitank Operations

*a.* The Aggressor system of antitank defense includes unit strongpoints with antitank weapons; firing positions prepared for occupation by tanks and antitank reserves; preplanned artillery fires on vulnerable avenues of approach; and extensive use of antitank mines and other obstacles.

*b.* Aggressor deploys antitank weapons so as to insure interlocking fires along the front and in depth; to insure the possibility of switching fires rapidly; also to insure thorough coverage of flanks and of most likely or actual axis of advance of enemy tanks. Aggressor never deploys antitank weapons frontally in lines.

*c.* Antitank weapons and mortars (120-mm or larger) are classified as artillery weapons, are manned by field artillerymen, and are employed as field artillery. Mortars smaller than 120-mm caliber are essentially organic unit support weapons, and are found in motorized rifle and tank regiments.

*d.* The utilization of antitank weapons in specific offensive roles generally is limited to the employment of antitank guided missiles against field fortifications and artillery emplacements in the forward area of the enemy's defense. Antitank weapons are otherwise employed in a protective role primarily against eventual enemy armored counterattacks.

## 6–20. Employment of Antitank Artillery

*a.* Division artillery direct fire weapons add depth to the antitank defense. These weapons are sited to protect battalion antitank guns from assault. Part of these weapons are held in mobile reserve in rear of the division artillery positions to be moved to threatened sectors or to establish antitank positions in depth.

*b.* Some antitank artillery units from higher headquarters, when allocated to a motorized rifle division, are kept in reserve and some are suballocated to first-echelon regiments. These antitank artillery units are deployed to form antitank strongpoints, consisting of mutually supporting platoon areas sited in depth. Alternate positions are prepared to meet enemy penetrations. The guns of an antitank platoon are located in a diamond formation with about 200 meters between guns. Antitank artillery units retained under army control are usually positioned in the second and third defense belts.

## 6–21. Employment of Division Artillery

*a.* Division artillery units are assigned the following antitank tasks:

(1) Long-range fires.

(2) Fires on tanks in assembly areas and at lines of departure.

(3) Defensive fires.

(4) Final protective fires.

(5) Direct fires.

*b.* Long-range fires are placed on approaching armored units to cause dispersion, delay, and destruction. Ideal target areas are defiles. All artillery and mortars are used for fires on assembly areas and attack positions. They also fire targets covering probable routes from the attack positions to the forward edge of the defense areas. These targets separate the tanks from their accompanying infantry. Targets are fired as soon as the leading enemy tanks enter the preselected area and are timed to move forward with the enemy advance.

*c.* All field artillery pieces habitually have at hand several rounds of armor-piercing ammunition. For antitank purposes, an alternate position for each artillery piece is prepared near each firing battery. Air defense artillery may also be employed in antitank roles if required.

### 6–22. Employment of Tanks and Self-Propelled Artillery

Aggressor self-propelled (SP) artillery pieces, 100-mm, 122-mm, and 152-mm are essentially armored fighting vehicles and usually are so used. In the defense, tanks and SP artillery normally are used against armored penetrations as part of the counterattack forces. Nonregimental medium tanks and SP artillery may support motorized rifle battalions when it is believed that enemy armor attack is too strong for the normal antitank defenses and attachments. Heavy tanks and SP guns may be employed to establish ambushes for enemy tank units. These ambushes are set up in a horseshoe shape with the open side toward the enemy on a good avenue of approach. The positions are frequently dug in and well concealed.

## Section II. NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

### 6–23. Nuclear Weapons

*a.* The initial use of nuclear weapons is controlled by the Minister of the Armed Forces. Once nuclear weapons have been employed, tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are under the control of the Army Group Commander. Delegation of control to subordinate commanders is rarely allowed and then only in special situations such as during the exploitation phase of an offensive. Commanders who do not have an allocation of nuclear weapons or control of delivery systems request fires to support their mission from the next higher command.

*b.* Aggressor has a family of nuclear weapons ranging from the subkiloton to the multimegaton. These weapons can be delivered by conventional artillery, rockets, guided missiles and aircraft. Selected data on Aggressor nuclear weapons is contained in figure 6–4. Aggressor considers only one category of missile artillery comprising all large free rockets and surface-to-surface missiles in the hands of ground troops. Aggressor subdivides its missile artillery into tactical and strategic subcategories according to range and mission. The tactical subcategory includes both free rockets and the shortrange guided missiles. The strategic subcategory includes the larger and longer-range guided missiles. In addition to the rockets and guided missiles used by the ground forces as missile artillery, there are many surface-to-surface free rockets and guided missiles used by the Aggressor Navy, launched from surface ships and submarines, as well as aircraft delivered weapons used by the Aggressor Air Force against both surface and airborne targets. Aggressor missilery is highly advanced and new rockets and missiles can be expected to appear in all categories.

### 6–24. Aggressor Rocket and Missile Systems (fig 6–5)

*a. Free Rockets.* Aggressor employs one-round free rocket launchers for general support. Available warheads include high explosive (HE), nuclear, and chemical/biological (CB) munitions. However, the Aggressor concept of employment emphasizes the use of these weapons primarily as a nuclear delivery means. These free rocket launchers are mounted on tracked carriers that are ideally suited for mobile, fast-moving cross-country operations, and thus capable of rendering close support to ground forces. The RAGE carrier is amphibious. RAKE rocket characteristics are unknown, and no RAKE equipped units have been identified. Free rockets are tactical artillery weapons.

| Delivery System[1] | | Type Weapon and Yield | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Delivery error | | | | Burst Options: low or high air and the following | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | SUBALFA | ALFA | BRAVO | KAROLO | DELTA | EKO | FOKSO | GOLFO | HOTEL | INDIO | JULIO | KILO | LIMA | MIKO | NENIO | OBEI | PETI | KVEN | Horizontal (meters) | | | Vertical (meters) | | |
| | | 0.1 KT | 0.5 KT | 1 KT | 2 KT | 5 KT | 10 KT | 20 KT | 50 KT | 100 KT | 200 KT | 500 KT | 1 MT | 2 MT | 5 MT | 10 MT | 20 MT | 50 MT | 100 MT | CEP | $PE_r$ | $PE_d$ | $PE_h$ | Contact surface | Sub-surface |
| Cannon[3] | 203mm gun—how | | | X | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Divide range by 145 | Divide range by 300 | Divide range by 500 | Divide range by 500 | | |
| | 240mm mort | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 310mm gun (SP) | | X | | X | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | 400mm mort (SP) | | | | X | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Free Rocket | RAGE | | | | X | | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | Divide range by 75 | Divide range by 200 | Divide range by 100 | Divide range by 200 | X | |
| | RAGE 1A | | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | |
| | RAKE | | | | | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| SSM | RANCOR | | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | 600 | | | 30 | X | |
| | RAVAGE | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | 1,000 | | | 100 | X | |
| | REBEL | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | | | | 1,500 | | | 150 | X | |
| | REGAL | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | 3,000 | | | 250 | X | |
| SAM | REGENT | | | | X | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | '75 | | | '100 | 2X | |
| | RASCAL | | | | X | | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | '150 | | | '100 | 2X | |
| AIRCRAFT | FRACTURE | | | | | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | | | 200 | | | 50 | X | |
| | FORFEIT | | | | X | | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | | | 200 | | | 50 | X | |
| | FRENZY | | | | | | X | X | X | X | X | X | | | | | | | | 600 | | | 100 | X | |
| ADM[2] | | | X | | X | | X | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | X | X |

1 Surface to surface fires only.
2 Atomic demolition munition.
3 Although the 152mm gun (fig. 6-1) is assumed to have nuclear capability, no data is available.

NOTE: Determination of nuclear weapons effects for above weapons can be made by using data available in FM 101-31-3.

*Figure 6-4. Aggressor nuclear weapons for which data is available.*

| System | Range Minimum | Maximum | Mount | Propellant | Ammunition[1] | Guidance | Emplacement Time | Minimum time between rounds | Associated equipment |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Free Rockets** | | | | | | | | | |
| RAGE<br><br>RAGE 1A | 8,000 meters<br><br>8,000 meters | 24,000 meters<br><br>36,000 meters | Amphibious tank chassis[2] | Solid rocket motor | HE<br>CB<br>Nuclear | Free flight<br>Preset fuzing | 15 minutes | 30 minutes | Pole trailers, capacity 2 rockets, complete.<br>Fire direction van.<br>Warhead checkout van.<br>Met station including wind set and weather balloon with radiosonde.<br>Medium and small generators. |
| RAKE | Unknown | Unknown | Heavy tank chassis | Solid rocket motor | HE<br>CB<br>Nuclear | Free flight<br>Preset fuzing | 25 minutes | 40 minutes | Pole trailers, capacity 1 complete rocket.<br>Fire direction van.<br>Warhead checkout van.<br>Met station, including wind set and weather balloon with radiosonde.<br>Medium and small generators. |
| **Surface-to-Surface Missiles** | | | | | | | | | |
| RANCOR | 10 Km | 120 Km | Heavy tank chassis[3] | Solid Propellant | HE<br>CB<br>Nuclear | Command-Inertial | 40 minutes | 1 hour | Pole trailers, capacity 1 missile without warhead.<br>Fire direction van.<br>Computer van.<br>Warhead checkout van.<br>CLEAVER fire control radar.<br>Large and medium generators. |
| RAVAGE | 90 Km | 380 Km | Heavy tank chassis[3] | Liquid Propellant | HE<br>CB<br>Nuclear | Command-Inertial | 1 hour | 1 hour missile fueled<br>3 hour missile empty | Long pole trailers, capacity 1 missile with warhead.<br>Fire direction vans.<br>Computer vans.<br>Warhead checkout vans.<br>CLEAVER fire control radar<br>Liquid fuel tank trucks.<br>Heavy duty cranes.<br>Air compressors.<br>Air-conditioning vans.<br>Large and medium generators. |

*Figure 6-5. Aggressor free rocket and surface-to-surface missile systems.*

| | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| REBEL | 300 Km | 1200 Km | Towed on trailer. Fired from launching pad. | Solid Propellant | Nuclear Biological | Command Inertial | 3 hours | 1½ hours | Long pole trailers, capacity 1 missile with warhead. Fire direction van. Computer van. Warhead checkout van. CLEAVER fire control radar. Heavy duty crane. Large and medium generators. |
| REGAL | 1000 Km | 12000 Km | Semipermanent installation, or rail mobile. | Liquid Propellant | Nuclear | Command-Inertial | Semi-permanent 4 days Rail mobile 12 hours | 4 hours | Extensive ground handling equipment similar to REBEL but more complex, with additional radars. Rail mobile system distinguished by extra long cars for the missiles, radar antennas mounted on cars, tank cars, and crew quarters. |
| URGE | 1900 Km | 5100 Km | Underwater, launched from submarines. | Solid Propellant | Nuclear | Inertial | Unknown | Unknown | Unknown |

1 See figure 6-4 for yields of nuclear weapons.
2 Cannot be fired while afloat.
3 Launcher raises to vertical for firing; hydraulic jacks provide stability.

*Figure 6-5—Continued.*

*b. Surface-to-Surface Guided Missiles.* Aggressor has a complete family of surface-to-surface missiles, ranging from short-range ballistic missiles in the tactical category to the strategic intercontinental ballistic missile. Surface-to-surface missiles are nuclear artillery weapons.

*c. Surface-to-Air Guided Missiles (fig 6–2).* Aggressor surface-to-air guided missiles are an integral part of Aggressor's antiaircraft artillery defense. REGENT and RASCAL systems have a surface-to-surface capability and can employ HE, nuclear, or CB warheads. CB warheads are used in the surface-to-surface role only. The RAIDER and RAMMER systems are primarily designed for defense of the army group area. They may be found, however, in defense of critical field installations at lower levels. The RAIDER employs HE warheads only. The RAMMER is reported to be nuclear capable, and it is believed to also have a surface-to-surface capability.

## 6–25. Target Analysis

Aggressor employs essentially the same system of target analysis employed by the United States Army. Aggressor exercises great care in the target selection process to insure adequate economy of expenditures consistent with the tactical requirements. Aggressor employs nuclear weapons usually on a one shot basis; even if more than one weapon is used, there is only one weapon at a time for each desired ground zero. Aggressor analysts work on the assumption of a high reliability of their nuclear delivery means. Provisions, however, are made in the case of critical targets for alternate means to attack the target in case the first weapon fails to achieve the desired effects. Aggressor considers target suitability in the light of the current tactical situation and mission. Aggressor considers the following priorities for target selection:

*a.* Enemy nuclear delivery means.

*b.* Large troop concentrations.

*c.* Critical command and control installations.

*d.* Large supply facilities, with special emphasis on nuclear ammunition storage points.

Much consideration is given to the possible effects upon their own forces and subsequent operations.

## 6–26. Nuclear Weapons Employment

*a. Concept.* Main efforts are supported by nuclear fires. If nuclear weapons are available in sufficient numbers, secondary efforts are also supported by nuclear fires.

(1) In the offensive and defensive, full use is made of artillery and airpower. Nuclear weapons are integrated with other artillery and air delivered fires to achieve massed fire support.

(2) Nuclear weapons supplement but do not replace conventional weapons. They are employed for their mass and surprise effect with the massed fires of conventional weapons. Nuclear weapons are employed only against carefully selected targets that permit the achievement of maximum effectiveness with the minimum expenditure of nuclear resources, minimum danger to Aggressor troops and minimum effects that will hinder the maintenance of control. Missile or aircraft-delivered small yield weapons, 2–5 kilotons, are not to be fired at targets closer than 2–5 kilometers to Aggressor troops unless the troops are well protected. Aggressor employed nuclear weapons fired by gun artillery and mortars may be employed as close as 1.5 kilometers to Aggressor troops.

(3) Where surprise is a major consideration, nuclear or chemical fires may be used instead of conventional artillery and air fires in preparations and counterpreparations. Aggressor teaches that the full effect of nuclear fire is realized by coordinating nuclear attacks with conventional fires and air attack, followed by immediate ground exploitation.

*b. Offense.*

(1) In the offense, nuclear weapons systems are sited approximately one-third of the maximum effective range from the leading friendly elements.

(2) In a large-scale offensive, the principal uses of nuclear weapons are:

(*a*) Destruction of enemy nuclear weapons delivery means, including airbases that cannot be otherwise eliminated.

(*b*) Initial preparation.

(*c*) Reduction of enemy defenses or forces that may slow the offensive.

(*d*) Prevention and destruction of enemy counterattacks.

(*e*) Elimination of enemy troop concentrations and reserves.

(3) The allocation of nuclear weapons for the above purposes varies with the strength of the enemy defenses and the scheme of maneuver. Normally, the largest allocation is for destruction of the enemy tactical forces (usually the corps in contact), with the highest percentage being allocated to support the main

effort. The next largest allocations normally are for the destruction of large enemy reserves and enemy nuclear weapons delivery means. Some nuclear weapons are held in reserve to support the tank army when committed and for unforeseen contingencies.

(4) Before the actual start of the preparation, only deep targets are attacked with nuclear fires to achieve surprise and to conceal the location of the main effort. Suitable targets for such attack are enemy airbases, nuclear delivery means, storage sites, and supply concentrations. Nonnuclear fires are normally massed on enemy forces in close contact, though nuclear fires may be used to assist in making the penetration. Close-in targets usually are attacked last to achieve surprise as to the exact location of the main effort.

*c. Defense.*

(1) In the defense, nuclear delivery weapons systems are generally sited at a distance equal to approximately one-third to one-half of their maximum range.

(2) In the defense nuclear fires are primarily used:

(*a*) To destroy enemy nuclear delivery means.

(*b*) In conjunction with chemical fires, to break up the enemy's offensive by inflicting severe damage or casualties to the enemy's main attacking group. Aggressor believes that consequent disruption of the enemy offensive might provide the opportunity to seize the initiative and switch from the defense to offensive action.

(*c*) In counterpreparations.

(*d*) In support of counterattacks.

(*e*) To eliminate penetrations.

(*f*) To deny areas to the enemy by use of surface bursts.

## 6-27. Radiological Operations

*a. Offense.* Radiological operations are limited to contamination from surface to subsurface bursts of nuclear weapons. Radiologically contaminated barriers are used to slow the advance of opposing troops and to canalize sizeable elements into restricted pockets to create targets suitable for nuclear weapons. Tank or motorized forces follow up nuclear strikes against main defenses of the enemy to break through these defenses and to achieve quick control of the area.

*b. Defense.* Radioactive contamination from nuclear weapons is used in support of defensive operations to restrict or hinder the opposing force use of areas, or to cause concentration and canalization of attacking forces. This type of contamination is used in large-scale barrier and denial operations to delay the opposing force, and hinder reconstruction of vital installations.

## 6-28. Radiological and Nuclear Defensive Measures

*a. General.* Aggressor has developed specific measures to reduce the blast, thermal, and radiation effects of nuclear weapons against command structures, personnel, and materiel. These measures are detailed and complete and are used by all units in all types of operations, in rear and forward areas, with the technical assistance of chemical and engineer troops. Such specific measures are used with other protective measures, such as continuous contact with the enemy, withdrawal from expected target areas prior to enemy nuclear attack, dispersions, rapid movement, camouflage, and deception. Many of the measures employed for defense against chemical and biological attack are also applicable for defense against nuclear attack.

*b. Responsibility for CBR and Nuclear Defense Measures.*

(1) The Aggressor intelligence organization is responsible for detecting enemy intentions regarding the use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. Regimental and higher headquarters are responsible for insuring uninterrupted control of operations.

(2) Chemical troops are used for:

(*a*) Detecting CBR contamination and surveying to determine the extent of contamination and dose rates.

(*b*) Warning troops of the presence of contamination.

(*c*) Assisting in training troops in CBR and nuclear defense measures.

(*d*) Supplying protective equipment, radiation and chemical survey instruments and personnel to units.

(*e*) Decontaminating routes through areas subjected to contamination and assisting units in personnel and equipment decontamination.

(3) Engineer troops are used for:

(*a*) Selecting and preparing sites for attack positions, deployment areas, command posts, and rear area installations that offer maximum passive defense against the effects of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

(*b*) Clearing debris resulting from nuclear attacks.

(*c*) Constructing and maintaining roads, bridges, and detours necessary to bypass areas made unusable by effects of nuclear or chemical fires.

(*d*) Testing water sources to detect CBR contamination, and decontaminating water supplies when necessary.

*c. Chemical and Radiological Reconnaissance.*

(1) Unit commanders are responsible for radiological monitoring and chemical detection within their unit perimeter. Chemical troops perform radiological survey and chemical detection in unoccupied areas, along supply routes and other critical areas.

(2) Three types of chemical and radiological reconnaissance are:

(*a*) *Chemical and radiological observation posts.* These posts consist of three individuals who periodically check their unit areas for the presence of radioactivity and chemical agents. There is at least one post per battalion. The battalion commander is responsible for warning his unit and higher headquarters of the presence of radiological contamination.

(*b*) *Radiation patrols.* Radiation patrols are formed by the chemical platoon of each regiment for conducting radiological surveys. They operate on foot or use motorcycles, trucks, motorized rifle transporters, tanks, or aircraft to carry out these surveys. These patrols have more elaborate detection equipment than that possessed by chemical observation post personnel.

(*c*) *Individual chemical and radiological specialists.* These personnel or teams are attached to the advance guard, reconnaissance, security, quartering, or any other special details that may need the services of personnel trained in chemical and radiological methods.

*d. Concept of CBR Defense.* Aggressor defense against nuclear bursts provides for maximum defensive measures to be taken against nuclear weapons effects consistent with the accomplishment of the mission. Nuclear defense measures are detailed and reduced to a standing operating procedure. These defensive measures are a command responsibility, with chemical and engineer personnel furnishing technical advice and assistance. In all operations, battalions and larger units prepare detailed plans covering measures to be taken in case of an enemy nuclear attack. Plans and operating procedures usually include the following:

(1) Concentration of the intelligence effort to determine the enemy's intentions to use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in specific areas.

(2) Detection of radiological or chemical contamination. Aggressor has radiation and chemical devices similar to those used by US forces. These devices are used by the special reconnaissance teams to detect the presence of radioactive or chemical contamination.

(3) Troop warning systems. Aggressor uses two types of CBR warning systems. One system warns of the presence of contamination, and the other warns of the imminent use of friendly nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Chemical troops usually issue the warning, using all available means of communications. Care is taken to insure that every soldier is warned. The air warning system is used to warn of the imminent use of friendly weapons.

(4) Individual and unit measures to reduce the effects when subjected to nuclear or chemical attack.

(5) A prescribed system to insure continuity of command and operations, through the establishment of alternate command posts and communications systems.

(6) Procedures for decontamination of personnel, weapons, and equipment exposed to contamination. Aggressor employs either complete or partial decontamination; however, neither system is used if it interferes with the mission. If possible, units are relieved and moved to the rear for decontamination. Detailed decontamination plans are prepared and complete decontamination is performed only in the rear areas after the unit has been relieved. Partial decontamination is done at the unit level to the extent of available time and equipment.

(7) Fire prevention and damage clearing measures. Aggressor units form special firefighting details and prepare plans to limit the damage created by fires caused by nuclear or chemical effects. Positions are made as fireproof as possible, and areas subjected to attack are cleared of refuse and rubble as soon as possible. Combat units do much of the work; engineer troops perform major repair and debris removal.

*e. Tactical Defensive Measures.*

(1) In all operations, maximum use is made of terrain and weather for passive defense against nuclear effects based on assumed ground zeros. For example, artillery positions

are selected to take advantage of terrain irregularities as a partial defense against thermal effects of nuclear detonations, and to reduce the target acquisition capabilities of the enemy.

(2) Maximum use is made of dispersion to preclude destruction of large concentrations by a single nuclear blast. Distances between units of battalion size are increased to achieve the desired dispersion guidance. Within the range of enemy tactical nuclear weapons, Aggressor battalion assembly areas are separated by 2 kilometers, whenever possible, and, when on the march, battalion columns are separated by at least 2 kilometers of road space.

(3) Deep entrenchments with overhead cover for personnel and subsurface shelters for tanks, vehicles, and supplies are provided where possible. If the situation permits, assembly and concentration areas are prepared with elaborate subsurface shelters before occupancy. Extensive organic mechanical means are provided to enable units to dig in rapidly for passive protection. Assembly areas for first-echelon units are occupied by second-echelon units as they are vacated.

(4) Camouflage, deception, and concealment measures are emphasized. All major troop movements behind the area of contact usually are made at night, under cover of smoke, or during other periods of limited visibility. Such movements are executed as rapidly as possible and are rigidly controlled to prevent undue massing. Extensive decoying, false rail and road movements, and simulated radio traffic are incorporated into tactical cover and deception plans at all command levels in an attempt to make the enemy waste nuclear weapons.

(5) Operations exposure guidance for each operation is announced by the army group. Armies and divisions may modify the guidance to a lower risk for certain subordinate units, but may not increase the exposure risk without prior approval from the army group. In emergency situations, the local commander may exceed the announced guidance if he is unable to contact his parent unit. The fact that a battalion-size or larger unit has, or will exceed the exposure guidance must be reported to the division as soon as possible. It must be pointed out that Aggressor permits higher radiation doses for troops than those permitted by the US Army, even allowing lethal doses when the situation requires.

(6) CBR reconnaissance and decontamination teams or units are provided all task organizations. These teams or units provide the commander a capability of rapidly detecting the presence of a hazard, finding alternate routes around contaminated areas, and performing limited personnel and equipment decontamination. If the mission requires crossing a contaminated area, troops are mounted in tanks or motorized rifle transporters and cross the area as rapidly as possible.

## Section III. CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL AND FLAME OPERATIONS

### 6–29. Control of Chemical and Biological Weapons.

The initial use of chemical and biological weapons is controlled by the Minister of the Armed Forces. Once chemical agents have been used, control of chemical operations involving such agents is delegated to army level. The use of smoke is controlled by divisions. Employment of biological agents normally is coordinated at army group or higher level, since the delivery systems and long-range strategic planning to take advantage of delayed casualties produced by a biological attack are accomplished at that level.

### 6–30. Chemical and Biological Agents.

*a.* Dissemination of Aggressor chemical and biological agents is accomplished through the use of artillery, mortar, missiles, aircraft bombs, and aircraft spray, ground spray equipment, and underwater missiles launched from Aggressor submarines. Specific delivery means will be discussed later.

*b.* Aggressor conducts antipersonnel operations by use of chemical fires separately or in conjunction with nuclear or nonnuclear fires.

(1) Chemical agents employed by Aggressor may be similar to agents shown in TM 3–215 and FM 21–40. Available information on Aggressor agents is as follows:

(*a*) Agents employed for immediate casualties and nonpersistent effects include G series nerve agents, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride, and phosgene. In addition, Aggressor employs a nonpersistent mental incapacitant, designated NK, having temporary psychological and physiological effects. This gaseous agent is colorless and odorless. It will affect personnel within 30 minutes to 1 hour after exposure, inducing hallucinations and inhibiting motor

reflexes. Complete recovery usually occurs within 32 hours.

(*b*) Agents employed for persistent effect to produce casualties, restrict use of terrain or materiel, and for defensive operations include V series nerve agents, mustard, and lewisite. In addition, Aggressor reportedly is ready to employ a new persistent agent suspected of high lethality. Its exact composition is unknown, but it has been tentatively identified as an anticholinestrerase phospholipid nerve agent.

(2) Irritant agents used by Aggressor for an irritant and incapacitating effect include adamsite and chloroacetophenone.

(3) Aggressor uses white phosophorous and oil as smoke agents.

*c.* In the event of biological operations, Aggressor will employ antipersonnel and antianimal biological agents as well as antiplant agents. Biological agents employed by Aggressor may be similar to agents described in TM 3–216. Information available on Aggressor agents is as follows:

(1) *Lugo Fatigue (common name).* A vegetative incapacitating agent.

(*a*) *Scientific name*: bacterium fatigum.

(*b*) *Description*: a gram-negative, nonsporulating, motile, rod-shaped, aerobic bacterium, 0.5 by 1.0 microns.

(*c*) *Disease produced*: lugo fatigue is an incapacitating, disabling disease of long duration, in man it is characterized by sores in the nose and throat.

(*d*) *Mode of transmission*: by ingestion or inhalation of organisms.

(*e*) *Incubation period*: from 2 to 5 days.

(*f*) *Susceptibility*: susceptibility is general, about 90 percent, among unexposed individuals. Recovery from an attack results in temporary immunity lasting up to 6 months.

(*g*) *Prevalence*: the disease is almost unknown in the United States but is common in Aggressor's Homeland.

(*h*) *Length of incapacitation*: average among untreated individuals is 3 months.

(*i*) *Mortality*: in untreated individuals mortality ranges from 0 to 10 percent.

(*j*) *Immunization*: temporary only; is effective in 40 percent vaccinated individuals for a 6-month period.

(*k*) *Treatment*: appropriate antibiotics lower mortality and shorten the course of disease.

(*l*) *Epidemicity*: high in presence of carriers, in absence of sanitary controls, and where no protection has been provided by immunization.

(*m*) *Stability*: is viable 2 to 3 weeks in water; 1 to 2 months in fecal matter. Pasteurization, (expose to 142 degrees F. for 30 minutes), by cooking or boiling are effective measures of decontamination.

(*n*) *Probable mode of dissemination*: by airplane spray tank, guided missiles, aerosol bomb, or aerosol generator.

(o) *Decay factors*: 2 hours, day; 5 hours, night.

(2) *Toledo infection (common name).* A sporeforming, lethal type, biological agent.

(*a*) *Scientific name*: bacillus pneumosporus.

(*b*) *Description*: A gram-positive, sporulating, nonmotile, rod-shaped, aerobic organism, 1.0 to 1.3 by 3.0 to 10 microns.

(*c*) *Disease produced*: toledo infection is pulmonary infection characterized by high fever, glandular swelling, coughing, pneumonia, and skin lesions.

(*d*) *Mode of transmission*: by ingestion or inhalation.

(*e*) *Incubation period*: from 1 to 3 days.

(*f*) *Susceptibility*: general among previously unexposed personnel.

(*g*) *Prevalence*: the disease is widespread in animals, rare in man.

(*h*) *Mortality*: in untreated personnel mortality ranges from 90 to 100 percent.

(*i*) *Immunization*: none has been developed for man.

(*j*) *Treatment*: cutaneous infections can be effectively treated by some antibiotics (penicillin, terramycin). Similar treatment for respiratory infections may be effective in early stages.

(*k*) *Epidemicity*: not epidemic in man.

(*l*) *Stability*: very stable and may remain viable in soil and water for years. Steam under pressure, or dry heat at 165 degrees F. for 1½ hours, is necessary to kill spores. Ordinary disinfectants have a limited effect.

(*m*) *Probable mode of dissemination*: spores are disseminated in vials or capsules from airplane spray tanks, guided missiles, or from other dry agent disseminators. They may be dispersed from an aerosol dispenser when suspended in a liquid solution.

(*n*) *Decay factors*: 10 hours, day; 10 hours, night.

(3) *September fever (common name).* A viral incapacitating type biological agent.

(*a*) *Scientific name*: September fever virus.

(*b*) *Description*: a virus 10 to 20 millicrons in diameter.

(c) *Disease produced*: September fever is an acute, infectious disease of field mice (mus aggressoris) transmissible to man. It is characterized in humans by high fever (103 to 104 degrees F.), muscular aches, vomiting, diarrhea, and complete helplessness. The symptoms last from 6 to 10 days and recovery normally is uneventful.

(d) *Mode of transmission*: in nature, by inhalation of dust containing contaminated rodent feces.

(e) *Incubation period*: from 1 to 3 days.

(f) *Susceptibility*: general, about 95 percent, among unexposed individuals. Recovery from an attack results in immunity lasting from 10 to 30 years.

(g) *Prevalence*: this disease is found only in the plains area of the Aggressor nation.

(h) *Length of incapacitation*: average among untreated individuals is 6 to 10 days.

(i) *Mortality*: fatalities are low (2 to 3 percent) even in untreated individuals.

(j) *Immunization*: none.

(k) *Treatment*: there is no specific treatment; supportive only.

(l) *Epidemicity*: disease is not communicable from man to man.

(m) *Stability*: viable in dried rodent feces for 1 to 3 weeks. Exposure to direct sunlight kills the organism in 1/2 to 1 hour. It may be killed by heating to 176 degrees F. for 3 minutes. Formalin is an effective decontamination agent.

(n) *Probable mode of dissemination*: by airplane spray tank, guided missiles, or aerosol generator.

(o) *Decay factors*: 1 hour, day; 3 hours, night.

(4) *Cholera (common name)*. A lethal type biological agent.

(a) *Scientific name*: Vibrio Comma.

(b) *Description*: A short, slightly bent, motile, gram-negative, nonsporulating rod.

(c) *Disease produced*: Cholera, an acute infectious disease of man, is characterized by sudden onset with nausea, vomiting, profuse watery diarrhea, rapid loss of body fluids, toxemia, and frequent collapse.

(d) *Mode of transmission*: through direct and indirect fecal contamination of water or foods, by soiled hands or utensils, or by flies.

(e) *Incubation period*: 1 to 5 days.

(f) *Susceptibility*: General. Recovery from an attack is followed by a temporary immunity which may furnish some protection for years.

(g) *Prevalence*: endemic centers exist in India and Southeast Asia. It normally is absent from the Western Hemisphere.

(h) *Mortality*: ranges from 3 to 30 percent in treated cases, up to 50 percent in untreated cases.

(i) *Immunization*: artificial immunization with vaccines is of variable degree and uncertain duration (6 to 12 months). Acquired immunity lasts for many years.

(j) *Treatment*: drug therapy has little or no effect upon the clinical course of the disease. Supportive treatment: by replenishing body fluid and mineral losses. Orally administered antibiotics are effective in reducing the spread of the disease.

(k) *Epidemicity*: very high under unsanitary conditions, especially those concerned with water supplies, food, and fly control.

(l) *Stability*: the organism is easily killed by drying. It is not viable in pure water, but will survive up to 24 hours in sewage, and as long as 6 weeks in certain types of relatively impure water containing salts and organic matter. It can withstand freezing for 3 to 4 days. It is readily killed by dry heat at 212 degrees F., by steam and boiling, by short exposure to ordinary disinfectants, and by chlorination of water.

(m) *Probable mode of dissemination*: by releasing infected insect vectors in containers or crates equipped with parachutes and automatic opening devices.

## 6-31. Employment of Chemical Agents

*a. Concept.* Aggressor stresses coordinated use of chemical agents and chemical support troops in a variety of offensive and defensive operations. When tactical nuclear weapons are employed, chemical weapons may be used as follow-up weapons. Aggressor plans to use several chemical agents at various points at the same time to gain maximum effect in the offense. Emphasis is on bulk dissemination, principally from aircraft, and also from munitions of simple design. Aggressor naval forces also have limited capability to disseminate.

*b. Offense.* Use of chemical agents is carried out quickly and without warning to inflict maximum casualties on opposing forces and restrict their use of important areas and facilities.

(1) Chemical operations in support of offensive operations are characterized by the following:

(a) Employment of chemical agents to

restrict movement is given special consideration. Persistent agents are used to contaminate obstacles on roads and routes used by advancing or retreating enemy troops, with special emphasis placed on hindering their escape during withdrawal. Handgrenades containing irritant agents are used by platoon-size units to help neutralize small fixed and fortified positions. Chemical fragmentation bombs are used to reduce the will of opposing forces to fight through a combined harassment (or casualty) and fragmentation effect.

(*b*) Aggressor will take a much higher risk than US forces in the use of chemical agents. He will attack over terrain that he has contaminated with mustard after a delay of only several hours.

(*c*) Concentrations of chemical agents are employed to exhaust enemy strength and reduce morale. By forcing continuous wear of protective clothing and masks, chances of facepiece leakage, canister breakdown, and damage to the protective mask are increased. In addition to the direct casualties from the chemical agent, casualties may be produced due to heat stress from prolonged wearing of protective clothing.

(2) Dissemination of chemical agents in Aggressor offensive operations includes artillery, mortar, rockets, missiles, aircraft bombs and aircraft spray, ground spray equipment, and underwater missiles launched by Aggressor submarines. Objectives for use of chemical agents in offensive operations are outlined below.

(*a*) Chemical agents delivered by artillery, mortar, rocket and missiles are employed to produce persistent contamination of enemy artillery and mortar positions, observation posts, and small critical terrain features to decrease their usefulness. They may also be employed against troop concentrations to circumvent the protective mask when delayed casualties are acceptable. Agents employed to produce quick acting vapor hazards are used against enemy troop concentrations to produce immediate casualties. Agents are used repeatedly, especially at night, to reduce the combat strength of opposing forces. Concentrations are maintained from 1 to 4 hours and under favorable weather conditions for as long as 8 to 12 hours. Chemical agents are used on objectives in direct support of breakthrough operations and against counterattacking troops. They are also used against resistance centers and reserves in bivouac or in movement. Chemical agents are used to neutralize approaching reserves. Agents are used to contaminate roads in the rear of engaged units, to hinder disengagement, and to isolate them from ground support. They are also used for flank protection. In pursuit, chemical agents are employed to contaminate escape routes to impede enemy withdrawal as well as employed directly on enemy units to inflict casualties.

(*b*) Aircraft deliver chemical agents, either by bombs or by spray, to aid Aggressor troops in the approach by neutralizing and inflicting casualties on enemy targets. These targets include troops not in contact, in assembly areas, on the march, or troops entraining and detraining. The employment is essentially the same as for artillery, except that aircraft can be used beyond normal artillery range.

(*c*) Ground spray equipment and landmines, because of their short range, are limited to the contamination of terrain to protect flanks, approaches to defensive positions, and to produce casualties on opposing troops during flanking movements.

(*d*) Submarines employ chemical agents either by underwater-to-surface missiles or chemical warhead torpedoes to harass troop transports and supply vessels, and to render them ineffective for troop and equipment resupply.

*c. Defense.* Large scale use of chemical agents is indicated in the defense. Various types of agents are used during all phases of defensive combat from aerial chemical attack on the enemy during his approach march to the action after he has penetrated the main defensive lines.

(1) Aggressor's defensive use of chemical agents prescribes that chemical landmines are to be used to impede the advance of opposing forces and to tie in obstacles. Aggressor employs repeated attacks and prolonged concentrations of chemical agents on attacking personnel to produce casualties and require continuous wear of protective equipment. Obstacles are normally contaminated to delay clearing and impede advance. Aggressor normally employs liquid chemical agents for large area contamination during withdrawal.

(2) Methods of dissemination of chemical agents in Aggressor defensive operations include artillery, mortars, rockets, missiles, mechanical spraying devices, landmines, aircraft, and submarines. Objectives for the use of chemical agents in defensive operations are outlined below.

(*a*) Artillery, mortar, rocket, and missile warheads filled with chemical agents are

used in the same manner as in offensive operations.

(*b*) Mechanical spraying devices and landmines disperse agents for a persistent effect. Spraying devices are used during withdrawal for large-scale contamination. The munitions are also used to contaminate defiles, river-crossing sites, prepared obstacles and buildings, that have been damaged or destroyed by demolitions or have been prepared as obstacles.

(*c*) Aircraft disseminate chemical agents by bombs or spray. The manner of employment is similar to that for artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles except that targets engaged usually are beyond the range of these weapons. Aircraft are used to establish a contamination with a persistent effect on units on the march or in assembly areas, on reserve concentrations, on command posts, and on supply facilities. Contamination of personnel and facilities causes casualties, hinders movement, and interferes with support and supply of the opposing forces. Aircraft also deliver agents for a nonpersistent effect to inflict casualties and harass attacking troops.

(*d*) Submarines disseminate chemical agents by missiles or torpedoes. The purpose is to block enemy attempts to resupply by sea. The major targets are transport ships and harbors to cause casualties, hinder loading and unloading of troops and equipment, and interfere with support and supply by means of vessels.

## 6–32. Biological Operations

The purpose of Aggressor biological operations is to attack opposing personnel, causing death or disability either directly by use of antipersonnel agents or indirectly by limiting his food and water supply.

*a.* Dissemination of biological agents is accomplished by aircraft spray equipment, aerosol bomb, artillery shell, aerosol generators, infected animals, vials, capsules, and hand aerosol dispensers. The Aggressor biological agents are not restricted to specific munitions.

*b.* Although Aggressor propaganda may indicate that biological operations will be used only as a means of retaliation, Aggressor can be expected to use biological agents quickly and concurrently with all other means in general war. Selection of biological agents depends upon the target attacked, the nature of the operation, and the weather and other meteorological conditions. Aggressor's plans include a massive biological attack against large, well-defended cities. Before such an attack, the defenses of the city would be weakened by using biological agents in surrounding areas.

*c.* Aggressor uses biological agents in the defense to contaminate opposing reserve forces, supply depots, and other rear area installations, in order to decrease the support afforded opposing frontline troops.

## 6–33. Chemical and Biological Defense

*a.* Aggressor has developed specific measures to reduce the effects of chemical and biological agents against command structures, personnel, and equipment. Many of the measures discussed under nuclear defense are applicable to chemical and biological defense (para 6–28). In addition to those previously discussed, Aggressor has developed, produced, and supplied to its armies a variety of means of individual and collective protection to insure continuous operations despite chemical and biological attacks. These include:

(1) Protective masks that afford respiratory protection against all known chemical agents; protective covers (also used as ground sheets), chemical protective capes, boot covers, and special protective clothing for operations in contaminated areas.

(2) Shelters providing an uncontaminated atmosphere for use by individuals, groups, small units, headquarters and command posts, and medical aid posts. In these shelters, normal duties can be continued, wounded and chemical casualties can be treated, and essential staff and supply functions carried out.

(3) Personnel decontamination equipment, decontamination stations, and medical facilities for evacuation. Initial aid for chemical casualties is provided by the individual soldier from his first aid packet. Medical treatment may be provided at company level. During combat, personnel who have been contaminated will not be evacuated immediately unless also wounded.

*b.* Aggressor's defense against biological attack is based on attempts to minimize rather than prevent effects of such attacks. The protection of personnel against biological agents in aerosol form is effected by donning the protective mask. Other means of protection include immunizing shots, quarantining of contaminated buildings and areas, cleanliness of hands, proper care of cuts and wounds, and education of troops to eat and drink from approved sources only.

*c.* Aggressor organization and training for

chemical and biological protection are responsibilities of every commander and are included in the planning and preparation for any action. Training programs stress CBR discipline, and rapidity in masking. All units of battalion size and larger have organic chemical units and/or staff personnel to assist units in CBR and nuclear defensive measures.

*d.* Chemical observation is conducted by all troop units, and by chemical troops where available, on a continuous basis. The mission of observers is to determine enemy preparations for chemical or biological attack and to warn units upon indication of initiation of such attacks.

*e.* Aggressor utilizes the following CBR contamination marking system:

| *Contamination* | *Primary Color* | *Lettering* |
|---|---|---|
| Radiation | Blue | White ATOMO |
| Chemical | Red | Yellow KEMIA |
| Biological | Green | Red BUIO |

Aggressor marks contaminated areas with 20 × 27 centimeter rectangular signs, unless the area is to be abandoned to the enemy. The lettering and color scheme are indicated above.

## 6–34. Flame Operations

Flame operations (combat with any type of incendiary weapon or ammunition) can be expected whenever they support Aggressor's plan of operation. They are most effective against static installations and prepared defenses. Flame weapons include static, portable, and mechanized flamethrowers, as well as air-delivered incendiary bombs. Flamethrowers are also designed to disperse persistent chemical agents and smoke for screening purposes.

*a. Offense.*

(1) Static flame weapons are used primarily for defensive operations, but they are also used for clearing opposing forces located close to Aggressor jumpoff positions. For this purpose, static flame weapons are installed during the night prior to the attack, and are set off just before the Aggressor offensive gets underway.

(2) Portable flamethrowers are organic special purpose weapons of the motorized rifle company and the division engineer battalion. Portable flamethrowers are employed with assaulting elements to assist in the capture of strongpoints and pillboxes and to repel counterattacks. They are also employed in various phases of street fighting.

(3) Mechanized flamethrowers in offensive operations are used to reinforce elements leading the main assault and to operate against reserves during the exploitation phase following a breakthrough in close coordination with tank weapons. They are also effective in street fighting to flush opposing troops from fortified buildings, bunkers, and other hiding places.

*b. Defense.* Flame weapons are extensively used in defensive operations. Static flame weapons are employed primarily in defensive operations. They are set out along expected routes of opposing troop advance or in front of Aggressor positions. They are fired by remote control, timing devices, or pressure. Mechanized flamethrowers are used defensively to ambush advancing detachments and to support tank and motorized rifle units. They are also used to cover the retreat of rear guard units, using either smokescreens or flame. In withdrawal operations, all types of flame weapons are used to set fire to supplies, buildings, grain fields, and installations that are of potential use to opposing forces. Ampoule type incendiaries are used extensively as fire weapons in defensive operations, and are used like ordinary hand grenades.

# Section IV. AGGRESSOR ENGINEER SUPPORT

## 6–35. General

*a.* Aggressor combat engineer units are found at regiment and division. Above division, there are specialized engineer organizations such as construction units, amphibious engineer units, pontoon units, and lessor known units specializing in topographic mapping, pipeline construction, and other engineer functions. Staff engineers are found at all echelons down to and including battalion.

*b.* One of the primary missions of Aggressor combat engineers is to assure the mobility of Aggressor combat forces by rapidly overcoming natural and manmade obstacles while aiding in hindering the enemy force's movement. Other missions of Aggressor combat engineers include camouflage, fire protection, damage clearing, and water supply.

## 6–36. Field Water Supply

The production of potable water in the field is the responsibility of the engineers with support from the medical service. Water supply planning is begun well in advance of an operation

| CONDITIONS | CONSUMPTION (liter/day/man) | |
|---|---|---|
| | TEMPERATE/ COLD CLIMATE | HOT DRY/HOT WET CLIMATE |
| Minimum Combat Requirement (3 day maximum) | 2.2 - 4.4 | 8.8 - 13.2 |
| Normal Combat Requirement (sustained) | 8.8 | 13.2 - 17.6 |
| March/Bivouac | 8.8 | 22 |
| Camp with Bath Facilities | 66 | - |

*Figure 6–6. Aggressor water supply requirements*

and includes a survey of existing water supplies for both quality and quantity, plans for any new wells to be dug, the deployment of water supply points, and the designation of unit responsibilities for water supply. Special engineer units are responsible for operating water points in the rear area of army groups and combined arms or tank armies, but organic combat engineers perform this function at division and below. Aggressor water consumption factors are shown in figure 6–6.

## 6–37. Engineer Equipment

Aggressor combat engineer units are armed with the same small arms and provided with the same tactical communications equipment as Aggressor combat arms units and are capable of fighting as infantry when required. Special engineer equipment is managed by the Engineer Directorate and is issued through special engineer supply channels from army group to regiment. Engineer equipment may be classified as demolitions equipment, including ADM, mine warfare equipment, river crossing equipment, and utility equipment. Items of engineer equipment include:

*a. Ditching Equipment.* In support of their highly mobile armies, Aggressor has developed high-speed ditching machines capable of digging hasty field fortifications and trenches at the rate of 14 meters per minute. The trenches produced are 1.5 to 3.5 meters deep and 1 meter wide.

*b. Earth Augers.* These can dig holes up to 4 meters in diameter and 3 meters deep in many types of soils. Shallow wells can also be dug using this equipment.

*c. Mechanical Mine Planters.* These devices are capable of carrying a load of up to 350 antitank mines and emplanting them at the rate of one per minute depending upon the conditions of the terrain.

## 6–38. Engineer Support in Offensive Operations

*a. General.* Aggressor offensive operations are characterized by speed and shock. Much of this speed and shocking power is the result of engineer operations. Engineer support is well forward and priority is given to the reduction of obstacles for maneuver units and flank security against armor threats. Secondary emphasis is given to engineer support in rear areas for logistical operations. Support is tailored to the needs of the operation.

*b. Advance to Contact.* Engineer elements are habitually assigned to units performing advanced guard missions. Engineer support re-

quirements vary with the mission, weather and terrain, and nature of the enemy threat, but normally a platoon of engineers is attached to the leading company of a motorized rifle or tank regiment. A squad of this platoon moves with the leading combat platoon, and one or two engineers may accompany the point squad.

(1) Engineers assist in reconnoitering roads, defiles, bridges, river crossing sites, bivouac areas, and water supply sources. They also mark march routes, reduce obstacles, repair and strengthen bridges and roads, and clear passages through minefields and radioactive areas.

(2) Mobile obstacle detachments (MOD) are formed from organic engineers to provide flank security against armor threats. These detachments vary in strength from a platoon to a company and are composed of motorized rifle transporters, mechanized mine layers, and trucks or tracked cargo carriers. They may also be reinforced by antitank teams. Their mission is to provide protection for the advancing column by laying hasty minefields in designated areas along armor approaches.

*c. The Breakthrough.*

(1) During preparation for the attack, maximum effort is devoted to concealing Aggressor intentions. An important mission for the engineers during this period is advising and assisting in camouflage efforts. Extensive engineer reconnaissance of the battlefield is conducted to discover minefields and other obstacles which may impede the progress of the attack and to discover possible avenues of approach for armor into the flanks and rear of the attacking force.

(2) During the attack, combat engineers are attached to motorized rifle companies expecting to encounter minefields or other obstacles. Where necessary these units are equipped with mine-clearing tanks and flamethrowers. Riflemen and engineers armed with flamethrowers protect advancing tanks from hostile infantry, neutralize antitank obstacles, and help evacuate damaged tanks.

(3) Flank security against armor is provided by MOD reinforced with antitank weapons. Mines deployed in hasty minefields blocking approaches favorable to enemy armor are recovered when the armor threat no longer exists and are moved forward to be used again as the attack progresses.

*d. The Pursuit.* Engineers are always attached to pursuit forces and are located well forward to facilitate rapid breeching of obstacles. They are always mounted or given a mobility equal to the mobility of the supported force. When possible hostile rear guards are bypassed and their routes of withdrawal are blocked by mines and demolitions prepared by engineers of the pursuit group.

## 6–39. Engineer Support in Defensive Operations

*a. General.* Aggressor defensive operations are characterized by the extensive use of prepared positions and large-scale employment of mines and other obstacles. A planned antitank defense is basic to Aggressor tactical doctrine. The primary mission of the engineers in the defense is to assist the combat elements in preparing defensive works, supervise and assist in the preparation of obstacles, and assist in maintaining the mobility of the reserves.

*b. Reconnaissance.* As in the offense, Aggressor engineers make a detailed reconnaissance and analysis of the battlefield. The results of their analysis will form the basis for planning the locations of defensive works, barriers, minefields, and the locations of routes of communications for reserve forces.

*c. Field Fortifications.* Great emphasis is placed on elaborate trench systems and heavy fortifications. To construct these rapidly, Aggressor relies heavily upon mechanical trench diggers, explosive excavators, and other specialized engineer equipment. All division defense plans include priorities for the construction of defensive works. Although the engineers are responsible for planning the construction of field fortifications and operating specialized engineer equipment, most of the actual construction work is done by the combat forces with the advice and assistance of the engineers.

*d. Obstacles.* Aggressor uses minefields and other obstacles extensively to impede and canalize the movements of enemy forces, especially tanks. Engineers are responsible for planning the use of obstacles, supervising their construction, and in some cases actually constructing them.

(1) Aggressor makes extensive use of mines in all operations but especially in the defense. Mines are employed against all types of targets. Antitank minefields are laid with a minimum average density of one mine per meter of frontage. Because the average distance between mines is 3 meters, three rows of mines are required for minimum density. In the defense, antitank minefields are placed across likely tank approaches about 400 meters in front of

the forward defenses and across approaches into areas occupied by division artillery. Controlled chemical and high explosive mines are placed in gaps in minefields and detonated by hidden observers. This allows Aggressor units to freely traverse the minefield.

(2) Obstacles other than mines are placed to cover all possible enemy avenues of approach into defensive areas. Aggressor engineers are noted for their resourcefulness in using locally available materials for the construction of obstacles. Principal types of obstacles include antitank ditches, tank traps, abatis, barbed wire, and chemical or radioactive contamination. Obstacles are covered by fire whenever possible.

## 6-40. Engineer Support in Retrograde Operations

In retrograde operations. as in other operations, the primary mission of the combat engineers is to aid in delaying the advance of enemy forces while facilitating the movements of Aggressor forces. Engineers are found in rear guards, flank security forces, and with the main body of Aggressor forces. As rear guards fall back, engineers systematically carry out a program of destruction. The scope of this destruction may vary from a scorched earth policy where nothing is left that could possibly aid enemy forces in any way to a more standard mission of destroying bridges, emplacing obstacles along enemy routes of advance, and saturating the area with boobytraps. Obstacles employed include extensive minefields and chemical or radiological contaminated areas. Flank security forces are primarily antitank oriented and MOD may be attached to them. The missions of these MOD are basically the same as their mission in the offense. At the other end of the column, engineer units assist in maintaining the routes of withdrawal by repairing roads and bridges or conducting river crossing operations where bridges no longer exist.

## 6-41. Other Engineer Operations

*a. General.* Engineers are also employed in special operations and in operations in special environments. The basic mission of the engineers remains unchanged under these conditions, but the emphasis of the support is changed. Heavy engineer support is given to forces engaged in mountain operations, operations in forests and swamps, and operations in snow and cold. Priority in these operations is given to maintaining the mobility of Aggressor forces under the prevailing conditions. During operations in cities and towns and attacks against fortified areas, priority is given to demolitions activities, and in airborne operations, the focus of engineer support is directed toward defense against armor.

*b. River Crossing Operations.* Regardless of the type crossing to be conducted—hasty or deliberate—engineer support is the key to the successful operation. Engineers provide reconnaissance of the water obstacle prior to the crossing, the equipment and expertise necessary to effect the crossing, and assistance to units before, during, and after the crossing. In this respect, engineers are organized into reconnaissance detachments, crossing detachments, and movement support detachments.

(1) Engineer reconnaissance elements generally accompany combat and reconnaissance patrols to accomplish their reconnaissance of a water obstacle. Their mission is to find the width, depth, and current speed of the river; the type of ground on the river bottom and banks; bridges, fords, or potential crossing sites, as appropriate; the availability of local resources to assist in the crossing; routes of approach and egress from the crossing sites; and the presence of mines or other obstacles.

(2) Rivers may be crossed by helicopter, by fording, by ferrying, or by bridging. The last two means are the responsibilities of special engineer units. Amphibious engineers are provided with a variety of wheeled and tracked amphibious vehicles with capacities up to 8.8 tons. They are responsible for crossing major water obstacles where bridges are impractical or the organic bridging capability needs supplementing. They are also responsible for working with the naval infantry in conducting amphibious assaults along coasts. Pontoon units are provided with floating bridges which can support the largest Aggressor tanks and other equipment. Tank-mounted scissors assault bridges are also available for crossing short gaps of up to 35 meters.

(3) Engineer movement support detachments assure a constant stream of traffic to the bridgehead and across the bridge. They are responsible for maintaining the repair of approaches to the bridge and inforcing traffic discipline prior to, during, and immediately after the crossing. A top speed of 30 kilometers per hour with vehicle intervals of 40-50 meters during the day and 25-30 meters are maintained on the bridge in order that the crossing may be effected as rapidly as possible and to avoid the creation of a nuclear target on the

| TYPE | LOCATION | NUMBER | LENGTH (M) | WIDTH (M) | CAPACITY (METRIC T) | EMPLACEMENT TIME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| SCISSORS ASSAULT | Engr Bn, Div | 3 Units | 35 | 4 | 60 | 1 Min |
| MEDIUM PONTON | Mdm Ponton CO, Div Engr Bn/ Ponton Regiment | 50 Pontons | 250 | 4 | 15 * | 50-100 M/HR |
| | | | 125 | 5 | 25 * | |
| | | | 62.5 | 5 | 50 * | |
| HEAVY PONTON | Hvy Ponton Bn, Ponton Regiment | 100 Pontons | 500 | 3 | 20 * | 25-50 M/HR |
| | | | 250 | 4 | 60 * | |
| | | | 125 | 5 | 100 * | |

* Can also be used to construct ferries of these capacities

*Figure 6-7. Aggressor bridging capabilities.*

near side of the bridge. Bridging capabilities are shown in figure 6-7.

*c. Defense Against CBR Attack.* In addition to assisting in the preparation of such passive defense measures against CBR attack as deep entrenchments with overhead cover for personnel and subsurface shelters for tanks and other vehicles and supplies, the engineers are also responsible for countering the effects of such an attack. These countermeasures include:

(1) Clearing debris resulting from a nuclear attack.

(2) Constructing and maintaining roads, bridges, and detours necessary to bypass areas made unsafe by the effects of CBR attack.

(3) Decontaminating routes through areas subjected to CBR contamination.

(4) Testing water sources to detect CBR contamination and decontaminating water supplies as necessary.

## Section V. INTELLIGENCE AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE

### 6-42. General

*a.* Aggressor regards reconnaissance and intelligence as indispensable to the planning of an operation. Improved nuclear weaponry and planned use of these weapons has had its impact on combat intelligence doctrine and great effort is exerted to establish targets in the combat situation. Aggressor intelligence objectives and activities are those normal to any military force engaged in a war. Combat intelligence doctrine includes, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Thorough training of all units and individuals in combat intelligence and counterintelligence.

(2) Specific reporting requirements levied on all members of the military.

(3) Dissemination of overlapping and duplicating requirements.

(4) Centralized control at the highest echelon of command.

(5) Comprehensive detailed coverage of the enemy, weather, and terrain.

(6) All-weather, day and night surveillance over the zone of operations to the maximum extent possible.

(7) Extensive use of reconnaissance by small units.

(8) Reliance on aerial surveillance, electronic interception, long-range patrols, and use of agents at army group level, and higher.

(9) Automatic priority assigned to the transmission of intelligence information to permit its rapid processing.

(10) Target acquisition in sufficient detail for the timely and effective employment of weapons.

*b.* Aggressor's system of intelligence information collection is predicated on the integrated use of human sources and mechanical means to gain information which intelligence analysts at all levels of command interpret into usable intelligence for the commander's use. Aggressor has placed high priority in his research and development efforts to continually improve existing systems of information gathering, as well as to develop new devices which will assist commanders in locating and identifying the enemy.

### 6-43. Combat Intelligence Operations

*a.* Numerous and varied intelligence units are available to provide all types of intelligence support to Aggressor forces. An intelligence regiment is organic to army group, a battalion to armies, and a company to divisions. Operations of these units are controlled by the intelligence officer of the command. When needed these units are supplemented by elements of the next higher intelligence unit on a temporary basis, or by personnel from intelligence units found under GHQ.

*b.* Army group, as the largest tactical grouping organized for the conduct of land and over land warfare, is the highest echelon for which combat intelligence is produced. As such it has at its disposal a variety of means of collecting information. Overall responsibility for the organized employment of these means is vested in the chief of staff of the army group. The principal staff officer to assist the chief of staff in his intelligence responsibilities is the chief, department of intelligence. At army and division level, the chief of staff is also responsible for the employment of information gathering means and the production of combat intelligence; at these levels there is also an intelligence officer assigned to the staff section, who assists the chief of staff.

*c.* At army and army group level, the intelligence unit provides the necessary intelligence personnel and equipment to operate the intelligence portion of the operations center of the command post. This includes data processing

equipment (manned and operated by signal personnel), analysis and evaluation, cryptographic and dissemination functions, and control of special operations groups.

*d.* At division level, the intelligence staff officer is the focal point for intelligence information from all sources under the control of the division and for information received from outside the division. Necessary technical personnel are contained in the division intelligence company, supplemented by attachment from the army intelligence battalion.

*e.* The army group area of interest generally extends up to 1500 kilometers forward of the forward elements in battle. There is, however, an overlapping area of interest shared by the army group and the Agency for Special Operations (ASPO). In terms of ground distance, this area lies between 1000 kilometers and 1500 kilometers forward of the Aggressor forward elements in battle. The actual chain of command and extent of responsibility has not been established, but indications are that specific cells within this geographical area would respond to both the army group and the ASPO. Up to 1000 kilometers forward of the Aggressor forward elements in battle, the army group commander employs those personnel and mechanical means normally associated with the collection of combat intelligence information. These methods include, but are not limited to, mounted and dismounted reconnaissance, imagery, electronic measures, and special troop operations.

*f.* The army area of interest usually extends some 800 kilometers forward of the Aggressor forward elements in battle, while the division's area of interest usually extends some 450 kilometers forward. Although these distances appear to be somewhat extended, it must be remembered that Aggressor's tactical doctrine for offensive operations emphasizes rapid advance during the first few days of an offensive. For this reason, army level staffs must be continually concerned with long-range planning on a continuous basis, and the division staff, while remaining concerned with the immediate tactical situation, must concurrently plan for future operations. The army and the division employ all their organic information collection assets within these areas, while also relying on their higher headquarters for information.

*g.* Other than those intelligence units previously identified, Aggressor utilizes several agencies to obtain intelligence information. Aggressor makes extensive use of the intelligence collection capabilities of the various observation and reconnaissance elements of the air army, the surveillance assets of his artillery target acquisition elements, the division reconnaissance companies, long-range patrols, and other organic assets found at all levels of command. Wide use is made of the secondary capability of guerrilla units to collect information. Clandestine agents are used in large numbers to collect information and conduct subversive activities and sabotage. In retrograde actions, extensive use is made of stay-behind elements consisting of small bodies of regular troops which are given specific passive intelligence missions. In addition, Aggressor has assigned to his combat intelligence units members of the Agency for Special Operations which are capable of providing specialized and in many cases sophisticated intelligence support to the tactical commander.

## 6–44. Agency for Special Operations

*a. General.* The Agency for Special Operations (ASPO) is responsible for the clandestine collection and production of military intelligence for Aggressor concerning target areas of interest. Organizationally, it is subordinate to the Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Service (ACIS), which is responsible for controlling all Aggressors strategic intelligence operations world-wide. ACIS is a well-developed, efficient organization which is capable of highly sophisticated operations. It is well-financed and its logistical support to lower echelon elements appears to be limited only by the ingenuity of operational planners. Though large and complex, it remains highly flexible and responsive.

*b. Headquarters, ASPO*: The Agency headquarters, which is located within the General Staff Directorate of the Ministry of the Armed Forces, is responsible for overall direction and control of operations. The Chief of the Agency, a high ranking member of the General Staff Directorate, reports directly to and is under the direct control of the Minister of the Armed Forces. At the National level, much coordination is effected between ASPO and its sister service, the Agency for Strategic Operations. Coordination is also effected with, and specific tasking may be received from, the Directorate of the Land Masses.

*c. Personnel.* All members of ASPO are active military personnel. Since there is no intelligence branch per se in the Aggressor force structure, personnel retain their basic branch identity; their assignments are handled by the

Directorate of Intelligence, under the General Staff Directorate. While other personnel selected for assignment in the intelligence service may return to their basic branch upon completion of an assignment, members of ASPO are channelized in their assignments with the agency; this is primarily due to the amount of time spent in undergoing extensive preparatory training. Training usually consists of language qualification, operational training in clandestine intelligence techniques, extensive background preparation on the area of assignment, and a continuous testing and evaluation process. Once personnel are trained for their assignments, they are dispatched to the area where they may spend up to one year establishing themselves and their covers prior to becoming operational.

*d. ASPO Organization.* The Agency headquarters is further subdivided into a number of functional subagencies which are mission oriented. Identified subagencies include the Bureau of Personnel, Bureau of Finance, Bureau of Supply, Bureau of Direction and Research, and the Bureau of Special Activities. There are believed to be additional bureaus in existence, and the actual relationship of the existing bureaus has not been clearly defined.

*e. Bureau of Special Activities.* This bureau is believed to be the operational element of ASPO. It is charged with subversion, espionage, sabotage, psychological operations, and may also have a role in guerrilla warfare. The bureau also provides the control elements for the next lower echelon, the Area Control Elements. The organizational chain closely parallels that of the Agency for Strategic Operations (para 3–8). The bureau is also believed to have personnel within the Aggressor embassy staffs wherever they are located. Additionally, attaches and members of Aggressor advisory teams are believed to receive direction from the bureau directly.

*f. Strategic Operations.*

(1) All echelons of the ASPO maintain close liaison with local CTP personalities. In all instances, where it is necessary to maintain security for the local ASPO operation, as well as to conceal the identity of the CTP members where they must operate covertly, contact with the local CTP is made under some type of cover.

(2) Since ASPO and ASTOP are both subordinate to the ACIS, there is a close working relationship at the field level. However, since ASTOP is charged with assuring the political reliability of all CTP members and Aggressor citizens located in the Homeland as well as abroad, there does exist an interservice jealousy which at times may work to the detriment of ASPO.

(3) Operations of ASPO may be planned and, with approval from Agency Headquarters, may be executed from any control element level. Since clandestine operations are costly in terms of time, monetary expense, and possibility of compromise, control is highly centralized at the headquarters level. Most personnel, prior to their dispatch to a target area, are thoroughly familiar with their target, and much of the preliminary planning has been accomplished. However, even on certain targets of opportunity which may arise during the agent's tenure in a target area, his actions are strictly controlled, and he must obtain prior approval before attempting to initiate a new operation. In all instances a decision to start clandestine intelligence operations depends on the value of the information to be gained carefully weighed with the probable losses to be incurred should the operation be compromised. A tenet which runs throughout Aggressor clandestine operations is that an operation using human sources will not be mounted when the same information could be gained through the use of an overt source. The reliability of indigenous agent personnel is always suspect, and extensive operational testing (known target testing, parallel missions, manipulative and mechanical tests) is used.

*g. Tactical Operations.*

(1) Although ASPO personnel are basically trained for the conduct of strategic collection operations against military targets, ASPO also has a definite role in the collection of tactical intelligence information in a combat environment. The various collection companies and special operations elements found within Aggressor intelligence units at army group and army levels are composed of ASPO personnel.

(*a*) The collection companies are composed of from five to 10 subordinate collection teams which are located throughout the Army group and army areas of operations. While most of the clandestine operations are controlled from Aggressor-held territory, certain teams may be located in the contested area or in the enemy rear area with the mission of conducting espionage against military targets located in these areas.

(*b*) A special operations company usually has varying combinations of groups not exceeding a total of 10 groups; a platoon nor-

mally does not exceed four groups. When committed, these groups are controlled by the army group intelligence regiment or army intelligence battalion, not by the special operations company.

(2) The collection companies and special operations units are subordinate to and under the operational control of the intelligence battalion or regiment in a tactical environment. Control of these personnel is usually relinquished by the Agency Headquarters, with these elements responding to direct tasking received from their parent unit. Approval for clandestine operations in a tactical environment rests with the Regional Command, although the Agency Headquarters must monitor these operations as well. Agency Headquarters in turn notifies the Regional Command of on-going operations under Headquarters control within the Regional Command's area of operations and provides the Regional Command with information gained from these operations which may be useful to the planning of future tactical operations.

(3) The basic function of ASPO in a combat situation is the establishment and handling of clandestine agent nets throughout the army group and army areas of operations. The basic principles discussed under strategic operations still apply, but tactical collection operations are in most cases limited by the time available to establish the operation and obtain needed information; the difficulty of clandestine communications in a fluid tactical environment, the reduced mobility of agent and control personnel in this environment, and the mortality rate of agents are other limiting factors.

(4) In addition to their clandestine mission, ASPO members within the special operations elements are formed into the following types of special operations groups:

(*a*) *The raid intelligence group.* This is an overt, uniformed group of not more than eight men, which is airdropped, airlanded, or infiltrated into the enemy rear. It seizes and interrogates prisoners and transmits the information gained directly by radio to the army or army group headquarters to which attached. Though organized primarily for the capture and interrogation of prisoners, it can also accomplish other limited intelligence functions requiring the use of some military force.

(*b*) *The agent group.* This is a covert, nonuniformed group of six to eight men trained and equipped to operate espionage nets in the enemy rear areas and to communicate directly with the army or army group headquarters to which attached. These groups usually will be sent out during static periods to establish passive networks within the immediate and anticipated army group zones of action. These groups have the mission of locating enemy nuclear weapons and missile launching sites, observing enemy movements and equipment, and determining enemy disposition. They may operate up to 1,000 kilometers from the area of contact.

(*c*) *The destruction group.* This is an overt uniformed group of about 20 men which is airdropped, airlanded, or infiltrated into the enemy rear. Its mission is to seek out and destroy enemy nuclear delivery means and associated equipment. It will interdict missile units on the march or neutralize launch positions. Aggressor air elements work closely with these groups, providing them with accurate locations of enemy nuclear delivery systems, as well as suspect positions.

## 6–45. Aggressor Counterintelligence (CI)

Military counterintelligence activities are conducted by personnel from the Agency for Strategic Operations. The lowest level of assignment is usually regiment which consists of a two or three man team. Counterintelligence personnel are assigned the mission of countering espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities directed against the military. They also report on troop morale and activities to their superiors in the Agency for Strategic Operations, thus providing the Circle Trigon Party with an additional means of monitoring the military forces. Aggressor CI personnel assigned from the Agency for Strategic Operations to the tactical organizations are found in the various security sections and companies of the intelligence units from army group to division. To accomplish the counterintelligence mission, CI personnel conduct interrogations of a CI nature, operations against and neutralization of CI targets, and screening of both civilian and military personnel in the area of operations who are of counterintelligence interest. To meet these responsibilities CI personnel will, when appropriate, perform functions in the areas of military and civilian security; port, frontier, and travel security; censorship activities; and defensive CI special operations. They are also believed to have a role in advising the commander on his responsibilities for operational security, as well as tactical cover and deception.

## 6-46. Handling of Prisoners of War

*a.* Immediately after capture, prisoners are disarmed, searched, and in some cases deprived of their personal belongings. They are segregated by rank, interrogated briefly for information of immediate tactical value, and evacuated promptly to battalion or regiment. Battalion is sometimes bypassed, or prisoners may sometimes go from battalion to division, bypassing the regiment, depending on such factors as the number of prisoners, the operating procedure of the individual unit, or the availability of interrogators or interpreters. Wounded prisoners requiring hospitalization are treated in Aggressor medical channels. Speed in the evacuation of prisoners is emphasized throughout the operation. Any documents and items of technical intelligence interest are evacuated with the prisoner who had these in his possession.

*b.* At battalion or regiment, a more thorough search is made, and a brief, formal interrogation, confined to personal data and the immediate combat situation, is conducted. These interrogations are conducted by an officer from the unit intelligence section. One copy of the interrogation report at this and succeeding echelons accompanies each prisoner to the rear. All prisoners are evacuated as soon as possible, with priority given to prisoners of high rank, or those who by their assignment possess important intelligence or technical information.

*c.* The main interrogation takes place at division level. Interrogators from the division intelligence company's interrogation section conduct a detailed questioning of the majority of the prisoners, confining their interrogation to tactical or operational matters. Members of the counterintelligence section question those prisoners who have been singled out in the lower echelons for interrogation by this agency. A political interrogation is also conducted by an officer from the political section. The more knowledgeable prisoners and technical specialists are earmarked for questioning at higher echelons by specialists of the various arms and services. Each interrogating agency, either military or political, forwards its reports through its own channels. At regiment and division, prisoners are usually confined in collecting points in the rear of the unit. A stockade may be established at division, but prisoners are normally evacuated to army over the main supply route after interrogation at division level.

*d.* At any time during the interrogation process, certain categories of prisoners may be singled out for interrogation by the counterintelligence unit that is found at division and above. Individual representatives of this unit are also found at battalion and regiment to screen prisoners for counterintelligence interrogation. Prisoners of special interest include: former Aggressorland nationals or those of very recent Aggressorland ancestry; suspected enemy agents (if proven to be so, these prisoners may be sentenced to death after exploitation as a source of information); prisoners who had been in the Aggressor homeland prior to outbreak of hostilities; interpreters or prisoners speaking Aggressor language; intelligence officers and members of intelligence units; members of police units; nationals of other nations claimed by Aggressor to be part of the Homeland; general officers and general staff officers; members of military government and civil affairs units; and members of US advisory groups engaged in internal defense operations. Prisoners in these categories can expect to be convicted of war crimes and be sentenced for up to 25 years at hard labor.

*e.* At army, only the more important or knowledgeable prisoners are interrogated, along with those whose forms indicate a need for further questioning. Specialists and technicians are interrogated by Aggressor specialists from the arms and services who have been trained in interrogation techniques. Counterintelligence interrogators continue to seek out any special category of prisoners who may not have been identified in previous interrogations. All prisoners are turned over to the security forces at army and are confined in the security forces prisoner cage.

*f.* At army group and higher echelons the handling of prisoners is a function of special units. Only very important prisoners are interrogated at army group. Prisoners are either evacuated to the Aggressor Homeland or are kept in detention facilities in the army group rear or the zone of occupation. In the latter case, prisoners fall under the control of special units assigned to the Chief of the Rear, and are used on labor details. Prisoners evacuated to the Homeland are sent to prisoner camps scattered throughout the Homeland; those special category prisoners are usually sent directly to punishment camps. The ultimate destination of the vast majority of prisoners is the basic work unit of the prison camps: the camp brigade.

*g.* The security forces operate all prison camps in the Homeland. Aggressor expects each prisoner to fill out a personal history form

upon arrival at the camp, and the prisoner is interrogated in detail at least once. The security force receives copies of all field interrogation reports and maintains a dossier on all prisoners. Specialists, technicians, and other personnel with specialized qualifications are questioned extensively by experts in each field.

### 6-47. Treatment and Management of Prisoners of War

*a. Objectives.* Aggressor philosophy concerning the treatment of prisoners of war is based on his own political ideology which attempts to subordinate the individual to the will of the state. To transform the individual and redirect his goals requires a changing of the individual's values, personal aims, and moral attitudes. The objective of the Aggressor prisoner of war program is the exploitation of the individual prisoner for political, propaganda, and subversive purposes. The prisoners in some cases have been used as bargaining tools to bring political pressure to bear on the United States. But the ultimate goal of any Aggressor prisoner management program must be to instill in the individual prisoner a sympathy for, if not a conversion to, Aggressor political beliefs. To achieve these objectives, the basic tools used by Aggressor are interrogation and indoctrination conducted by civilian and military personnel extremely skilled in manipulating human attitudes and behaviors.

*b. Permanent Prisoner of War Facilities.* En route to permanent prisoner of war facilities, action is taken to instill shock, fear, and uncertainty in the minds of the prisoners by subjecting them to threats, verbal abuse, and exposure to hostile civilian mobs. Upon arrival at a permanent facility, environmental controls are established through structuring the prison routine, further segregation (by class, wealth, education level, and susceptibility to indoctrination), and also isolation. Early conditioning stages include subjecting prisoners to a solitary existence—eating, sleeping, and meeting bodily needs in isolation. The disruption of sleep and the use of harassing techniques tend to exhaust the individuals in this environment. Confinement facilities are usually located in harsh terrain, or in hostile populated areas. Further security against escape is provided by guards and physical barriers. Facilities are usually primitive, medical care is substandard, the quality and quantity of food is inadequate for good health, and strict regulations govern the captives' daily activities. Designed to reduce the prisoners to submissiveness and responsiveness, such conditions and treatment usually have a psychologically shattering effect upon them.

*c. Interrogation.* In addition to the use of interrogation to obtain tactical intelligence information, interrogation is also used to obtain information useful to the political and propaganda exploitation of the prisoner. A starting point is the personal history questionnaire, which requires far more personal information than that authorized under the US code of conduct. These questionnaires are used as the basis for interrogation in permanent camp facilities by skilled civilian and military interrogators. Interrogators attempt to establish a dialogue with the prisoner in order to learn as much as possible about the individual's background, personality, social values, and political beliefs. Proper response by the prisoner is mandatory, and ignorance, arrogance, and refusal to answer are dealt with severely. Brutality is rarely used; instead, interrogators use various psychological techniques to extract information from the prisoner as well as to engage him in seemingly meaningless conversation. Abuse, when used, is carefully controlled. A system of reward and punishment is used to induce cooperation on the part of the prisoner. Rewards usually consist of promises of leniency, additional privileges, and promises of repatriation. Punishment usually starts with verbal abuse, controlled physical harassment, reduction of rations, the withholding of medical aid and mail, and may lead to confinement of the individual in isolation. The latter technique is considered the most successful, for prolonged isolation causes the individual to respond to any form of human association, even that of his interrogator. Underlying the entire management process is the desire to instill in the prisoner a feeling of futility and dependency which will lead him to cooperate and comply with his captor's requests.

*d. Indoctrination.* The initial steps in the prisoner's political training are taken during the transient stages. Although Aggressor field regulations stress that commanders and political staff officers must "organize political work among the prisoners prior to their evacuation to the rear," intensive political training and indoctrination commences once the prisoner has reached permanent prison facilities. Through the interrogation process, information has been gained concerning the individual's social status and political views; additionally,

| Name | Type | Power | Frequency | Maximum range | Allocation | Remarks |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GRIEF | Company level short range surveillance radar | 10 KW | 9,700 MHz | 1,200m--pers<br>4,500m--veh | 1/bn | Man carried in 2 loads, tripod mounted. Emplacement time -- 10 min. |
| GRIM | Regimental level medium range surveillance radar | 25 KW | 9,000 MHz | 3,500m--pers<br>12,000m--veh | 2/regt | Man carried in 3 loads, or mounted on light truck, dismounted for use. Emplacement time--15 min. |
| GRIP | Division level long range surveillance radar | 50 KW | 9,500 MHz | 12,000m--pers<br>25,000m--veh | 1/Tgt Acq Btry | Mounted on light truck, can be dismounted for use. Emplacement time, truck mounted--15 min; dismounted--30 min. |
| GRUDGE | Side view airborne radar | 100 KW | 10,000 MHz | 150 Km | 1/div | Mounted on surveillance aircraft |
| GUACO | Camera system | | | | | See para 6-49d(1) |
| GUARDIANS | Unattended sensors | | | | | See para 6-49c(4) |
| GUARANTORS | Infrared sensors | | | | | See para 6-49d(3) |

*Figure 6-8. Aggressor surveillance radars and scanner equipment.*

attempts have been made using various management techniques to establish a spirit of communication between the prisoner and his interrogator. During this period political cadre in the camp have been monitoring reports of the interrogators, and when it is felt that his indoctrination should succeed, the political cadre takes over. The purpose of the indoctrination procedure is to undermine the prisoner's faith in his own convictions and engender a sympathetic attitude toward the Circle Trigon ideology. His subversion is oriented toward his eventual participation in the propaganda effort, and either his conversion to Circle Trigonism or his recruitment as an agent. Techniques used by the interrogator in the initial stages, to include playing the individual prisoner against his fellow prisoners by creating dissension among them, lay the groundwork for this indoctrination. The use of leading questions to cause the prisoner to agree with his captors on minor issues are skillfully supplemented by more important questions tied to these previous minor points of agreement. Such questioning will usually cause the individual to contradict himself, and thus admit that he was previously lying (which will result in the prisoner's punishment) or concur with the major position. Indoctrination advances to the next step which requires the individual to read selected material, and write essays on what he has learned; a dialogue process is also included in this step. A third stage of indoctrination requires the prisoners to comment, debate issues, and conduct self-criticism in group sessions; substantial rewards are promised to the individual who renounces his own beliefs and positively participates in the "reeducation programs," proving his new loyalty by writing false statements in support of Aggressor's propaganda aims and by actively encouraging others to adopt Aggressor's ideology. Through the indoctrination process, prisoners are made to believe that their previous convictions were wrong, followed by a confession of this guilt and a commitment to support the Aggressor cause.

## 6–49. Aggressor Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Night Observation Doctrine and Devices

*a.* Although the Aggressor inventory includes only a limited variety of surveillance, target acquisition, and night observation (STANO) devices, much research effort is directed toward developing such items. The limited inventory does not indicate a lack of interest in STANO devices, but rather, indicates strict adherence to a few basic principles governing their development and employment. These are:

(1) Man is the ultimate sensor, and mechanical or electrical devices are used only to supplement the human senses.

(2) Only simple, rugged, and reliable equipment is acceptable for issue to the field.

(3) Passive sensors are preferred over active because of their greater security.

*b.* Tactical employment.

(1) Aggressor tactical doctrine emphasizes continuous, rapid, and violent offensive action. Accordingly, the majority of Aggressor STANO equipment is designed to complement this philosophy by enhancing the Aggressor ability to locate the enemy, maneuver rapidly under all conditions of visibility, and bring accurate fires to bear. Early discovery and location of the enemy is the mission of aerial surveillance during the advance to contact, primarily using side-looking airborne radars. Once the enemy is discovered, higher resolution sensors are employed to develop specific details. Night driving aids and night sighting devices for direct fire weapons found at company-level and below in motorized rifle and tank units allow night operations to be carried out on the same scale and with the same intensity as daylight operations. Formerly these devices were exclusively active infrared emitting devices, but they are rapidly being replaced with various passive image intensification and infrared detecting sensors.

(2) Sensing devices which are designed for static employment in support of defensive operations are given secondary emphasis. Unattended ground sensors are for the most part centralized in the intelligence company supporting the division and the intelligence battalion supporting the combined arms army. Ground surveillance radars are found in the motorized rifle battalion and regiment and in various artillery units. In the defense, the ground and air surveillance plan is integrated with the barrier and fire plans to provide maximum protection against surprise. The primary mission of ground and air surveillance in the defense is to give early warning against armor. Areas covered by both attended and unattended ground sensors are covered with fire whenever possible.

*c.* Ground Surveillance Equipment. Aggressor ground surveillance equipment includes radars and unattended ground sensors as described below. Technical characteristics of types of Ag-

gressor Surveillance radars are shown in figure 6–8.

(1) *GRIEF.* A short-range ground surveillance radar found at battalion but normally employed at company level. It has a traverse of 360°, a beam width of 6°, and is manually scanned in the manner of a searchlight. The total system weight is 42 kilograms. An average of 15 minutes processing time delay is normally allowed for information to reach the company commander.

(2) *GRIM.* A medium-range ground surveillance radar found at regiment. It is normally kept under regimental control and employed well forward, taking advantage of local security provided by one of the frontline companies. This radar has a 360° traverse, a beam width of 12°, and an automatic scanning mode. The total weight of the system is 111 kilograms. An average of 20 minutes processing time delay should be allowed for information to reach the regimental commander.

(3) *GRIP.* A long-range ground surveillance radar found with the division artillery. It has a traverse of 120°, a beam width which can be varied by the operator from 3° to 15°, and an automatic scanning mode. It also provides automatic plotting of target range and azimuth and can automatically track targets selected by the operator. The total weight of the system is 1124 kilograms. An average of 15 minutes processing time delay should be allowed for information to reach the artillery commander.

(4) *GUARDIANS.* Few specific details are known concerning Aggressor unattended ground sensors. However, some of the types currently employed have been determined. Presently, in the Aggressor inventory are radio-linked seismic, magnetic, electromagnetic, acoustic, passive infrared, and ignition detecting sensor devices. When activated, these sensors emit radio-frequencies which are monitored by simple, lightweight, and portable ancillary equipment. All of these can be emplaced by hand, artillery, or aircraft, and all are capable of being equipped with explosive anti-tamper devices. Employment doctrine closely parallels US doctrine, since Aggressor has closely observed US employment methods and techniques in Southeast Asia. Aggressor's basic doctrine is to employ a chain of three to five sensors mixing detection techniques, in order not only to detect an approaching target, but also to confirm what the target is. This chain will be long enough to provide adequate coverage of the area under surveillance. Two or more chains in the employed area compose an array. The sensor activations are monitored either from portable ground-mounted sites or from airborne platforms. Either configuration has the capability of recording the activations which may be data-linked into an automated fire-control system to provide immediate and accurate defensive fires on any intruders. The distance required from a sensor array to a ground mounted monitoring site may be increased, by using small relay antennas, to extend the distance between the area under surveillance and the Aggressor positions.

*d.* Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Equipment. The Aggressor aerial surveillance and reconnaissance equipment includes conventional cameras, side-looking radars, and infrared detectors. Photographic, radar, and infrared imagery is processed in flight, and a data-link allows the processed imagery to be transmitted directly to the ground from the surveillance aircraft. The total time delay from acquisition of the imagery to the report of hard copy on the ground is 90 seconds.

(1) *GUACO.* This extremely versatile camera system allows the production of single frames or stereo pairs ranging in format from 10 X 10 centimeters to 25 X 50 centimeters. Lenses ranging in focal length from 5 to 1000 centimeters are available for the systems, and it may be employed either at night or during the day. Depending upon the aircraft it is used with, the system can produce vertical photographs, forward or backward obliques or side obliques. Recent advances in film technology give the Aggressor the capability of producing extremely high quality black and white or color photographs with this system.

(2) *GRUDGE.* This side-view airborne radar is capable of scanning out of both sides of the surveillance aircraft either simultaneously or out of one side only. It has a horizontal range of 150 kilometers out of one side of the aircraft only or 75 kilometers if scanning out of both sides simultaneously. It is capable of detecting an object the size of a quarter-ton vehicle or small boat moving at a speed of 5 KPH or more. Moving target indications are superimposed on the fixed target image. Processing time delay is 90 minutes when the presentation is by 35-mm film recording.

(3) *GUARANTORS.* The infrared sensor system records images of objects based on their temperature differences. The IR sensor will detect campfires, vehicles, artillery weapons, and command post areas even though they are

camouflaged. Infrared sensors have a limited all-weather and foliage penetration capability and are best employed at night. Aggressor surveillance flights using infrared sensors are normally flown at or before dusk and then again during darkness to search for assembly areas and artillery positions (based on heat of engines and gun tubes). This system is capable of producing near photographic quality images.

## 6-49. Aggressor Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)

*a.* SIGINT is a generic term which includes communications intelligence (COMINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT). COMINT is information gathered from communications electromagnetic emissions. ELINT is information derived from the intercept of electromagnetic energy radiated by non-communications emitters. Aggressor considers SIGINT as a primary source of intelligence. Through pattern analysis, traffic analysis, and message content he can develop SIGINT concerning enemy force composition, structure, capabilities and intentions. Data developed through SIGINT is also used in the employment of jamming and deception operations against enemy emitters and operations. Aggressor SIGINT collection efforts give priority to tactical, logistical, and administrative communications nets in support of combat operations. Signal intercept and analysis resources are located as near to front line units as possible. Employment concepts require that maximum efforts be made to provide the supported commanders with real time SIGINT information thereby enhancing reaction time and value of the information received.

*b.* Aggressor's signal intercept capability must be assumed to cover a broad range of frequencies. Aggressor is capable of searching the various frequency bands to detect enemy emissions, of locating the enemy's communication emitters through his ground-based and airborne detection finding equipment, of identifying the type unit Aggressor opposes by the type transmitter in use, and of recording enemy transmissions for further analysis to derive information of tactical value.

*c.* Aggressor conducts signal intercept operations in order to gain intelligence information for tactical operations, to gain information concerning the technical characteristics of the enemy's equipment and his operating procedures in order to form a data base for the conduct of electronic countermeasures operations, and to identify any new emitters which the enemy may introduce on the battlefield.

*d.* The majority of Aggressor tactical direction finding and intercept equipment is mobile and transportable. Aircraft in the tactical air army, as well as support aircraft from the Long Range Directorate, are also equipped for the conduct of direction finding and intercept operations.

*e.* Aggressor units are believed to fire on a direction-finding (DF) fix alone. Once an emitter is located through direction-finding efforts, artillery will then fire a barrage to cover a wide area around the emitter location. In this regard, Aggressor considers the possibility of an enemy deception operation but feels that the expense of ordnance is worth the possible gain.

## 6-50. Electronic Warfare

*a. General.* Aggressor conducts offensive and defensive electronic warfare (EW) operations in order to disrupt or degrade enemy use of the frequency spectrum while protecting his own communications-electronic (C-E) equipment from enemy jamming. Aggressor is capable of locating, identifying and rapidly jamming all types of communications and non-communications receivers over a wide range of frequencies. Aggressor has special purpose EW units found at army group and army level; additionally SIGINT units are believed to also have high-frequency jammers. Below army level, commanders may use their organic assets to conduct unsophisticated EW operations when special purpose units have not been attached from higher levels and when approval for such operations is obtained. Because of the sensitivity of such operations, control is tightly maintained at army group level.

*b. EW Collection Activities.* Aggressor is known to be particularly adept at conducting collection activities which enhance the operational effectiveness of his electronic countermeasures (ECM). Aggressor SIGINT units, as a corollary to their mission of collecting tactical intelligence information about the enemy through the conduct of signal intercept operations, are also tasked with collection activities directed at both intentional and accidental C-E emissions. During search and monitor operations, Aggressor SIGINT personnel are charged with locating, recording and analyzing the technical characteristics of the signals they intercept as well as specific operating procedures employed in the victim nets, for the purpose of exploiting such radiations. Such items as type of equipment, frequency range, type modulation, primary and alternate frequencies, operat-

ing schedules and patterns are all necessary pieces of information which must be gathered before Aggressor can launch any type of electronic countermeasures operation. Additionally, information relating to the call signs, code words, authentication procedures, and radio technique must also be known before Aggressor can begin planning for any type of deception operation. Aggressor radar intercept operations are also geared to the collection of technical information concerning the enemy's surveillance systems, to include pulse repetition time, pulse width, radar deployment, area of surveillance, frequency-change capability and operating power. Both ground-based and airborne direction-finding equipment are used to locate enemy C-E transmitters. Such information gathering operations facilitate ECM planning by providing EW units a capability to determine when and where to conduct ECM operations, what frequencies to use, what power capabilities are required, and in the case of deception operations, how best an intrusion can be made into the enemy communication net. Such collection operations, as well as ECM activities are particularly applicable when the enemy's communications-electronic operations are careless or imprecise, or when his operations are conducted under pressure, as in a combat situation. SIGINT collection activities can determine the capabilities and vulnerabilities of the enemy's systems, leading to estimates of the potential effectiveness of ECM operations.

*c. ECM.* Aggressor employs ECM, i.e., jamming and deception, (when such ECM is more desirable than the intelligence that could be obtained from intercept), to selectively disrupt, harass or deceive communications and electronic systems with the overall aim of degrading or denying the utility of such systems to the enemy. Aggressor advocates the employment of electronic countermeasures as a complementary combat support means to his firepower and maneuver capabilities and selects types of ECM, depending on the effect desired, which best support his tactical objectives. Aggressor ECM operations are usually directed at communications nets where signals are weak, there is natural background interference or some atmospheric disturbance, or where large communications nets are operating in which there exists an atmosphere of confusion.

(1) *Jamming.* Aggressor uses either spot (one frequency), sweep, or barrage (band frequencies) jamming of tactical radio nets when such jamming is more desireable than the intelligence that can be obtained from such nets. Aggresser EW units have specialized jamming equipment, with modulators; additionally, Aggressor realizes that any transmitter is a potential jammer, and on occasion has been known to employ normal communications equipment in a jamming role. Aggressor jamming techniques include the use of spark, random-noise, sweep-through, stepped-tone, and beat tones, as well as various CW-based signals and assorted other sounds. A jamming effort by Aggressor usually involves a period of jamming followed by a brief listening period to determine how effective his jamming has been. Airborne and ground-based electronic jamming equipment is used to jam and confuse enemy early-warning, gun-laying, and missile controlling radars. Aggressor radar-jamming operations consist of both emitted and reflected jamming. Aggressor makes extensive use of chaff (against higher frequencies) and rope (against lower frequencies) delivered by artillery fire or dropped from aircraft to jam radars. Aggressor also uses corner reflectors and spoofers to confuse enemy radars; selected aircraft from air armies and from long range aviation are also equipped with electronic jamming means. Jamming operations directed against non-communications emitters permits surprise air attacks and denies the enemy use of radar-controlled fires. Aggressor doctrine relies on the principle that jamming is most effective when the opposing force is unaware of its occurrence; therefore, operators are trained to gradually increase their jamming instead of relying on sudden bursts of power.

(2) *Deception.* Aggressor also possesses a significant capability to conduct electronic deception operations against radio communications circuits and electromagnetic radiations emanating from non-communications media. In deception operations, Aggressor emphasizes taking the enemy by surprise, concentrating on the most critical phases of combat operations. Aggressor deception operations are directed against the enemy's signal intelligence deception planning, Aggressor considers the use of electronic deception by creating false levels of traffic to cover normal high traffic level prior to the initiation of offensive operations, as well as simulating electronic equipment in an area after a unit has moved. On occasion, Aggressor will enter enemy communications nets in order to deceive enemy operators; doctrine empha-

sizes intrusion into the enemy's most important communications nets and at the most critical points of operations. Deception operations are also targeted against enemy radars and missile guidance systems, in this regard, Aggressor has had most of his success using chaff and other reflective devices to represent fictitious targets.

*d. ECCM.* Basic Aggressor electronic counter countermeasures (ECCM) doctrine relies on the exacting training given communications and electronic operators to prevent enemy jamming and deception. Basic means used to prevent enemy disruption operations includes the proper siting of antennas and radars behind radiation barriers, controlling the radar's scan sector to minimize radiations into enemy territory, the use of dummy loads for testing and maintenance, random scheduling of C-E operations, and insistance on short radio transmissions using the lowest power possible. Fully aware that his enemy also has a deception capability, Aggressor emphasizes good operating techniques, and stresses the need for signal security in all operations. If Aggressor operators do experience any jamming they are directed to continue to operate, while adjusting standard components to improve the signal-to-jamming ratio. Such actions as antenna relocation, reduction of transmission speed, and changing mode of operation, are used to reduce the effectiveness of enemy jamming. If a decision is made to switch to an alternate frequency or to an alternate means of communications, Aggressor communications doctrine requires the maintenance of a dummy operation on the primary frequency to conceal the change. In most non-communications emitters found in the Aggressor inventory, there is special anti-jam circuitry, such as video integrators and moving target indicators, which are designed to reduce the effects of enemy jamming operations and permit continued operation of the system.

## Section VI. COMMUNICATIONS

### 6-51. General

*a.* Organizing and maintaining communications in a combat situation is considered the most important responsibility of a headquarters. Overall responsibility for the establishment of reliable communications within a tactical organization lies with the chief of staff for units down to division level, and with the deputy commander at regiment and below. The unit signal officer functions under the staff supervision of the chief of staff and is charged with maintaining continuous communications throughout an operation. Emphasis is placed on the dependability of command circuits, with administrative and service troop needs being relegated to secondary considerations.

*b.* Means of communications used by Aggressor include a heavy dependence on radio and wire; foot, motorcycle, and helicopter messenger service are used as a backup when the above systems cannot operate properly, or when there is a need for a higher degree of security. Pyrotechnics, to include flares and smoke, are also used for communications in the combat areas.

*c.* Requirements for communications in the Aggressor armed forces are broken down as follows:

(1) Command.
(2) Control of subordinate maneuver units.
(3) Fire control.
(4) Transmission of orders and reports.
(5) Transmission of intelligence information of immediate tactical value.
(6) Warning of imminent air, nuclear, chemical or biological attack.
(7) Transmission of requirements for ammunition and POL.
(8) Administration and other logistics.

### 6-52. Principles of Communications

*a.* Higher headquarters is responsible for establishing communications with organic subordinate headquarters, and with one echelon below, to maintain contact between senior and junior commanders in the event intermediate communications are disrupted.

*b.* Supporting units will establish communications with support units.

*c.* Lateral communications are normally established from right to left.

*d.* Equipment and traffic will be kept to absolute minimum, governed by the availability of equipment, the mission and the terrain.

*e.* Local existing facilities and captured material will be utilized to the utmost.

*f.* Wire will be used where feasible, and will also serve as a backup to radio and radio relay.

*g.* Communications security will be enforced at all times.

### 6-53. Communications Equipment

*a. General.* The Aggressor army is amply equipped with dependable communications and

| TYPE | FREQ (MHz) | OPN MODE | RANGE (km) | CHANNELS | PWR RQMT | WEIGHT |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **AM FAMILY** | | | | | | |
| TA-21-P | 1.6 to 4.5 | Voice/CW | 50 | 260 | CG-21 | 12kg |
| TA-23-V | 1.0 to 7.9 | Voice/CW | 110 | 640 | 28v Veh Batt | 37kg |
| TA-25-S | 1.5 to 12.5 | RTT/V | 200 | 960 | Eng Driven Gen | 46kg |
| TA-27-S | 1.0 to 7.9 | Voice/CW | 350 | 640 | Eng Driven Gen | 38kg |
| **FM FAMILY** | | | | | | |
| TF-92-P | 48.0 - 51.9 | Voice | 1.8 | 160 | CG-92 | 28kg |
| TF-94-V | 20.0 - 22.9 | Voice | 22 | 120 | 28v Veh Batt | 64kg |
| TF-96-P | 27.0 - 36.9 | Voice | 27 | 100 | CG-96 | 11kg |
| TF-98-P | 36.0 - 46.9 | Voice | 27 | 440 | CG-98 | 11kg |

**EXPLANATION OF NOMENCLATURE**

T - Transceiver
A - Amplitude Modulated
F - Frequency Modulated
P - Portable
V - Vehicular
S - Stationary
CW - Continuous Wave
RTT - Radio Teletype
CG - Cell Group (Electrical Battery)

*Figure 6–9. Aggressor radio equipment.*

electronic equipment. This equipment ranges from the simple, easy-to-operate electronic devices to the complex, vehicular-mounted sets that require the skill of well trained operators for employment. Some of this equipment is old and would be considered obsolete by US standards, but it will serve its purpose on the battlefield. However, items have recently been introduced which are as good or almost equal to their foreign counterparts.

*b. Radio and Radio Relay.* Radio is considered the primary means of communications in fast-moving situations, due to its versatility and transmission speed. The tactical radio equipment issued to the Aggressor ground force units consist mainly of lightweight, manpack sets; mobile, vehicular-mounted radios; and transportable radio-relay systems which are used to form an integrated tactical radio system from army group to battalion levels and below. These radios are ruggedly built, generally simple to operate, and overlap in tuning ranges for intercommunications between infantry, armor, artillery, and other tactical units. These deficiencies include restricted frequency limits which results in spectrum congestion, low power which limits transmission range, dependence on vacuum tubes, complicated tuning systems in the larger sets, and their susceptibility to electronic countermeasures. Aggressor is aware of these deficiencies; new radio sets being introduced into the Aggressor inventory are characterized by a higher power output, reliance on transistors and miniature circuitry which simplify maintenance and remote control transmission options. Current radio relay sets are used down to division level by all arms and services for

command, staff and control communications. Most sets operate in the 20–46.9 mhz frequency range, and are capable of providing two voice and two radio teletype (RTT) channels. Figure 6–9 outlines the characteristics of selected Aggressor radio equipment.

*c. Wire.* Although wire is considered impractical for fast-moving operations, it is used in static situations and within headquarters. Types of cable and wire used by the Aggressor armed forces are conventional with respect to capability. They range from single-conductor field wire through two-pair (4-conductor), rubber-covered field cable which is similar to the US spiral-four cable. A variety of cable and wire drums, both manpack and vehicular-mounted, and cable-laying devices are available to facilitate installation of wire circuits. Telephone switchboards currently in use include a 10-line and a 40-line variety; these switchboards are used in conjunction with the standard field telephone. Teleprinter communications are provided down to regimental level. Carrier equipment is available in a variety of channelling arrangements, such as one voice, one-voice and one-telegraph, two-voice, three-voice, and six-channel telegraph. It is usable on either wire or radio-relay.

## 6–54. Types of Aggressor Radio Nets

There are basically four types of radio nets employed by the Aggressor forces.

*a. Command Nets* used by the commander for command and control of subordinate units. These nets provide direct communications between commanders.

*b. Liaison Nets* employed between adjacent ground force units to coordinate operations. These nets are also established by supporting to supported units. Each liaison office provides the communications equipment to operate with its parent unit.

*c. Logistics/Administrative Nets* employed by rear service elements for the control of supply, transport, medical, and other administrative and support services.

*d. Staff Nets* used primarily by the chief of staff for directing other staff elements and keeping subordinate and superior staffs informed of the commanders intention. These circuits also facilitate receipt and transmission of warning orders, situation reports, and combat intelligence. In addition, the chief of artillery utilizes these nets at army group headquarters, combined arms headquarters, and at division headquarters level to pass staff communications to lower echelons.

## 6–55. Multi-channel Communications

*a. Command and Control Multi-channel Systems.*

(1) An Army group main headquarters is connected to adjacent army group headquarters by a multi-channel system for liaison and coordination.

(2) Two additional multi-channel systems are established by the army group headquarters to provide circuits from army group main headquarters to army group rear headquarters (services) and major subordinate command (combined arms army, tank army, air army).

(3) One multi-channel system controlled by the combined arms army main headquarters provides circuits from army main headquarters to army rear headquarters (services) and to major subordinate commands. Multi-channel systems do not appear below division level.

*b. Admin/Log Multi-channel systems.*

(1) Army group rear headquarters (services) is connected to the rear headquarters (services) of the combined arms army by a multi-channel system.

(2) The combined arms army rear headquarters is connected to the division rear headquarters by a multi-channel system.

## 6–56. Distribution of Communication Systems

*a. Command and Control Communications.*

(1) Army group communications—

(*a*) Three command nets consisting of two full duplex radio teletype (RATT) nets and one AM voice net.

(*b*) One full duplex RATT staff net.

(*c*) Three multi-channel systems consisting of 12 channels in each system.

(2) Combined arms army communications—

(*a*) Three command nets consisting of one full duplex RATT net, one AM voice net, and one FM voice net.

(*b*) One full duplex RATT staff net.

(*c*) One full duplex RATT liaison net.

(*d*) One multi-channel system consisting of 12 channels.

(3) Division communications (motorized rifle and tank)—

(*a*) Five command nets consisting of two AM voice nets and three FM voice nets.

(*b*) Two staff nets consisting of one full duplex RATT net and one AM voice net.

(*c*) One FM voice liaison net.

(4) Regimental communications (motorized rifle (MR) or tank (TK))—

(*a*) Two AM voice command nets. (MR/TK)

(*b*) One FM voice staff net. (MR/TK)

(*c*) One FM voice liaison net. (MR)

(*d*) One AM voice liaison net. (TK)

(5) Battalion communications (motorized rifle (MR) and tank (TK))—

(*a*) Two AM voice command nets. (MR)

(*b*) One FM voice liaison net. (MR)

(*c*) One FM voice command net. (TK)

(*d*) One full duplex AM RATT liaison net. (TK)

*b. Special Communications Nets.*

(1) An administrative/logistics full duplex RATT net from army group rear (services) to the combined arms army rear headquarters (services). An additional full duplex RATT net from the combined arms army rear headquarters (services) to division rear headquarters (services) and service elements of major divisional units.

(2) Division artillery nets with two command nets consisting of one AM voice net and one FM voice net.

(3) Air army communications—

(*a*) Primary command communications media is the telephone utilizing army group and combined arms army multi-channel communications facilities.

(*b*) One full duplex RATT command net.

(*c*) One full duplex RATT admin/log net.

(*d*) An air request net utilizing high-frequency AM voice radio from the division liaison office up through the air request net to the air army control center in support of the army group headquarters.

(*e*) Ground to air communications and air traffic control communications nets.

## 6–57. Tactical Communications Doctrine

*a.* In the offense, radio is considered the most practical means to insure viable communications in a fast-moving operation. Prior to the attack, radio silence is usually observed, with wire and messenger service being relied upon for communicating. The only exception to this rule is that reconnaissance and warning nets do operate. Once the attack is launched, radio communications is used to the fullest extent, with wire used in a standby role as well as in the rear areas. As the forward elements continue to penetrate the enemy defense, the second echelon and reserves that are moving forward tie into the wire axis. Once they are committed to exploitation and pursuit roles, they conduct all communications using radio, with wire used to communicate with the mop-up elements. If it appears that consolidation of the new positions is necessary, Aggressor forces, once again shift to wire communications.

*b.* In the defense, wire is considered the primary means of communications. A wire net is established with the main axis in the direction of the anticipated enemy main attack, and with the path of the anticipated, inevitable counterattack. The only radio communications permitted during these static situations is for reconnaissance and warning nets, and for air defense artillery fire control. Once the enemy attack is launched, radio traffic is permitted. Radio will then become the primary means of communications until the enemy attack is stalled and a counterattack is launched to restore the defensive positions. Wire is still relied on for communications with rear areas.

## 6–58. Communications Security

*a.* Aggressor forces assume the enemy possesses the capability to intercept, monitor and jam both communications and non-communications emissions. In order to minimize the enemy's success in these operations, Aggressor radio operators undergo extensive training in signal security procedures and proper radio technique. This training is discussed in paragraphs 6–42 through 6–50, and is applicable to both signal security and electronic counter-countermeasures.

*b.* Communications security practices that are used in tactical organizations include the following:

(1) Emphasizing strict transmission discipline. This may be accomplished through the monitoring of Aggressor transmissions on a random basis.

(2) Changing of frequencies as often as possible.

(3) Changing of call signs and code names on a frequent and irregular basis.

(4) Depending on the particular situation or the environment, restricting the output power to the minimum necessary.

(5) Restricting the number of personnel having access to or operating communications equipment.

(6) Restricting the availability of communications equipment.

# CHAPTER 7
# AGGRESSOR COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

## Section I. GENERAL

### 7-1. Development

In recent years the Aggressor Homeland has been modifying its logistical organization and procedures in an effort to meet the requirements of mobile and fast-moving forces in modern warfare. Recent developments include increasing the mobility of supply operations, the use of modern supply handling procedures and equipment, increasing the depth of forward-units service areas, providing forward units larger reserves of supplies, dispersing and camouflaging logistic installations to a greater extent, organizing within rear area units the means for quickly neutralizing the effects of nuclear attacks and increasing the scope of medical treatment and evacuation. The placement of supply bases has been changed in conformity with the increased depths of deployment of tactical units. For protection against nuclear attacks, Aggressor locates logistic installations away from other likely targets for enemy nuclear attacks. The entire transportation system has been improved by the extensive use of lower-unit transportation facilities, by providing field units with a more mobile and flexible repair organization, and by wide use of cargo helicopters, conventional cargo airlift, portable pipelines, and portable package supply conveyors. Complete rear area automation is the ultimate goal.

### 7-2. Responsibilities

*a.* At ministerial level, responsibility for supply is vested in the agency responsible for procurement. The party, probably in the Central Committee, determines the amount of each year's production which is to be allocated to the armed forces for current consumption and the amount that is to be held in reserve. The details of this allocation plan are worked out by the Council of Ministers and its subordinate agencies. In every command at regiment and higher levels, the responsibility for overall logistical coordination rests with the Deputy Commander for the Rear who is also known as the Chief of the Directorate of Rear Services. He is directly responsible for the procurement and supply of food, clothing and equipment, fuel and lubricants, and medical and veterinary material. He supervises and maintains rear area installations, is responsible for the physical movement of all classes of supplies, and is tasked with additional duties as traffic control coordinator. Additionally, he is responsible for rear area security and damage control, the flow of replacement personnel and control of civilians except those falling under the purview of civil affairs. The Chief of the Directorate of Rear Services, with the assistance of the commanders of arms and chiefs of technical services, is responsible for logistical planning in support of his unit's mission and for supervising the execution of the final plans.

*b.* The commanders of arms and chiefs of the technical services at all levels are responsible for the supply, maintenance, repair of weapons, equipment and technical supplies pertaining to their arms or services. They coordinate closely with the Chief of the Directorate of Rear Services in carrying out their procurement activities.

### 7-3. Organization

*a.* The Deputy Minister of Defense for the Rear (the Chief of the Directorate of Rear Services at the national level) directly influences logistical activities down to the lowest levels. At successively lower unit levels, the organizational Chiefs of the Rear come under the operational control of the unit commanders while subordinate to the Chief of the Rear of the next higher level for technical and administrative activities. In the area of logistics, this system of duel control also applies to commanders of arms and chiefs of technical services.

*b.* The logistical organization at national level is illustrated in figure 7-1. Generally, a similar organization exists at army group, the

combined arms army or tank army, the division, and regimental level. At army group level and above, the supply agencies for food, clothing and equipment are subordinate to the Subordinate Directorate for the Rear-Intendance. This agency is not found below army group and its functions are taken over directly by the unit Chief of the Rear. At division and regimental level a deputy for technical affairs heads the combined agency responsible for combat and noncombat vehicles, spare parts, tank and motor vehicle repair facilities. At all levels, each commander of arms/chief of technical service is responsible for the supply of items peculiar to his arm or service, but at divisional and regimental level these supplies are stored in a combined technical supply depot. The specialized supply channels end at regimental level. At battalion, all supply is handled by the commander, his executive officer, and the leader of the battalion service platoon. At company level, the commander and the first sergeant perform all supply functions.

*c.* The supply responsibilities of the Directorates listed in figure 7–1 are as follows:

| *Supplies* | *Responsible Directorate* |
|---|---|
| Artillery, small arms, and all types of ammunition | Artillery |
| Combat vehicles | Tank |
| Noncombat vehicles | Motor vehicle-tractor |
| Engineer equipment | Engineer |
| Signal equipment | Signal |
| Chemical supplies | Chemical |
| Food, clothing and equipment | Intendance |
| Fuel and lubricants | Fuels |
| Medical | Medical |
| Veterinary | Veterinary |
| Aircraft (fixed-wing and rotary) | Air Force |
| Vessels and boats | Navy |

## 7–4. Principles of Logistical Support

*a.* Aggressor logistical concepts reduce requirements to a minimum and aim at relieving combat troops of logistical problems as much as possible. As presently practiced, the emphasis is on attaining and maintaining a capability to support sustained operations over long distances. Improvisation and full use of local materials, food and labor are important factors in Aggressor logistical support.

*b.* Detailed and long-term planning of Aggressor logistical support is carried out at the highest practicable level. Supply and transportation are coordinated with the production program of civilian ministries and state committees. Supply procedures have been thoroughly tested. At all levels the logistical staffs are brought into the planning at the earliest possible date to advise the commander and to insure that his plans are implemented.

*c.* The Aggressor armed forces have attained a high degree of standardization of rugged, high quality equipment. This standardization not only eases manufacture but also simplifies maintenance.

*d.* There is a strict order of priority for the delivery of supplies that is normally as follows: ammunition, petroleum, oil and lubricants, technical stores, and rations.

*e.* Aggressor utilizes a distribution forward principle of supply in the field. Normally the higher echelon is responsible for supplying forward. However, divisions and regiments under certain circumstances may pick up their own supplies from rear installations.

*f.* The salvage and use of local and captured materials follow a definite plan, and the procedure is standard at all levels. Special staffs and units are allocated to this task at army and army group levels.

*g.* Supply discipline is strict and effective. Personal accountability for equipment and supplies is rigidly enforced. Waste and negligence are kept to a minimum by holding the individual or unit commander financially responsible.

*h.* The standard of living in the Aggressor Homeland is much lower than in the United States. This is definitely an advantage when translated into armed forces logistics. The average Aggressor civilian is accustomed to inadequate clothing, simple food, and few luxuries. He, therefore, expects little or no attention to his personal comfort when he becomes a soldier. These factors tremendously reduce the volume of food, clothing, and comfort-type supply items required and permit logisticians to place their main efforts on the supply of ammunition, fuel, and weapons.

*i.* Aggressor transportation capabilities are becoming increasingly greater. However, in the Aggressor Homeland the rail system is still the major means of transportation. The lack of adequate road nets results in an almost complete dependence upon the rail system for long-distance hauling. This weakness is compensated to some extent by a vast network of storage depots.

*j.* Aggressor's technological skills and procedures have shown substantial improvements. Because of the improved training and the availability of modern equipment and spare parts,




*Figure 7-1. National level logistical organization.*




*Figure 7–2. Flow of Supplies within Aggressor Field Forces.*

the efficiency of the rear service units is at a relatively high level. High level staff planning and execution thereof are considered adequate to satisfy the logistical needs of the ground forces.

## 7-5. Field Supply

*a. General.* The displacement of Aggressor service units and installations varies according to the nature of the threat. Installations generally are well dispersed, camouflaged, and away from possible nuclear targets. Supplies are placed underground or dug in whenever possible. Rear service personnel prepare plans for damage control. Firefighting and decontamination are emphasized in damage control planning.

*b. Army Group Supply Base.* This base usually is located near rail junctions because of the importance of rail transport at this stage in the supply system. It usually is about 160 kilometers from the rear boundary of subordinate armies, but the distance varies depending upon the situation and availability of rail facilities. The army group supply base generally is an extensive complex made up of branch depots for each of the services. The army group supply base also contains medical installations, workshops, and maintenance units. The base commander is responsible for the administration of the base and is directly subordinate to the army group Chief of the Rear. Supplies come in by rail, either from the home depots or directly from factories or refineries. Fuels are stored in large tanks in one or more depots. Fuel and ammunition storage are well separated from other types of storage.

*c. Army Supply Base.*

(1) The army supply base is similar to that of army group but is smaller. The base is located in the vicinity of a rail net and, like the army group base, consists of the appropriate branch depots. The distance behind the front lines usually is about 100 kilometers, but it may vary considerably. Storage is similar to that at the army group supply base. If large fuel tanks are not available, railroad tank cars are used. Bulk fuels are broken down into drums and cans at this level.

(2) The Army usually establishes forward supply bases near the forward boundary of the Army rear area, generally one for each two or three divisions. The base commander is subordinate to the Army Chief of the Rear.

*d. Divisional Depot Area.* The divisional depot area usually is located near a road junction or main road. Supplies generally are kept on wheels, but dumps on the ground may be established. Petroleum products are kept in tank trucks, drums, or cans. The depot area is administered by a chief who is subordinate to the division Chief of the Rear.

*e. Regimental Supply Point.* The regimental supply point usually is on a supply road from the division. Its facilities and functions are similar to the division depot area, but is operated on a much smaller scale. Supplies at this time are usually maintained on trucks. At regiment there is no depot chief for administration as in division, and administration is conducted by the regimental Chief of the Rear.

*f. Flow of Supplies.* The flow of supplies with Aggressor field forces is shown in figure 7-2.

*g. Logistical Elements.*

(1) In the offense, companies never maintain logistical installations and, in some cases, neither do battalions nor regiments; all rear services for these units are performed by their parent division. The logistical elements of a second-echelon regiment usually are immediately behind the assembly area of the regiment. When the regiment is part of the second echelon of an army, these elements are with the regiment's troops. A second-echelon division rarely has a rear area, but it has a depot area about 3 kilometers (km) behind its assembly area. The rear areas of attached units usually are within the rear area of the unit being supported.

(2) In the defense, the rear installations of second-echelon regiments are located from 16 (the aid station) to 20 (munitions depots) kilometers from FEBA. All rear installations of second-echelon divisions are located 40–50 km from FEBA.

(3) Composition and location of Aggressor forces logistical elements are as follows. (Data are for first echelon units.)

| *Type of unit and elements* | *Offensive depths from LD* | *Defensive depths from FEBA* |
|---|---|---|
| COMPANY: | | |
| Aid Men | | 50–100 m |
| Ammunition Point | | 100–150 m |
| Rations Point | | Up to 1 km |
| BATTALION: | | |
| Medical Section | 1½ to 3 km | 1½ to 3 km |
| Ammunition Point | 4 km | 2–3 km |
| Ration Point and Battalion Kitchen | 5 km | 3–5 km |
| Vehicle Repair Section | 5 km | 3–5 km |

| *Type of unit and elements* | *Offensive depths from LD* | *Defensive depths from FEBA* |
|---|---|---|
| **REGIMENT:** | | |
| Medical Platoon | 5–7 km | 6–10 km |
| Motor Transport Platoon | 10–15 km | Up to 20 km |
| POL Dump | 10–15 km | 10–20 km |
| Ammunition Dump | 10–15 km | 10–20 km |
| Rations Dump | 10–15 km | 10–20 km |
| Motor Vehicle-Tank Repair | Up to 15 km | Up to 20 km |
| Weapons Repair | Up to 15 km | Up to 20 km |
| Vehicle Collection | 5–7 km | 6–10 km |
| **DIVISION:** | | |
| Medical Battalion | 10–14 km | Up to 20 km |
| Vehicle Depot and Repair Shop | 10–14 km | Up to 20 km |
| Tank Depot and Repair Shop | 20–40 km | 35–60 km |
| Artillery and Small Arms Depot and Repair Shop | 20–40 km | 35–60 km |
| Motor Transport Bn | 20–30 km | 20–40 km |
| Engineer Battalion | 20–40 km | 35–60 km |
| Ammunition Dump | 25–30 km | 35–50 km |
| POL Dump | 25–30 km | 35–50 km |
| Rations Dump | 25–30 km | 35–50 km |
| Field Bakery | 25–30 km | 40–45 km |
| Shower, Laundry and Water Point | 25–30 km | 40–45 km |
| **COMBINED ARMS ARMY:** | | |
| Evacuation Hospital | 50–100 km | All logistical elements, 90–130 km |
| Mobile Surgical Hospital | 10–14 km | |
| Mobile Therapeutic Hospital | 75–150 km | |
| Medical Depot | 75–150 km | |
| Medical Replacement Company (*) | 75–150 km | |
| Ambulance Company (*) | 75–150 km | |
| Motor Transport Regiment | 75–150 km | |
| Clothing and Equipment Depot and Repair Shop | 75–150 km | |
| Recovery and Salvage Depot | 75–150 km | |
| Bath and Laundry Units | 75–150 km | |
| Rations Depot | 75–150 km | |
| Field Bakeries and Flour Mills | 75–150 km | |
| POL Depots | 50–100 km | |
| Artillery and Small Arms Depot and Repair Shop | 50–100 km | |
| Ammunition Depots | 50–100 km | |
| Mobile Artillery Repair Shop | 75–150 km | |
| Nuclear Weapons Depot | 75–150 km | |
| Tank Depots and Repair Shops | 75–150 km | |
| Auto-Tractor Depots and Repair Shops | 75–150 km | |
| Chemical Depot and Repair Shop | 75–150 km | |
| Signal Depot and Repair Shop | 75–150 km | |
| **ARMY GROUP:** | | |
| General Hospitals | All installations, 60–400 km | 60–400 or more km |
| Evacuation Hospital (*) | | |
| Convalescent Hospital and Receiving Hospital | | |
| Medical Depots | | |
| Medical Replacement Company (*) | | |
| Artillery and Small Arms Depot and Repair Shop | | |
| Ammunition Depots | | |
| Nuclear Weapons Depot | | |
| Tank Depots and Repair Shops | | |
| Mobile Tank Repair Battalions | | |
| Auto-Tractor Depots Repair Shops | | |
| Intendance Depots and Repair Shops | | |
| Ration Depots | | |

| Type of unit and elements | Offensive depths from LD | Defensive depths from FEBA |
|---|---|---|
| ARMY GROUP: (Cont) | | |
| Materiel Recovery (Salvage) Battalions | | |
| Field Bakeries and Flour Mills | | |
| Bath and Laundry Units | | |
| Replacements Centers | | |
| POL Depots | | |
| Motor Transport Regiment | | |
| Signal Depot and Repair Shop | | |
| Chemical Depot and Repair Shop | | |

(*) Manned by Organic Medical Regiment

## Section II. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT IN THE OFFENSE

### 7–6. General

*a.* Aggressor offensive operations impose great demands on logistics organizations at all levels. These operations depend upon sound logistic support plans for success and require far-sighted preparation, flexibility, and simplicity in order to cope with quickly changing combat situations.

*b.* Aggressor preparations for logistical support of offensive operations are characterized by well-coordinated detailed planning, centralization of resources, and prestocking of large quantities of supplies well forward. Logistic staffs at all levels are brought into planning from the beginning, and maximum coordination is accomplished between the operations and logistic staffs. Transportation resources are rigidly centralized in order to complete logistical buildups efficiently and promptly. Motor transportation is organized into groups for the timely shifting of supplies during the offensive.

### 7–7. Preparations Prior to an Offensive

*a.* Logistical buildup includes dumping of ammunition at firing positions, establishment of dumps in division and regimental areas, and stocking of advanced army supply bases, army supply bases and, if necessary, forward sections of army group depots. The first-echelon divisions' motor transportation, augmented by army transportation or transportation of second-echelon divisions, hauls ammunition to firing positions and supplies to dumps in division and regimental areas from army supply bases. Simultaneously, army transportation may haul supplies from the army group supply base to advanced army supply bases, which generally are established in the rear area of first-echelon divisions. Army group motor transportation may haul supplies to army supply bases from the army group supply base. The uninterrupted flow of supplies to the troops from this stage on is assured by the prompt forward displacement of advanced army supply bases, the army supply base, and the army group supply base, and by means of army mobile supply columns following behind assaulting divisions.

*b.* Air resupply is employed in critical combat situations. Aggressor development of cargo aircraft and airdrop equipment in recent years indicates that Aggressor places great importance on this method of resupply in modern warfare.

*c.* Prior to the offensive, basic loads are adjusted. Initially, greater amounts of ammunition are carried and subsequently larger amounts of fuel when the battle develops into a fast-moving mobile operation. Units assigned to flank protection and advance elements are provided sufficient supplies to support them for the duration of their mission. The organic motor transportation of a motorized rifle division (cargo trucks and motorized rifle transports), augmented in some cases by army, is capable of transporting all of the combat troops of the division together with an estimated 5-day supply of ammunition, POL, and rations. This provides the division with a substantial degree of flexibility.

*d.* Before the offensive, division medical facilities are relieved of casualties to be able to cope with large numbers of casualties in the initial stages of the operation. Regimental medical points and the divisional medical point are moved well forward. An army surgical mobile field hospital is placed in support of first-echelon divisions and is located well forward in the divisional rear area.

## Section III. SUPPLY

### 7–8. Artillery Materiel, Small Arms, and Ammunition Supply

*a. General.*

(1) The supply of ammunition of all types, including nuclear weapons, is the responsibility of the artillery commander at all echelons down through regiment. Ammunition requirements are measured in terms of units of fire. Planning for ammunition supply is conducted by each echelon for subordinate units.

(2) The supply of small arms and artillery materiel, except antitank guns, is the responsibility of the artillery commander.

(3) The supply of antitank guns is the responsibility of the tank commander.

*b. Definitions.*

(1) *Unit of Fire.* A unit of fire is an arbitrary number of rounds per weapon (tube), rocket launcher, or missile launcher, corresponding to a basic load. The unit of fire will vary from weapon to weapon depending upon the caliber, expected echelon of use, and experience factors. The following is a tabulation of the average unit of fire for weapons:

| Weapon | Unit of fire (Rounds per tube, rail or launcher) |
|---|---|
| *Air Defense Artillery* | |
| MG, 14.5mm (quad) | 1775 |
| MG, 14.5mm (dual) | 1775 |
| Gun, 23mm (dual) | 1100 |
| Gun, 23mm (quad) | 1100 |
| Gun, 57mm | 190 |
| Gun, 57mm (dual) | 190 |
| Gun, 85mm | 170 |
| Missile, RAIDER (SAM 1) | 6 |
| Missile, REGENT (SAM 2) | 8 |
| Missile, RAMMER (SAM 3) | 6 |
| Missile, RASCAL (SAM 4) | 6 |
| Missile, ROVER (SAM 5) | 32 |
| Missile, ROGUE (SAM 6) | 6 |
| *Rocket Launchers* | |
| 140mm (16 tube) | 12 |
| 200mm (14 tube) | 12 |
| 240mm (12 tube) | 10 |
| *Artillery Rockets* | |
| RAGE | 8 |
| RAKE | 8 |
| *Artillery Ballistic Missiles* | |
| RANCOR (SSM) | 8 |
| RAVAGE (SSM) | 8 |
| REBEL (SSM) | 3 |
| REGAL (SSM) | 3 |
| *Tanks* | |
| TABU, Heavy, Gun, 122mm | 32 |
| THORN, Medium, Gun, 100mm | 37 |
| THUNDER, Amphibious, Gun, 76mm | 42 |
| TYRANT, Light, Gun, 57mm | 40 |
| *Small Arms* | |
| Submachinegun, 7.62mm | 250 |
| Light machinegun, 7.62mm | 1000 |
| Heavy machinegun, 7.62mm | 2000 |
| Rifle, 7.62mm | 120 |
| Pistol, 9mm | 28 |
| *Mortar* | |
| 82mm | 110 |
| 120mm | 90 |
| 160mm | 70 |
| 240mm | 35 |
| 400mm (SP) | 12 |
| *Towed Cannon* | |
| Mountain gun (Howitzer), 76mm | 146 |
| Howitzer, 122mm | 85 |
| Gun, 130mm | 75 |
| Gun/Howitzer, 152mm | 65 |
| Gun/Howitzer, 203mm | 32 |
| *Self-Propelled Cannon* | |
| Gun, 122mm | 90 |
| Gun, 152mm | 70 |
| Gun, 310mm | 18 |
| *Antitank Artillery, Missiles, and Recoilless Guns* | |
| Gun, 57mm (ATAP) | 190 |
| Gun, 85mm (ATAP) | 150 |
| Gun, 100mm (SP) | 110 |
| Missile, RIPPER (AT) | 20 |
| Missile, RIPPER 1–A (AT) | 20 |
| Recoilless Gun, 82mm | 12 |
| Squad Rocket Launcher, 82mm | 6 |

(2) *Ammunition Basic Load.* The basic load for a unit is the amount of ammunition authorized to be in the unit, expressed in units of fire. A unit basic load will include ammunition with the weapon and in unit trains or depots. The basic load is variable depending upon the situation, and type of operation. For example, in an offensive action where ammunition expenditure is expected to be high, the basic load will be increased by doubling, tripling, or further multiplying the unit of fire.

(3) *Artillery Materiel.* Artillery materiel encompasses mortars, guns, howitzers, gun-howitzers, antitank missiles, recoilless guns, air defense guns, surface-to-air missile launchers, and associated ground handling, electronic, and firing equipment.

(4) *Small Arms.* Small arms consist of submachineguns, light and heavy machineguns, rifles and pistols.

(5) *Ammunition.* All ammunition used by Aggressor weapons is defined as projectiles, regardless of caliber or size. This also includes projectiles which have nuclear, chemical, or biological warheads.

(*a*) Chemical ammunition consists of rounds (shell, rocket, missile) which have chemical warheads.

(*b*) Biological ammunition consists of rounds which have biological warheads.

(*c*) Nuclear ammunition consists of rounds which have nuclear warheads.

(6) *Ammunition Depot.* The ammunition depot may stock all ammunition listed in (5) above, except for nuclear ammunition, depending upon issues by the higher echelon. Transportation is provided by the motor transport unit at the depot echelon.

(7) *Artillery and Small Arms Depot.* The artillery and small arms depot normally is established in conjunction with the ammunition depot and handles receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of all weapons except assault guns. A repair workshop is an organic part of the depot, and repairs artillery and small arms. The services performed by the repair workshop will vary, depending upon the level of the depot (i.e., army group, army, division, regiment).

(8) *Nuclear Weapons Depot.* The nuclear weapons depot normally is established at army level and above, unless the army commander has allocated these weapons to divisions, in which instance a division nuclear weapons depot will be established. The depot is subordinate to the ammunition depot, but is not established in conjunction with the ammunition depot. The depot stores, issues, and maintains nuclear artillery shells, nuclear rockets, nuclear missiles, and nuclear warheads. Repairs and modifications are performed at army group and army level only.

*c. Supply Procedures.*

(1) Ammunition is stored in depots. Separate depots are maintained only for nuclear ammunition and warheads. Supervision of chemical and biological ammunition supply is the responsibility of the Chief of Chemical Troops. Channels of supply are through the artillery sources, supervised by the artillery commander and coordinated with the Chief of the Rear Services and the Chief of Chemical Troops. The planning for ammunition requirements and supply is by higher echelon for lower echelon, as is delivery, except in special operations.

(2) Small arms and artillery materiel supplies are planned by higher echelon for lower echelon. Delivery methods are the same as indicated in (4) below.

(3) Nuclear weapons are stored separately from all other ammunition. Since nuclear weapons normally are not allocated below army level, depots are established at sites by concurrence between the artillery commander and the Chief of the Rear Services. Once again, planning is by higher echelon for lower echelons and delivery methods are as outlined in (4) below.

(4) Each artillery commander submits a 12-hour ammunition status report through artillery channels to his next higher echelon. Reports are consolidated at each echelon. Allocations and shipments are made based on three factors: (1) the ammunition status report, (2) the level of depot stocks, and (3) shipments due from higher echelons. Priority is given to units and zones in which a major effort is to be made or is taking place. Transportation is provided by the transport unit at the echelon of supply.

(5) Each artillery commander submits a 24-hour artillery materiel status report through artillery channels to his next higher echelon. Procedures of consolidation, allocation, and shipment are identical to those indicated in (4) above.

(6) The supply of artillery materiel under the control of the tank commander is through tank channels down to division level. At division and regiment, the deputy commander for technical matters assumes control. Reports, as outlined in (4) above, follow channels and are the basis for allocation and delivery.

(7) Repair of small arms, artillery materiel, and ammunition is performed at the lowest possible echelon. Evacuation is the responsibility of the next higher echelon. Mobile repair teams from the higher echelon reduce evacuation to a minimum. The supply of spare parts is through the repair shops, coordinated by the depot to which assigned.

*d. Special Procedures for Handling of Nuclear Rounds and Warheads.*

(1) Allocation is by army group to army, and in special instances, to division.

(2) At each echelon to which nuclear weapons are allocated, a nuclear weapons depot is established as indicated in *c* (3) above.

(3) Upon allocation and determination by the commander as to which units will fire the weapons, delivery of the round or warhead, as appropriate, is made to the fire unit. At this

time, the fire unit commander assumes full responsibility for the weapon, including the setting of fuses and integration of firing data into the weapon.

(4) Due to the simplicity and ruggedness of Aggressor nuclear weapons, inspections, checkouts, and maintenance are held to a minimum. Maintenance personnel are trained in artillery schools and normally are present at the depot where they are under the control of the depot commander. Mobile teams are available to visit fire units and effect emergency repairs; this eliminates any requirements to have nuclear weapons specialists assigned to fire unit level. Subject to availability, the mobile team usually will accompany the weapon during delivery to the fire unit, and will remain with the unit until released by the commander or until the weapon is fired.

## 7-9. Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants Supply

*a.* Divisions receive their POL supplies by vehicle from army depots. These depots normally stock sufficient POL to refuel all elements of the army twice. In preparation for specific operations, army depots may build their refueling capability to three or four times the amount required to refuel all elements of the army. At army, army group, POL depots, and supply points, fuel is stored in tanks. Oil and lubricants are stored in 150- to 500-liter drums. Divisions use tank trucks, 180-liter drums, and 20-liter cans for supply. In addition to maintaining full tanks on all vehicles, the divisions maintain varying POL reserves. The motorized rifle and tank divisions retain sufficient reserves to refuel their units one or two times. Regimental reserves are sufficient to refuel regimental elements up to 70–75 percent capacity.

*b.* Listed below is the normal distribution of POL supplies in metric tons in selected Aggressor organizations—

| *Unit* | *In vehicles* | *In unit trains, depots, or dumps* |
|---|---|---|
| Combined arms army | 5,000 | 17,500 |
| Tank army | 4,000 | 11,000 |
| Motorized Rifle Division | 700 | 1,450 |
| Motorized Rifle regiment | 90 | 160 |
| Motorized Rifle battalion | 9 | 11 |
| Tank division | 800 | 1,700 |
| Tank regiment | 120 | 240 |
| Tank battalion | 25 | 40 |

## 7-10. Ration and Water Supply

*a.* Aggressor units carry enough regular and dry rations to insure several days subsistence without resupply. Nevertheless, the exploitation of local resources to supply food is a standard practice. The standard soldier's ration weighs about 2.5 kilograms and contains about 3,000 calories. A special dry ration of about 1 kilogram is used as an emergency ration. Most meals are prepared in the form of soups and stews. Aggressor tries to serve two hot meals daily. When this is not possible, the dry ration is issued. Hot meals usually are prepared at battalion level in rugged equipment of simple design. When necessary, the food is carried to the troops in large thermos containers. Bread is baked in the division field bakery and issued directly to regiments. Rations normally are distributed throughout the Aggressor army as follows:

(1) Army depots—four dry and six regular rations.

(2) Division—four or five rations.

(3) Regimental supply points—approximately two rations.

(4) Battalion and small units—one ration.

*b.* The water supply in the field is organized according to plans prepared by engineer units in cooperation with the medical service. When time permits, a water-supply plan is drawn up to include a survey, a water-supply chart, and a work schedule. The location of existing water resources in the expected zone of operations is established by the survey. The water-supply chart indicates which water wells will be used, where new wells will be dug, and how water-supply stations will be deployed. The work schedule designates water points and the specific soldiers assigned thereto. The schedule also shows daily water requirements, indicates transportation requirements for hauling the water, and provides for equipment relative to water availability.

*c.* Engineers organize water supply points in the rear of army groups and armies. Water supply points for all lower echelons are organized by organic engineer units or the soldiers themselves under the direction of the local commander. The daily requirements for areas where water points are few or widely scattered are carefully computed to determine the amount of transportation needed.

*d.* The normal rate of water consumption per man is about 10 liters a day; this includes drinking, food preparation, washing, laundry, and bathing. Under restricted water conditions, the daily allowance is reduced to about 5 liters, and washing, laundry, and bathing are eliminated. The absolute minimum, which covers only drinking water and which normally cannot

be maintained for more than 3 days, is about 3 liters. Additional information on Aggressor water supply may be found in paragraphs 6–35 through 6–41.

## 7–11. General Purpose Transportation and Combat Vehicles

Trucks, tractors, sedans, special-purpose wheeled vehicles, and motorcycles are supplied at army group and army levels by the motor vehicle-tractor directorate at each level. Tanks and armored vehicles are supplies by the commander of tank troops at army group and army level. At division and regimental levels, the supply of all vehicles, armored and noncombat, is consolidated under the Deputy for Technical Affairs. Agencies responsible for vehicle supply are also responsible for maintenance and spare parts.

## 7–12. Specialized Equipment

Specialized equipment, such as engineer, signal, and chemical, is supplied by separate supply channels within each branch of service from army group to regimental level. Medical, veterinary, and billeting supplies have their own supply channels. The medical and veterinary services are subordinate to the main directorate of the rear.

## 7–13. Resupply Requirement

The amount of supplies required to maintain prescribed levels in any unit will necessarily vary due to many factors with the most important factor being the unit's mission. The following is an estimate, expressed in metric tons of the daily resupply requirements of an Aggressor motorized rifle division (MTR) and a tank division (TK) under various mission situations:

| Mission | Ammunition | POL | Rations | Supplies | * Technical | Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | MTR/TK | MTR/TK | MTR/TK | MTR/TK | | MTR/TK |
| Attack | 280/330 | 375/420 | 22/22 | 80/55 | | 757/827 |
| Defense | 350/420 | 200/230 | 23/21 | 60/45 | | 633/716 |
| Covering, Security or Delaying Action | 152/175 | 432/491 | 23/21 | 55/46 | | 622/733 |
| Pursuit | 45/53 | 571/648 | 15/13 | 40/31 | | 671/745 |
| Reserve | 85/100 | 140/158 | 20/18 | 30/23 | | 275/299 |
| Average Combat | 178/208 | 228/260 | 23/21 | 51/40 | | 480/529 |

* Chemical, engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, and signal.

*Motorized Rifle Division Basic Loads**

Ammunition**—1.5 units of fire (up to four for certain weapons)
POL#—2.5 refills (in addition, all wheeled vehicles carry a reserve in two or three 20-liter containers)
Rations—5 days

* Division Basic Load. The amount of a given item of supply authorized to be in possession of a unit and which is distributed between the man/weapon, unit trains, and depots. Basic loads can be increased or decreased depending upon the operation. In mobile operations, for example, larger amounts of fuel would be carried. Basic loads include supplies for current consumption and emergency supplies. Emergency supplies are carried with the weapon, on the man, or in the vehicle, and may be consumed only on the authority of a regimental commander (in the case of ammunition, the battalion commander). Basic expendable supplies (ammunition, POL, and rations) are allocated by army on the basis of expenditures and requirements. Other types of supplies and equipment are furnished on requisition to the appropriate army supply agencies.

** Unit of Fire (para 7–8*b*(1)).

# Refill. Tbe amount required to replenish all vehicles in a unit, plus lubricants calculated at 10 percent of the fuel requirements.

# Section IV. REPAIR, MAINTENANCE, AND EVACUATION

## 7–14. General

Unit repair shops are organized to repair all types of combat materiel and armament. Mobile shops are assigned to unit service elements and are available to effect rapid, on-the-spot repairs. Units are expected to salvage any of their equipment that is disabled in combat. Equipment exposed to chemical, biological, or nuclear contamination is evacuated to decontamination points for cleaning, and then to repair shops for repair or salvage. Collection, salvage and evacuation of Aggressor and enemy materiel are the responsibility of salvage agencies subordinate to the rear commander at division and higher echelons.

## 7–15. Field Maintenance

*a.* It is Aggressor's practice to repair tanks and vehicles as close to the front as possible. Depending upon the situation and the repairs required, mobile repair units are sent out by regiment, division and army. When on-the-spot repair is not feasible, vehicles are evacuated. At company level no repair units are found, although some drivers are qualified mechanics and are capable of carrying out organizational

maintenance. At battalion level, there are small repair units in all line divisions that contain at least a shop truck and four or more mechanics. Tank battalions have larger repair units than motorized rifle battalions. These units are part of the service platoon and are capable of performing light repairs on trucks and armored vehicles. Repair units at battalion level through division are mobile and organized around two basic types of shop trucks. The type A shop contains basic tool sets, has limited spare parts, and can accomplish only light repairs. The type B shop contains a lathe, electric grinder, drill, battery charger, a generator for power tools and lights, welding equipment, and a 1-ton hoist. At regimental level, there is a repair unit that consists of several shop trucks of both types. This unit can do light and medium repairs. Motorized rifle regiments have a combined motor vehicle-tank workshop and tank regiments have separate tank and motor vehicle-tractor workshops. Each line division has a motor vehicle repair workshop and a tank repair workshop. These workshops consist of several shop trucks, many spare parts, supply trucks, tank retrievers (in the case of the tank repair workshop), and more than 100 men. These workshops can perform major repairs on trucks and medium repairs on armored vehicles. Field armies generally have two or more tank and motor vehicle repair battalions, respectively. An army group has several independent repair battalions, which are at least semimobile. Permanent plant facilities are used when available.

*b.* Aggressor pays particular attention to the operation of armored vehicles in winter. Preheating devices for fuel injectors and engines are installed in tanks in extremely cold areas. Coils carrying heated water are installed in crew compartments. Idlers and road wheels are cleaned and tracks are loosened for movement over ice and snow.

*c.* The Chief of Artillery at regiment and above is responsible for the maintenance of small arms, automatic weapons, mortars, and artillery. The line regiments usually have two or three armorers located at the regimental ammunition dump to perform light repair on small arms and some automatic weapons. Armorers in artillery regiments can effect low-echelon maintenance on artillery pieces, as well as on small arms. Artillery repair in tank regiments is accomplished in the tank workshop. In the motorized rifle regiment, some artillery repair is conducted in the motor vehicle-tank repair shop. At division level, there is a weapon repair shop mounted in one or more shop trucks with a good assortment of tools and several repair specialists. At this level, light to medium repairs are made. Artillery repair at regiment and division consists primarily of replacing parts. At army level there is a mobile artillery repair shop with several trucks and about 30 ordnance specialists, including two or three opticians. This group can do light and medium repair on infantry and artillery weapons. It can perform electric welding and riveting, disassemble and assemble mechanical and optical parts, mount parts, and adjust fire-control equipment. At army group level, the artillery repair capability includes complete overhauling of some types and major repairs on the heaviest types of artillery.

*d.* Signal repair units are not found at regiment and division levels. Signal equipment is repaired, when possible, by the signal units themselves. Radio, telephone, and radar units generally have some testing equipment and spare parts for light repairs. Medium repairs on telephone and some radio equipment are performed by signal technicians at the division motor vehicle-tank repair bases. These bases also carry out some repairs on quartermaster equipment. Medium and major repairs are performed at army and army group levels by signal repair units located at signal depots. Engineer and chemical equipment maintenance and repair are effected in the same manner as signal.

*e.* Higher units are responsible for evacuating troops and materiel from subordinate and attached units. This usually is done with the returning supply trucks of the higher unit which carry supplies forward. If lower unit supply trucks are used in their own supply, they evacuate equipment and wounded when they go to the rear.

*f.* Evacuation up to army level usually is by road, and rail or road is used from army to the rear. Armies use separate supply and evacuation routes, whenever possible, and usually have three or more evacuation routes.

*g.* Collection and evacuation of captured or abandoned weapons, equipment and supplies are the responsibility of all unit commanders. In practice, this responsibility is delegated to the appropriate chief of service. Heavy equipment, such as tanks, vehicles, and field artillery, is evacuated in an established manner. Artillery is evacuated by the recovery vehicles of the next higher artillery repair shop. Tanks

and trucks in the units are removed ordinarily by vehicles in the regimental motor vehicle or tank workshop to the regimental collection point for damaged vehicles. If regimental evacuation is not feasible, evacuation is made by the division, but normally the division evacuates from the regimental collection point to the appropriate division workshop or to the divisional collection point if the vehicle is to be evacuated farther. Special evacuation battalions at army level normally evacuate from the divisional collection point, but they may also evacuate from the regiment when necessary. The army level collection point arranges the loading and evacuation by rail to army group, from where evacuation to the Homeland is by rail. Vehicles that can be repaired on-the-spot or repaired at a particular stage in the evacuation route are not evacuated farther. Evacuation procedures can be altered to meet the situation.

## Section V. MEDICAL SUPPORT

### 7–16. General

*a.* The mission of the Aggressor Army Medical Support is to bring aid as far forward as possible to expedite the evacuation of patients. In addition, the service is responsible for dental care, medical supply, epidemic control, general preventive medicine, maintenance of sanitary conditions, and the inspection of food and water supply.

*b.* Aggressor military medical support is well organized and efficient. The government operates all the social services, including medicine, and all the military medical support accordingly has first call on the resources of the Ministry of Health.

*c.* Among medical personnel in the field, the Aggressor Army has the services of a corps of highly dedicated women litter-bearers and nurses. In recovering the wounded from the field, getting them to the aid stations, and providing frontline medical care, these medical assistants do their duty efficiently. The entire medical staff has received training and is proficient in the latest techniques; medical equipment available at all levels, as appropriate, is modern and very efficient.

### 7–17. Organization

*a.* The Chief of the Directorate of Rear Services administers the medical activities of the Aggressor Army through his subordinate directorate of medical support. During wartime, general and specialized hospitals are located in the Homeland and at army group and army levels. The Ministry of Health controls hospitals in the Homeland.

*b.* The army group medical directorate is responsible for medical support of the entire army group. In addition, it administers several hospitals for screening, special surgery, convalescent care and evacuation to the interior. These hospitals are not organic to the army group but are attached to it by the Subordinate Medical Directorate. The organic army group medical regiment operates the army group evacuation facilities.

*c.* At army level a medical department is responsible for medical support. The army hospital base consists of an organic medical regiment and a variable number of supporting field hospitals attached to the army. The basis for allocation of these hospital units to an army varies with the army's mission. Allocation is made and hospitals are controlled directly by the army group's medical directorate office. The organic medical regiment operates the army's evacuation facilities.

*d.* The medical battalion operates the division medical station, which can process a flow of about 200 patients in 24 hours under sustained operations and about 300 patients in 24 hours during periods of short duration, assuming an uninterrupted evacuation capability. The station is equipped to provide major surgery but not special surgery. It has a capacity of 60 beds and is divided into a receiving section, surgical section, and medical section.

*e.* The regiment has a medical platoon staffed with doctors, medical assistants, nurses, and drivers. The detachment organizes a medical point that normally classifies and prepares patients for evacuation to division. Blood transfusions and emergency surgery can be given. A dispensary normally is available.

*f.* The battalion medical section, a part of the service platoon, is commanded by a medical assistant, not a doctor, who has had extensive training in medical practice. The medical section has first aid supplies, litters, and sedatives. When necessary, bandages are changed before evacuation to the regimental medical point. At company level, medical aidmen administer first aid and remove wounded to the

medical collection post for evacuation to the battalion.

*g.* Medical supplies are issued within the medical channel down to company level. Higher units are responsible for supplying the subordinate units. Medical supply is supervised by the Chiefs of the Rear at division level and above, and by the deputy for supply at regimental level.

### 7–18. Treatment and Evacuation

*a.* First aid is administered by available nonmedical personnel using the individual's first aid packet, or by platoon or company medical aid personnel who carry first aid bags containing adequate first aid supplies. At battalion level, patient cards are filled out to indicate the urgency and type of wounds. Evacuation from battalion to regimental medical points is carried out normally within an hour after arrival at the battalion medical point. Evacuation normally is by regimental vehicle, although vehicles from the first-echelon army field surgical hospital sometimes assist if the number of patients at battalion is unusually heavy.

*b.* Evacuation from the regiment to the division medical station is accomplished by division vehicles. However, evacuation may be made directly to the first echelon army field surgical hospital. Normally, the army surgical hospitals pick up patients from the division medical station when the number of patients is too large for the station to handle, or when the division medical station is scheduled to advance.

*c.* Evacuation to the army hospital base is carried out by army ambulances or empty supply vehicles which are returning to the army supply base. Additionally, helicopters may be used. Patients who are expected to recover in 15–30 days are kept at the hospital base. Those patients whose convalescence will be longer and those requiring special treatment are evacuated to the army group hospital base, usually by converted hospital trains.

*d.* At army group level, after passing through the army group receiving hospital, patients are either retained or evacuated by standard hospital trains, ships, or aircraft to the hospitals inside the Homeland. Evacuation from army group level is regulated through evacuation points by representatives of the Subordinate Medical Directorate. Convalescent care in an army group hospital may vary from 6 weeks to 8 months or more.

## Section VI. REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

### 7–19. General

Aggressor forces in the field are supplied with replacement personnel from replacement units located in the Homeland. Personnel from these sources flow into replacement units activated by each army group or army. There they join other replacement personnel originating from disbanded units, hospital discharges, former PW, and other recovered personnel. Replacement units at this level may include elements of all arms and services forming a pool of officers and enlisted men located near the frontlines.

### 7–20. Replacement Procedures

*a.* The replacement system in the zone of operations functions on the principles of unit replacement, but when the number of field units is insufficient or when the sector held by a unit is relatively quiet, replacements are sent directly to frontline units. If possible, a unit is withdrawn from action and rehabilitated behind the front. Here it receives replacements and, if the tactical situation permits, undergoes intensive training. A unit normally is withdrawn while it still has a strong enough skeleton on which to rebuild, as Aggressor does not make a practice of exhausting a unit before it is withdrawn. In general, divisions are considered capable of offensive combat at 75 percent of authorized strength.

*b.* Requisitions for replacements are consolidated by occupational specialty at the lowest level of command and sent forward periodically through statistical control channels at each level of command. Officers are replaced on an individual basis. Field grade officers are assigned to army group replacement units from which they are further assigned individually. General officers are held in a pool controlled by the Ministry of the Armed Forces and assigned directly from the pool.

## Section VII. CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

### 7–21. Personnel

*a.* The Aggressor military forces perform Civil Affairs/Military Government (CAMG) functions only during the early stages of occupation. During those stages, selected military personnel are responsible for maintaining law and order in occupied territory. These personnel are drawn largely from the rear services of the major command comprising the Aggressor occupation force. As soon as the occupied area has been consolidated, the military administration is replaced by political administrators furnished by the Aggressor Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The commanding general of the Aggressor major command remains nominally the military governor. The senior political administrator serves as his advisor and, for all practical purposes, functions as the military governor.

*b.* In the initial stages of the occupation, the Army furnishes the troops required to insure the internal security of the occupied territory. After consolidation, internal security is often maintained by security forces controlled by the Aggressor Ministry of the Interior.

*c.* The Senior Administrator, although not subject to control by the Army, closely cooperates with the Chief of the Rear Services of the major Aggressor command. This cooperation extends primarily to logistical and administrative support furnished by the Army to CAMG and to exploiting local resources for the benefit of the major command. The Senior Administrator also cooperates with the command's political and counterintelligence officers in the areas of political indoctrination and surveillance of the local populace.

*d.* The Senior Administrator and civilian personnel under his control are mostly members of the Homeland Circle Trigon Party. If not, they are known to be completely loyal to the Aggressor regime. They have been carefully trained in the language, history, culture, social customs, and economic structure of the occupied territory in which they are to serve. Many of them are specialists in certain areas normally regulated or controlled by the government, i.e., law enforcement, finance, commerce, agriculture, and public health. Others specialize in political screening, information control, and civil censorship. Still others are members of the Aggressor counterintelligence and security forces, who pose as CAMG personnel while purging the native populace of active and passive opponents of Circle Trigonism.

### 7–22. Organization

*a. Aggressor CAMG Organization.* Aggressor's CAMG organization is generally adapted to the political subdivisions of the occupied territory. The allocation of military or civilian CAMG personnel per political subdivision is as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| (1) Township—1 Off, 3 EM (or equivalent amount of senior and junior civilian administrators) | Controls townships containing from 3000 to 5000 inhabitants. Smaller towns are under the jurisdiction of a team from the nearest larger town. |
| (2) County —5 Off, 30 EM (or equivalent amount of civilians) | Town of more than 5000 inhabitants in these counties are controlled by additional teams. The strength of the team depends upon the size of the town. |
| (3) State —(or Province)—25 Off, 100 EM (or equivalent of civilians) | This team may be augmented as required by the size and/or population of the state or province. |
| (4) Theater Headquarters, Headquarters of Major Command, or at national level. Military Governor, Senior Administrator, and Staff | Staff varies with the size of the territory administered, the size of the population, and the political and economic problems encountered. |

These personnel exercise full governmental control over the occupied territory during the early stages of the occupation. They make every effort to constitute a puppet government from natives of the area. Once this government has been established, Aggressor CAMG personnel relinquish their overt control and confine themselves to covert supervision. This is accomplished by assigning an Aggressor "advisor" to every important native official and circulating Aggressor CAMG inspection teams throughout the occupied territory. This rigid, though less obvious, control of the occupied territory requires that Aggressor CAMG personnel be retained at 75 percent of their original strength.

*b. Native Government.* The puppet government, through nominally independent, carries out the directives of the Senior Administrator

(often referred to as Ambassador or Political Advisor) and his staff. Candidates for this government are selected from underground or overt members of the local Circle Trigon Party, Circle Trigonist sympathizers, and, to a lesser extent, political opportunists with critical skills. Candidates for the legislature of the occupied territory are selected on the same basis. While officially designated as the legislature, this parliamentary body has no powers and rubberstamps the decisions of the executive. Aggressor prefers to establish native puppet government rather than exercise direct control for these reasons:

(1) A native government can be depicted as having genuine popular support and reflecting the popularity of the Circle Trigonist movement among the local populace.

(2) Aggressor can disclaim responsibility for oppressive and restrictive measures by attributing them to the native governments. Native governments are only constituted in areas where the tactical situation has been stabilized. Areas in which the tactical situation is fluid are governed by Aggressor personnel.

## 7-23. Functions of Aggressor CAMG Personnel and Units in Aggressor Occupied Territory

*a.* Perform actual governmental functions or supervise the governmental functions performed by the native government.

*b.* Maintain the internal security of the occupied territory in conjunction with tactical troops or security forces and counterintelligence personnel.

*c.* Indoctrinate the local populace with the political philosophy of the Circle Trigon Party.

*d.* Exploit local resources in support of the major command operating in the occupied territory.

*e.* Exploit the local economy in support of the Aggressor war effort.

*f.* Encourage and activate local auxiliaries, "International Brigades" separatist movements, and other para-military and political bodies designed to bolster the Aggressor military potential and support Aggressor political objectives.

## 7-24. Aggressor CAMG Policies and Operation

*a. Politics.* CAMG operation in the political field varies in accordance with the political traditions of the occupied territory. Consequently, the means of attaining Aggressor political objectives vary, but the objectives remain the same. Aggressor's primary political objective is the complete acceptance of Circle Trigonism by the local populace. In territories with an autocratic political tradition, Aggressor abolishes the existing monarchist or totalitarian party and supplants it with the Circle Trigon Party. In territories with a democratic tradition, some "democratic" parties are permitted to survive in name only. Such parties are usually taken over by political opportunists from their own ranks, who form a coalition with the Circle Trigon Party, and support Circle Trigonist policies.

*b. Law Enforcement and Judicial Procedures.* During the early stages of its occupation, Aggressor imposes martial law and sets up military tribunals to administer it. Once the occupied area has been pacified, Aggressor introduces its own legal code. This code denies the right of trial by jury and the right of habeas corpus, permits secret trials, and allows the security forces to arrest or search without a warrant. In cases affecting the security of the state, the accused need not be brought to trial, but can be deported to a corrective labor camp or penal colony by the security police. Law enforcement is initially performed by tactical troops and taken over by the security forces as soon as the tactical situation permits. After local law enforcement agencies have been purged of pro-democratic elements and replaced by Circle Trigonists, they are permitted to assume most police powers. Aggressor security forces step into the background, ready to be recalled at a moment's notice to enforce "the security of the state." Existing courts of law are abolished and replaced by People's Courts. These courts, staffed by local Circle Trigonists and "advised" by Aggressor jurists, take over from the military tribunals at the earliest opportune time and administer the Aggressor legal code.

*c. Industry.* Aggressor exploits all industries and natural resources in the occupied areas to the fullest possible extent. The major command stationed in or conducting operations from an occupied area has first priority in drawing on local resources. All resources not needed to support the major command or to sustain the local economy at a minimum level of existence are diverted to supporting the industrial base of the Homeland. All large industrial establishments are nationalized and run by managers responsible to the Ministry of Industry of the

native government. These ministries also appoint inspectors, who maintain close supervision over small factories run by their owners.

*d. Commerce.* Large commercial establishments, such as department store chains, are nationalized and run by managers responsible to the Ministry of Trade of the native government. Individual ownership of small stores is permitted, but heavy pressure is placed on owners to join cooperatives. These cooperatives are not consumers' cooperatives, but state-controlled commercial collectives. Foreign trade is channeled through the Foreign Trade Section of the Ministry of Trade. This section is heavily staffed by Aggressor administrators who are experts in the foreign trade field. These administrators exercise virtual control over all foreign trade carried on by the native government.

*e. Agriculture.* Large farms are expropriated and collectivized. Farm machinery of the expropriated farms is pooled in so-called "Farm Machinery Stations," which are distributed over all agriculture areas of the occupied territory. These stations, in addition to loaning farm implements to collective farms, place their tractors and trucks at the disposal of the military whenever the need arises. They also serve as centers of political indoctrination directed at the rural population. Small farms, in most instances, are retained by their owners. The Ministry of Agriculture of the native government sets a quota for the production and delivery of agricultural products. It requires all individually-owned and collectivized farms to meet this quota, but permits them to sell surplus crops on the open market.

*f. Manpower Policies.* The entire population of the occupied territory is registered and graded by mental and physical profiles. This registration enables Aggressor to maintain stringent controls over the movements of the population and to allocate qualified manpower to industry and agriculture as needed. Every effort is made to channel the best qualified manpower into activities which support the Aggressor war effort. Men and women employed in such key activities are prohibited from changing jobs without approval of the Ministry of Labor of the local government. Aggressor tries to induce qualified members of the population to enlist in military para-military organizations designed to support its military and political objectives. Such organizations include military auxiliary units, "International Brigades," and voluntary labor battalions. Members of the pre-Aggressor government's executive, legislative, and judicial branches; civic leaders; heads of patriotic organizations; religious leaders; executives of industrial and commercial establishments; large-estate owners; and key members of anti-Circle Trigon parties are rounded up and placed in "protective custody." Converts to the Circle Trigon cause are released and exploited for propaganda purposes, but remain under the strict surveillance of the security forces. Others are shipped to forced labor camps and penal colonies, where they perform menial labor under conditions of extreme hardship.

*g. Fiscal Policies.* Aggressor fiscal policies conform with its policy of economic exploitation of the occupied territory. Wherever it can seize printing plants, Aggressor will use them to print paper money in excess of paper currency in circulation. In other instances, Aggressor has printed occupation money in denominations equivalent to those used in the occupied territory. The flooding of the occupied area with money not backed by gold reserves has, of course, an inflationary effect on the local economy. On the other hand, this measure enables Aggressor troops and other Aggressor personnel to derive great profit from purchasing goods and services with worthless money.

*h. Property Control.* In all occupied areas, Aggressor initiates a large-scale expropriation of elements hostile to the Circle Trigon cause. Wherever possible, such property is nationalized. Where property does not lend itself to nationalization, Aggressor appoints custodians who place the property on sale. Aggressor nationals and native Circle Trigonists are permitted to purchase such property for a fraction of its actual value. Furthermore, payment is usually with worthless money of the type described above.

*i. Information Control.* All information media, including newspapers, periodicals, books, radio, television, theater and music, and motion pictures are placed under the stringent control of Aggressor information specialists. These specialists take personal charge of operating all media. At the same time, they institute a system of licensing designed to permit qualified Circle Trigonists or Circle Trigonist sympathizers to take over the operation of these media. After the licensees have been installed, strict controls are maintained by Aggressor information specialists. These controls insure that all information is slanted in favor of the

Circle Trigonist cause and that anti-Aggressor information is suppressed.

*j. Civil Censorship.* Aggressor CAMG personnel, in cooperation with counterintelligence personnel, are responsible for establishing and maintaining civil censorship in the occupied territory. Aggressor censors, functioning as "advisors" to native government censors, are found in all postal, telephone, and telegraph facilities operated by the native government. Civil censorship is maintained even after the occupied territory has been completely pacified.

# CHAPTER 8
# SPECIAL OPERATIONS

## Section I. AIRBORNE OPERATIONS

### 8–1. General

Aggressor airborne forces are an offensive arm for use in special operations. They are also considered invaluable adjuncts to all types of operations under nuclear warfare conditions. Airborne operations are conducted in cooperation with other ground force operations. Operations involving airborne forces of more than one division strength are usually controlled directly by the army group. Airborne divisions are usually reinforced with appropriate General Headquarters (GHQ) units. Organization of the airborne division is described in paragraph 9–3 and figures 9–2 and 9–3. A RAIDER surface-to-air missile battalion usually is attached to each airborne division. Airborne tasks are of short duration and usually require the link-up with ground forces within 2 or 3 days.

### 8–2. Missions of Airborne Forces

*a.* Aggressor airborne units support operations of specific ground units. Airborne missions are normally executed by separate airborne divisions, regiments, battalions, and companies employed independently or as part of an airborne force. Typical airborne missions include:

(1) Seizure of the area of a proposed junction of two ground forces to expedite the final stages of an envelopment and to prevent the escape of enemy forces.

(2) Seizure of river crossing sites deep in enemy territory to deny them to the enemy and to facilitate the advance of Aggressor forces.

(3) Destruction or capture of important command and communication centers.

(4) Seizure of coastal areas to secure landing sites for seaborne troops.

(5) Reconnaissance missions deep within enemy lines.

(6) Support of night combat operations by seizing objectives to be occupied by advancing ground forces.

(7) Seizure of water and fuel supplies in the enemy rear when operating in desert or thinly populated areas where such supplies are scarce.

(8) Outflanking mountainous areas or enemy fortified areas to isolate the enemy.

(9) Sabotage or seizure of enemy nuclear weapons sites and forward airbases from which aircraft delivering nuclear weapons can operate.

(10) Seizure or sabotage of enemy supply installations, primarily nuclear warhead depots.

*b.* Airborne missions of strategic significance are carried out in support of the army group, or of the overall war effort in a given area. Typical strategic missions are—

(1) Seizure or destruction of important industrial targets, centers of communication, electrical power production and distribution centers, and nuclear weapons storage areas.

(2) Seizure or destruction of centers of government or other important control centers.

(3) Capture or destruction of important experimental testing, production, or storage facilities for nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and agents.

(4) Occupation of islands.

(5) Seizure of straits commanding important sea communications lanes.

### 8–3. Reconnaissance for Conduct of Operations

*a.* The overall army group reconnaissance plan includes provisions for airborne assaults in the enemy rear. Once it has been decided to launch an airborne operation in a certain area, reconnaissance of that area is intensified.

*b.* Specific reconnaissance in preparation for an airborne operation is directed toward attaining the following objectives:

(1) Selection of suitable primary and alternate drop zones.

(2) Determination of the nature, composition, strength and capabilities of the enemy forces in the drop zone area or sufficiently near

it to interfere with the landing operations and subsequent attack of the objectives. Special attention is given to the presence of enemy tank and missile units.

(3) Determination in the area of operations of the nature of the terrain, conditions of the road network, and degree of difficulty of natural and manmade obstacles to the airdropping of personnel and equipment.

(4) Determination of the political orientation of population in the area and its probable effects on planned operations.

*c.* Reconnaissance is carried out by air, clandestine agents, long-range patrols, and airdropped reconnaissance teams. Reconnaissance activities, to include dropping of parachutist teams, are often also conducted outside the area of proposed operation as a deceptive measure.

## 8–4. Flight Routes

Routes are chosen to avoid enemy antiaircraft and fighter defenses, and to reach the objective as soon as possible. Secrecy and deception are emphasized. If the commander of an airborne regiment or higher unit receives information during the flight to the effect that the air or ground situation has altered, he may change the drop zone or landing point of his unit and switch to one of the alternate ones. His decision is reported to the next higher commander without delay.

## 8–5. Landing

*a.* Aggressor airborne troops can be dropped in any season of the year and at any time of the day or night. Troops are generally dropped from minimum safety heights and supplies follow immediately after them. Supplies normally are dropped from heights of 100–200 meters. Supply carrying aircraft fly as close behind troop carrying aircraft as possible. Aircraft land, if the situation permits, as soon as the ground has been secured by the Aggressor airborne units.

*b.* The commander of the army group mounting the airborne operation in coordination with the commander of the supporting air transport unit is the approving authority for the selection of drop and landing zones, the timing of operations, the measures planned to secure the airhead, and the plans for support of combat operations. The commander of the air transport unit is responsible for insuring that the troops and equipment arrive at the designated places at the right time.

## 8–6. Conduct of Operations

*a.* Nuclear fires may precede an airborne assault. Airborne troops are given an immediate mission and a subsequent mission. Their immediate mission is to destroy the enemy in the landing areas, secure the airhead, and move out and capture their objectives. Their subsequent mission is to defend the captured areas or destroy them and withdraw to previously selected defensive positions. In either case they will defend until a link-up occurs with advancing ground forces or until they are sufficiently reinforced from the air to resume the attack so as to expand the occupied areas. The employment of airborne troops may be centralized or decentralized depending on their mission and situation.

*b.* Decentralized action is used in large areas to disorganize enemy control and command, to hinder movements of troops and supplies, and to destroy small enemy detachments. The force is divided into battalions, companies, platoons, and squads which are allotted independent tasks. Provision is made to assemble the force as necessary.

*c.* In airborne operations of larger offensives, several airborne assaults are made in different localities. The more successful assaults are reinforced and subsequently merged into one airhead if adequate dispersion can be maintained. When the assaults do not meet with initial success, the surviving airborne units conduct harassing and interdicting operations until they are rescued or return to Aggressor lines.

*d.* Aggressor believes that night facilitates surprise and enhances the enemy's confusion at suddenly finding Aggressor forces to its rear, contributing to deceiving the enemy as to the actual location of the airhead and the strength of the landed forces which assures the execution of the mission with minimum losses. Consequently, Aggressor favors night airborne operations.

*e.* Aggressor emphasizes that the speed with which troops assemble and initiate combat operations after landing is of decisive significance for the successful outcome of the entire operation.

*f.* Aggressor seeks to insure successful operation by—

(1) Achieving total surprise of the enemy defense and its quick neutralization before the enemy has time to recover.

(2) Selecting drop and landing zones in areas relatively free of large enemy troop con-

centrations or where such forces have previously been neutralized. The areas selected should be reasonably out of reach of enemy armor and nuclear delivery means. Much of the Aggressor's preparatory air and long-range missile strikes are aimed toward achieving this objective.

(3) Giving the combat operations of the airborne troops continuous fire support and mounting diversionary attacks with other ground troops.

*g.* Aggressor attempts to achieve surprise by:

(1) Establishing strict security measures over assembly and loading operations of troops scheduled to participate in an impending airborne operation. In particular, Aggressor isolates personnel of participating units from contact with the local populace and members of other Aggressor units from the moment they are selected for an operation. Isolation is continued during movements to assembly areas and to staging areas. Movements are conducted using maximum cover and deception measures. Isolation is also used during the units stay in these areas. The time spent in assembly areas and staging areas is held to an absolute minimum.

(2) Selecting drop and landing zones as close to final objectives as possible.

(3) Carrying out landing operations rapidly and primarily at night.

(4) Initiating combat operations immediately upon reaching the ground before the enemy can organize a defense.

*h.* Aggressor's primary concern, once the airborne forces have landed, is the threat posed by enemy tanks and enemy air. Consequently, in addition to orienting his preparation toward the neutralization of these threats, Aggressor heavily reinforces the landing forces with antitank, air defense, and engineer elements. These elements, always among the first to land, include gun and guided missile air defense and antitank units and engineer elements equipped to construct antitank obstacles. Continuous air cover is also provided and an air liaison team is dropped with the lead elements to coordinate air support for air defense and ground support operations.

### 8–7. Logistics

Resupply is by air, usually by night or at dawn. Supply reservoirs are established in uninhabited places and under cover. Technicians equipped to carry out minor repairs accompany the force. Troops are trained to also use captured enemy weapons, vehicles, and equipment. Medical aid stations are set up in concealed positions. Wounded are evacuated by air, if possible, and usually at night. Normally, airborne units rely on linkup with ground forces so that the wounded may be evacuated by the organizational means of the link-up forces.

### 8–8. Air Support During Operations

Fighter aircraft escort the transport aircraft. During the landing, fighters protect the landing zone from enemy air attack, engage enemy air defense positions, give close support to the troops that have landed, engage approaching enemy reserves, and provide smoke screens when required. Bombers may also be allotted for close support and for delivery of nuclear fires. Attack aircraft provide close support to the landed units.

## Section II. AIRMOBILE OPERATIONS

### 8–9. General

To improve the ground combat effort, and to increase mobility and flexibility, Aggressor has recently emphasized training and development of existing troop and helicopter resources for use in joint airmobile operations. Helicopters employed in these operations are organic to the military transport aviation regiments of the air army. Riflemen usually are drawn from the airborne or rifle divisions due to the minimum training necessary to prepare these units. On occasion, Aggressor has conducted operations employing infantry troops which have received extensive airmobile training. It is anticipated that in the future, Aggressor will make much greater use of airmobile assault capabilities during both day and night operations.

### 8–10. Employment and Missions of Airmobile Forces

*a.* Aggressor employs airmobile operations to move combat forces and their equipment about the battlefield in aircraft under the control of the ground force commander to engage in ground combat. These operations are characterized by surprise, flexibility, maneuver, timing, accuracy, and speed over extended distances and terrain obstacles. Ideally, these forces will be employed in areas which are lightly defended by the enemy and which have been subjected to

a preassault nuclear or nonnuclear preparation.

*b.* Missions of airmobile forces are basically the same as for airborne forces; i.e., to prevent the enemy from closing gaps formed as a result of nuclear strikes, to seize and hold key terrain until the arrival of advancing troops, and to seize and hold key terrain along routes of enemy withdrawal.

*c.* In a typical airmobile operation, Aggressor will conduct reconnaissance of proposed landing zones, prepare these sites using nuclear or nonnuclear fires to include armed helicopters, then insert a control element with the mission of marking the landing zones and guiding in the assault element. The airmobile assault is conducted by task force elements of company through regimental size units. A regimental assault element is equipped to seize and hold an objective as far as 30 to 50 kilometers forward of the Aggressor forward ground forces for a period of 24 hours. The regimental assault element will normally consist of:

(1) Rifle Battalions (three).
(2) 82mm Mortar Battery.
(3) 57mm ATAP Battery.
(4) 57mm ADMG/MSL Battery.
(5) Signal Company.
(6) Engineer Company.
(7) Medical Company.
(8) Chemical Defense Platoon.
(9) Rear Service Elements.

*d.* If it is anticipated that linkup will require a period greater than 24 hours, Aggressor will reinforce the participating regiment by attaching additional artillery (85mm ATAP, 120mm mortar, or 122mm howitzer) from division artillery assets. In some cases 152mm gun/howitzers, motorized rifle transporters, and TYRANT tanks—all of which are air-transportable through the use of HOODOO C helicopters—are provided to the participating regiment.

### 8–11. Command and Control

*a.* When a division or combined arms army (CAA) commander desires to conduct an airmobile operation, his staff develops an airmobile operation plan. The division or CAA operations officer and the air liaison staff officer, in coordination with the rest of the staff, develop the ground tactical and air assault portions of the plan respectively. They determine the essential elements of the plan to include: objectives, scheme of maneuver, fire support, the number and type of helicopters required, time and duration of the operation, troop requirements, attachments, assembly areas, landing zones, reconnaissance, and logistical support. This operation plan is then forwarded for review by higher headquarters. The decision to launch an airmobile operation is the responsibility of the army group commander who, upon approval of the plan, will levy requirements for the necessary helicopters on the military transport aviation regiments of the air army.

*b.* During an operation, however, the lowest echelon capable of exercising control and coordination of the entire airmobile operation will have control of the aircraft. Forward air liaison officers are assigned permanently to regiments, and will be attached to a battalion or company when operations are conducted employing elements of this size.

## Section III. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS

### 8–12. General

*a.* Aggressor's amphibious tactics and materiel are similar to those of conventional forces of other nations throughout the world. Amphibious landings are generally carried out to complement ground operations. Aggressor does not, however, maintain a standing amphibious force. Typical missions are—

(1) Seizure of important objectives in enemy rear areas.
(2) Seizure of areas that cannot be captured through direct ground action.
(3) Aid in completing encirclements.
(4) Carrying out raids and sabotage.
(5) Collection of intelligence.

*b.* Nuclear weapons are used to destroy enemy shore batteries and fixed coastal defenses, and to protect beachheads from counterattack. Aggressor may use airborne forces in coordination with amphibious landings.

*c.* A variation of Aggressor amphibious tactics places great reliance on amphibious and helicopter landed forces. Aggressor uses appropriately modified sea transport to bring his heliborne forces close to the beachead. The landings are carried out by the heliborne forces landing in the rear of the enemy beach defenses while the amphibious force is landing at the beaches.

### 8-13. Troops Employed

Aggressor amphibious operations are carried out by specially trained ground and naval forces. Army ground forces rarely exceed the size of an army consisting primarily of motorized rifle forces. An intensified training program is used to develop an amphibious force after needs for such an operation are determined.

### 8-14. Command

Landings in direct support of an army group operation usually are under control of the army group commander. Other landings are usually under naval command. Once any beachhead is established, the ground commander assumes control of all ground forces participating in the landing.

### 8-15. Defense Against Amphibious Operations

*a.* Aggressor coastal defense or counteramphibious operations involve ground, naval, and air forces, with nuclear support, to include the surface-to-surface fires of antiaircraft missile units within range. Aggressor coastlines are fortified with fixed and mobile artillery, ground defenses protected against enemy nuclear attack, underwater and on-shore obstacles at all points where enemy landings are feasible. The main line of defense is the first high ground paralleling the shoreline.

*b.* Ground forces for the defense of coastal areas are designated by the army group controlling the coastal area. The army group controls all naval, ground, and air elements assigned to coastal defense. In those areas that are not within an army group zone, a special combined arms force under naval command defends the area. A combed arms army engaged in coastal defense will usually be assigned an area comparable in width and depth to the combined arms army defense area in the normal land defense (fig 5-7). If there is an extremely good road net in the coastal area, a wider front may be assigned.

*c.* Units defending coastal sectors organize their defenses into two echelons. The first echelon contains motorized rifle divisions, field and coastal artillery units, and a tank counterattack reserve. This echelon prevents enemy landings and the establishment of a beachhead. The second echelon and reserves consist largely of tank units. Their mission is to combat enemy airborne or airmobile landings and to counterattack major lodgements.

*d.* Aggressor uses clandestine agents and long-range aerial and naval reconnaissance to locate enemy amphibious forces. When detected, the enemy amphibious force is attacked by naval forces before the enemy's beach assault is launched. The enemy forces that do succeed in landing are cut-off from further support from the sea and destroyed.

## Section IV. OPERATIONS AT RIVER LINES

### 8-16. General

*a.* Aggressor uses both deliberate and hasty river crossings. Aggressor forces prefer hasty river crossings to insure that the momentum of the attack is maintained and to prevent the development of a nuclear target at the crossing site. The ground forces rely on the employment and the availability of amphibious vehicles and modern crossing equipment as well as on the capability of tanks to cross through deep fords. The amphibious type equipment permits the Aggressor force to cross a water obstacle from the march at a relatively fast rate.

*b.* Aggressor forces usually make river crossings on a broad front. Diversionary or feint crossings are made in considerable strength. These crossings also provide alternative crossing sites to which the main forces can be diverted should the main crossings fail or be held up. Once the assault has begun, every effort is made to carry it to its conclusion. If the attempt in a given area is unsuccessful, every possibility will be explored to shift the effort to another area. Terrain and the overall situation may cause the Aggressor force to execute repeated crossing attempts in the same area, but this will be done rarely and most reluctantly.

*c.* Aggressor seeks to insure a successful operation by:

(1) Thorough advance planning.

(2) Conducting reconnaissance on a broad front, simultaneously probing for weaknesses in the enemy defenses while seeking the most suitable crossing sites where the banks are accessible and where there is a valley providing good cover and concealment.

(3) Neutralizing enemy defenses and counterattack capabilities with all available firepower to include nuclear and chemical fires.

(4) Bold, rapid, and decisive action, both in approaching the river line and attempting to seize any undamaged enemy crossings as well as in the crossing operation itself.

(5) Swiftly expanding bridgeheads on the opposite side.

(6) Skillful use of and timely movement of crossing equipment to the river line.

(7) Providing reliable air cover for crossing operations.

(8) Providing large area smoke screens for crossing operations.

*d.* Aggressor river crossing operations are characterized by large-scale employment of amphibious vehicles, tanks, rafts, bridge sections, and boats or ferries to transport tanks, artillery, and loaded vehicles without waiting for the completion of bridges. Maximum use is made of field expedients and locally procured boats, rafts, and other material. Bridge construction usually is done at night. To hide the bridges from observation, Aggressor frequently constructs them beneath the surface of the water. Smoke screens are used to mask bridge construction sites and the adjoining countryside.

*e.* During the advance to contact or in the pursuit, tanks and motorized rifle units are sent ahead to seize bridgeheads. Airborne units may be used. If the leading units fail to capture bridgeheads, then the following units will organize a hasty assault crossing. If the hasty assault fails, forces are regrouped and plans initiated for a deliberate crossing.

## 8-17. Hasty River Crossings

*a.* Aggressor tank or motorized rifle divisions and regiments can make hasty river crossings independently from the march. Crossings made against strong resistance usually are conducted under division control, and those crossings against weak resistance are usually made under regimental control. Units are assigned definite crossing sites whose widths are determined by the existing situation. With a division, regimental crossing sites are 3-5 kilometers apart. Aggressor prefers to carry out hasty crossings at night or in first light.

*b.* If the division advance guard units cannot seize a bridgehead, they secure the near bank so the assault crossing can be made by the division. Advance guard units send out reconnaissance elements to reconnoiter the river and to select crossing points for amphibious vehicles, ferries, and bridges. Tanks with the advance guard are positioned to protect the division flanks. Antitank guns, heavy machineguns, and light air defense artillery are moved to the riverbank where they can deliver direct fire on the opposite bank.

*c.* First-echelon regiments move into assembly areas 2—5 kilometers from the far banks of the river during darkness, and the second-echelon regiment goes into assembly areas 10—13 kilometers from the river. Crossing equipment joins the units in their assembly areas. The engineers prepare the riverbank for easy entry of units into the river. Each first-echelon regiment designates an assault battalion that, in turn, designates an assault company. The assault company usually is reinforced by a platoon of amphibious tanks, an antitank gun, a squad of engineers, and a CBR reconnaissance squad. The company is also assigned amphibious motorized rifle transporters to permit crossing the river in one wave. The remainder of the assault battalion crosses behind the assault company in amphibious motorized rifle transporters or in pneumatic boats. Assault companies load into amphibious personnel carriers in their assembly areas, move to the riverbank, and cross directly behind the amphibious tanks during the artillery preparation. The artillery preparation, if any, usually lasts about 10—15 minutes, and is fired while the amphibious vehicles are moving up to the riverbank or as the vehicles enter the water and cross the river. On reaching the far bank, the company disembarks and attacks enemy positions that can bring direct fire to bear on the river. Vehicles return to the near bank to ferry across heavier equipment. Landing points are prepared for other units that are following. The remainder of the assault battalion then crosses and can attack to enlarge the bridgehead. When the first elements of the assault company reach the far bank, engineer units assemble ferries and ponton bridges on the near bank. Heavy equipment can usually start to cross in about 3 hours. With heavy equipment across, the first-echelon regiments attack to deepen the bridgehead and to secure the crossing for the rest of the division.

*d.* Construction of a heavy ferry or ponton bridge for the division's heavier equipment is begun when direct fire into the site is eliminated. Divisions usually are across the river in less than 8 hours after the crossing operation starts. The division objective will be the same as

in a normal operation; the river is considered an obstacle—not an objective. The divisions immediately deepen the bridgehead to at least 10—15 kilometers. The army second echelon crosses the river when the first-echelon divisions break out of the bridgehead. The army uses its second-echelon forces to widen the bridgehead and to encircle and destroy enemy forces along the river to permit commitment of the tank division.

### 8–18. Tank Army in the Hasty River Crossing

*a.* Tank divisions carry out the initial crossing for the tank army in the hasty river crossing. The assault unit for the tank division may be a special reconnaissance detachment consisting of a reinforced tank company. The tank company would normally operate with an advance guard well forward of its parent regiment and the reinforcements and crossing equipment would be assigned for an entire operation, not for just a single crossing. These detachments also have motorized rifle units, artillery, and mortars, and may have antitank guns. Ponton equipment is allocated. The basic task of these detachments is to reconnoiter the river, establish bridgeheads, and to secure uninterrupted crossing for the regiments.

*b.* While still about 8 kilometers from the river, the reconnaissance detachment is given a specific sector of the bank to reconnoiter. It bypasses enemy resistance and presses to the riverbank. Small combat and reconnaissance patrols, reinforced by engineers, precede the main body of the detachment, seize existing bridges, crossings, or fords, and establish a small bridgehead. The remainder of the detachment remains under cover until the results of this reconnaissance are available. The detachment crosses the river on amphibious vehicles under cover of tank and artillery fires and smoke provided by the attached artillery and tanks. The detachment forms a bridgehead, organizes its defenses, and holds it until the following regiments can cross and extend the bridgehead.

### 8–19. Use of Helicopters

Helicopters are used for reconnaissance, to insert reconnaissance detachments across rivers, and to move engineers and equipment to ferry and bridge sites. Helicopters are also used by assault elements to cross rivers and thus avoid actual water-crossing operations until a beachhead has been established and secured.

### 8–20. Use of Nuclear Weapons

*a.* Priority for nuclear attack, in a hasty river crossing, is given to the enemy force directly covering the crossing site, followed by the reserves of those forces. Once the crossing has been made, the priority for nuclear attack shifts to those enemy tactical and operational reserves constituting a major threat to the Aggressor forces holding the far side of the river; the Aggressor forces on the near side may, if required for safety, withdraw the minimum necessary distance.

*b.* Vulnerability to enemy nuclear fires at a crossing site is reduced by—

(1) Crossing at times of reduced visibility.

(2) Extending bridgeheads as rapidly as possible to avoid troop concentrations.

(3) Establishing air defense defenses early.

(4) Maintaining reserves of crossing equipment to replace losses.

(5) Maximum use of camouflage.

(6) Extensive use of smoke and deception measures.

### 8–21. Antitank Defense Priority

To prevent enemy armor from overrunning bridgeheads, Aggressor sets up antitank defenses as soon as the equipment has crossed the river. The division antitank artillery and engineer mobile obstacle detachments cross immediately after the first-echelon regiments. Army antitank units may cross before second-echelon divisions.

### 8–22. Deliberate River Crossing Operations

*a.* Aggressor undertakes deliberate river-crossing operations only when hasty river crossings fail or are not possible. The deliberate crossing is carried out in a manner similar to the hasty crossing; however, more detailed planning, reconnaissance, and preparation are involved. Centralized control of the crossing is exercised at army level and nuclear fire support is used. Crossings, closely controlled, are made on a broad front.

*b.* Thorough reconnaissance and assembly and equipping of forces are accomplished during the preparatory phase. Every intelligence means available is used to get complete information about the enemy. Units are reinforced in the same manner as for a hasty crossing. A combined arms army usually crosses with up to three divisions in the first echelon. Divisions cross with two regiments in their first echelons, and the regiments cross with two battalions in

the first echelon. The leading battalions cross in waves of reinforced companies.

*c.* First-echelon battalions are moved into assembly areas under concealment of darkness or smoke about 1½ kilometers from the river. Artillery is positioned to place fire throughout the enemy forward defenses. The actual assault crossing usually is made just before dawn, preceded by nuclear strikes and an intensive air and artillery preparation of about 30 minutes. The actual crossing is conducted in about the same manner as for a hasty river crossing.

### 8–23. Defense of a River

*a.* Aggressor considers a water obstacle as a natural obstruction enabling the organization of a firm defense with relatively small forces and on a wider front. Aggressor usually organizes the defense on the side of the river that is completely controlled by Aggressor units. When Aggressor expects to recross a given river an attempt will be made to retain bridgeheads on the far side.

*b.* Aggressor places the forward defense echelon as far forward as possible. Second echelons and reserves are held in areas from which they can be removed quickly to any sector where the enemy may succeed in crossing so as to hit the enemy force with a counterattack before the enemy can organize a bridgehead.

*c.* Aggressor takes all necessary measures to counter eventual airborne attacks. Aggressor engineer units set up obstacles in the water and artillery units prepare fire plans to hit a crossing enemy with flanking and intersecting fire while he is halted or slowed down by the obstacles. Antitank weapons are emplaced so as to cover those areas suitable for tank crossings, and extensive use is made of tank traps.

*d.* The enemy approaching a water obstacle is taken under fire at maximum range. Nuclear and chemical weapons are employed against enemy concentrations of personnel and crossing equipment and the enemy's fire support means.

*e.* Antitank guided missiles, tanks and other artillery are brought up close to the river bank to lay direct fire into the enemy forces engaged in crossing the river.

*f.* Aggressor will seize such facilities as dams and flood gates and will utilize them to aid him in his defensive effort.

*g.* Once enemy elements have crossed the river, their hold on the near bank is subjected to counterattacks by second-echelon and reserve forces while first-echelon forces will attempt to prevent additional enemy units from crossing and reinforcing the elements already on the Aggressor's side of the river.

## Section V. OPERATIONS IN FORTIFIED AREAS

### 8–24. General

*a.* Combat formations of motorized rifle, tank, artillery, engineer, and aviation units are used to break through fortified zones. Aggressor doctrine stresses the intensive training of assault groups together with the supporting arms as the most important single factor in the successful assault of heavily fortified zones. Where possible, at least two rehearsals by assault groups and supporting arms are held in rear areas prior to the actual assault.

*b.* The assault usually is made with the main effort along a single front from 10—25 kilometers wide or in multiple thrusts each approximately 3—5 kilometers wide. Secondary attacks are made simultaneously for diversion and to seize isolated fortified positions. Emphasis is placed on attacks against the flanks of the penetration area. Against fortified areas in mountains and swamps, assaults are generally made on a narrower front.

*c.* The destruction of enemy forces in a fortified zone is accomplished by the complete breakthrough of the enemy defensive positions in the sector to clear the entire fortified zone. Tank and motorized rifle divisions exploit the breakthrough.

### 8–25. Organization for Assault

Motorized rifle assault groups are composed of a balanced force of all arms. The composition of the assault groups provides for the immediate replacement of losses in the leading elements. Organization of assault groups begins with the assault division. The basic element is the assault battalion. Although some details of the assault organization vary with the situation, the basic structure of the assault groups is standard.

### 8–26. Assault Division

*a.* The assault division normally consists of a motorized rifle division reinforced with an engineer regiment. Normally one regiment of

heavy tanks, some self-propelled artillery, and about a company of mine-clearing, flamethrowing, and bridging tanks, support the assault. Division artillery is reinforced by battalions of heavy artillery and mortars. The assault engineer regiment includes flame thrower operators and other special engineer troops, such as demolition personnel.

*b.* The assault division is deployed in two or three echelons depending on the strength of the enemy fortifications and the width of the assigned zone. Small general troop and antitank reserves are provided. The assault division in the main effort has a zone of about 3,000 meters wide. In secondary efforts the zone is about 6,000 meters wide.

*c.* Four artillery groups operate under division control. The division artillery support group (heavy mortars and medium howitzers) is responsible for neutralization of the forward enemy defenses and for reinforcement of the regimental artillery groups after the assault is launched. The division artillery countermortar group (heavy mortars and medium howitzers) and the division artillery destruction groups (heavy howitzers and guns) have the missions indicated by their names. The destruction group concentrates on the destruction permanent fortifications. The fourth division artillery group is the artillery reserve. It is also used for general support of the division.

### 8–27. Assault Regiment

*a.* Each regiment of the motorized rifle division used in the assault usually is reinforced with—

(1) One battalion of the organic division artillery, a heavy mortar battalion and a medium gun battalion.

(2) Two companies of medium tanks, one battery of medium self-propelled guns, and a platoon of mine-clearing tanks.

(3) A battalion of combat engineers.

*b.* The regimental artillery group consists of one organic battalion of division artillery and a battalion of heavy mortars. This group is under division control during the artillery preparation, but passes to control of the regimental commander during the assault phase.

*c.* The motorized rifle regiment formation in the assault is usually in two echelons. If the enemy fortifications are in considerable depth, the regiment may attack in three echelons. The first echelon clears passages through obstacles and minefields and assaults specified fortifications. The succeeding echelons provide security for the regiment's flanks, widen the gaps created by the first echelon, and pass through the preceding echelon to extend the depth of the penetration. The assault regiment in the main effort may be assigned a frontage of 1,500 meters.

### 8–28. Assault Battalion

The assault battalion is the basic unit in the assault of fortified positions. It consists of a motorized rifle battalion reinforced by two batteries of light guns or medium howitzers, a battery of 100mm self-propelled guns, and a company of engineers. The assault battalion deploys on a front approximately 750 meters wide and about 400 meters deep. The assault battalion forms two assault companies. The third company is used to reinforce assault companies and the direct-fire artillery group, and to act as the battalion reserve. Each assault company deploys two platoons abreast. Infiltration and trench-clearing teams as well as personnel for flank security, are organized from the third platoon. Each assault company is reinforced by an obstacle-clearing group of one engineer and one rifle squad, and a direct-fire artillery group of light guns or a medium howitzer battery, an 85mm gun platoon, and a rifle squad for security. Direct-fire artillery does not participate in the artillery preparation.

### 8–29. Tactical Preparations

Tactical preparations consist of preparatory fires, breaching of obstacles and final preparations by assault units. The nuclear preparation is greater than that used in a normal attack. Nuclear fires are used to destroy obstacles and minefields, and to reduce the need for extensive use of engineer personnel to clear the way into the main fortified area. The air and artillery preparations are of sufficient length to neutralize enemy defenses that may survive the nuclear preparation, but not so long as to permit remnants of the defenses to recover from the nuclear attack. Artillery and air units attack all known enemy fortifications on a front wider than the sector of the main effort to neutralize enemy positions that can direct flanking fire on the penetration area. Obstacle clearing groups prepare lanes through minefields and wire entanglements during the night preceding the assault, and move forward during the artillery-air preparation to continue obstacle clearance.

### 8–30. Defense of Fortified Areas

Aggressor defense of permanently fortified areas is based on the battalion or regimental defensive position. Special battalions are often organized for this purpose. Such battalions are equipped with a high proportion of automatic weapons. The defense of permanently fortified areas is conducted in about the same manner as the defense as described in paragraphs 5–14 through 5–22.

## Section VI. OPERATIONS IN TOWNS AND CITIES

### 8–31. General

The terms towns and cities will be used interchangeably throughout this section. Aggressor forces, as a rule, prefer to capture towns by a strike delivered by attacking units on the move as part of a general advance. In these cases the Aggressor force attempts to strike at the town swiftly with mobile forces, cutting through the enemy forces between the leading edge of the Aggressor advance and the town in order to capture it before a proper defense can be organized. When this attempt fails and Aggressor force is faced with a strongly defended town, the units may be directed to bypass it rather than risk a loss of momentum for the offensive. The town is subsequently surrounded while the offensive goes on past it. A decision as to what to do next depends on many factors and generally is left to the army group commander whose forces have mounted the offensive. Aggressor commanders know that a strongly garrisoned town cannot be left for long in enemy hands. Aggressor commanders are also aware of the cost of taking such a town when it involves house-to-house combat. In order to draw the defenders into open ground, Aggressor commanders will at times leave a gap in the encirclement letting it appear to the enemy as a possible escape route. Once the enemy forces have left the town, Aggressor units will hit them from all sides and destroy them and then take the town. If the above ruse fails to deceive the enemy or when the town facilities are of no great importance to Aggressor, then the unoccupied area around the town will be increased and nuclear weapons will be used to destroy it together with the defending garrison.

### 8–32. Attack to Capture a City

*a. General.* There are occasions when strategic considerations, often combining with political and psychological reasons, make it necessary for Aggressor forces to capture a city by more direct methods. Aggressor considers the attack on a city as comparable to the assault of a fortified zone, but with certain advantages for the attacker. The civilian population imposes a burden on the defending military forces with respect to food, water, health, and shelter. On the other hand, the offense in city warfare has handicaps not found in open terrain. The rubble of destroyed buildings affords the defenders easily adaptable defensive positions with excellent camouflage. The ease of mining and boobytrapping, the presence of traps for tanks and artillery, and the danger of collapsing structures favor the defense and must be overcome by specially trained assault groups. The presence of unsuspected passages, such as subways and sewers, and the ease of interior communications facilitate infiltration, counterattacks, and breakout offensives by the defending forces. Where the layout of these passages is known to him, Aggressor will use them to infiltrate reconnaissance and sabotage groups into the city.

*b. Reconnaissance.* Detailed intelligence of the main fortified city zones is prepared, to include firing positions and approaches affording the best cover. The ease of concealing weapons in city warfare makes their location especially important. Combat reconnaissance detachments may operate in a city for as much as 6 days before an assault. Reconnaissance is continued during the assault. Combat reconnaissance is supplemented by studying city plans and locating utility systems, subways, and sewers. Special patrols are organized to capture prisoners for interrogation.

*c. Assault Formations.* The basic unit in city warfare is the reinforced motorized rifle battalion. The battalion is deployed for assault in a column formation composed of four distinct groups. The leading or infiltration group usually consists of a motorized rifle company and antitank gun platoon. The main body is the assault group and is similar in strength and composition to the motorized rifle battalion assault group organized for the attack of fortified zones. It consists of a motorized rifle company, about one-half of the battalion heavy weapons, and a detachment of demolition engineers from the motorized rifle regiment. Supporting weapons include two to three battalions

of direct fire guns and a platoon of self-propelled guns. The third group is the support group that includes the remainder of the battalion heavy weapons, three to four direct fire guns, and one platoon of medium tanks or self-propelled guns. The last group is one motorized rifle company that provides flank security patrols and acts as the battalion reserve. Subgroups of varying size and composition are detached for separate assault missions on isolated structures.

*d. Conduct of the Attack.*

(1) The first phase of the attack consists of driving in outposts and surrounding the built-up area. Some portions of the attacking force are used to prevent enemy counterattacks from interfering with the assault of the city. Tanks cover all exits from the city, and a tank reserve is held to engage enemy counterattacks.

(2) The city is divided into battalion areas. The attacks, launched after artillery and air preparations, are supported by artillery fire and airstrikes. The battle then takes the form of a number of independent actions by small units that attack one block of buildings after another, consolidating their gains, and clearing all houses, tunnels, and sewers as they advance.

*e. Use of Artillery.*

(1) Light artillery is used to destroy enemy firing positions by direct fire. Batteries attached to motorized rifle units conduct direct fire at embrasures, windows, and other enemy firing positions. In addition to neutralizing enemy firing positions, direct fire is used to create breaches in buildings, walls, and barricades. Guns are displaced forward alternately under cover of heavy fire from other guns and motorized rifle units. Large-caliber howitzers are used to destroy buildings.

(2) Mortars cover avenues of enemy troop movements, such as street intersections, trenches, and alleys. Mortar firing positions are placed behind walls or inside buildings close to their targets. Their mobility and effective fire from concealed positions provide strong fire support for the assault groups.

(3) The artillery reserve is used for counter-battery fire. Massed fire from heavy batteries of the artillery reserve is used against forts or other strong enemy fortified positions. Other missions for the artillery reserve include interdiction and destruction of enemy supply installations, headquarters, and communication centers. The artillery reserve is retained under centralized control by army and division.

## 8-33. Defense of a City

*a. General.*

(1) Aggressor forces will normally conduct the defense of a city outside the city itself and in the approaches to it. Every effort is made to prevent envelopment of the city by the enemy. If necessary, Aggressor forces may organize a defense within the city itself. Large tank units are employed outside the city to counterattack enemy troops. Smaller tank units may be employed by platoons to set up ambushes individually to reinforce the defenses of strongpoints.

(2) Fighting within a city usually breaks up into a number of separate local battles focused around the defense of strongpoints. Aggressor forces have standing orders that in such situations they will, even when completely surrounded, defend every single building and every area until ordered to withdraw.

*b. Organization of Defense.*

(1) The city is organized for defense in depth and districts are allotted to units. Groups of buildings at crossroads and squares are transformed into mutually supporting strongpoints, and every house in these groups is organized for defense. Solid buildings are connected by holes made through the walls. Ceilings are strengthened by beams and earth, and by pulling down the upper stories. Cellars are connected and are used for intercommunication as well as the sewers, subways, and trenches. Streets are mined and blocked with any available materiel. Strongpoints are stocked with supplies.

(2) Artillery, air, and tank support do not differ materially from the normal defensive support. Artillery support is also provided by single guns firing directly from strongpoints. An artillery group outside the city provides fire on call from observers in strongpoints. Single tanks and self-propelled guns are sited in strongpoints, but tanks normally are kept in reserve for counterattacks.

## Section VII. OPERATIONS BY ENCIRCLED FORCES

### 8-34. General

Aggressor has specific tactics designed to extricate any forces encircled on the battlefield. These tactics are a combination of defensive-offensive actions.

### 8-35. Preliminary Preparation

Aggressor forces which determine that a position is threatened with imminent encirclement take immediate steps to prepare for all-round defense. Aggressor deems it essential; to hold the area occupied, to maintain direct contact with the enemy, not to allow his own troops to concentrate into nuclear targets, and to prevent the encircled troops from being destroyed. If the potential encirclement is detected in time, all excess units and personnel are evacuated from the area. Stocks of essential supplies, if possible, are increased. If encirclement is accomplished before excess personnel and service units can be evacuated, they are assigned to combat units, especially to engineer units. Strong mobile reconnaissance and screening units are placed outside the main defense perimeter to delay the enemy attack as long as possible.

### 8-36. Organization of the Defense

*a.* Depending upon the size of the encircled force, a first echelon, consisting of motorized rifle elements reinforced with antitank units and a tank reserve is established. If sufficient forces are available, a second echelon, composed primarily of antitank forces, is formed. The reserve of the first echelon is a major element of the defense because the success of the operation depends upon successful counterattacks. An encircled army places its entire tank division in the reserve, reinforcing it with most of the tanks from the motorized rifle divisions.

*b.* The entire perimeter of the encircled forces is not manned. The first echelon establishes battalion-size strongpoints along the most likely avenues of approach. Alternate positions are prepared in less dangerous areas. These areas are covered by observation posts and patrols. Antitank strongpoints are placed in the second echelon along likely avenues of an enemy armor attack. The second echelon is also prepared to occupy first echelon positions if enemy fires destroy a first echelon unit. The reserve is held deep within the encircled area in numerous assembly areas ready for use at any point.

### 8-37. Support

*a.* The greater portion of the artillery of encircled units is employed under centralized control and preparations are made to move it to repel attacks from any direction. If sufficient artillery is available, a mobile artillery group is formed to provide additional support for the first echelon units. This group also supports the reserve, replaces artillery units destroyed by enemy fires, and provides fire cover for units and sectors of the perimeter subjected to enemy attack. When artillery is not available in sufficient quantity to form this group, flank units provide the fire needed by units under attack. All units in the encircled area form air defense artillery groups and a central group is formed for defense of the entire command. Command logistical installations receive top priority for air defense protection. Artillery units from outside the encirclement, especially missile units, are employed in support of the encircled forces.

*b.* Engineer units construct fortifications along the most likely avenue of approach and obstacle belts within and without the area. Wide use is made of available natural material for obstacles.

*c.* Air and nuclear support is provided by the command to which the encircled force is subordinate. Air elements are stationed within the encircled area if the area is sufficiently large to contain dispersed airfields. All passive means of protection against nuclear attack are observed and strong protective positions are constructed. Air support for encircled units includes the normal air defense cover and air strikes against the surrounding enemy as well as casualty evacuation and resupply.

### 8-38. Control

Encircled Aggressor forces normally remain under the control of the headquarters that controlled them prior to their encirclement. That command is responsible for the defense and extrication of the encircled forces. Command of the encircled force is exercised by the senior officer present. Radio communication is maintained with the control headquarters and an active air liaison is established.

### 8-39. Conduct of the Defense

*a.* Detailed defense plans are prepared, including provisions for meeting single or multiple enemy thrusts into the area. In the event of single thrusts, the threatened area is immedi-

ately reinforced with additional units. Antitank and artillery weapons, as well as the reserve elements, counterattack if the enemy succeeds in penetrating the area. The first echelon holds and attempts to beat the enemy back, withdrawing to the second echelon defenses only upon order. Nuclear attacks are used to disrupt the enemy attack, but close-in nuclear strikes are not used if they require units to withdraw from prepared positions.

*b.* Simultaneous enemy attacks in several sectors are met by moving perimeter forces to the threatened areas, leaving only skeletal defenses in some areas. The reserve is deployed to close to the most threatened sector. Counterattacks are made as soon as possible and before the enemy attack can become critical. Such counterattacks are preferably carried out at night and supported by nuclear fires. If the enemy attack is halted, the reserve attempts to drive the enemy back to his former positions. If the enemy attack cannot be completely halted, the reserve counterattacks to disrupt the enemy attack. The reserve then moves to another threatened sector. The motorized rifle elements clear up the disrupted enemy attack. Surprise attacks to prevent the enemy from launching his attacks are made if Aggressor forces have sufficient reserves of fuel and ammunition.

### 8–40. Organization of the Offensive

*a.* Encircled Aggressor forces always attempt to break out. The breakout may be accomplished with strong outside support or with little or no outside support. A breakout with little support is attempted only when the encircled force is small and only a short distance is involved. In both types of breakouts, the enemy is compelled to fight on two fronts and the time and place of the breakout are a surprise. The headquarters controlling the encircled force plans the breakout as part of the overall defense plan.

*b.* Encircled forces are organized for the breakout into an assault group, a covering force group, a flank security group, and an artillery and reserve group. The assault group forms two echelons, one of tanks with most of the artillery and all of the nuclear support, and the other of motorized rifle units to mop up enemy bypassed by the first echelon. The covering force group is composed of motorized rifle units reinforced by engineers, chemical warfare personnel, and as much field and antitank artillery as can be spared from the assault group. A minimum number of personnel are placed in the flank security group. The artillery and reserve group is usually placed to the rear of the assault group so that it can deliver fire to support either the assault group or the covering force group.

### 8–41. Conduct of the Breakout

Breakout attacks are coordinated with attacks by forces outside the perimeter. Missions assigned to the assault group of the encircled forces depend on the distance to other Aggressor units outside the perimeter. When the distance is short, only an initial and a final objective are assigned. The final objective is the junction area between the two Aggressor forces. When the distance is greater, specific daily objectives are assigned. The assault group moves into attack positions at the last possible moment. The attack usually is launched at night without artillery preparation to achieve surprise. If the attack starts during daylight, it is preceded by a short intensive artillery, air, and nuclear preparation. The attack of the first echelon of the assault group forms an escape corridor through the enemy positions. Strong enemy resistance is bypassed. These centers of resistance are reduced by the second echelon. The second echelon keeps the escape corridor open. Rear echelon elements form and move through the corridor as soon as possible. Maximum amounts of equipment and supplies are evacuated. What cannot be moved is destroyed. The covering force withdraws last.

## Section VIII. PARTISAN OPERATIONS

### 8–42. General

Aggressor partisan bands operate in isolated areas in small strength, and are frequently dropped from aircraft well behind the enemy front in rear support areas to support the overall effort of the Aggressor advance. Partisan group activities seldom cover areas near the front except when extensive, pathless forests favor their approach. In general, these partisan groups maneuver in rear areas, in woods and swamps next to highways and railroads. They avoid open territory and regions occupied by enemy troops, but keep constant surveillance over enemy activities.

## 8–43. Partisan Combat Methods

*a.* During large scale enemy breakthroughs or withdrawals, strong partisan groups coordinate their operations with Aggressor special operation units such as, ski units, infiltrated infantry, or paratroops. This will require the enemy to muster substantial force (usually several infantry divisions) to combat the joint Aggressor and partisan effort.

*b.* Prior to large scale Aggressor offensives, bands or groups will migrate to areas designated as Aggressor objectives. Such movements, therefore, will give some indication of Aggressor's intentions. On the other hand, during each Aggressor withdrawal, as well as subsequent battles of encirclement, many of the Aggressor soldiers, cut off from their own forces, and in some events, entire combat units, can make their way to the partisans and continue to fight with them. In such instances, partisan activities develop into a serious threat.

## 8–44. Partisan Organization and Employment

*a.* Aggressor partisan bands are generally organized into groupments of 300 to 500 personnel each. As long as the front remains static, these groupments remain in a fixed location. During winter months, they are quartered in winterproofed camps, excellently constructed and heavily guarded. Smaller groups, varying greatly in strength, are comprised of at least 100 personnel. Attached to each groupment is a number of these smaller partisan groups. They branch out through the entire rear area and frequently are only in loose liaison with the groupment. They constantly change their position and therefore, are difficult to locate in the vast rear area. They maintain contact men in all of the larger towns and villages of importance to them. Dispersed and cut-off Aggressor units give them tactical striking power.

*b.* Every camp of larger partisan groups is secured on all sides, to a depth of several hundred meters, and by thick underbrush, brier obstacles, or abatis and wire entanglements. All roads leading to the camp will be blocked or camouflaged, or detours will be built which will lead in another direction. Traffic to the camp is conducted on paths known only to the initiated. Sometimes these paths will be protected by bodies of water with crossings built 8 to 12 inches below water level, or by large stretches of swamp which can be crossed only on swamp skis. All movements of strangers are carefully controlled by sentries stationed far from camp and disguised as peasants. Strangers are also kept under close surveillance by a network of informers active in all villages in the vicinity.

*c.* These partisan camps are well supplied with weapons, ammunition, explosives, and rations. Food supplies are sometimes obtained by forced requisition in nearby villages. Supplies are normally delivered to the camps by aircraft which drop the rations in the immediate vicinity of the camp using prearranged light or fire signals. The looting of vehicles during partisan raids also provides ammunition and small arms for the bands.

*d.* Excellent camouflage is used to deny aerial observation of the camps. The shelters are allowed to be heated only at night so that no smoke will disclose the existence of the camp during the day. Aggressor is also very careful to construct sufficient overhead insulation in order to deny detection by enemy infrared sensors. Secrecy is also maintained by disseminating false rumors concerning partisan movements.

*e.* Partisan communications are mainly provided by short-wave radio in order to provide the partisan units with directives, up-to-date information about current military developments in their respective sectors, and any political developments which may affect their operations. Air couriers are also used by carefully camouflaging a landing place for liaison airplanes in the immediate vicinity of each major camp.

## 8–45. Conduct of Operations

*a.* Without exception, partisan operations are carried out at night. Daytime raids are of no value, except perhaps on an individual motor vehicle which may threaten to violate partisan security.

*b.* The demolition of a railroad bridge as an objective would be considered a major partisan operation. In order to effectively approach the selected bridge, Aggressor will cause a long column of refugees to move along the right of way toward the bridge. As the head of the column reaches the bridge, heavy surprise fire will be directed against the sentries and bridgehead from the end of the column. Machineguns will be set up on the roadbed in the direction of the bridge, and under the cover of this fire, the prepared demolition charges will be installed and activated.

*c.* Also, included in this type of operation is the mining of a main highway, demolition of railroad tracks, mining railroad beds, surprise fire attacks on trains, looting railroad cars, raids on trucks and convoys, and destroying ration, ammunition, and fuel depots. Raids on command posts of higher enemy headquarters are less frequent in that Aggressor considers the threat of capture too great under these circumstances.

*d.* Aggressor partisans avoid open combat as much as possible. This practice is the guiding rule for all units unless unusual developments at the front would immediately result in their exposure. Aggressor maintains that by avoiding open combat and continuously conducting lively partisan activity, the entire enemy supply and communications system is seriously hampered, thereby greatly assisting Aggressor conventional forces.

## Section IX. ANTIPARTISAN OPERATIONS

### 8–46. General

Aggressor military theorists have placed great stress on the "stability of the rear," a concept which they rank alongside such better-known tactical principles as surprise, mobility, and concentration of force. Aggressor forces conduct both passive and active defense measures against partisan activities in order to protect their rear areas from disruption.

### 8–47. Passive Antipartisan Measures

*a.* Each army group will create a special staff to collect all information concerning the appearance and movement of partisans by maintaining close contact with the military authorities in the rear areas as well as with a network of agents in areas threatened by partisans.

*b.* Small headquarters are combined to protect them more effectively against partisan raids.

*c.* Local defense units are drawn from among the civilian population in the threatened areas.

*d.* All traffic is halted on especially endangered roads at nightfall. Such roads are used in daytime only at certain hours and all convoys are escorted by armed guards.

*e.* Railroads, bridges, and trains are protected. Outguards within sight or earshot of each other are posted along railroad lines in threatened areas. The outguards are quartered in blockhouses protected by wire entanglements and abatis, behind which lay also the entrenchments for defense. Wherever a railroad line leads through wooded terrain, all trees within 50 meters of either side of the right-of-way are felled to provide a better field of vision. All trains going through danger zones will have two sand-filled gondola cars coupled in front to protect the locomotives from mines and will be escorted by a guard detachment of about forty men.

*f.* Reinforced outguards equipped with infantry heavy weapons protect all bridges. Strong guard detachments are posted at a great enough distance to permit them to spot approaching partisan bands and to allow enough time for an orderly preparation of countermeasures.

### 8–48. Active Antipartisan Measures

*a.* Units such as security divisions and forces are particularly organized for the purpose of fighting the partisans. The great depth of area requires a substantial number of such units, and if sufficient numbers are not available at the time, those present are assigned zones to control.

*b.* Duties of these security units consist of protection of important points in seriously threatened wooded areas; surveillance and protection of zones and villages through which military supply routes pass, and which are constantly imperiled by partisan bands; reconnaissance of partisan camps and roads leading to them; daily dispatch of as many combat patrols as required into partisan territory to prevent the partisans from uniting into groups and establishing permanent bases; and operations against detected partisan camps.

*c.* Whenever Aggressor plans a major operation against a detected partisan camp, the project is kept secret from the ranks. This is to prevent even larger partisan groups from immediately dissolving only to assemble again at a different location, should the operation be inadvertently discovered by a partisan informer. The troops, therefore, can only be informed of the actual plans after they reach the outer line of the encirclement.

*d.* The assembly of the attacking Aggressor units is designated at least 1 day's march away from the partisan camp. The advance toward the outer line of encirclement is so timed that

all units can reach it simultaneously and occupy it immediately. The outer line of encirclement is anchored on natural obstacles that are easy to block and to keep under surveillance. The Aggressor soldiers are deployed in the outer line of encirclement in such a manner that they form a continuous line of sentries, with each soldier within calling distance, and at night, within sight of the next. Behind this line of sentries, pursuit detachments are kept ready for immediate employment against partisan teams which might break out. As soon as the encirclement has been completed, leaflets are dropped over all inhabited places within the ring, ordering all inhabitants to evacuate at once and to assemble at a designated point.

*e.* The contraction of the ring of encirclement normally proceeds during daytime except during winter months, in phases covering not more than 2 to 3 kilometers per day, and the territory is carefully combed. Individual sectors are to be occupied by at least 2 hours before twilight, so that the individual soldiers can establish themselves and become acquainted with the terrain ahead while it is still light.

*f.* Sectors easily distinguishable in the woods (glades, paths, railroad lines) are designated as the new line of encirclement. Close contact between individuals must be maintained. Nighttime security at the sector boundaries is of particular importance. The procedure of detailing forces for guarding unit boundaries, as well as the command over those forces, is clearly regulated. The further contraction of the ring up to the final encirclement of the camp follows the same pattern as described above.

*g.* As soon as the encirclement is started, the surrounded area is kept under constant aerial observation. By dropping messages or using secure signal communications, the aircraft immediately notify Aggressor personnel in command of any observed breakout attempts. Since breakouts are to be expected mainly at night, sufficient security detachments are posted in front of the sentry line. With the contraction of the ring of encirclement a proportionate number of reserves are withdrawn, and their follow-up is properly regulated. If the partisans still remain in their camp by the time the troops reach the final line of encirclement, a heavy air attack is directed into the target allowing the Aggressor units to score a quick success.

*h.* Experience has taught Aggressor that this type of antipartisan warfare, though requiring large numbers of troops and much time, promises great success. No other methods have proven themselves in wooded terrain, since breakouts at night can hardly be prevented. Rigid discipline is a prerequisite for the success of such an operation. The designated objective for the day can not be changed during the operation, and the slightest independent changes on the part of the units will disrupt the line of encirclement and make the breakout of partisans possible.

*i.* Winter proves to be the most favorable season for antipartisan operations because all movements can be more readily observed in snow-covered terrain. As far as possible the operation is carried out during bright nights, ideally during a full moon. Liberal armament with light automatic weapons proves advantageous. Mortars have more of a demoralizing than actual effect, since the shells burst in the trees. Artillery is difficult to use during advances in woods. As a rule artillery can be put into action only during the battle for the fortified camp itself. Depending upon the terrain, Aggressor finds it advisable to have individual artillery pieces follow directly behind the leading elements. The employment of tanks, where the terrain is suitable, produces excellent results. In such operation the units are issued an adequate supply of signal pistols and cartridges. In the case of swampland, Aggressor personnel are equipped with swamp skis.

*j.* Wooded terrain, which affords poor visibility, and deceptions at night, often causes shooting frays that start panic among the units. Aggressor therefore, finds it advisable to prohibit the firing of all infantry light weapons except during partisan attacks. Special regulations for opening fire are required when the final ring of encirclement is closed and Aggressor soldiers are facing each other at a short distance.

## Section X. NIGHT OPERATIONS

### 8-49. General

*a.* Aggressor prefers night operations when terrain, dense minefields, and other obstacles eliminate the possibility of surprise and will cause heavy casualties in daytime operations. Round-the-clock operations are habitual to maintain the uninterrupted momentum of the

offensive. Aggressor units are well trained in night operations. Objectives for night attacks unsupported by nuclear fires may be as deep as 8 to 15 kilometers.

*b.* Aggressor units are equipped with devices to aid in night fighting, including gunlaying telescopes, night viewers, night driving and aiming equipment and sniperscopes. Battlefield illumination is used frequently to help night attacks.

*c.* All tactical organizational elements are capable of conducting night operations and extensive training is conducted to better prepare units for sustained employment at night and during periods of reduced visibility.

### 8-50. Timing of Night Attacks

The attack is launched at a time when the enemy least expects it or is least ready to repel it. For example, after a quiet period the attack might be launched at 0200 hours, or after a hard day's fighting, at 2300 hours when tired enemy troops will be seeking rest. Apart from the consideration of surprise, the attack may begin 2 or 3 hours before dawn to permit daylight exploitation of success.

### 8-51. Preparation and Planning

Preparations for night attacks are made in detail and plans are based on careful reconnaissance, simplicity of maneuver, speed of execution, and surprise. Two phase lines are selected. The first is located within the forward defense area of the enemy and is used to regroup assault teams and establish coordination with the supporting artillery for the attack of the next objective. The second phase line is selected so that its capture will force the enemy to displace his division artillery. Orientation points for motorized rifle and tank units are carefully designated.

### 8-52. Conduct of Attack

*a.* The deployment area is occupied secretly during twilight hours so that the commanders of assault teams may familiarize themselves with orientation points, phase lines, and avenues of approach. To achieve surprise, the artillery preparation is often omitted during the initial assault.

*b.* The motorized rifle battalion attacks in a single echelon preceded by a small advance guard. Companies are deployed in line, each company being deployed in a line of platoons. Individual riflemen may wear some type of identification such as white armbands. Squads advance in the wedge formation.

*c.* If the assault zone is narrow (500—600 meters), a battalion may attack in two echelons. The second echelon then consists of a reinforced company whose mission is to protect the flanks of the battalion. For raiding missions, a special detachment is formed to evacuate captured documents, equipment, and prisoners. The assault team principle is followed in grouping elements of the battalion. For example, assault teams include company and battalion weapons and engineers, as required by the mission of each assault team.

*d.* Tanks are frequently employed in night attacks with motorized rifle units. Careful terrain reconnaissance and close cooperation with motorized rifle units are considered essential for successful use of tanks at night. Each tank is assigned a route, mission, and specific assault team. Several riflemen are assigned to each tank to aid its crew in locating antitank weapons and obstacles. When the situation permits, tank headlights and searchlights are used to illuminate enemy firing points, to blind the enemy, and to assist obstacle-clearing parties.

*e.* Illumination support for night attacks is primarily used to illuminate objectives deep within the enemy positions. Illumination of targets in the immediate vicinity of advancing Aggressor units is accomplished taking care to preclude illuminating the attacking Aggressor personnel and not to interfere with their use of night vision equipment. Illumination is often used to mark targets for artillery fires and to interfere with the enemy's night vision equipment. Air support at night has the additional mission of creating lighted reference points in the enemy's deployment and to illuminate the most important targets. The use of illumination support is controlled by the commander of units to which such support has been allocated.

*f.* Duing a night attack, Aggressor will often subordinate to the battalions and companies, the artillery normally in support of the regiment, in order to support the subordinate units in their relatively independent action in developing the attack in depth.

*g.* To repel enemy counterattacks at night, Aggressor forces intensify reconnaissance along the flanks of each unit and to the front in order to detect in time the approach of enemy counterattack forces. Aggressor arranges for continuous illumination of the terrain along all possible axis of enemy counterattacks.

## Section XI. MOUNTAIN OPERATIONS

### 8-53. General

Mountainous terrain seriously limits military activity by canalizing maneuver, complicating control and fire support, reducing communications efficiency, impairing logistical support, and providing the defender with excellent observation. Aggressor does not consider large-scale use of nuclear fires to be practical in mountainous terrain.

### 8-54. Concept

Aggressor considers that the principles of the offensive and the defensive are applicable in mountain warfare with some modifications necessary because of the nature of the area. Flank security is emphasized. Second echelons are disposed in depth and follow the first echelon closely to meet enemy counterattacks in minimum time. The normal maneuver of Aggressor units in the mountains is a combined frontal and flanking attack, the latter being executed by a force larger than that employed frontally. Efforts are made to avoid the enemy's outposts, to infiltrate through his positions, and to emerge in the enemy rear areas. Simultaneous attacks are made from several directions on principal strongpoints.

### 8-55. Characteristics of Mountain Operations

Characteristics of mountain operations common to the offensive and the defensive follow:

*a.* Gaps between friendly sectors that may be occupied by the enemy are blocked by second-echelon forces to counter enemy attempts to envelop, outflank, or infiltrate through the gap.

*b.* Snipers play an important role in preparing ambushes and infiltrating through enemy lines. Close fighting with small arms and hand-to-hand fighting are of increased importance. Because combat in mountains frequently assumes a piecemeal character, initiative on the part of subordinate commanders is stressed.

*c.* Whenever conditions permit, narrow gauge railroads are built for divisions and larger commands to transport supplies and evacuate casualties. Tractors are used in large numbers to haul supplies over difficult areas. Air supply is used extensively. Regiment and division supply and evacuation installations are located well forward. The division service area is within a 2-hour foot march of the first echelon regiments.

*d.* Engineer troops, in addition to their other functions, are employed to open routes through obstructions, and to lay special bridges and horizontal hauling lines across mountain rivers, canyons and other similar obstacles.

### 8-56. Employment of Weapons

Heavy machineguns, heavy mortars, field guns, and light artillery follow rifle units closely. Uninterrupted ammunition supply is of primary importance. Direct-fire artillery plays an important part in mountain fighting. Guns of various types are located on forward mountain slopes for direct fire. In operations against a strong enemy defensive position, artillery control is centralized at regiment and division. In pursuit, control of operations is decentralized to lower echelons. Air defense artillery units with a ground fire capability are deployed to protect defiles. The 76mm mountain gun-howitzer is used extensively.

### 8-57. Employment of Tanks

When terrain permits, Aggressor uses tanks extensively in mountain fighting. Tanks are used in small groups to reinforce rifle elements. An assault group may include from two to three tanks, a rifle platoon, a squad of engineers, and an antitank platoon. Tanks are used to support night attacks. The tanks approach enemy positions under cover of darkness, and then deliver fire and illumination to support the assault. Night attacks by tanks require careful preparation. If possible, tanks occupy positions by daylight that permit them to move directly into the attack.

### 8-58. Control and Communication

*a.* Command posts are located near forward elements. Security of command posts is provided by detachments occupying the heights commanding the approaches. To keep abreast of rapidly changing combat conditions, commanders at regimental and lower levels usually remain at their command observation posts. They move forward to new command observation posts immediately after the seizure of crests and spurs that obstruct observation.

*b.* Radio is the basic means of communication in mountains. Reliability of radio communications is increased by special training, careful selection of frequencies, placement of radios,

and adjustment of antennas. Visual signaling and liaison planes are also widely used.

## 8-59. The Offensive

*a. General.* Aggressor offensives in mountains are based on a series of attacks to seize heights, ridges, passes, and valleys. Maneuvers generally consist of isolation of separate tactical objectives by double or single envelopment. Main efforts generally are supplemented by several secondary efforts. In attacking enemy positions arranged in altitudinal levels, fire is directed to neutralize enemy positions at all levels simultaneously. Particular care is taken to neutralize strongpoints guarding the axis of attack. As the attack progresses upward, fires are shifted so as to stay just ahead of the Aggressor troops but keeping under continuous fire all the enemy positions above the altitude reached by the Aggressor troops. Tactical missiles are employed to destroy enemy nuclear delivery means and enemy troops in passes, gorges, and ravines. In deciding to employ nuclear fires, the Aggressor force considers the danger to the advance derived from the effects of these fires in creating obstructions. Consequently, Aggressor selects targets carefully so as to avoid hindering the plans of the offensive.

*b. Attacks Along a Ridge and Valley.* Attacks along ridges assist in a breakthrough in a valley. Aggressor forces accomplish an encircling maneuver over the ridges to seize commanding heights and road junctions in the enemy rear and on his flanks. The breakthrough is accomplished by heavy concentration of artillery, tanks and aviation. In the exploitation of the breakthrough by mobile units, seizure of road junctions deep in enemy rear areas is stressed because such seizure may also lead to the isolation and defeat of enemy forces in other sectors. In advances along valleys, Aggressor flanks and rear are secured by airborne troops and mountain rifle units who seize heights on the ridges commanding the valley. Flank security units are supported by aerial attacks, artillery fire, and other forces operating in the rear of the enemy defending the heights. Flank security units assist the advancing main body by fire and movement on the flanks and in the rear of enemy units in the valley.

*c. Attacks Across a Ridge.* Attacks across ridges are based on possession of mountain passes that are secured by the seizure of the heights commanding them. Seizure of heights is accomplished by attacking the enemy's rear in a rapid outflanking maneuver by landing airborne troops in the rear of enemy units defending the pass, and by simultaneously launching an aggressive frontal assault in coordination with air support.

*d. Advance Detachments.* In the offensive, rifle battalions, and in some cases companies, use rifle detachments to precede the attack. An advance detachment for a battalion normally consists of a rifle platoon reinforced by a mortar squad or section. Before a height is assaulted, advance detachments infiltrate behind the enemy and open fire on the enemy positions. If possible, the height is then attacked from the flanks. An artillery preparation, supplemented by air attacks, usually precedes the coordinated attack.

*e. Infiltration Detachments.* Infiltration detachments are used to penetrate deep into the enemy rear area. Their main task is to control or harass enemy lines of communication. These detachments seize the high ground overlooking these routes. A few riflemen are assigned the task of moving from place to place where they can suddenly open fire to create the impression of greater strength. Infiltration detachments also establish roadblocks at defiles. Infiltration detachments may be increased to sufficient strength to permit their use in pursuit operations following an Aggressor offensive.

*f. Reorganization After the Attack.* Every captured height or area is immediately consolidated. Supporting weapons are displaced forward to support further advance. Positions are strengthened by antipersonnel mines, field works, and antitank mines. Special emphasis is placed on strengthening strongpoints on the flanks and covering the intervals between attacking units. Security measures, including patrols, observation posts, and outposts, are immediately taken to prevent surprise by sudden enemy counterattacks.

## 8-60. The Defensive

*a.* Aggressor mountain defense operations stress thorough reconnaissance, well-organized outposts, continuous flank security, and swift counterattacks by the second echelon.

*b.* Observation posts are established 9—12 kilometers in front of the forward defenses. Communication is maintained by radio and visual signaling. Relay points are established when necessary. In the outpost area, security elements block roads and other approaches, secure flanks, salient positions, and intervals between defensive positions. Outpost security

elements delay enemy attacks until reinforced by Aggressor units. These units in the outpost area counter enemy outflanking maneuvers, destroy small groups attempting infiltration, and, when necessary, cover the withdrawal of other Aggressor elements. In defense of the outpost area, ambushes are used extensively.

*c.* The main defensive positions are organized along or across a mountain ridge. In either case, the forward strongpoints are situated on the forward slopes, although a part of the force is also on the reverse slopes. Firing positions are echeloned vertically as well as in depth. In defending a mountain valley, strongpoints are located on adjacent heights that permit covering the valley with crossfire. In wooded terrain, defensive positions are organized at the forward edge of the woods or on commanding heights. In the latter case the woods are used as a natural obstacle. Elevated platforms are built in trees for heavy machineguns and observation posts. Antitank and antipersonnel mines, artificial landslides, and other obstacles are widely employed.

*d.* In defending mountainous country, Aggressor uses nuclear and chemical fires against enemy troops in narrow valleys, gorges, passes and river crossings. Nuclear and chemical fires are also used to create obstructions and contaminated areas across the enemy axis of advance.

*e.* If the enemy penetrates Aggressor defenses, units defending heights have orders to continue to resist, even when completely surrounded, and wait for counterattacks to destroy enemy penetrations. Aerial resupply of isolated units is provided for in planning. Aggressor counterattacks normally are carried out from high ground downward and along ridges and valleys.

## Section XII. EXTREME COLD OPERATIONS

### 8-61. General

*a.* Aggressor forces are trained and equipped to operate in an extreme cold environment. Cold is counteracted by the following methods:

(1) Aggressor soldiers are kept under shelter as much as possible. Tentage or improvised shelters are used whenever troops occupy temporary positions.

(2) Special clothing is used.

(3) Snowshoes or skis are used.

(4) Bunkers and weapon emplacements are heated.

(5) Attacking units move from tents or improvised shelters in assembly areas to the line of departure at the last moment.

(6) Warming shelters are established along all lines of communication and in rest areas where drivers can stop and warm themselves.

(7) Casualty clearing stations are sited well forward so that wounded can be treated as quickly as possible.

(8) Helicopters are widely used for casualty evacuation.

*b.* Aggressor considers the motorized rifle division as the principal unit to conduct operations under extreme cold conditions, particularly dismounted operations. Individuals and units must be trained and equipped with snowshoes or cross-country skis when the depth of snow exceeds 30 centimeters. For increased operational capability of the combat elements, all individuals with skiing experience may be transferred to specially organized ski units within the motorized rifle division.

*c.* In areas void of roads, specialized tracked vehicles and sleds are substituted for wheeled vehicles and trailers. At times, animals and sleds from local sources are used to increase the cross-country capability of rifle and artillery units under deep snow conditions.

*d.* Ground reconnaissance assumes greater than normal importance due to the limitations imposed on aerial reconnaissance by atmospheric and climatic conditions.

### 8-62. Ski Troop Units

*a.* The Aggressor forces do not have ski troop units as such. When needed, ski troop units are formed with personnel from the standard ground forces or a standard unit is converted to a ski troop unit by appropriate training of personnel and conversion of equipment.

*b.* Ski troop units are characterized by their high mobility. They are able to move cross-country and appear suddenly in enemy rear areas. Although possessing a greater firepower for close combat, ski units are not well suited for attack of strong defensive installations and fortifications, nor for sustained defensive operations.

*c.* Ski units achieve surprise in the attack by conducting a deep envelopment of enemy flanks, by infiltrating between enemy strongpoints, and by employing effective counterreconnaissance and security measures. Ski units pursue and destroy a retreating enemy. When the enemy succeeds in organizing a defense, ski units maintain contact until they are relieved by rifle or motorized rifle units.

*d.* Ski units can carry out operations at great distances from their own bases under difficult and quickly changing circumstances. Their operations must be carefully coordinated with other arms, especially aviation and artillery. A ski unit can operate up to 4 days while separated from its base.

*e.* Ski units up to battalion size are able to carry out reconnaissance deep in the enemy rear and may operate with guerrilla detachments. Ski units reach enemy rear areas by infiltrating in small groups, by moving around exposed flanks or through gaps created by attacking forces. Isolated routes are used when possible. Forming false ski trails to conceal the true direction of movement of ski units headed into enemy rear areas is accomplished by specially designated elements. While moving toward enemy rear areas, ski units avoid decisive engagement. Small enemy groups interfering with accomplishment of the mission are destroyed. When a ski unit cannot avoid contact with a strong enemy force, it attacks the enemy quickly and with full force. If the attack fails, a small part of the force may be left to harass, confuse, and contain the enemy while the main force disengages.

*f.* When operating in enemy rear areas, assembly points near the objective are established before the attack. After action is broken off, small groups, under cover of darkness of limited visibility, assemble at the previously designated assembly points.

### 8–63. Towed Artillery

Movement of towed artillery in snow deeper than 30 centimeters usually is confined to roads. To increase its limited mobility, towed artillery may occasionally be mounted on tractor or horsedrawn sleds. Engineer support is required to establish temporary winter roads for towed artillery. Mortars and rockets having greater mobility than towed artillery are used extensively in areas of deep snow and extreme cold. The 76mm mountain gun howitzer may be transported by helicopter or disassembled and carried by pack animal or manpower.

### 8–64. Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns

Tanks and self-propelled artillery are frequently used to replace towed field artillery because of greater maneuverability in snow. Aggressor equips tanks with grousers for movement over slippery terrain. In addition, special mats are used for movement over snow slopes. Since tank tracks are clearly visible in fresh snow, Aggressor moves tanks in column during the night or in snowstorms. Often the last tank in the column drags sleds or trees to erase the tracks and create appearance of an ordinary trail.

### 8–65. Offensive Operations

*a.* The objectives of offensive operations remain unchanged. Seizure of road nets and envelopment tactics are of greater importance. Offensive operations are often conducted during blinding snowstorms or at night to achieve surprise. Lines of departure are as close to the enemy as possible to avoid tiring the units before the assault. Trenches are dug in snow and are extended as close as possible to enemy positions. Aggressor units use these trenches to launch their attack. As a rule, the division is deployed in greater depth; regiments and battalions advancing on different axis must operate with a greater than normal degree of independence.

*b.* Reconnaissance is conducted by small teams on skis or on vehicles appropriately modified for cross-country operation over deep snow and ice. For reconnaissance in depth, Aggressor makes extensive use of long-range ski patrols delivered to and evacuated from their area of operations by helicopters.

*c.* Reserves are kept deployed along roads and echeloned in depth. Often the normal divisional antitank reserve is decentralized and split among the regimental antitank reserves.

*d.* When attacking under arctic conditions, Aggressor shifts artillery fires both by fire maneuver and by using helicopters to effect rapid displacements of mortars and light and medium artillery weapons to support the operations of units attacking at a considerable distance from the main forces. Such units would be mostly flanking detachments and enveloping forces.

### 8–66. Defense Operations

*a.* The defense organization differs to a certain degree from the normal pattern. Generally, the defense in an arctic-type environment is organized to defend separate axis. The main effort is directed at blocking those main avenues of approach which the enemy could conceivably utilize under the circumstances. A division may be assigned to defend several possible enemy axis of advance at a considerable distance from one another, thus requiring subordinate units to acquire additional capabilities for independent operation and improved means of communication.

*b.* The depth of the defense zone is greater than normal. Aggressor forces prefer a selective

defense system in these circumstances instead of defense belts covering a sector from end to end. Aggressor forces utilize terrain and climatic conditions to aid the defense. An Aggressor commander will not waste his unit's strength to block areas over which it is impossible for the enemy to travel. An Aggressor force will concentrate its effort in the defense of such terrain features as road junctions and the adjacent heights, and all other positions from which it is possible to block those avenues of approach that the enemy can physically utilize.

*c.* Aggressor commanders believe that the greater danger comes from the possibility that the enemy might use outflanking and enveloping tactics carried out by ski troops or by forces mounted on special cross-country vehicles. Consequently, Aggressor forces deploy the units in defense so as to have a series of company and platoon strongpoints each organized for all around defense. These strongpoints are located where they can cover avenues of approach with intersecting fires. The gaps between regiments, battalions, and even companies are generally large. Aggressor relies on engineer troops to lay obstacles and on artillery fire to cover the gaps. A high degree of coordination is maintained between engineer units setting up obstacles and artillery fire control centers.

*d.* Aggressor divisions do not deploy their second echelon in fixed defense positions when operating in an arctic-type environment. A series of unoccupied defense positions are prepared. The second echelon is used as a mobile reserve and contingency force. It is dispersed in several locations, all near roads or cross-country routes, and kept ready to move at a moment's notice. The mobility of this force allows it to occupy prepared defense positions at given points, to counterattack enemy penetrations or to attack enemy attempts at outflanking or enveloping. Engineers prepare and maintain routes over which second-echelon units, including artillery, may be rapidly shifted from one sector to another as needed.

*e.* Counterattacks are carried out, usually with small forces, against the flanks and rear of the enemy who has succeeded in penetrating into the defense area.

### 8–67. Logistical Support

In planning for logistical support, special attention is given to measures to reduce personnel discomfort and to counteract those factors which might constitute a handicap to combat operations. Measures are taken to insure that individual soldiers are supplied with warm clothing, appropriate footwear, skis, heating devices for troop shelters, and a steady supply of fuel appropriately treated for use at extremely low temperatures. Extensive use of helicopters, cross-country vehicles, and dog-sled teams is made to insure a steady flow of supplies as well as to evacuate casualties.

## Section XIII. SWAMP OPERATIONS

### 8–68. General

Operations in swampy terrain are carried out by small self-sufficient units organized as rifle divisions. Mobile units such as the tank and motorized rifle divisions may be used in these areas, but generally are employed where the inherent mobility is exploitable. Objectives are roads, clearings, road junctions, small woods, heights, and inhabited places. Engagements occur at short distances, visibility is limited, observation is difficult, and infiltration by small units is relatively easy. Movement of large forces is canalized, and supply and evacuation must take place over the same routes. Large scale offensives under conditions of nuclear warfare bypass extensive wooded or swampy areas.

### 8–69. Swamp Crossing

In crossing swamps, Aggressor forces make maximum use of log trails, tread, and corduroy roads. Many improvisations have been developed into standard methods.

*a.* Floating bridges are constructed from light logs and branches. These bridges will support light antitank guns.

*b.* Diagonally constructed flaoting corduroy roads, from 7 to 8 meters wide, will support from 8 to 10 tons. A similar bridge, about 2 to 3 meters wide, can be used by a motorized rifle column.

### 8–70. Employment of Motorized Rifle Units

Motorized rifle units usually operate in self-sufficient units of reinforced battalion size. Companies attack in a line of platoons. Second echelons are close to the first echelon. Flanks and lines of communication are protected. Units are used in small groups (platoon or smaller) to infiltrate and prepare ambushes. Direct-fire artillery weapons are attached to battalions. High-trajectory weapons are nor-

mally retained under a centralized control. Use of motorized rifle transporters is reduced to a minimum.

### 8-71. Employment of Tanks

Aggressor forces consider that the effort expended in making possible a tank maneuver in apparently inaccessible terrain is warranted by the surprise achieved. After careful terrain and route reconnaissance, engineer and rifle units construct river and swamp bridges, fill holes, and lay corduroy roads when necessary. Tank units are assigned special engineer and motorized rifle detachments that follow the tanks. A typical tank assault team consists of an engineer squad, a tank platoon, and one or two rifle platoons. The Aggressor light tank called TYRANT has proven extremely valuable in this environment.

### 8-72. Defensive Use of Swamps

Small swamps are integrated into the system of defensive obstacles. Large swamps are used to cover frontal or flank approaches to the main defensive zone. The battle outpost line is placed within the swamp. Improvised platforms of logs and branches are used to support security detachments and forward observation posts. The main defense belt may be established within a large swamp area.

## Section XIV. DESERT OPERATIONS

### 8-73. General

Aggressor desert operations are conducted swiftly, methodically, and violently. Using darkness and periods of reduced visibility (sand storms, etc.) for troop movements, preparations for attack, construction of field fortifications, and supply operations, Aggressor forces proceed with patience, cunning and perseverance. The types of missions conducted under these adverse environmental conditions are reconnaissance in force and raids. On occasion, Aggressor will also conduct night attacks up to regimental size.

### 8-74. Conduct of Offensive Operations

*a.* In the desert, Aggressor forces will employ partisan teams for night raids into the enemy's rear areas. Appropriate to the nature of their mission, these units will be equipped only with absolutely essential items. Minutely detailed orders insure every phase of the undertaking, and these orders are carried out methodically. Attacks on strongpoints in the desert are broken off only when Aggressor casualties amount to several times the strength of the strongpoint complements.

*b.* More conventional types of operations are conducted by the motorized rifle division, using its tanks to their maximum effect. A condensation of this type of operation normally is conducted in the following sequence.

(1) The division's motorized rifle units dismount as far forward as possible without alerting the enemy's observation posts or listening posts and advance towards predesignated attack positions. This is accomplished as soon after dusk as possible in order to use darkness to the best advantage.

(2) As soon as the attacking units are assembled and in position, medium tanks from the division's tank regiment attack the enemy's weakest point, then continue as rapidly as possible towards communications facilities to disrupt the enemy's reinforcing capability.

(3) Immediately after the tank raid has been executed, the dismounted infantry will attack in multiple thrusts along the enemy's perimeter behind intense artillery fires and air strikes. The motorized rifle transporters will follow closely behind the attacking infantry providing additional firepower and should the attack be stopped, or slowed, multiple thrusts by the individual motorized regiment's medium tank battalion will be initiated.

(4) As substantial gains are made, the heavy tanks from the tank regiment are committed, with their objectives being enemy command posts and logistics facilities deep in the enemy's rear area.

(5) Any dismounted infantry which has not become decisively engaged, will infiltrate towards the enemy support units, conduct raids, and neutralize any bypassed pockets of resistance within their axis of advance.

(6) Special steps are then taken to restore control of the situation to maintain the territorial gains. Such objectives targeted will be limited in nature and favorable enough to hastily defend against any enemy counterattacks. Major night attacks of this size are only conducted upon orders from a higher command, or when attempts to take an important objective in a day attack has failed.

### 8-75. Conduct of Defensive Operations

*a.* During desert operations, security and reconnaissance activity will be greatly increased. Surprise attacks will always be expected at

night. Aggressor principles of defense against night operations hold true in this environment. Almost the only new feature is that fighting is not limited to local actions. To counter any enemy attempts to mount offensives, Aggressor raiding parties consisting of smaller units do not hesitate to thrust far into the depths of the enemy's front.

*b.* Attempts to break out of pockets of seige or encirclement in the desert require a slight modification of operations by encircled forces as discussed in paragraphs 8–34 through 8–41, and conduct of the night attack discussed in paragraph 8–49 through 8–52, due to the difference in terrain. This modification in general terms is simply a reorganization of the Aggressor rifle units into tightly packed groups which attack towards enemy weak points in multiple thrusts led by their organic tanks.

# PART THREE
# ORGANIZATION AND TACTICAL EMPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES
# CHAPTER 9
# THE ARMY GROUP

## Section I. GENERAL

### 9-1. Army Groups

An army group performs tactical, administrative and logistical functions. A type army group contains three combined arms armies, one tank army, one air army, one airborne division, one artillery division, one surface to surface missile division, and other combat units and service elements. However, its organization is flexible and may vary considerably, depending upon the mission and terrain. The number of combat as well as service units may be increased, decreased, or in some instances eliminated. Figure 9-1 depicts the organization of a typical Army group.

### 9-2. Armies

*a.* The combined arms army and the tank army are the main maneuver elements assigned to the army group. Chapter 10 and chapter 11 discuss these units in greater detail, and provide information on their organization and tactical employment.

*b.* One air army is organic to each army group. Activities of the air army are controlled by the army group commander, who is advised by the air army commander. The organization, mission, and type of support rendered by the air army may be found in chapter 4.

### 9-3. Airborne Divisions

*a.* The airborne division, illustrated in figure 9-2, is similar in organization to the motorized rifle division. Differences are that it has no large motorized rifle transporters, no tanks or tank units, no rocket launcher battalion or multiple rocket launcher battalion (a second 122-mm howitzer battalion replaces the 152-mm gun-howitzer battalion), no reconnaissance battalion, and the engineer battalion has no tracked amphibious cargo vehicles. All other units are identical in structure and contain the same type of equipment.

*b.* All personnel assigned to an airborne unit are qualified parachutists. They are trained to be air landed by both helicopter and aircraft and to fight from motorized rifle transporters when these vehicles are attached to airborne units. Equipment is either air landed or air dropped. See figure 9-3 for personnel, weapons and equipment—airborne division.

*c.* One airborne division is usually found assigned to each army group. Airborne divisions are special purpose type units, whose employment is carefully controlled by the army group commander. Airborne operations are discussed in chapter 8.

### 9-4. Rifle Divisions

*a.* Rifle divisions are formed for special operations in such areas as mountains and jungles. Consequently, they have no firmly established tables of organization and equipment. However, they are organized similarly to airborne divisions, with variances which reduce their strength to about 8,500. Variances include less organic transportation and field artillery in subordinate units, lighter caliber field artillery support weapons at division level, and personnel are not required to be parachute qualified. Weapons and equipment will vary from division to division. For example, divisions operating in mountains will, when appropriate, be equipped with skis, related equipment, and mountain gun (howitzers) 76-mm. Those operating in jungles will be equipped and trained to fight in jungle environments. In addition, all rifle divisions are trained to be transported by helicopters and to function with larger type




*Figure 9–1. Typical army group.*

artillery weapons which may be air landed or air dropped into an area of operations to provide additional artillery support for the rifle units.

*b.* Rifle divisions are basically GHQ units that are attached to army groups for special purposes. Where terrain and weather conditions would adversely affect the employment of motorized and armored units, Aggressor has been known to structure combined arms armies which consist of two-three rifle divisions supported by one motorized rifle division or a tank division to provide adequate mobility for counterattack purposes as well as extended firepower capability. Rifle divisions are employed normally against opposing infantry forces, either in a ground gaining role or a ground holding role, pending the employment of more mobile forces.

## 9–5. Artillery Divisions

*a.* One artillery division (fig 9–4) usually is allocated to each army group to provide conventional and nuclear fire support to armies making the main effort in the advance or to assist in the defense of a critical coordinating area. Normally, units of the division are attached to armies or divisions, but the division is capable of coordinating all its subordinate units when needed to support one sector of operations. There are no observation aircraft organic to the division, but they are attached to the division from the air army during tactical operations. Its main subordinate units are two mixed artil-




Note: Aggressor unit symbols, found in Chapter 21.

*Figure 9-2. Organization—airborne division.*

lery brigades, and one heavy artillery brigade. Personnel, weapons and equipment for an artillery division are shown in figure 9-5. Employment of Aggressor artillery can be found in paragraphs 6-1 through 6-22.

*b. Mixed Artillery Brigade.* In addition to being organic to artillery divisions, two artillery brigades are subordinate to each combined arms army. These separate artillery brigades are identical in organization to those organic to artillery divisions. They normally are allocated by the army commander to first echelon divisions where provisional artillery groups are formed for specific operations. Organization, personnel, weapons and equipment for a typical mixed artillery brigade are depicted in figures 9-6 and 9-7.

*c. Heavy Artillery Brigade.* One heavy artillery brigade is organic to each artillery division. Units of the brigade are employed to provide long-range artillery support for tactical units. Organization, personnel, weapons and equipment are shown in figures 9-8 and 9-9.

## 9-6. Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) Division

*a.* The surface-to-surface missile division, as illustrated in figures 9-10 and 9-11, is, together with its subordinate brigades, an administrative entity through which the army group commander exercises his control over the firing units. The missile battalions are tactical firing units capable of independent operations. They are utilized in a general fire support role for army group operations. In exceptional cases a number of battalions may be specifically employed in support of a combined arms army operation, in which case, they temporarily come under the operational control of the army commander. The SSM division and its subordinate elements are dependent upon the army group for logistical support.

*b.* Two surface-to-surface (SSM) brigades (RANCOR), which are purely administrative, are assigned to a surface-to-surface missile division. In addition, one surface-to-surface missile brigade is subordinate to the combined arms and tank armies. They are equipped with RANCOR missiles which provide additional support for ground units.

*c.* The organization of the heavy surface-to-surface missile (SSM) brigade (RAVAGE/REBEL) is similar to that of the RANCOR surface-to-surface missile brigade. It is found only in the surface-to-surface missile division and normally is retained under control of the army group commander to provide long-range tactical support. It is equipped with RAVAGE and REBEL missiles.

## 9-7. Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Brigades

*a.* Because of the increased reliance placed on the use of guided missiles, there are no rocket units and only a few conventional air defense artillery units organic to tactical echelons above division. The latter are the air defense artillery batteries subordinate to each of the battalions of the surface-to-air brigade. In addition to the units outlined in this section, others may be in existence about which no information is available. However, it is known that Aggressor has several experimental missiles (both SSM and SAM) sites in the Homeland.

*b.* There are two types of surface-to-air missile brigades, the RAMMER and the RAIDER. Both have identical organizations (fig 9-12 and 9-13). One of each of the brigades is organic to the army group while only one RAIDER brigade is organic to each army. These brigades

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | MRT 4 | 85mm (ATAP) | 57mm (ATAP) | RIPPER AT MSL | 82mm Rcl Gun | 122mm How | 160mm Mort | 120mm Mort | 82mm Mort | 100mm AT Gun (SP) | ROGUE (SAM) | 57mm AD Gun (Dual)(SP) | 57mm AD Gun (Towed) | 23mm AD Gun (Dual) | 14.5mm AD MG (Quad)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual)(SP) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr | Ponton | GRIP | GRIM | GRIEF | CALLOUS | CHARLATAN | GRUDGE | FUTILE | FURY | AV-2 | AV-1 | Trk |
| HHC | 82 | 173 | 255 | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | 35 |
| Airborne Regt (3) | 171 | 1837 | 2008 | 11 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 9 | | | 6 | 18 | | 6 | 6 | | 6 | 6 | 20 | 54 | 89 | 89 | | | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | 119 |
| Div Arty | 157 | 1536 | 1693 | 15 | | | 6 | | 36 | 18 | | | 12 | 3 | 3 | 24 | 3 | | 13 | | 24 | | | 1 | | | 5 | 1 | | | | | 275 |
| Engr Bn | 28 | 344 | 372 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 24 | | | | | | | | 36 | 6 | 68 |
| Sig Bn | 29 | 185 | 214 | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 33 |
| Cml Co | 6 | 85 | 91 | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 |
| Svc Elm | 75 | 542 | 617 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 277 |
| Total | 890 | 8376 | 9266 | 65 | 18 | 27 | 24 | 27 | 36 | 18 | 18 | 54 | 12 | 21 | 21 | 24 | 21 | 18 | 73 | 162 | 291 | 267 | 24 | 1 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 36 | 6 | 1050 |

*Figure 9-8. Personnel, weapons and equipment—airborne division.*




Note 1: Aggressor unit symbols, found in Chapter 21, may be used in training exercises.

Note 2: Same organization as signal battalion, motorized rifle division.

Note 3: Same oganization as motor transport battalion, motor transport regiment.

*Figure 9–4. Organization—artillery division.*

provide air defense artillery support for the army and army group rear areas while REGENT and RASCAL units normally are employed in a static role, generally in the Homeland.

## 9–8. Chemical Units

*a. General.* Chemical units at division level and below are primarily defensive in nature. There are organic units at army level, and units may also be attached from the chemical brigade at army group for specific operations. Either the chemical officer or the commander of the chemical unit at each level of command advises the commander on the employment of chemical and biological agents and on necessary defensive measures. Additional information on the employment of chemical units can be found in paragraphs 6–29 through 6–34.

*b. Chemical Brigade.* A chemical brigade is organic to each army group. Its mission is to provide chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) reconnaissance and decontamination, and to restrict enemy observation by employment of screening smoke. The brigade is organized (fig 9–14 and 9–15) to provide CBR support to troop units in the army group area and on a priority basis to reinforce army chemical battalions for specific operations.

## 9–9. Engineer Units

Above division level there are primarily three types of engineer units: general construction, amphibious, and ponton. Others, such as pipeline construction units, may be in existence but little information is available regarding their organization. The employment of engineer units is discussed in paragraphs 6–35 through 6–41.

*a. Engineer Regiment.*

(1) One engineer regiment, illustrated in figures 9–16 and 9–17, is assigned to each army group. It provides general construction support for the army group rear area and additional bridge construction, mine laying and mine clearing support for tactical units.

(2) The construction battalion is a general unit. There is one subordinate to each engineer regiment and to each army. It has the capability of constructing roads, shelters, supply points, airstrips, and water purification facilities for units in the rear areas.

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 122mm Gun (SP) | 130mm Gun | 152mm Gun - How | 152mm Gun (SP) | 203mm Gun - How | 240mm Mort | 310mm Gun (SP) | 400 mm Mort (SP) | 23mm AD Gun (Quad) (SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | 7.6mm Lt MG | GRIP | Trk |
| HHB | 37 | 84 | 121 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 28 |
| Arty Bde (2) (Mixed) | 115 | 1239 | 1354 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | | | | | 8 | 12 | 20 | | 214 |
| Hv Arty Bde | 115 | 959 | 1074 | | | | | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 12 | 20 | | 199 |
| Tgt Acq Bn | 27 | 247 | 274 | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 48 |
| H & S Btry | (6) | (25) | (31) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (12) |
| Tgt Acq Btry (3) | (7) | (74) | (81) | | | | | | | | | | | | (1) | (12) |
| Sig Bn | 29 | 185 | 214 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 38 |
| Svc Elm | 62 | 540 | 602 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 285 |
| Hq Sec | (6) | (12) | (18) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (10) |
| MT Bn | (22) | (195) | (217) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (160) |
| Med Bn | (22) | (97) | (119) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (18) |
| Svc Bn | (12) | (236) | (248) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (97) |
| Total | 500 | 4493 | 4993 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 36 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 20 | 36 | 60 | 3 | 1026 |

*Figure 9-5. Personnel, weapons and equipment—artillery division.*




**Note 1: Aggressor unit symbols are found in Chapter 21.**

**Note 2: All battalions organized the same as gun battalion.**

*Figure 9-6. Organization—mixed artillery brigade.*

(3) A bridge construction battlion is organic to each engineer regiment. Its mission is to construct bridges in the rear areas or to supplement the capability of divisional engineer battalions. A technical company contains various types of equipment such as cranes, pile drivers, bridge-laying tanks and trucks, and portable fixed bridges. These

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 122mm Gun (SP) | 130mm Gun | 152mm Gun-How | 152mm Gun (SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | 7.62mm Lt MG | Trk |
| H & S Btry | 27 | 79 | 106 | | | | | 4 | 4 | 46 |
| Gun Bn (SP) | 22 | 281 | 303 | 18 | | | | 2 | 4 | 33 |
| Hq Btry | (7) | (20) | (27) | | | | | (2) | (2) | (9) |
| Gun Btry (3) | (4) | (72) | (76) | (6) | | | | | | (2) |
| Svc Btry | (3) | (45) | (48) | | | | | | (2) | (18) |
| Gun Bn | 22 | 281 | 303 | | 18 | | | 2 | 4 | 51 |
| Gun-How Bn | 22 | 299 | 321 | | | 18 | | 2 | 4 | 51 |
| Gun Bn (SP) | 22 | 299 | 321 | | | | 18 | 2 | 4 | 33 |
| Total | 115 | 1239 | 1354 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 20 | 214 |

*Figure 9-7. Personnel, weapons and equipment—mixed artillery brigade*

bridges are capable of supporting the heaviest Aggressor equipment and can bridge spans up to 30 meters.

(4) The mine battalion provides support for forward units by transporting, laying and clearing mines. Each company is capable of laying deliberate minefields at the rate of 60—75 meters per hour, with 30 percent of the mines boobytrapped.

*b. Amphibious Engineer Regiment.* One amphibious engineer regiment (fig 9-18 and 9-19) is organic to each army group. An amphibious battalion, organized identically to the battalions of the amphibious regiment, is subordinate to each combined arms army when required.

*c. Engineer Ponton Regiment.* One engineer ponton regiment is assigned to each army group. Two medium and one heavy ponton battalions are organic to the regiment. One medium battalion is also organic to each army. The medium battalion is capable of constructing one 500-foot, 50-ton ponton bridge in 6 hours or nine 50-ton ferries in 3 hours. The heavy battlion can construct one 400-foot 60-ton ponton bridge in 4 hours or six 60-ton ferries each requiring an hour and 30 minutes to




Note 1. Aggressor symbols found in Chapter 21, may be used.

Note 2: Same organization as gun/how battalion.

Note 3: Same organization as gun (sp) battalion.

*Figure 9-8. Organization—heavy artillery brigade*

construct. The organization, personnel, and equipment for a typical engineer ponton regiment is illustrated in figures 9–20 and 9–21.

## 9–10. Signal Units

*a.* Signal units above division level are capable of providing all types of wire, radio, intercept, and radio relay support for the commands to which assigned. In addition, they are responsible for the internal communications, the control of classified documents, and messenger service of the supported headquarters. Additional units, other than those outlined in this section, are available at the Ministry of Armed Forces to augment signal support of tactical units.

*b.* Two signal regiments are organic to each army group and one to each army. A regiment (fig 9–22) normally is composed of three operational battalions, one intercept battalion, and a command post company which provide services for the supported unit headquarters. The number of operational battalions in a regiment may be increased depending upon the size and mission of the unit to which assigned. Also, the type of equipment will vary. For example, the radios and radio relay equipment in the battalions of the regiment supporting an army group have a longer range capability than those in the regiment supporting an army. Additional information concerning Aggressor communications can be found in paragraphs 6–51 through 6–58.

## 9–11. Transportation Units

*a.* Movement of troops and supplies in the Homeland is coordinated with the Ministry of Transportation by the Transportation Directorate of the General Staff. They are made by rail, air and road. Rail movements are handled principally by the Ministry of Transportation with the assistance, in some instances, of ground forces transportation engineer units. These units usually are employed in the Homeland but where required may be attached to army groups for a special operation. Air movements are conducted by transportation elements of the Troop Carrier Directorate of the Aggressor Air Force. In the event of emergencies, civilian airlines can be used to supplement the capability of the air force. Road movements are performed by motor transport units, but as with air movements, civilian transportation may be utilized.

*b.* A motor transport regiment (fig 9–23) is subordinate to an army group and a combined arms army while a motor transport battalion is assigned to each tank army. The three subordinate battalions of the regiment and the separate battalions have identical organization. Each is equipped with 150 trucks, with the type varying

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 203mm Gun - How | 240mm Mort | 310mm Gun (SP) | 400mm Mort (SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | 7.62mm Lt MG | Trk |
| H & S Btry | 27 | 73 | 100 | | | | | 4 | 4 | 49 |
| Gun - How Bn | 22 | 284 | 306 | 12 | | | | 2 | 4 | 42 |
| Hq Btry | (7) | (20) | (27) | | | | | (2) | (2) | (9) |
| Gun - How Btry (3) | (4) | (74) | (78) | (4) | | | | | | (6) |
| Svc Btry | (3) | (42) | (45) | | | | | | (2) | (15) |
| Mort Bn | 22 | 284 | 306 | | 12 | | | 2 | 4 | 42 |
| Gun Bn (SP) | 22 | 159 | 181 | | | 6 | | 2 | 4 | 33 |
| Hq Btry | (7) | (20) | (27) | | | | | (2) | (2) | (8) |
| Gun Btry (3) | (4) | (34) | (38) | | | (2) | | | | (4) |
| Svc Btry | (3) | (37) | (40) | | | | | | (2) | (13) |
| Mort Bn (SP) | 22 | 159 | 181 | | | | 6 | 2 | 4 | 33 |
| Total | 115 | 959 | 1074 | 12 | 12 | 6 | 6 | 12 | 20 | 199 |

*Figure 9–9. Personnel, weapons and equipment—heavy artillery brigade*

depending upon the organization of the supported unit.

### 9–12. Propaganda Units

Propaganda troops are organized into battalions (fig 9–24) that operate at army group level and into companies that operate at army level. Teams can be formed from these units for attachment to divisions and other units.

### 9–13. Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Units

*a.* The highest identified military intelligence organization is the combat intelligence regiment. The regiment, normally assigned on the basis of one per army group, is directly subordinate to the army group, Department of Intelligence, and under the operational control of the




Note 1: Aggressor symbols, in Chapter 21, may be used for training.

Note 2: Organized the same as RAVAGE battalion.

*Figure 9–10. Organization, surface-to-surface missile division.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | RANCOR | RAVAGE | REBEL | CLEAVER | Trk |
| HHB | 28 | 85 | 113 | | | | | 24 |
| SSM Bde (RANCOR) 2) | 119 | 1129 | 1248 | 12 | | | 3 | 349 |
| H & S Btry | (26) | (82) | (108) | | | | | (43) |
| SSM Bn (3) | (31) | (349) | (380) | (4) | | | (1) | (102) |
| SSM Bde (HVY) | 155 | 1349 | 1504 | | 4 | 2 | 3 | 422 |
| H & S Btry | (34) | (97) | (131) | | | | | (49) |
| SSM Bn (RAVAGE) 2) | (38) | (395) | (433) | | (2) | | (1) | (119) |
| SSM Bn (REBEL) | (45) | (462) | (507) | | | (2) | (1) | (135) |
| Svc Elm | 64 | 375 | 439 | | | | | 186 |
| Total | 485 | 4067 | 4552 | 24 | 4 | 2 | 9 | 1330 |

*Figure 9–11. Personnel, weapons and equipment—surface-to-surface missile division.*

intelligence chief. Its organization is flexible and its strength and variety of specialties can be expanded through a system of assignment and attachment from GHQ elements located in the Aggressor Homeland. A type combat intelligence regiment is illustrated in figure 9–25.




Note 1: Aggressor unit symbols, Chapter 21, may be used.

Note 2: Same organization as the AD gun battery, ADA battalion, division artillery, motorized rifle division.

*Figure 9-12. Organization—surface-to-air missile brigade (RAIDER or RAMMER)*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | RAIDER OR RAMMER | 23 mm AD Gun (Quad) | 57mm AD Gun (Towed) | ROVER (SAM 5) | ROGUE (SAM 6) | CHOPPER | CALLOUS | CARNAGE A-3 | |
| H & S Btry | 28 | 84 | 112 | | | | | | 1 | | | 46 |
| SAM BN (4) | 32 | 376 | 408 | 6 | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 115 |
| AD Gun/Msl Btry (4) | 4 | 60 | 64 | | | 12 | 4 | | | | | 36 |
| AG MG/Msl Btry (4) | 3 | 48 | 51 | | 4 | | | 36 | | | | 36 |
| Total | 184 | 2020 | 2204 | 24 | 16 | 72 | 16 | 144 | 1 | | 12 | 794 |

*Figure 9-13. Personnel, weapons and equipment—surface-to-air missile brigade (RAIDER or RAMMER).*

*b.* A signal intercept regiment is also organic to the army group. Its mission is to locate and intercept enemy communications and non-communications emissions for the purpose of obtaining intelligence information. Its organization is shown at figure 9-26.




*Figure 9-14. Organization—chemical brigade.*

| | Personnel | | | Equipment | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unit | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Recon Equipment | Pers Decon Equipment | Equip & Terrain Decon Equip | Smoke Generating Equip | Trk |
| H & S Co | 18 | 82 | 100 | | X | | | 44 |
| Recon Bn | 19 | 264 | 283 | X | X | X | | 31 |
| Pers Decon Bn | 18 | 257 | 275 | X | X | | | 33 |
| Equip & Terrain Bn (2) | 20 | 310 | 330 | X | X | X | | 51 |
| Smoke Bn (2) | 22 | 281 | 303 | | | | X | 51 |
| Total | 139 | 1785 | 1924 | | | | | 312 |

*Figure 9-15. Personnel and equipment—chemical brigade.*

*c.* An electronic warfare (EW) battalion is organic to the army group, and is also found at the army level. It is responsible for the conduct of electronic countermeasures activities in support of the army group and army tactical operations. Figure 9-27 depicts the organization of a type EW battalion.




*Figure 9-16. Organization—engineer regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Dozer | Motorized Grader | Ditching Machine | Motorized Scraper | Trench Digger | Tractor | Crane (Truck mounted) | Pile driver | Bridge laying tank | Portable fixed bridge | Mdn Tk | Trk |
| H & S Co | 24 | 45 | 69 | | | | | | | | | | | | 18 |
| Const Bn | 31 | 300 | 331 | 9 | 6 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 3 | | | | 121 |
| H & S Co | (16) | (54) | (70) | | | | | | | | | | | | (25) |
| Const Co (3) | (5) | (82) | (87) | (3) | (2) | (1) | (1) | (1) | (2) | (2) | (1) | | | | (32) |
| Brg Const Bn | 34 | 281 | 315 | 6 | 2 | 2 | | 4 | 7 | 6 | 6 | 3 | 3 | | 96 |
| H & S Co | (18) | (48) | (66) | | | | | | | | | | | | (24) |
| Brg Const Co (2) | (5) | (79) | (84) | (2) | (1) | (1) | | (2) | (2) | (2) | (2) | | | | (30) |
| Tech Co | (6) | (75) | (81) | (2) | | | | | (3) | (2) | (2) | (3) | (3) | | (12) |
| Mine Bn | 20 | 181 | 201 | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | 63 |
| H & S Co | (8) | (25) | (33) | | | | | | | | | | | | (12) |
| Mine Co (3) | (4) | (52) | (56) | | | | | | | | | | | (3) | (17) |
| Total | 109 | 807 | 916 | 15 | 8 | 5 | 3 | 7 | 13 | 12 | 9 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 298 |

*Figure 9-17. Personnel and equipment—engineer regiment.*




*Figure 9-18. Organization—amphibious engineer regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Equipment | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | AV-3 (Amphibious Vehicle, Tracked) | AV-2 (Amphibious Vehicle, Med, Wheel 6x6) | AV-1 (Amphibious Vehicle, Lt, Wheel 4x4) | Trk |
| H & S Co | 12 | 22 | 34 | | | 4 | 7 |
| Amph Bn (3) | 25 | 276 | 301 | 45 | 45 | 14 | 14 |
| Hq Co | (7) | (9) | (16) | | | (2) | (2) |
| Amphib Co (3) | (6) | (89) | (95) | (15) | (15) | (4) | (4) |
| Total | 87 | 850 | 937 | 135 | 135 | 46 | 49 |

*Figure 9-19. Personnel and equipment—amphibious engineer regiment.*




*Figure 9–20. Organization—engineer ponton regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Equipment | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Pon (Mdm) | Pon (Hv) | AV–2 (Amphibious Vehicle, Med, Wheel 6x6) | AV–1 (Amphibious Vehicle, Lt, Wheel 4x4) | Crane | Motor boat | Pile driver | Trk |
| Hq Co | 12 | 26 | 38 | | | | | | | | 8 |
| Pon Bn (Mdm) (2) | 19 | 234 | 253 | 100 | | 6 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 36 |
| Hq Co | (7) | (18) | (25) | | | | (2) | | | | (6) |
| Pon Co (2) | (6) | (108) | (114) | (50) | | (3) | | (1) | (4) | (1) | (15) |
| Pon Bn (Hv) | 19 | 234 | 253 | | 100 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 8 | 2 | 36 |
| Hq Co | (7) | (18) | (25) | | | | (2) | | | | (6) |
| Pon Co (2) | (6) | (108) | (114) | | (50) | (3) | | (1) | (4) | (1) | (15) |
| Svc Co | 10 | 92 | 102 | | | | | | | | 35 |
| Total | 79 | 820 | 899 | 200 | 100 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 24 | 6 | 151 |

*Figure 9–21. Personnel and equipment—engineer ponton regiment.*




*Figure 9-22. Organization—signal regiment.*




*Figure 9-23. Organization—motor transport regiment.*




*Figure 9–24. Organization—propaganda units.*




*Figure 9–25. Combat Intelligence Regiment.*




*Figure 9–26. Signal Intercept Regiment.*




*Figure 9–27. Electronic Warfare Battalion.*

## Section II. OFFENSE BY THE ARMY GROUP

### 9–14. Conduct of Large-Scale Offensives

*a.* Large-scale offensives (fig 9–28) are directed by the Regional Command, and they are conducted by the Regional Command's army groups. They usually start after an intensive preparation, including nuclear and nonnuclear fires delivered by artillery and aircraft. Motorized rifle and tank forces are organized in echelons to break through the forward enemy defenses and to push deep into the enemy rear, securing the army group objective. Normally, two echelons are used, the first to make the breakthrough, encircle, and destroy surrounded enemy forces, and create a gap for the commitment of the second echelon. The tank army is the exploitation force and passes through the gap created, by-passing enemy pockets of resistance, and drives to the army group objective. The second echelon reinforces and supports the first echelon, assists in the destruction of enemy forces, and provides flank security.

*b.* In a large-scale offensive, Aggressor usually attacks at a number of points on a broad front with heavy concentration of artillery, tanks, airpower, and nuclear fires at the decisive points. Normally, Aggressor seeks a double envelopment to surround and destroy the enemy. If the enemy flanks are not assailable or cannot be bypassed, the pincer maneuver may be used.

*c.* Mobility, fluid tactics, maintenance of the momentum of the attack, and close contact with the enemy are emphasized. Every opportunity to envelop the enemy and to attack him from the rear is exploited to surround and subsequently destroy him. Radiological and chemical contaminated areas are bypassed or crossed rapidly to maintain the momentum of the attack. Although Aggressor does not needlessly expose his troops, he temporarily accepts considerable risk to accomplish his mission.

### 9–15. Phasing of Major Offensives

*a.* Major offensives normally consist of three phases—

(1) The first phase consists of the

breakthrough, encirclement, and destruction of the enemy forces in contact, to include enemy corps reserves. This phase lasts about 3–5 days and is carried out to a depth of approximately 250—280 kilometers.

(2) The second phase is the exploitation, which includes the destruction of the enemy strategic reserves, by tank and combined arms armies. This phase lasts about 4—8 additional days and carries the advance approximately 250—280 kilometers farther.

(3) The third phase is pursuit of enemy remnants and the securing of the army group objective by all armies, spearheaded by the tank army. It may also consist of a deep pursuit into the enemy logistical base and could involve an advance of an additional 500 kilometers in 8 days.

*b.* The phasing of the offensive is flexible and depends on factors such as the nature of the enemy's defenses, the terrain, and the road net. An average rate of advance of 85 kilometers per day is planned.

*c.* Under conditions of nonnuclear warfare, the general phasing of a large-scale offensive remains unchanged except that the average rate of advance will be about 50 kilometers per day.

## 9–16. Planning for the Offensive

*a.* Major offensives are conducted by army groups.

*b.* Planning for the offensive by the army group is initiated in anticipation of or upon receipt of directives from the Regional Command. The first stages of the offensive are planned in great detail. Subsequent stages are planned only in outline form. An army group can prepare a plan for a major offensive in 2 weeks or less when the planning is concurrent with the planning of subordinate headquarters, and can mount an offensive with one army in approximately 8 hours.

*c.* Tactical cover and deception plans and detailed security measures are integral parts of the offensive planning. Information concerning the preparatory measures for the offensive are disseminated to the minimum necessary personnel. The following security measures, among others, are rigidly enforced:

(1) Ground reconnaissance into enemy areas is limited to the units already in contact. Reconnaissance by large advance parties is prohibited.

(2) Normal radio traffic patterns and volume are maintained. Opening of new radio nets is prohibited.

(3) Normal patterns and scale of weapon fires, air activities and logistical activities are maintained.

(4) Maximum use is made of liaison officers for transmitting orders and plans.

(5) Newly arrived units, redisposition of forces, engineer construction, and movement of supplies required for the offensive are carefully concealed.

(6) Troop movement is conducted at night or during periods of reduced visibility.

*d.* Maximum effort is made to conceal all preparations for the attack. Camouflage discipline is strictly enforced. Ground reconnaissance before the attack is deep and extensive. As a security and deception measure, intensive ground and air reconnaissance is carried out along the entire front and not just in areas of the main efforts. This reconnaissance is carried out by divisional, regimental, and battalion motorized rifle and reconnaissance elements of the units in contact. Reconnaissance seeks to obtain a complete and continuous picture of the enemy capability, vulnerability, and the terrain under his control. Ground reconnaissance is supplemented by all available intelligence information collection means. Reconnaissance is tightly controlled so that plans for the offensive are not revealed.

## 9–17. Army Group Frontages and Depths

*a.* The typical army group zone of action usually is about 200 kilometers wide and about 180 kilometers deep, exclusive of the area for combat service support units and installations. Under nonactive nuclear conditions, the width of the army group zone remains unchanged; however, additional combat power may be employed. Regardless of the environment, frontages for army groups normally are based on the number of divisions available for the operation.

*b.* The total width of the army group main effort area or areas is about 40—50 kilometers and normally does not exceed one-third of the total width of the entire army group zone. The army group main efforts may be made at different parts of the army group zone. Usually not more than two main efforts are made.

*c.* The depth of the army group attack formation depends on the terrain, weather, and available assembly and concentration areas. The ability of the enemy to attack units beyond the line of contact and interfere with their movement is also considered. Usually the depth of the army group first-echelon formation extends

to about 100 kilometers behind the forward edge of the battle area. The army group second echelon usually is located in assembly areas about 100—120 kilometers behind the area of contact to permit prompt commitment and still achieve dispersion in depth. Reserves may be located 30—180 kilometers in rear of the forces in contact.

### 9–18. Army Group Formations

*a.* The number of echelons used in the attack formation depends on the mission, means available, terrain, and the strength of enemy defenses. The greater the depth of the enemy defense, the more echelons in the formation. Normally, a two-echelon formation is used. If the attack is not supported by nuclear weapons, a three-echelon formation may be used, particularly if the area of operations is very narrow and the enemy is very strong. A one-echelon formation is seldom used and then only against a weak enemy or in a secondary attack.

*b.* The composition of each echelon depends on the nature of the enemy defenses, the terrain, and the availability of nuclear fires:

(1) In an offensive against a relatively strong enemy, in terrain not permitting use of large masses of tanks, or when available nuclear fires are limited, a typical army group will usually use the following formation:

(*a*) First echelon: two combined arms armies.

(*b*) Second echelon: one combined arms army and the tank army, with those forces not employed in the second echelon being deployed in the third echelon.

(2) In an offensive against a relatively weak enemy or where terrain permits use of large masses of tanks, and adequate nuclear fires are available, the army group normally will use the following formation:

(*a*) First echelon: one or two combined arms armies and one tank army.

(*b*) Second echelon: one or two combined arms armies.

(3) In offensives where none of these factors is predominant, the army group attacks with two combined arms armies in the first echelon, and a combined arms army and the tank army in the second echelon.

*c.* The advance to contact is made on a broad front in parallel columns with each combined arms army advancing in its assigned zone of action.

### 9–19. Concentration for the Offensive

*a.* Units in the first echelon of the offensive and not already in contact are concentrated at night, several days prior to the offensive, in assembly areas 60—75 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area. The leading element of first echelon armies move, three to four days prior to the offensive, to forward assembly areas 20—30 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area. At the last possible time, usually the night preceding the start of the offensive, these units move to attack positions 3—10 kilometers from the forward edge of the battle area. The movement to the attack positions, made in either regimental or battalion columns, is timed to reach these positions just prior to the firing of the preparation.

*b.* Second-echelon units normally move forward into assembly areas vacated by the first-echelon units.

*c.* Tank and self-propelled gun units move from assembly areas to attack positions during the preparatory fires so that the noise of their movement is masked.

*d.* Artillery units move at the last possible hour that will permit them to be in position to support the attack at least 24 hours prior to the launching of the offensive.

*e.* The location of assembly areas depends on terrain, type of operation, time, and other related factors. They are located away from cities, important communications centers or other possible nuclear targets, and usually are large enough to permit 2 kilometers between battalion-sized forces. Movement to assembly areas and to attack positions are made by vehicle and are conducted in the same manner as the advance to contact.

### 9–20. Tactical Employment

The army group normally attacks in two echelons with the tank army as the exploitation force. The first echelon is expected to break through the enemy positions and envelop the enemy forward defenses. It will create a gap about 20 kilometers wide and 40 kilometers deep to permit the employment of the tank army as early as possible. The first echelon will then complete the destruction of encircled enemy forces, consolidate overrun areas, and initiate pursuit of the enemy remnants. The second echelon is committed to support and reinforce the first-echelon armies, to outflank enemy defenses, and to protect flanks against enemy counterattacks.

### 9-21. The First Echelon of the Army Group

The first echelon of the army group is expected to advance to a depth of 70—100 kilometers in the first 24—48 hours of the offensive and destroy the enemy tactical defenses and the enemy corps reserve. This depth, in conjunction with the required tempo of attack, takes maximum advantage of Aggressor's speed, and capitalizes on massed firepower and surprise. Aggressor considers this operation essential to develop a secure penetration area for the commitment of the tank army. The first-echelon armies continue the advance to complete the destruction of enemy forces, consolidate overrun areas and initiate the exploitation phase.

### 9-22. The Army Group Exploitation Force

The tank army is normally the army group's exploitation force. It is committed as early as possible after the start of the offensive. A minimum gap of about 20 kilometers in width and 40 kilometers in depth is required for the commitment of the tank army. Once the breakthrough area is passed, the tank army will fan out in columns of divisions in a zone up to 50 kilometers in width. The tank army will maintain rapid and uninterrupted movement toward the army group objective, bypassing any resistance that cannot be overcome. The tank army normally will not assist in the destruction of encircled forces, but will protect the combined arms armies from enemy forces advancing to the relief of the encircled enemy. At the first sign of an enemy withdrawal, the tank army will start in pursuit.

### 9-23. The Second Echelon of the Army Group

Prior to the start of the attack, the second echelon normally is held in large assembly areas 100—120 kilometers behind the forward edge of the battle area. It is moved up into concentration areas as they are vacated by the first-echelon. The second echelon usually is committed after the army group has committed its tank army, and its area of commitment normally is on the flank of the first-echelon elements of the tank army. The commitment of the second echelon is carefully coordinated by the army group to preclude lucrative nuclear targets for the enemy. Once committed, the second echelon may rapidly deploy to an attack zone about 40 kilometers wide.

### 9-24. Preparatory Fires

*a.* The initial preparation is coordinated and controlled by armies in the first echelon of the army group attack formation. Nuclear preparatory fires on relatively close-in targets normally are made immediately before the nonnuclear artillery and air preparation. When nuclear fires are used in the preparation, the nonnuclear artillery and air preparation usually lasts about 20 minutes. This permits sufficient time for post-strike damage assessment and return of close support aviation to the area, but does not allow the enemy enough time to recover from the effects of the nuclear fires. Preparatory fires are so intensive that they are often referred to as the "artillery offensive." The preparation is intended to silence the bulk of the enemy's supporting fires and neutralize the forces in immediate contact. The exact duration of the preparation depends on the extent and type of areas to be neutralized, available air and artillery support, and ammunition resources. When nuclear fires are not employed in the preparation, the nonnuclear artillery and air preparation is longer, varying from 30 minutes to 1 hour or more.

*b.* A short, heavy preparation, including nuclear fires and air support, usually precedes the commitment of the second echelon. This preparation is fired by the organic and attached artillery of the army, reinforced by some of the artillery of the first echelon. At times nuclear fires alone may constitute this preparation.

### 9-25. Army Group Artillery

*a.* Organic army group artillery together with attached artillery is divided so that the greater portion will support the first echelon armies. This is further divided for allocation to the main attack army, the secondary attack army, and the army group artillery groups. Allocations are made so as to give the forces in the main attack sector a preponderance of artillery support.

*b.* When the second echelon combined arms army and/or tank army is committed, some artillery support is shifted from first echelon support roles so that the newly committed forces may receive an artillery support allocation commensurate with the degree of resistance they are expected to encounter.

## Section III. DEFENSE BY THE ARMY GROUP

### 9-26. Conduct of the Defense

*a.* Aggressor conduct of the defense is not stereotyped, nor does he always use the same groupings of forces and weapons. Occupied defensive areas are frequently changed to mislead the enemy. Under conditions of active nuclear warfare, small forces are left in the previously occupied positions to simulate normal activity. Movements to alternate or supplementary positions designed to mislead target acquisition means of the enemy are made at night or during conditions of reduced visibility.

*b.* If it is known or believed that the enemy will fire a nuclear preparation on the main defense belt, troops in the threatened area may, on authority of the army group commander, temporarily withdraw. A strong, well-dug in covering force is left in place to conceal the withdrawal. The defensive positions are reoccupied at the earliest possible time.

*c.* In all defensive operations close contact with the enemy is stressed. All units are alert for any signs of enemy withdrawal as a possible indication of preparation for close-in nuclear fires. Close contact with the enemy is considered excellent protection from nuclear attack.

*d.* The defense is based on the motorized rifle divisions of the combined arms army in the main defense belt destroying or canalizing the enemy. If the enemy penetrates the first defense belt his attack is slowed, and he is weakened and exhausted by the continuing resistance of the motorized rifle divisions until he can be destroyed by counterattacking forces.

*e.* Counterattacks are the backbone of the defense and are planned in advance for second echelons and reserves. The counterattack usually is preceded by short, heavy nuclear and/or conventional mortar preparation and supported by fires from adjacent units. Counterattacks are made by a sudden thrust on the advancing enemy's flanks and rear before he has had sufficient time to consolidate the positions he has captured. Counterattacks involve progressively larger units and are delivered with more frequency as the depth of the enemy's offensive salient increases.

### 9-27. Organization for the Defense

*a.* The army group normally prescribes the general location of the forward edge of the main defense belt and the limits of the combined arms army zone of defense. Strict adherence is given to the principle that defensive action is initiated only to gain time or economize in one area to provide forces for another area. The temporary nature of any defensive posture is emphasized and Aggressor forces will seek the opportunity to seize the initiative and convert to the offensive.

*b.* The frontage and depth of an army group defense can be up to 400 kilometers wide and 400 kilometers deep. The defense is organized in successive belts designed to provide depth to the defended area. These defensive belts consist of a security zone, a main defense belt, a second defense belt and a third defense belt as required by the mission, means available, terrain and the strength of the enemy attacking force.

(1) The security zone is established and manned, by each combined arms army in the army group first echelon. Usually 20—30 kilometers deep but may be up to twice as deep if space and troops are available. Aggressor units are dispersed to the maximum extent consistent with the terrain, anticipated employment and the possibility of use of nuclear weapons by the attacking enemy force.

(2) The army group first echelon of the main defense belt generally will have two or three combined arms armies. The second echelon of the main defense belt normally consists of the tank army, reserve units and possibly one combined arms army. The second echelon is widely dispersed well to the rear in or near the third defense belt. The tank army will be used normally as the counterattack force.

(3) The second defense belt is manned by each army's second echelon divisions, including the tank divisions, after they have completed their assigned tasks in the security zone. It contains each army's main and alternate command posts and portions of the reserve force.

(4) The third defense belt contains the army group second echelon forces, usually elements of the tank army and some army group reserve. The third defense belt forces prepare to mount a counterattack. Army group counteroffensives are launched from this area.

*c.* The Aggressor's concept of defense is discussed in detail in paragraphs 5-14 through 5-21. Figure 5-6 depicts the Aggressor defensive belt concept and figure 5-7 provides a schematic representation of Aggressor large-scale defensive operations.

# CHAPTER 10
# COMBINED ARMS ARMY

## Section I. ORGANIZATION

### 10–1. General.

The combined arms army is a tactical and administrative organization usually employed as part of an army group although it is capable of independent operations. A type combined arms army is depicted in figure 10–1. The combined arms army may have other combinations of divisions, combat support units and service units due to differences in mission or terrain.

### 10–2. Subordinate Elements

*a.* The main combat elements of the combined arms army are three motorized rifle divisions and one tank division. These units are discussed in detail in chapter 12 and chapter 13.

*b.* Other units subordinate to the combined arms army are identical in organization to those found at army group level. Oftentimes, units will be attached from army group level to support the combined arms army for brief or extended periods, depending on the army's mission.

*c.* In addition to the above units one antitank regiment (fig 10–2 and 10–3) is organic to each combined arms army. It is used to supplement the antitank battalions of the motorized rifle divisions. In addition to antitank guns, antitank guided missiles are an integral part of the regiment.

*d.* A chemical defense battalion (fig 10–4) is




Note: Aggressor unit symbols found in Chapter 21, may be used in training exercises.

*Figure 10–1. Typical combined arms army.*




Note: Same organization as antitank battalion, motorized rifle division.

*Figure 10-2. Organization—antitank regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 100mm AT Gun (SP) | RIPPER AT MSL | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | MRT | 7.62mm LMG | Trk |
| H & S Btry | 10 | 62 | 72 | | | 2 | 2 | 4 | 9 |
| AT Bn (3) | 22 | 222 | 244 | 12 | 6 | 2 | 2 | 4 | 29 |
| Total | 76 | 728 | 804 | 36 | 18 | 8 | 8 | 16 | 96 |

*Figure 10-3. Personnel, weapons and equipment—antitank regiment.*

also organic to each army. The battalion's mission is the same as the chemical brigade at army group, and it is capable of providing complete support to army area troop units in all but large scale decontamination or smoke operations. Units from the chemical brigade are attached to the army for special operation beyond the capability of the organic chemical battalion.

*e.* A combat intelligence battalion is assigned on the basis of one per army. The composition will vary, depending on the type army to which assigned, and the mission of the army. Figure 10-5 depicts the organization of a type combat intelligence battalion. Where necessary elements from the combat intelligence regiment at army group, and GHQ elements may augment the battalion to expand the battalion's capabilities.

*f.* A signal intercept battalion is also found at the army level. It provides organic signal intercept support to the army, and it can also be augmented by elements from the signal intercept regiment at army group. The organization of a typical signal intercept battalion may be found at figure 10-6.




Note: Aggressor unit symbols found in Chapter 21, may be used in training exercises.

*Figure 10-4. Organization—chemical defense battalion.*




*Figure 10-5. Organization—combat intelligence battalion.*




*Figure 10-6. Organization—signal intercept battalion.*

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 10–3. General

*a.* The mission of the combined arms army in the first-echelon of the army group is to destroy enemy resistance to the front and to create gaps large enough to permit employment of large mobile forces of the army group, such as the tank army or the second-echelon combined arms army. The army is expected to advance far enough in the first few days of the offensive to destroy the continuity of the tactical defenses of the enemy, including his corps reserves. In accordance with the army group scheme of maneuver, the advance is continued for further operations against deep enemy reserves and for destruction of the encircled enemy forces.

*b.* The combined arms army in the second-echelon of the army group is used to—

(1) Widen gaps created by the first-echelon.

(2) Outflank enemy defenses.

(3) Block counterattacks against the army flanks.

(4) Destroy encircled enemy forces.

(5) Reinforce the army group first-echelon.

*c.* The following discussion of the combined arms army in this section deals with the combined arms army in the first-echelon of the army group. It generally is applicable to the combined arms army of the second-echelon of the army group, when committed.

### 10–4. Attack Formation

*a.* Usually, the combined arms army attacks in two echelons. When attacking a weak enemy, or as part of a secondary effort, the combined arms army may attack in one echelon. The army usually does not attack in three echelons unless assigned to a very narrow attack zone. The first-echelon of the army usually consists of two motorized rifle divisions. The second-echelon consists of a motorized rifle division and one or two tank divisions. The army second-echelon is initially dispersed in assembly areas 15 to 25 kilometers to the rear of the first-echelon. It maintains close liaison with the first-echelon and moves on order. If the terrain, expected enemy resistance, and available combat support permit, a tank division will be used in the first-echelon. In that event, the first-echelon will consist of two motorized rifle divisions and one tank division, and the second-echelon will consist of one motorized rifle division and an additional tank division if available. Reserves may consist of a motorized rifle regiment or separate motorized rifle or tank units made available by army group, in addition to artillery and engineer reserves. The tank division may be considered as an exploitation force separate from the second-echelon.

*b.* In nonnuclear warfare there is no change in the usual army attack formation except that a tank division normally is used in the first-echelon only against weak enemy defenses.

### 10–5. Frontages and Depths

*a.* The combined arms army making the main effort for the army group normally will have an attack zone of about 30 kilometers. A combined arms army making a secondary attack will have an assigned front of up to 80 kilometers. The width of the actual zone used may be less than the frontage assigned. The depth of the combined arms army normally is about 100 kilometers.

*b.* In nonnuclear warfare, the width of the combined arms army attack zone will remain essentially the same. The depth of the army zone under these conditions also remains unchanged.

### 10–6. Combined Arms Army Artillery

Organic and attached artillery is divided, and allocations are made much in the same manner as army group artillery, with priority to first-echelon main attack forces. Second-echelon forces, when committed, would be allocated sufficient artillery support to enable them to carry out their mission.

### 10–7. Advance to Contact

*a.* Plans for the advance to contact are as detailed as time permits and are based on information of the enemy, weather, terrain, and the scheme of the anticipated battle to include planned nuclear fires. Particular attention is paid to passive defense measures against nuclear attack, antitank, air defense, antiairborne, security, and tactical cover and deception measures.

*b.* All available aircraft support the advance. Air support provides continuous reconnaissance, assists in destruction of forces interfering with the advance, attacks enemy reserves, delivers nuclear fires, and provides column cover. Air liaison officers, who can either call for air support or direct column cover aircraft to specific targets, accompany all regimental and higher headquarters and principal security elements.

*c.* Marches normally are made at night or during limited visibility. Unopposed marches are continued without interruption until contact with the enemy is made. March deception plans are habitual. Feint marches on different routes may be made.

*d.* Advance Guard.

(1) Advance guards normally are assigned the following missions:

(*a*) Screen and secure the advance of the main body.

(*b*) Seize key terrain features until the arrival of larger forces.

(*c*) Determine the enemy composition, disposition, and defenses, with particular attention to the enemy's nuclear capabilities.

(2) The composition of the advance guard varies with the tactical situation, terrain, and size of the unit. The advance guard usually is composed of reconnaissance, motorized rifle, tank, engineer, artillery, and chemical units. The advance guard moves by bounds from one terrain objective to the next. Advance detachments from the advance guard may be sent forward to seize specific terrain features until the arrival of the advance guard. These terrain features include road junctions, obstacles, and defiles.

*e.* Security.

(1) *Ground Security.* All march elements are responsible for their own security in all directions. Security elements prevent surprise attacks by the enemy on the main body and permit deployment of the main body under favorable conditions. Security is furnished by advance, flank, and rear guards and march outposts. Flank and rear guards move in coordination with the main body or establish a series of outposts protecting the passage of the main body. Strength and composition of security elements depend on the mission, enemy situation, terrain, size of the unit being protected and the time it requires for deployment. Security elements are habitually reinforced with artillery, tanks, self-propelled (SP) guns, engineers, and chemical units as required.

(2) *Air Defense Security.* Great care is taken to insure proper protection against air detection and/or attack. Measures taken include—

(*a*) Ground and air observation and warning nets within all march elements.

(*b*) Camouflage measures and use of routes concealed from air observation.

(*c*) Coordination of ground air defense fires with employment of fighter aviation.

(*d*) Preplanned actions to be taken by troops if attacked by enemy aircraft.

Air defense artillery may be attached to battalions serving as advance guard or to any advanced detachment element. Organic air defense artillery of less than 85mm is dispersed within the column of the units. On receipt of an air alarm these weapons are halted at the roadside and are prepared to engage enemy aircraft. They may be sent ahead, protected by the advance guard, to cover the passage of the unit through defiles. Medium caliber and larger air defense artillery and missiles attached to the division and larger units protect columns by moving by bounds in echelon. Several parallel columns may be protected simultaneously.

(3) *Antitank Security.* Aggressor's high regard for the capabilities of tanks is evidenced by the great care taken to insure antitank security. Antitank warning nets are established within all march elements. All march elements contain SP guns and/or antitank guns. When contact is likely and the enemy has an armor attack capability, security elements are reinforced with additional antitank weapons. When the advance is threatened by an imminent armor attack, antitank guns take up firing positions. These positions may be in advance of the column they are protecting. Hasty, temporary minefields may be set out if time permits. These mines are recovered when the advance resumes.

(4) *CBR Security Measures.* All units are responsible for continuous CBR reconnaissance in their zone of advance or along their march route. Chemical reconnaissance units from the army chemical battalion may be attached to the lead element to assist in CBR reconnaissance. Plans are made prior to the march for area decontamination. Announced radiation operation exposure guidance for individuals may be exceeded temporarily by the army commander to permit rapid passage of radiological contaminated areas that cannot be readily bypassed. This is done only when absolutely necessary to accomplish the mission.

*f.* Engineer Support. Engineers assist in reconnoitering roads, defiles, bridges, river crossings, bivouac sites, and water supply sources. They also mark march routes, prepare cross-country routes, repair and strengthen bridges and roads, and clear obstacles and passages through radioactive areas. Mobile obstacle detachments are formed from organic engineers as required. These detachments vary in strength from a platoon to a battalion, and they

may be reinforced by infantry and antitank weapons. Their mission is to provide immediate protection for the advancing columns in the direction of advance, and for the exposed flanks and approaches by laying hasty minefields.

*g.* When possible, the combined arms army advances in its assigned zone in two or more columns with all divisions on one or more separate parallel routes. Two divisions may move in column on one route. The road space between divisions moving on the same route may be up to 6 kilometers. A motorized rifle division (reinforced) screens to the front. Nondivisional elements of the army may be attached to divisions and integrated into division columns or formed into separate columns marching on the same or different routes. Nondivisional columns are normally provided with their own air defense protection. The combined arms army antitank reserve is echeloned in the most likely direction of enemy armor threat and moves by bounds.

### 10–8. Conduct of the Attack

Strongpoints that hold up the advance are bypassed and reduced by the second echelon of the army. Strong enemy counterattacks are dealt with by nuclear or chemical fires or by the second echelon. The second echelon is committed without hesitation to maintain the momentum of the attack. If the enemy uses nuclear or chemical fires, the offensive continues with minimum necessary reorganization. If necessary, unit replacements are made promptly from the general troop reserve or from the reserves of higher headquarters. Once the army objective has been captured, strong security detachments remain to secure the objective and the major elements move to dispersal areas and prepare to continue the attack.

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 10–9. Security Zone and Main Defense Belt

*a.* Units in the security zone normally employ delaying action, followed by withdrawal. Security zone forces halt the enemy or delay him, by forcing him to deploy, and prevent enemy reconnaissance units from reaching the main defense belt. Close contact with the enemy is maintained. Tank heavy reserves are employed to assist in disengaging the first echelon.

*b.* When forced, the delaying forces withdraw through the main defense belt to the second defense belt. Stay behind forces are often left in the security zone to execute intelligence and sabotage missions, attempt to locate enemy nuclear delivery means, and to determine enemy attack formations and the time of attack.

*c.* As the enemy approaches the main defense position, he is subjected to continuous heavy fires from all available means. Reconnaissance is intensified. Troops are alerted to occupy prepared protective shelters to minimize the effects of nuclear fires delivered by enemy weapons.

(1) Counterpreparatory fires are readied and fired on order of the army commander. Authority to fire a counterpreparation may be delegated to division commanders. Nuclear fires, as available, are included in the counterpreparation. Preferred targets for nuclear counterpreparatory fires are enemy units in assembly areas and nuclear delivery systems.

(2) If the enemy overruns or penetrates the main defense belt, the combined arms army normally launches a counterattack with the tank division and available elements of the motorized rifle division engaged, supported by nondivisional reserves of tanks and other support weapons.

(3) The combined arms army counterattack usually is carried out by the tank division. If other elements of the army reserve have not been previously committed, they may also be used in the counterattack. Counterattacks are directed at the flank and rear of enemy penetrations. Nuclear fires are used on deep penetrations. If necessary, the counterattack forces pass through radiologically contaminated areas to reach the enemy.

(4) Full use is made of motorized rifle transporters to speed the counterattacks. Motorized rifle units normally will not dismount from armored transporters until forced to do so by enemy fires. If the enemy penetration has been neutralized by nuclear fires, the motorized rifle units may advance through this penetration in motorized rifle transporters. This type of carrier-borne counterattack is continued until stopped by the enemy or until the final objective is gained.

(5) If the counterattack fails, Aggressor withdraws his forces from the main defense belt to take up positions in the second echelon defense belt. From the third defense belt, the army group second echelon launches a counterattack to regain the lost territory. All withdrawals are protected by nuclear fires and counterattacks by elements of the army second echelon.

## 10-10. Second Defense Belt

*a.* The tank division, held in assembly areas near probable areas of hostile penetration, counterattacks from the vicinity of the second defense belt to destroy enemy penetrations of the main defense belt. It may be used to counterattack in adjacent zones also.

*b.* The army general reserve, normally located in the third defense belt, may be employed in the second defense belt to block the enemy advance while the tank division counterattacks.

*c.* The force and speed of the enemy advance may require the army tank division initially to occupy prepared positions in the second defense belt to halt the enemy penetration.

*d.* If the combined arms army fails to eject the enemy from the main defense belt, through either failure of the counterattack or inability to execute it, elements of the motorized rifle divisions engaged, withdraw from the main defense belt and take up positions in the second defense belt.

*e.* The forces occupying the second defense belt defend their respective areas in a manner similar to that employed by the motorized rifle division in the defense of the main defense belt, except that the tank division employs its second echelon as a division counterattack force.

*f.* Army forces occupying the second belt support the counterattack or counteroffensive of the army group launched from the vicinity of the third defense belt.

## 10-11. Third Defense Belt

*a.* The army reserve, held in assembly areas in or near this belt, is employed as a contingency force by the combined arms army. It may be used to replace units destroyed by enemy action, to block enemy penetrations, or to counterattack in either the main or the second defense belt.

*b.* If it appears that the enemy is succeeding in penetrating the second defense belt, the army reserve conducts a counterattack to block the penetration.

*c.* In the event the counterattack fails or cannot be mounted, the reserve occupies prepared defensive positions in the third defense belt.

*d.* From the third defense belt, the army group second echelon (the tank army) launches either a counterattack or a counteroffensive as indicated by the situation.

# CHAPTER 11
# THE TANK ARMY

## Section I. ORGANIZATION

### 11–1. General.

Like the combined arms army, the tank army is composed of tactical and administrative units capable of independent operations even though it normally is employed as a component of an army group. It is highly mobile and is designed to exploit breakthroughs and to thrust deep into enemy rear areas. A typical tank army consists of three divisions and various combat and service support units (fig 11–1 and 11–2). A heavy tank regiment may be subordinate to the tank army when its divisions are organized with three medium tank regiments rather than two medium and one heavy tank regiments.

### 11–2. Combat Support and Service Units

Combat support and service units found in the tank army are identical in organization to those units subordinate to the combined arms army. However, due to the increased mobility of the tank army, and its intended employment as an exploitation force in the offense and as a counterattack force in the defense, subordinate




Note. Aggressor Unit Symbols, found in Chapter 21, may be used in training exercises.

*Figure 11–1. Typical tank army.*

| Name | Type | Weight (Metric tons) | Crew | Main Armament | | | Maximum road speed (km per hr) | Range (km) | Fuel[4] Consumption (liters per km) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | Caliber | Maximum range (m) | Penetration[1] (centimeter) | | | |
| TABU | Heavy | 52 tons | 4 | 122-mm | 22,850 | 22.0 | 42 | 275 | 3 |
| THORN | Medium[2] | 36 tons | 4 | 100-mm | 21,900 | 18.0 | 60 | 500 | 2.4 |
| THUNDER | Amphibious | 18 tons | 3 | 76-mm | 15,000 | 14.0 | 50[3] | 300 | 1.6 |
| TYRANT | Light | 10 tons | 2 | 57-mm | 10,000 | 10.0 | 50 | 400 | 0.7 |

[1]At 500 meters at 0°.

[2]Mine clearing tanks are medium tanks equipped with flails or rollers for detonating mines.

[3]Water speed 18 KPH.

[4]Aggressor tanks have multiple-fuel capability, but contained figures are for diesel fuel.

*Figure 11-2. Aggressor tanks.*

units must be so equipped as to maintain momentum with the thrust of the tank army. Therefore, most of these units are 100 percent mobile and capable of providing continuous support to the army during its employment. Subordinate units are characterized by a heavy reliance on self-propelled artillery, air defense, and antitank weapons.

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 11-3. The Tank Army

*a.* The tank army is the army group's exploitation force. It is committed as soon as a gap at least 20 kilometers wide is created in the enemy's defenses. Its early commitment is designed to catch the enemy off balance, complete the encirclement of forward forces before they can be reinforced, and exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical fires.

*b.* Where the enemy defenses are weak, the terrain suitable for wide-spread tank operations and a high level of use of nuclear weapons is envisioned, the tank army may be used in the first echelon of the army group. Capitalizing on the characteristics of the tank for shock action, speed, and partial protection from the effects of nuclear weapons, the tank army is expected to break through enemy defenses rapidly and immediately initiate the exploitation phase.

### 11-4. Attack Formations

*a.* The tank army normally attacks in two echelons. A one-echelon formation may be used against a weak or overextended enemy. A three-echelon formation is seldom used. In those tank armies having four tank divisions, each echelon will contain two tank divisions, otherwise there will be two tank divisions in the first echelon and one in the second.

*b.* The first echelon of the army usually attacks in parallel division columns preceded by strong advanced detachments reinforced with artillery and antitank guns. The second echelon follows about 35 kilometers to the rear of the lead elements.

### 11-5. Frontages and Depths

The tank army is committed when a gap at least 20 kilometers wide and 40 kilometers deep is formed in the enemy defenses. Once the breakthrough area is passed, the tank army deploys in two columns of two divisions each in a zone up to 80 kilometers wide. The depth of the tactical formation is about 100 kilometers.

### 11-6. Tank Army Artillery in the Offensive

The tank army also allocates part of its assigned and attached artillery to its subordinate first-echelon divisions, retaining the remainder in tank army provisional artillery groups. The second echelon is allocated artillery from the first echelon or the army artillery groups when committed.

### 11-7. Conduct of the Attack

*a.* When the situation will permit, a short, but intense, preparation of about 20 minutes is

fired by all available air and artillery fires in the area prior to the commitment of the tank army. If necessary, the artillery of the first echelon of the tank army participates in this preparation. If the enemy is very weak or has been completely neutralized by nuclear fires, the nonnuclear preparation may be omitted.

*b.* The tank army advances to forward positions with the division of its first echelon in column formation. Deployment of the first echelon takes place only when required by enemy resistance.

*c.* The tank army attempts to maintain its momentum and shock action in driving for the army group objective. Resistance that cannot be overcome rapidly is bypassed. If necessary, contact with the combined arms armies is broken to continue the advance to the objective. Destruction of encircled enemy forces is left to the motorized rifle divisions of the combined arms armies. The tank army is expected to destroy any threats to the breakthrough area from enemy forces advancing to the relief of the encircled enemy. At the first indication of an enemy withdrawal, the tank army starts in pursuit, and the securing of the army group objective is assigned to a combined arms army.

### 11-8. Employment of Tank Divisions

The employment of the tank divisions of the army is essentially the same as that of the tank division of the combined arms army (chap 13).

### 11-9. Logistics

*a.* The tank army has an organic capability of advancing from 370—520 kilometers after commitment depending on the terrain and the enemy strength.

*b.* The tank army attaches sufficient transportation to the tank divisions to enable them to be self-sufficient for each phase of an operation. Resupply from army supply points is made at the end of each phase. For large-scale offensives, tank divisions are logistically self-sufficient for about six days when reinforced with transportation units.

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 11-10. General

*a.* While the tank army is designed to neutralize or destroy the enemy's strategic reserves and to seize the army group objective, it is not well suited to static defensive operations. Defensive combat by the tank army is avoided whenever possible. Therefore, during a defensive stage, the tank army is held in reserve as the army group's counterattack force.

*b.* Aggressor doctrine dictates that the tank army will not be employed to hold an occupied area, to repel an attack of a superior enemy force, or to deplete the offensive strength of an enemy in order to create favorable conditions for transition to a decisive offensive. These are the missions of motorized elements, in that it is these units which conduct a stubborn defense in a series of defensive positions echeloned in depth in the tactical defense zone. While this is being accomplished, the army group conducts defense by employment and maneuver of its highly mobile tank army in counterattacks and counteroffensives launched from behind the tactical defense zone.

*c.* In Aggressor's defense the tank army's vulnerability to nuclear destruction is reduced by dispersion of forces both laterally and in depth, by digging in the equipment and by executing movements rapidly. The defense system includes specific measures for protection against air strikes, artillery, rockets, missiles and countermeasures to cope with enemy airborne and tank units. Antitank doctrine in defense places special emphasis on the employment of antitank weapons to augment tanks, tied-in with mines and obstacles at all levels to repel enemy armor.

### 11-11. Organization of the Defense

*a.* The tank army defends as a first-echelon unit only if a situation demands it, and then only temporarily. In this case the army group commander makes every effort to replace the tank army at the earliest possible time with a combined arms army. The tank army is redeployed to a sector of offensive action or to prepare and execute a counteroffensive.

*b.* The ultimate objective of the defense in an area of strategic significance is to launch a counteroffensive. The counteroffensive is executed by the army group, and tank armies constitute the main striking force. A series of counterblows successfully executed by one or more combined arms armies develops favorable conditions for the army group to launch the counteroffensive. Such action is often employed as the forerunner of a general large-scale offensive operation.

*c.* The army group in defense (fig 5–6) is typically organized into defensive belts and an army group counterattack force. The army group counterattack force is normally composed of the tank army located to the rear of the second defensive belt or in the vicinity of the third defensive belt.

*d.* The army group's defensive depth of responsibility may extend up to 400 kilometers or more. Within this zone the first-echelon armies are responsible for a depth of about 100 to 120 kilometers. In addition, army responsibility includes a security zone of up to 40 kilometers forward. Initially, second-echelon and counterattack forces are dispersed and uncommitted and take special precautions against enemy nuclear strikes. Prior to an expected enemy attack, the second echelon of one or more combined arms armies and the tank army move into the zone of the first-echelon army to be in readiness behind the army counterattack force and the army second-echelon division or divisions. The overall result is that the entire army group becomes one deeply-echeloned defense system, with the bulk of its forces located in the rear zones.

*e.* The tank army, located in the rear defense area of the army and composing the army's counterattack force, is the key to the defense of the army zone. The mission of the army in this zone is to prevent the enemy from completing a breakthrough of the area. This is accomplished by conducting a series of large-scale counterblows rather than by an active defense in place. Also, located in this rear defense belt with the tank army are the second-echelon armies of the army group. These strategic rear defense belts are established under army group control and have as their mission the prevention of the development of a breakthrough of strategic significance in that it is possible that such a breakthrough would not only endanger the defense of the army group, but would also jeopardize the planning and conduct of the overall defense or adjacent army groups. Therefore, Aggressor maintains that if an extension of an enemy breakthrough is to be prevented, decisive action must be taken no later than the time when the enemy penetration reaches the army rear area.

## 11–12. Conduct of the Defense

*a.* Should the first and second-echelon defense belts collapse, the combined arms armies would conduct a series of counterattacks, coordinated with nuclear strikes and supported by army group's aviation. A powerful nonnuclear artillery preparation under army group control, coordinated with the artillery support of adjacent armies, tactical air support, and missile support, may precede the counterattack if the enemy temporarily delays the continuation of his attack. The counterattack may be launched against an advancing enemy without artillery preparation. The counterattack force receives two missions; immediate and subsequent. The immediate mission may be the destruction of the enemy in front of the second defense belt and the recapture of the third defensive line of the first defense belt. The subsequent mission may be the recapture of the second and first defensive lines. If the counterattack fails or does not at least lead to the recapture of the third defensive line of the first defense belt, and if the army's tank division is forced to disengage, fall back, and seal off the second defense belt, the army has failed to accomplish its defensive mission, even if the enemy has not yet completed the tactical breakthrough.

*b.* The army group is confronted with a grave situation when the entire defense system of the tactical defense zone has collapsed. In that the basic mission is to prevent an enemy breakthrough, the CAA's will conduct a series of counterblows in their zones. If these counterblows are unsuccessful, the enemy is then able to overrun the rear defense belts. At this time, the army group must succeed in completing a major regrouping for launching a decisive counteroffensive.

*c.* The counteroffensive may develop from one or a series of counterblows successfully executed by the armies. The counteroffensive is planned and prepared by the regional command and executed by one or more army groups. The tank army, supported by at least one combined arms army of the second echelon of the army group, represents the main striking force of the army group. The counteroffensive is carried out in accordance with principles similar to those stipulated for an offensive operation, with the exception that the planning and preparation take place under critical conditions and in the course of a defensive operation when the enemy apparently is in full control of the situation.

*d.* The objective of the counteroffensive is to prevent a complete breakthrough of the army group defensive system. A counteroffensive is normally initiated by rested tank and combined arms armies at the point where the enemy has begun to lack effective reserves. This counterof-

fensive force may be predesignated for this mission or constituted from a major regrouping directed by the regional command.

*e.* In view of the difficulties of a large-scale regrouping and the time required for troop movements, the ratio of forces will seldom be in favor of the defender. Therefore, the defense must be continued in order to gain time. However, because of the exhaustion of the enemy, favorable conditions may arise in order to launch the counteroffensive quicker and defeat an enemy force with equal strength. This is especially true if the counteroffensive is preceded by a nuclear preparation.

*f.* In order that a counteroffensive may develop swiftly into a general offensive, it must begin at the time when the enemy is still attacking and before he has had an opportunity to establish his defenses. As in the case of the army counterblow, all forces of the army group resort to the counteroffensive, spearheaded by the tank army. Successive counterblows by the armies, transformed into a counteroffensive, may often be used as the vanguard of a general large-scale offensive operation. Such a counteroffensive seeks to destroy the enemy in the entire depth of his advance, with subsequent development of a general offensive operation to extend far beyond the original FEBA into the enemy's rear.

# CHAPTER 12
# THE MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION

## Section I. GENERAL

### 12-1. Organization of the Motorized Rifle Division

*a.* The motorized rifle division is a balanced tactical and administrative unit with a fixed organization (fig 12-1 and 12-2). The division is the highest tactical level where a fixed organization is found. The army and army groups may be tailored for the specific mission or area of operations. The motorized rifle division normally is employed as part of a combined arms army but may conduct independent operations for brief periods. The principal maneuver elements are three motorized rifle regiments and a medium tank regiment.

*b.* The division headquarters includes the command and staff personnel necessary for the operational, administrative, and political control of divisional units. It consists of the commander and his deputy commanders, the chiefs of arms and services, the division staff, and the division political apparatus. It is a replica, on a smaller scale with some simplifications, of army and army group headquarters and of the High Command itself. A headquarters element consists of administrative and service personnel.

*c.* The motorized rifle regiment contains organic motorized rifle, tank, artillery, engineer, signal, chemical and other necessary elements to make it an organization capable of functioning under nuclear as well as nonnuclear conditions. It is 100 percent mobile and equipped with sufficient amount of motorized rifle transporters to carry all combat and combat support personnel and equipment of the unit. A more complete discussion of the motorized rifle regiment may be found in chapter 14.

*d.* The medium tank regiment is the main armor striking force of the motorized rifle division. It is both a tactical and administrative unit and is organized on a triangular basis with three medium tank battalions as its primary combat components. This regiment is identical in organization, weapons, and equipment to the medium tank regiment of the tank division. Chapter 15 discusses the employment of the tank regiment.

### 12-2. Division Artillery, Motorized Rifle Division

Organic division artillery (fig 12-3 and 12-4) consists of conventional field artillery, mortar, antitank artillery including guided missiles, rockets with a nuclear capability, multiple rocket launcher, and air defense units. These may be supplemented by the attachment of artillery elements from higher headquarters.

### 12-3. Support Units

*a.* At division level, combat support units include a reconnaissance battalion, an engineer battalion, a signal battalion, a chemical defense company, and an intelligence company.

*b.* The service support units of a motorized rifle division are a headquarters and service section, a medical battalion, a motor transport battalion, and a service battalion.




*Figure 12-1. Organization—motorized rifle division.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | |




*Figure 12-3. Organization—division artillery—motorized rifle division.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 152mm Gun-How | 122mm How | 160mm Mort | 100mm AT Gun (SP) | 140mm MRL | 200mm MRL | RAGE | RIPPER | ROVER (SAM5) | ROGUE (SAM6) | 57mm AD Gun (Towed) | 57mm AD Gun (Dual)(SP) | 23mm AD Gun (Dual) | 23mm AD Gun (Quad)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual)(SP) | MRT | 7.62 Lt MG | GRIP | CALLOUS | CHARLATAN | CHOPPER | TRUCK |
| Hq Btry | 7 | 63 | 70 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 7 |
| Arty Regt | 91 | 923 | 1014 | 18 | 18 | 18 | | | | | | | | | | | | 8 | 8 | 16 | | | | | 189 |
| H & S Btry | (25) | (62) | (87) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (42) |
| Gun-How Bn | (22) | (299) | (321) | (18) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (49) |
| Hq Btry | (7) | (20) | (27) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (2) | | | | | (7) |
| Gun-How Btry (3) | (4) | (78) | (82) | (6) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (8) |
| Svc Btry | (3) | (45) | (48) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | | | | | (18) |
| Mort 8n | (22) | (281) | (303) | | | (18) | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (49) |
| How Bn | (22) | (281) | (303) | | (18) | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (49) |
| TGT ACQ Btry | 7 | 74 | 81 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 12 |
| Hq Sec | (3) | (12) | (15) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (4) |
| SF Plat | (1) | (16) | (17) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Surv Plat | (1) | (18) | (19) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Rdr Plat | (1) | (14) | (15) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (1) | | | | (2) |
| CM Plat | (1) | (14) | (15) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| AT Bn | 22 | 222 | 244 | | | | 12 | | | | 6 | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 4 | | | | | 31 |
| Hq Btry | (7) | (20) | (27) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (2) | | | | | (7) |
| AT Btry (2) | (4) | (66) | (70) | | | | (6) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| AT Btry (GM) | (4) | (25) | (29) | | | | | | | | (6) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (8) |
| Svc Btry | (3) | (45) | (48) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | | | | | (12) |
| RL Bn | 14 | 85 | 99 | | | | | | 2 | 2 | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 20 |
| H & S Btry | (6) | (15) | (21) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (2) | | | | | (12) |
| RL Btry | (4) | (34) | (38) | | | | | | | (2) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| MRL Btry | (4) | (36) | (40) | | | | | | (2) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (5) |
| MRL Bn | 27 | 240 | 261 | | | | | 18 | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 6 | | | | | 31 |
| Hq Btry | (6) | (18) | (24) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (6) |
| MRL Btry (3) | (5) | (61) | (65) | | | | | (6) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| Svc Btry | (6) | (39) | (42) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | | | | | (16) |
| AD Bn | 27 | 262 | 289 | | | | | | | | | 20 | 36 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 4 | | 5 | 5 | 1 | 62 |
| Hq & Svc Btry | (10) | (62) | (72) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (4) | | | | (1) | (28) |
| AD Gun Btry (SP) | (4) | (42) | (46) | | | | | | | | | | | | (4) | | (4) | (2) | | | | (2) | (1) | | (8) |
| AD MSL Btry | (5) | (51) | (56) | | | | | | | | | (16) | | | | | | | (5) | | | | | | (8) |
| AD Gun/MSL Btry | (4) | (60) | (64) | | | | | | | | | (4) | | (6) | | (6) | | | (1) | | | (2) | (2) | | (10) |
| AD MG/MSL Btry | (4) | (47) | (51) | | | | | | | | | | (36) | | | | | (8) | | | | (1) | (2) | | (8) |
| Total | 195 | 1869 | 2058 | 18 | 18 | 18 | 12 | 18 | 2 | 2 | 6 | 20 | 36 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 24 | 25 | 32 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 352 |

*Figure 12-4. Personnel, weapons and equipment—division artillery—motorized rifle division.*

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 12-4. Control and Communications

*a.* Aggressor requires each division level unit and larger to have a main command post and an alternate post at a nuclear safe distance from each other, both fully manned and in continuous operation. In practice, due to the

limited number of staff personnel, divisions man their alternate command posts with a reduced skeleton force. An alternate command post takes over on order or when the main command post is rendered inoperative.

*b.* Duplicate communications systems are mandatory. Radio and wire communications nets are established on a multilateral network basis to insure that the maximum number of alternate channels is available. Sufficient equipment is provided to permit the establishment of complete backup nets.

## 12-5. Offense

*a. Meeting Engagement.*

(1) The motorized rifle division normally is assigned either a zone of advance or a specific route. A single route of advance is avoided wherever possible. The time gaps between columns of the division depend on enemy capabilities and march conditions. Most tactical marches are carried out under blackout conditions for maximum concealment.

(2) When moving alone in one column, the division may be extended as much as 90—120 kilometers. When the division is part of a large force on multiple routes it requires 30—70 kilometers. The division normally uses a reinforced motorized rifle battalion as its advance guard. The distance between the advance guard and the main body may be as much as 45 kilometers.

(3) The division rear guard usually is composed of a motorized rifle regiment reinforced with artillery, tanks, and small engineer and chemical units. The distance between the rear guard and the main body may be as much as 25 kilometers.

(4) Flank guards and outposts are dispatched as required. Normally, they are not more than 5 kilometers from the column. The composition of flank guards and outposts vary with the terrain and the situation.

(5) Tanks and self-propelled (SP) guns move at the head of the main body. The bulk of the artillery marches with the main body and/or the advance guard to permit early deployment and rapid employment of artillery groups. The bulk of the available antitank artillery follows the advance guard along the principal route of march. The antitank artillery reserve is echeloned toward the direction of the most likely enemy armor threat and moves by bounds.

(6) The advance guard upon contact with an undeployed force overruns the forward enemy units while the tanks and SP guns attack the enemy main body and artillery from the flanks and rear. Every effort is made to split the enemy column, destroy isolated elements, and attack from the enemy rear. Artillery and aircraft are used throughout the attack as they become available. Motorized rifle units are deployed as close to the enemy and in as much depth as possible. Regrouping and centralization of fire support control are accomplished by successive commanders as soon as possible, but not at the expense of delaying combat operations. Uninterrupted pressure on the enemy is maintained. SP guns and tanks cover the advance by following closely and engaging enemy strongpoints and antitank weapons. Before the attack of enemy armor, efforts are made to separate any accompanying enemy infantry. If a strong enemy antitank screen is located, motorized rifle elements attack first, followed by tanks and SP guns. Against superior enemy armor, division medium tanks may withdraw, protected by fires of SP guns and heavy tanks, and attempt to ambush the pursuing enemy tanks.

(7) The advance guard upon contact with a deployed enemy attacks and attempts to destroy the enemy. If unsuccessful, it then tries to locate the enemy flanks while the main body deploys. The main body attacks with the least practicable delay. The attack of the main body is supported by all available aircraft and artillery, including nuclear fires. A hasty coordinated attack from the march can be made by division size units within 5 to 6 hours. A deliberate attack is made in accordance with normal offensive procedures if the available intelligence indicates that the enemy is defending in force. If the attack of the advance guard is stopped and the enemy counterattacks, the advance guard holds sufficient ground to cover the deployment of the main body. If this fails, the main body deploys on the nearest suitable terrain. Leading tank units may deliberately withdraw as a deception measure to lure the pursuing enemy into ambushes by SP guns and other tanks.

*b. The Breakthrough.*

(1) The motorized rifle division in the first-echelon of the combined arms army is given the mission to breakthrough opposing enemy forces to include division reserves, overrun enemy division artillery and continue the attack against corps reserves. To accomplish its mission, the motorized rifle division is normally organized so as to have two motorized rifle regiments, reinforced with tank battalions and antitank companies, in the first echelon; one

reinforced motorized rifle regiment in the second echelon; one tank regiment minus battalions attached to the first echelon motorized rifle regiments in reserve.

(2) When the first echelon has broken through to the enemy light artillery positions, the second echelon proceeds to widen the breach, destroy bypassed resistance, and exploit the division objective. The first-echelon regroups and continues to advance, or prepares to repel counterattacks.

*c. Pursuit.*

(1) *Organization of Forces.* Motorized rifle divisions form pursuit groups consisting of a motorized rifle company, a reconnaissance squad, an engineer squad, and an antitank platoon.

(2) *Employment of Forces.* When the motorized rifle division initiates pursuit, tanks of the medium tank regiment, supported by motorized rifle units, parallel the lines of enemy retreat to block, cut-off, and destroy segments of the enemy columns. Direct pressure on the enemy units in contact is increased across the entire zone of action so as to make the formation of enemy march columns difficult. Second-echelon regiments are moved forward in the main direction of pursuit and prepared for early commitment.

## 12-6. Large-Scale Offensives

The mission of a motorized rifle division in the first-echelon of a combined arms army is to break through the defenses of the opposing enemy forces. When this is done, the division continues the attack against the enemy corps reserves. The object of the motorized rifle unit is to destroy the cohesive defense of the enemy, dividing him into small isolated groups, destroying each group in turn, and overrunning his division artillery. One battalion of the medium tank regiment is normally attached to each of the first-echelon motorized rifle regiments with the condition that when the parent medium tank regiment is committed, the battalions are returned to its control.

## 12-7. Attack Formation

*a.* The division normally attacks in two echelons. The first echelon usually consists of two motorized rifle regiments reinforced with tank battalions and antitank batteries. The second echelon consists of one reinforced motorized rifle regiment. The tank regiment, minus battalions assigned to the first echelon's motorized rifle regiments is kept in reserve for commitment when the initial penetration is made.

*b.* When the motorized rifle division attacks in one echelon, one or two reinforced motorized rifle battalions are retained under division control as the division reserve.

## 12-8. Frontages and Depth

The width of the attack zone of a motorized rifle division in the first echelon of the army group's main effort, or one making the main effort for a combined arms army, is about 10—16 kilometers. The depth of the division tactical formation may be up to 30—35 kilometers when fully deployed. When the division is attacking as part of a secondary effort, the width of the attack zone may be increased to about 20 kilometers with no significant change in depth of the formation, or to 30 kilometers with a corresponding decrease in depth.

## 12-9. Preparation for the Attack

The division moves by organic means into assembly areas about 20—30 kilometers from its attack positions. The stay in assembly areas is limited to the time necessary to assign missions to subordinate units, check preparations, and organize combat groups for the attack. On the night preceding the attack, the division moves to the attack position in battalion and regimental columns. March columns are preceded by antitank units. Wherever possible, attack positions and assembly areas are prepared with subsurface shelters before occupancy. Arrival at the attack positions is timed just to precede the start of nuclear preparatory fires. The division medium tank regiment moves after the preparation has started so that the noise of its movement is masked.

## 12-10. Conduct of the Attack

*a.* Covered by the artillery preparation, motorized rifle units and their accompanying tanks and assault guns move in on previously cleared lanes through obstacles to close with the enemy. Assault units move within 100 meters of the artillery impact areas and take advantage of any limited visibility and surprise achieved to close with the enemy. During the assault, antitank guns and 82mm mortars are under the control of the supported units. Organic regimental artillery reinforced by regimental artillery groups supports the assault in depth and prepares to displace forward. Extended fire duels with enemy centers of resistance are

avoided. Small detachments are left to contain the bypassed enemy.

*b.* The supporting artillery units concentrate their fire on enemy antitank defenses. Riflemen and engineers protect the tanks from hostile infantry, neutralize antitank minefields and other antitank obstacles, and help evacuate damaged tanks. Tanks normally do not outdistance their supporting motorized rifle units by more than 400 meters.

*c.* During the advance through the enemy position, special antitank groups composed of antitank guns, SP guns, and engineers armed with flamethrowers follow in the rear of the assault groups. The antitank groups block frontal counterattacks while tanks engage the enemy from the flanks and the engineers assist in reducing enemy positions.

*d.* When the first echelon has driven through the initial enemy positions and has reached the enemy light artillery positions, widening of the breach, destruction of bypassed centers of resistance, and exploitation of the breakthrough are undertaken by the second echelon, assisted by some of the assault group. The remainder of the first-echelon force consolidates captured positions and prepares to repel counterattacks, or regroups and continues the advance.

### 12–11. Second Echelon and Reserves

*a.* The second echelon is used to provide direct support to the attack of the first echelon, protect flanks, repel counterattacks, maintain the impetus of the assault, mop up centers of resistance bypassed by assault units, and exploit breakthroughs. It is also used to replace first echelon units weakened or destroyed by enemy action. The second echelon normally follows the first echelon by about 6—8 kilometers and usually is committed from the march.

*b.* The medium tank regiment may be employed in the first echelon; but, as the division's main striking force, it normally is kept in reserve to exploit the initial penetration. The tank battalions may be used to reinforce the motorized rifle regiments of the first echelon. In this case the medium tank regiment regains control over them when it is committed.

*c.* Normal antitank, engineer, and antiairborne reserves are retained under division control for later engagement at the decisive time.

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 12–12. Planning the Defense

*a.* Division commanders select the exact trace of the forward edge of the main defense belt. Division defense plans include the organization of the defense, allocation and use of artillery, antitank defense, use of air support, counterattack by division forces, and priorities for the preparation of defensive works.

*b.* When not in contact with the enemy, the motorized rifle divisions manning the main defense belt establish general outposts in the security zone as much as 25 kilometers in front of the main defense belt. This is in addition to the combined arms army security force. Normally the division's second echelon (a motorized rifle regiment) is employed in this task. As in the case of the contact and delay force, probable deployment of the general outpost force would be in the order of one Aggressor battalion for each 8—12 kilometers of frontage.

### 12–13. Conduct of the Defense

*a.* The defense is based on the motorized rifle divisions of the combined arms army in the main defense belt destroying or canalizing the enemy. The division defends in place.

*b.* The division, supported by army units, holds its position until overrun or ordered to withdraw. As a minimum it attempts to canalize the enemy and reduce the effectiveness of the penetration.

(1) Nuclear or chemical fires are employed to blunt the enemy spearhead and to minimize his forward progress.

(2) Penetration in the division's first-echelon areas which cannot be reduced by local battalion or regimental counterattacks, or by fire alone, are attacked by the division's medium tank regiment, the primary counterattack force available to the division.

(3) Penetration of the first-echelon regimental areas are blocked by the second-echelon regiment while the division counterattack force attempts to restore the area.

(4) Major enemy attacks which threaten to penetrate the main defense belt are counterattacked by the army counterattack force (usually the tank division from the second defense belt) supported by the division reserve if the latter has not been previously committed.

*c.* If the combined arms army fails to eject the enemy from the main defense belt, through either failure of the counterattack or inability to

execute it, elements that are engaged, withdraw from the main defense belt and take up positions in the second defense belt.

*d.* The first echelon motorized rifle division usually is assigned to defend a zone from 20 to 30 kilometers wide and approximately 15 kilometers deep.

(1) On occasion, the division may be assigned to defend on an extended frontage of up to 45 kilometers. The defense is organized in two echelons, with two motorized rifle regiments in the first echelon and one motorized rifle regiment in the second echelon.

(2) A division artillery group, consisting of several light and heavy artillery battalions from the combined arms army, is attached to the division. Some of these battalions may be used to fill regimental artillery groups; the remaining units are placed in the division artillery group.

(3) The first echelon motorized rifle regiments defend the forward 8 to 10 kilometers of the division defense zone. The third motorized rifle regiment organizes three battalion defense areas across the rear of the division zone approximately 10 kilometers from the forward trace of the main defense belt. These are sited to protect key terrain and control avenues of approach from the front.

(4) The medium tank regiment is retained under division control as the division's tank reserve. Elements of this force (two or three companies) may be used to reinforce the motorized rifle regiments. It is located in the area between the first and second-echelon regiments.

(5) Light caliber artillery is also located in the area between the first and second-echelon regiments. The remainder of the divisional group's artillery and the division's alternate command posts are located behind the second-echelon regiment.

(6) The logistical elements of the first echelon regiments are usually located within the division's second echelon area.

## 12–14. Antitank Defense

*a.* Divisional antitank defenses are organized throughout the depth of the defense zone, mainly along avenues of approach vulnerable to tanks. Aggressor antitank defense plans include:

(1) Locating defensive positions on terrain unfavorable to the operation of armor.

(2) Attachment of additional antitank units to frontline defensive positions to cover the most dangerous avenues of approach. (In areas where there is a serious armored threat, 25 antitank guns for every 1,000 meters of front may be used.)

(3) Destroying enemy armor with nuclear fires while in rear areas and attack positions.

(4) Placing extensive minefields on avenues of approach.

(5) Concentrating artillery fire on enemy tanks as they approach the defensive position, and separating accompanying infantry.

(6) Opening fire with antitank guns on enemy tanks as they approach within effective range.

(7) Using artillery, antitank guided missiles, air defense artillery, tanks, and SP guns in direct fire on tanks that have penetrated the defense position.

(8) Counterattacking the armored penetration with tanks and SP artillery.

*b.* Division artillery direct fire weapons add depth to the antitank defense. These weapons are sited to protect each battalion's antitank guns from assault. Part of these weapons are held in mobile reserve in the rear of the division artillery positions to be moved to threatened sectors or to establish antitank positions in depth. Some antitank artillery units from higher headquarters, when allocated to a motorized rifle division, are kept in reserve and some are suballocated to first-echelon regiments. These antitank artillery units are deployed to form antitank strongpoints, consisting of mutually supporting platoon areas sited in depth. Alternate positions are prepared to meet enemy penetrations. The guns of an antitank platoon are located in a diamond formation with about 200 meters between guns. Antitank artillery units retained under army control are usually positioned in the second and third defense belts. Division artillery units are assigned the following antitank tasks:

(1) Long-range fires.

(2) Fires on tanks in assembly areas and at lines of departure.

(3) Defensive fires.

(4) Final protective fires.

(5) Direct fires.

*c.* Long-range fires are placed on approaching armored units to cause dispersion, delay, and destruction. All artillery and mortars are used for fires on assembly areas and attack positions. They also fire targets covering probable routes from the attack positions to the forward edge of the defense areas. These fires separate the tanks from their accompanying infantry. Targets are fired as soon as the leading enemy

tanks enter the preselected area and are timed to move forward with the enemy advance. All field artillery pieces habitually have several rounds of armor-piercing ammunition. For antitank purposes, an alternate position for each artillery piece is prepared near each firing battery. Air defense artillery may also be employed in antitank roles if required.

# CHAPTER 13
# THE TANK DIVISION

## Section I. GENERAL

### 13-1. Organization of the Tank Division

The tank division (fig 13-1) is a major tactical and administrative unit with a fixed composition. Tank divisions are the main components of tank armies and are also assigned to combined arms armies. Their principal subordinate units are two medium tank regiments, one heavy tank regiment, and one motorized rifle regiment. In those divisions assigned to tank armies there may be three medium and no heavy tank regiments. When this occurs, a separate heavy tank regiment is organic to the tank army. Personnel, weapons and equipment are shown in figure 13-2.

### 13-2. Division Artillery, Tank Division

Organic division artillery (fig 13-3) consists of conventional field artillery, multiple rocket launchers, rockets with nuclear capability, and air defense artillery. This may be supplemented by attachment of artillery from higher headquarters. Personnel, weapons and equipment of the tank division artillery are shown in figure 13-4.

### 13-3. Support Units

The tank division has an organic reconnaissance battalion, engineer battalion, signal battalion, and chemical defense company organized in a manner similar to those units subordinate to the motorized rifle division. Service elements are also similar to those of the motorized rifle division; however, due to the large number of tanks found in the tank division, the capabilities of the service elements are designed to effectively support this armored force.




Note: Same organization as units of Motorized Rifle division.

*Figure 13-1. Organization—tank division.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Hv Tk - TABU | Mdm Tk - THORN | AMTK - THUNDER | Tk Recov Veh | MRT | Scout Cars | Motorcycles | 85mm (ATAP) | 57mm (ATAP) | RIPPER | 82mm Rcl Gun | RAGE | 122mm How | 120mm Mort | 82mm Mort | 240mm MRL | 200mm MRL | ROVER (SAM5) | ROGUE (SAM6) | 57mm AD Gun (DUAL)(SP) | 57mm AD Gun (Towed) | 23mm AD Gun (DUAL) | 23mm AD Gun (QUAD)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (QUAD)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (DUAL)(SP) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr | Ponton (Mdm) | GRIP | GRIM | GRIEF | CALLOUS | CHARLATAN | GRUDGE | FUTILE | FURY | AV-3 (Trk) | AV-2 (Med) | AV-1 (Lt) | Truck |
| HHC | 85 | 183 | 268 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | 3 | 2 | | | | 35 |
| Hv Tk Regt | 103 | 789 | 892 | 95 | | 3 | 5 | 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | 5 | 5 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 103 |
| Mdm Tk Regt(2) | 105 | 821 | 926 | | 95 | 3 | 5 | 15 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 7 | | | | | | | 5 | 5 | | | | 1 | | | | | | | 101 |
| Mrt Rifle Regt[1] | 205 | 2245 | 2450 | | 31 | 3 | 2 | 170 | | | 6 | 9 | 6 | 9 | | | 6 | 18 | | | | | 7 | | | | 6 | 8 | 54 | 89 | 89 | | | 2 | 3 | 1 | | | | | | | 124 |
| Div Arty | 130 | 1238 | 1368 | | | | | 21 | | | | | 6 | | 2 | 36 | | | 12 | 2 | 20 | 36 | 4 | 6 | 6 | 4 | | 10 | | 20 | | | 1 | | | 5 | 1 | | | | | | 258 |
| Recon 8n | 29 | 203 | 232 | | | 7 | | 12 | 18 | 12 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 23 | 17 | | | | | | | | | | | | 23 |
| Engr Bn | 28 | 344 | 372 | | 3 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 50 | | | | | | | | 15 | 18 | 6 | 72 |
| Sig 8n | 29 | 185 | 214 | | | | | 5 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 33 |
| Cml Co | 6 | 95 | 101 | | | | | 9 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 5 |
| Intel Co | 11 | 46 | 57 | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 15 |
| Svc Elm | 82 | 605 | 687 | | | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 302 |
| Total | 918 | 7575 | 8493 | 95 | 224 | 19 | 19 | 264 | 18 | 12 | 6 | 9 | 12 | 9 | 2 | 36 | 6 | 18 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 36 | 32 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 18 | 54 | 147 | 121 | 50 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 9 | 1 | 1 | 3 | 2 | 15 | 18 | 6 | 1172 |

Note 1: Same personnel, weapons and equipment - motorized rifle division

*Figure 13-2. Personnel, weapons and equipment—tank division.*




Note: Organized the same as units of the motorized rifle division.

*Figure 13–3. Organization—division artillery—tank division.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 122mm How | RAGE | 240mm MRL | 200mm MRL | ROVER (SAM 5) | ROGUE (SAM 6) | 57mm AD Gun (Towed) | 57mm AD Gun (Dual)(SP) | 23mm AD Gun (Dual) | 23mm AD Gun (Quad)(SP) | 14.5 mm AD MG (DUAL) (SP) | MRT | 7.62mm Lt MG | GRIP | CALLOUS | CHARLATAN | CHOPPER | Trk |
| Hq Btry | 8 | 65 | 73 | | | | | | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | 7 |
| How Regt | 56 | 596 | 652 | 36 | | | | | | | | | | 6 | 6 | 12 | | | | | 124 |
| H & S Btry | (12) | (34) | (46) | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (26) |
| How Bn (2) | (22) | (281) | (303) | (18) | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (4) | | | | | (49) |
| TGT ACQ Btry 1 | 7 | 74 | 81 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 1 | | | | 12 |
| RL Bn 1 | 14 | 85 | 99 | | 2 | | 2 | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 20 |
| MRL Bn | 18 | 156 | 174 | | | 12 | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | 2 | | | | | 33 |
| H & S Btry | (6) | (21) | (27) | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | (2) | (2) | | | | | (15) |
| MRL Btry (3) | (4) | (45) | (49) | | | (4) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (6) |
| AD Bn 1 | 27 | 262 | 289 | | | | | 20 | 36 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 10 | 8 | 4 | | 5 | 5 | 1 | 62 |
| Total | 130 | 1238 | 1368 | 36 | 2 | 12 | 2 | 20 | 36 | 6 | 4 | 6 | 4 | 20 | 21 | 20 | 1 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 258 |

Note 1: Organized and equipped the same as units of the motorized rifle division.

*Figure 13-4. Personnel, weapons and equipment—division artillery tank division.*

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 13-4. Employment of the Tank Division

*a.* As the primary offensive maneuver element within the ground forces, the tank division is considered the combined arms army's exploitation force. Its employment is characterized by shock action, mobility, and fire power. It may be employed as part of the first or second echelon, or it may be considered as the army's tank reserve. In either case its mission is to exploit gaps created in the enemy defenses, rapidly penetrate enemy territory, destroy the continuity of the defense, and assist in securing the army's objectives.

*b.* The tank division is used to create and maintain shock deep in the enemy rear; prevent or break up the formation of hasty rear defense positions; disrupt enemy command, communications, and logistical installations; and overrun communications centers, airfields, and nuclear weapon launching sites. Its operations are closely coordinated with the operations of the motorized rifle divisions. If the combined arms army is forced to assume the defensive, the tank division is normally used as a mobile counterattack force.

*c.* Aggressor doctrine permits the tank division to be employed as a first echelon unit where the mission, terrain, and opposing forces favor its employment. Good tank terrain, a weak enemy, and a high level of use of nuclear weapons favor the use of the tank division as part of the breakthrough force to exploit nuclear breakthroughs, for deep penetration, for enveloping movements, and for exploiting gaps in enemy formations. Its mission would be to break through the opposing defenses and continue the advance to the army's objective.

*d.* As the exploitation force, the division's mission is to exploit gaps created in the enemy defenses by the initial thrust of the motorized rifle divisions' attacks, destroy or isolate small groups of the enemy, avoid becoming decisively engaged by bypassing enemy resistance, and destroy the enemy corps reserves. It will attack enemy counterattacks that threaten the breakthrough area. Its operations are directed to destroy the enemy's ability to reconstitute an organized defense or engage in an orderly retrograde movement, and are characterized as a series of meeting engagements. At the first sign of an enemy withdrawal, the tank division will initiate pursuit operations designed to divide and destroy the enemy force.

*e.* Regardless of whether the division attacks in the first echelon of a large-scale operation or is committed after the forward enemy defenses have been breached, its attack is characterized by the utmost violence and aggressiveness. As the decisive element in the offense, the tank division once committed, receives first priority from its higher headquarters for reinforcements, air support, fire support, and service support. Thus, its attack is also characterized by its persistence and staying power.

### 13-5. Frontages and Depths

The tank division in the first echelon of the army normally is assigned a frontage of 12—15 kilometers in a main attack and 25—30 kilometers in a secondary attack. However, its attack zone usually is 12—15 kilometers regardless of its frontage. In breakthrough operations its attack zone is about 12 kilometers. Once through the enemy defenses, the width of the attack zone may be extended to 20—25 kilometers depending on the terrain and the enemy strength.

### 13-6. Movement to Contact

*a.* The division is assigned a zone in which it advances in multiple columns 4—6 kilometers apart on a 15-kilometer front. Organization of the march is normally based on the possibility of contact with the enemy at any time and from any direction. The approach march is conducted by two tank regiments abreast, each advancing in two tank columns. Where possible, separate paths are followed by wheeled and tracked vehicles in each column, with tracked vehicles normally moving off roads.

*b.* An advanced guard, normally consisting of a reinforced motorized rifle battalion, is normally sent out by each lead regiment. The advanced guard overcomes local opposition or, if possible, bypasses it and still keeps the main body from being forced to deploy. Every effort is made to advance as far as possible before deployment.

*c.* The flanks of the zone of advance are protected by supporting aircraft and flank guards strong in tanks and air defense artillery. The flank guards, operating at approximately 3 kilometers from each echelon, may move over lateral routes to occupy stationary posts during the passage of the column, and then join the tail of the column. As required, new flank guards are assigned from forces organic to the column.

*d.* The tank division may employ tank-infantry teams, or the division reconnaissance battalion, as the division reconnaissance screen up to 100 kilometers forward of the main body of the advanced guard. Normally they bypass encountered enemy forces, where possible, report their location, and continue to advance.

*e.* Control measures used in the advance include routes of march or zones of advance, phase lines, line of deployment, and an assault line. Whenever possible, tanks are carried on wheeled transports until enemy contact is imminent.

*f.* CBR reconnaissance is continuous by all elements. Deployment of columns only takes place when necessary to overcome resistance that is holding up the advance and cannot be bypassed. The second echelon follows in dispersed battalion columns at a distance of up to 20 kilometers.

### 13–7. Attack Formation

*a.* The tank division usually attacks in two echelons. The first echelon usually will consist of two medium tank regiments reinforced. It may consist of a medium tank regiment and the motorized rifle regiment reinforced. The second echelon will consist of the heavy tank regiment and the remaining medium tank regiment and/or motorized rifle regiment. No tank reserves as such are retained by the tank division commander.

*b.* The tank division may organize combat teams based on the two medium tank regiments by attaching to each a motorized rifle battalion and a heavy tank battalion. It may also organize combat teams around the motorized rifle regiment and the heavy tank regiment if appropriate to the situation. Attachments are made one way; the required reinforcements usually come from second-echelon units, and cross-attachments are not normal.

### 13–8. Conduct of the Attack

*a.* Maneuver elements of the tank division normally attack from an approach march formation. The tank division can rapidly concentrate its power, deal with the problem, and quickly disperse. The attack position normally is 3 to 5 kilometers from the line of departure. Primary attention is devoted to uninterrupted movement of the two regimental first-echelon battalions from regimental column through the successive stages of deployment to a simultaneous assault by the entire first echelon. Great care is taken to insure that speed and routes of movement are synchronized toward this end. Whenever necessary, extensive engineer effort is devoted to preparing routes of movement and breaching obstacles to insure the unimpeded advance.

*b.* After deploying for combat, the immediate mission is to penetrate the enemy defenses to a depth of 12—15 kilometers to destroy the tactical reserves. Primarily the offense will be a series of meeting engagements, or attacks from the march by first echelon troops who bypass strong resistance, roll over hasty defenses, and rush on to the objective, leaving mopping up operations to second echelon troops. Only when the terrain, enemy dispositions, or time consideration so dictate will there be a coordinated deliberate attack against prepared defenses.

*c.* When the forward defenses are passed, attacks are made on the flanks and rear of enemy positions wherever possible. Moving rapidly, the tank division overruns and destroys isolated enemy groups. If resistance is too great, the assault is broken off, containing forces are left to await the arrival of motorized rifle units, and the tank forces move on. Crossroads, bridges, and other terrain features that will result in cutting off enemy forces are seized. Enemy command posts and logistical installations are overrun, weapons depots are seized and lines of communication are severed as deep in the enemy rear as possible. Every effort is made to retain the initiative and maintain the impetus of the attack. The tank division concentrates on rapid slashing attacks, and leaves the destruction of strong centers of resistance to the motorized rifle divisions. If the enemy commits sizable reserves, the tank division blocks them with motorized rifle forces or by requesting nuclear fires and continues the advance. In the exploitation phase, operations of the tank division are characterized as a series of meeting engagements.

*d.* A tank division in the second-echelon would normally be employed in a similar manner after it is committed. The division is assigned a line of commitment which it should reach at the same time as the first-echelon assault divisions. The main body moves to the departure area in a dispersed formation, arriving about one hour after the assault has begun. At this point, division artillery which has been supporting the attack reverts to division control. The division deploys at the line of commitment and enters combat through a gap between the first echelon divisions or from an

exposed flank. Usually attacking from the march, the tank division attempts to penetrate the enemy's second defense zone. When a counterattack by enemy reserves is anticipated, the tank division will be assigned the mission of destroying these forces; it will normally occupy an area favorable for defense, with minimum forces deployed to halt the counterattack and the bulk of forces maneuvering to destroy the enemy from the flank or rear.

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 13-9. Employment of the Tank Division

*a.* Aggressor doctrine on the employment of tanks has recently undergone substantial revisions. Aggressor still prefers to employ antitank weapons against tanks but is no longer reluctant to engage in tank versus tank combat. Aggressor has also integrated the use of tanks into his artillery fires. For this purpose tanks are deployed on reverse slopes where they employ indirect fire at long ranges. Maximum advantage is taken of the tank's mobility to shift firing points and evade detection by enemy target acquisition means.

*b.* The tank division is considered primarily as an offensive unit, and in circumstances where it is forced to assume the defense, attempts will be made to relieve it with a motorized rifle division. The tank division is normally employed in a counterattack role during the defense, and is usually located in or behind the area of the second echelon forces. Such a mission is offensive in nature, and the tank division will be employed in a manner similar to that discussed in paragraphs 13-4 through 13-8.

*c.* The tank division is prepared to conduct a defense if required to gain time to mass necessary forces to continue the offense, to consolidate captured positions, or to repel enemy ground attacks. In this case, the tank division may be employed in a first-echelon role, or be charged with the defense of the second defense belt. As a first echelon force, the division would be assigned the defense of the most vital sector, or of that sector where an armor-heavy enemy attack is expected. As a second-echelon force, the tank division would prepare defensive positions but would remain in dispersed assembly areas to the rear from which it could move rapidly to counterattack or occupy these positions as required to defend the second defense belt.

### 13-10. Organization of the Defense

*a.* The tank division in the first echelon will normally be assigned to defend a zone 20—30 kilometers wide. The depth of the defense zone will be 12—18 kilometers. The tank division normally defends in two echelons in a manner similar to the motorized rifle division. On an extended front, the division may defend with only one echelon and reserve.

*b.* The first echelon usually consists of the two medium tank regiments, each reinforced with up to a battalion of infantry from the motorized rifle regiment. Forces in this echelon defend in battalion defense positions similar to motorized rifle defense positions except that they are generally smaller.

*c.* The heavy tank regiment usually constitutes the second echelon; however, it does not occupy battalion defense areas and is used to execute counterattacks or repel enemy tanks. It may also be employed in the first echelon.

*d.* The motorized rifle regiment may be employed as the commander's contingency force and held in reserve. It is used primarily to reinforce and support the defense of the first echelon. However, in some cases it too may be employed intact in the first echelon and assigned an independent sector.

*e.* The division will organize its defense within the limits of its assigned zone normally with one forward position, and one or more subsequent positions. If efforts are to be concentrated to holding the first positions, the division will attempt to repel the enemy forward of the position, or eject him through counterattacks if he penetrates the position. If planning has been directed to holding subsequent positions, the division will employ a mobile defense in its zone. In either case, subordinate units are expected to defend in position until they receive further orders. Unauthorized withdrawals are strictly prohibited. In cases where the mission requires that the main effort be made to hold the first defensive zone, a security zone will be established by the division. Reconnaissance and covering forces, which will be armor-heavy, seek out the enemy and maintain contact forward of the security zone. Tank ambushes, patrolling and observation are organized in front of the defense zone, in the depths of the defense, and also in gaps or on the flanks.

*f.* Normal fire support is organized with artillery, air defense, and air support. Antitank defense forms the basis for the defensive system. Antitank strongpoints are organized at all echelons, and consist of antitank guns, rocket launchers, tanks, flamethrowers, and obstacles. The division antitank areas are dispersed laterally and in depth. Antitank obstacles are organized in the gaps and are covered by antitank artillery, mortar and small arms fire. To complete the antitank system, the division commander employs engineer mobile obstacle detachments, air strikes, roving antitank artillery, and a warning system.

*g.* The concept of the defense is based on battalion defense areas, which consist of company strongpoints organized for all around defense. Gaps between the company strongpoints within battalion defense areas (up to 2 kilometers is permitted) are covered by obstacles, ambush sites, artillery and mortar fire. The battalion is reinforced with infantry.

## 13-11. *Conduct of the Defense*

*a.* During the defense, the tank division may be employed in delaying actions, defense of the main or secondary defense zone, or in a counterattack. In all these defensive situations, the division conducts a stubborn defense while always maintaining an aggressive posture, constantly attempting to seize the initiative. The tank division inflicts maximum punishment on the enemy at all times, and does not give up territory unless forced to do so.

*b.* As the enemy approaches the defense, he is engaged by the security forces. The security forces attempt to deceive the enemy as to the exact location of the defense, and to cause the enemy to deploy early. On order the security forces withdraw, and the enemy is engaged by the front line units as far forward as possible from the main defense zone. Violent resistance is emphasized at all times.

*c.* As the enemy closes into assembly areas or starts to deploy for combat, the area commander may order a counter-preparation to be fired to disrupt enemy attack preparations. The tank division's role in the counter-preparation may be confined to participation in the artillery barrage or the use of indirect tank fires. Another tactic that can be employed is the use of the reconnaissance in force or limited objective attacks. The tank division may be assigned to control the reconnaissance in force, or to conduct tank-heavy attacks against the enemy forces that have suffered the most damage from the counter-preparation.

*d.* The defense is conducted based on holding assigned defense areas throughout the main defense zone. When the assault is launched, defensive fires reach their maximum intensity and are concentrated on destroying the attacking tanks. Fires are directed at the most dangerous enemy grouping, and the division commander may move up tanks and artillery from the depths of the defenses or from areas not under attack. While the tanks attempt to destroy the enemy forces, attached infantry are committed to destroying the attacking infantry.

*e.* If the enemy succeeds in penetrating the defensive area, the division commander institutes measures to halt the progress of the attack, destroy those forces which have effected the penetration, and restore the defensive positions. Forces from the second echelon and reserves are moved to the most threatened sectors, and elements in the main defensive area are regrouped in anticipation of a counterattack. Where the enemy possesses a superiority of force, the division will continue to defend instead of counterattacking, attempting to create favorable conditions for a counterattack by higher headquarters.

## 13-12. *The Counterattack*

*a.* The peak defensive intensity is reached at the time of the counterattack, which may be conducted at any level with approval of the higher commander. Counterattacks in the main defensive zone are launched only by battalion and larger units, and are directed against penetrations which have been successfully contained. The striking force for the tank division would consist of the heavy tank regiment, which would counterattack from the march in an attempt to hit the enemy flank or rear before he can consolidate his gains. Timing of the counterattack is critical, since the enemy must be caught before he can establish his own defense. The objective of the counterattack is to seal off the penetration and destroy the encircled enemy forces. The containing forces support the counterattack with fire, and they may also assault the enemy from their defensive positions.

*b.* When the tank division is assigned the role of the army's counterattack force, it employs tactics similar to those discussed under offensive operations. The tank division counterattacks with all available forces, and avoids piecemeal action. The counterattack would nor-

mally be launched in two echelons, if adequate maneuver space is available. The heavy tank regiment would be in the first echelon, and would strike at the base of the enemy penetration.

*c.* Upon successful execution of the counterattack, defenses are reestablished in anticipation of successive attacks by the enemy. If favorable conditions exist, the division takes the necessary steps to prepare for resumption of the offense. If the counterattack is unsuccessful or if no counterattack is launched, troops are required to defend in place until further orders are received.

## 13–13. Withdrawal

*a.* Withdrawal is a two-step process (disengagement and retirement) conducted in a concealed, well-organized fashion. Withdrawal is conducted only on order and usually occurs at night, although a daylight withdrawal may be conducted if required.

*b.* The tank division may be assigned to cover the withdrawal of the combined arms army, but normally it withdraws with the main body of the army. A rear guard, normally a reinforced medium tank regiment, is the first unit to withdraw from the front lines; it moves to and occupies a delaying position to the rear. The main body withdraws through the rear guard, and then moves to the division's next assigned position. A covering force composed of small tank units protects the withdrawal of both the rear guard and the main body. It remains in place for a designated period of time, then joins the rear guard. The rear guard continues to defend in successive delaying positions for a specified period of time.

*c.* After disengaging, the main body deploys into march columns and retires to the next defensive position. The main body may be deployed to attack an enemy force which is attempting to cut off its route of withdrawal. In this case, heavy tank units would attack from the march, supported by medium tanks, infantry, artillery, and air.

# CHAPTER 14
# THE MOTORIZED RIFLE REGIMENT

## Section I. GENERAL

### 14–1. Organization

The motorized rifle regiment (fig 14–1) contains organic rifle, tank, artillery, engineer, signal, chemical and other necessary service elements to make it an organization capable of functioning under nuclear conditions. It is 100 percent mobile and equipped with sufficient amount of motorized rifle transporters to carry all combat and combat support personnel and equipment of the unit. Personnel, weapons and equipment of the motorized rifle regiment are shown at figure 14–2.

### 14–2. Regimental Artillery, Motorized Rifle Regiment

Units of the regimental artillery (fig 14–3) provide fire support for the regiment. These units include mortar, antitank (including guided missile), and air defense artillery elements. Regimental artillery personnel, weapons and equipment are shown at figure 14–4.




Note 1: Same organization as tank battalion, tank regiment.

Note 2: Scout platoon, same as found in the Scout Company, reconnaissance battalion.

*Figure 14–1. Organization—motorized rifle regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Mdm Tk - THORN | AMTK - THUNDER | Tk Recov Veh | MRT | 85mm (ATAP) | 57mm (ATAP) | RIPPER | 82mm Rcl Gun | 120mm Mort | 82mm Mort | ROVER (SAM5) | ROGUE (SAM6) | 57mm AD Gun (Dual)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Quad)(SP) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual)(SP) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr | GRIM | GRIEF | CALLOUS | TRUCK |
| HHC | 22 | 152 | 174 | | | | 7 | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | | 6 | 6 | 2 | | | 12 |
| Hq Sec | (14) | (28) | (42) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Engr Plat | (1) | (23) | (24) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) | (3) | | | | (2) |
| Sig Plat | (1) | (29) | (30) | | | | (4) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | | | (3) |
| Scty Plat | (1) | (33) | (34) | | | | (2) | | | | | | | | | | | (2) | | (3) | (3) | | | | |
| Med Plat | (3) | (14) | (17) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| Cml Plat | (2) | (25) | (27) | | | | (1) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| Mtr Rfl Bn (3) | 39 | 499 | 538 | | | | 48 | | 3 | | 3 | | 6 | | 36 | | | 2 | 18 | 27 | 27 | | 1 | | 17 |
| Mdm Tk Bn | 26 | 179 | 205 | 31 | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | | 36 | | | | | | | | | | 11 |
| Regt Arty | 32 | 296 | 328 | | | | 15 | 6 | | 6 | | 6 | | 4 | 36 | 6 | 6 | | | | | | | 1 | 20 |
| Scout Plat | 1 | 27 | 28 | | 3 | | 2 | | | | | | | | | | | | | 2 | 2 | | | | |
| Svc Co | 7 | 94 | 101 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | 30 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (6) | (8) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Mt Plat | (3) | (57) | (60) | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (25) |
| Hq Sec | [1] | [7] | [8] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [1] |
| MT Sec (2) | [1] | [25] | [26] | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [12] |
| Maint Plat | (2) | (31) | (33) | | | 1 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| Total | 205 | 2245 | 2450 | 31 | 3 | 2 | 170 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 9 | 6 | 18 | 4 | 180 | 6 | 6 | 8 | 54 | 89 | 89 | 2 | 3 | 1 | 124 |

*Figure 14-2. Personnel, weapons and equipment—motorized rifle regiment.*




*Figure 14-3. Organization—regimental artillery, motorized rifle regiment.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | MRT | 85mm (ATAP) | RIPPER | ROVER (SAM 5) | ROGUE (SAM 6) | 120mm Mort | 57mm AD Gun (Dual) (SP) | 14.5mm AD MG(Quad)(SP) | CALLOUS | TRUCK |
| H & S Btry | 8 | 40 | 48 | | | | | | | | | | 9 |
| AT Gun Btry | 5 | 63 | 68 | 7 | 6 | | | | | | | | 2 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (6) | (8) | (1) | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| AT Gun Plat (3) | (1) | (19) | (20) | (2) | (2) | | | | | | | | |
| ATGM Btry | 4 | 25 | 29 | | | 6 | | | | | | | 2 |
| Hq Sec | (1) | (4) | (5) | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| ATGM Plat (3) | (1) | (7) | (8) | | | (2) | | | | | | | |
| Mort Btry | 5 | 55 | 60 | 6 | | | | | 6 | | | | 3 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (4) | (6) | | | | | | | | | | (3) |
| Mort Plat (3) | (1) | (17) | (18) | (2) | | | | | (2) | | | | |
| AD Gun/MSL BTRY | 5 | 59 | 64 | 2 | | | 4 | | | 6 | | 1 | 8 |
| Hq Sec | (1) | (3) | (4) | (1) | | | | | | | | (1) | (1) |
| AD Gun Plat (3) | (1) | (13) | (14) | | | | | | | (2) | | | (2) |
| AD MSL PLAT | (1) | (17) | (18) | (1) | | | (4) | | | | | | (1) |
| AD MG/MSL BTRY | 5 | 54 | 59 | | | | | 36 | | | 6 | | 8 |
| Hq Sec | (1) | (3) | (4) | | | | | | | | | | |
| AD MG Plat (3) | (1) | (13) | (14) | | | | | | | | (2) | | |
| AD MSL PLAT | (1) | (12) | (13) | | | | | (36) | | | | | (1) |
| Total | 32 | 296 | 328 | 15 | 6 | 6 | 4 | 36 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | 32 |

*Figure 14-4. Personnel, weapons and equipment—regimental artillery motorized rifle regiment.*

## Section II. THE OFFENSE

### 14-3. Mission

The mission of a motorized rifle regiment in the first echelon of the division is to break through the enemy forward defenses to at least the depth of the enemy light artillery positions. When this is done, the regiment continues the attack against the enemy division reserves. The regiment in the attack normally is supported by artillery, tanks, SP guns, and engineer troops. The amount and type of supporting units depend on the nature of the terrain and the expected enemy resistance. In an attack against a strong enemy, the regimental artillery may be supported by as many as four field artillery battalions as well as additional antitank and air defense artillery units and engineers.

### 14-4. Attack Formation

The attack formation of the reinforced regiment is determined after consideration of the mission, terrain, character of enemy defenses, and means available. Normally, the regiment attacks in two echelons. The first echelon consists of two motorized rifle battalions, each of which is usually reinforced with a company of tanks from the regiment's medium tank battalion. The regimental second echelon usually is a motorized rifle battalion, which may or may not be reinforced with tanks. The second echelon is used to reinforce the first echelon, to outflank the enemy defenses, and to mop up bypassed resistance, and to block counterattacks from the flanks. It usually follows the first echelon by 3—6 kilometers and is usually committed from the march. The remaining tank company of the tank battalion is the regiment's tank reserve, and it may be reinforced with antitank weapons from the antitank battery of the regimental artillery.

### 14-5. Frontages and Depths

A regiment normally has a frontage of 10—15 kilometers if the division is making a secondary attack. If the division is making the army's effort or is in the first echelon of the army group main effort, the regiment normally has a frontage of 5—8 kilometers. The actual attack zone of the regiment is about 4 kilometers wide within its assigned frontage. The depth of the attack formation of the regiment when fully deployed is about 15 kilometers.

### 14-6. Movement to Contact

*a.* When marching independently, the regiment normally sends out an advance guard of reinforced battalion strength and a rear guard of reinforced company strength. Reconnaissance platoons normally are employed ahead of the leading battalion. The distance from the head of the main body to the rear of the advance guard may be up to 30 kilometers. Advance, rear, and flank guards send out advance parties which, in turn, send out points. A regiment marching as part of the main body of a division normally is assigned one or more routes of march. It normally sends out local security only, but will send out flank security if on the flank of the division.

*b.* The regiment acting as the advance, flank, or rear guard of a larger force is organized for the march in the same manner as though it were marching independently.

*c.* Regimental trains normally march in separate columns between the main body and the rear guard. They may also march separately under division control.

### 14-7. Conduct of the Attack

*a.* The motorized rifle regiment in the attack, as part of the motorized rifle division's first echelon, is given the mission to breakthrough to the enemy light artillery positions and continue the attack against enemy division reserves. The regimental commander uses the fire and maneuver capabilities of battalions and supporting units to maintain the momentum of the attack.

*b.* Attack positions for the battalions are selected by the regimental commander behind the last available terrain feature that can be reached without exposure to hostile observation and small arms fire. These positions may be at varying distances from the line of contact. The advance is so timed that all first-echelon battalions cross the line of departure at approximately the same time.

*c.* Security is organized at the regimental echelon. Antitank units in reserve prepare to protect the flanks of the pursuing units against armored counterattacks. Flank and rear security is provided by motorized rifle elements. Rear security groups keep the lines of communications free of enemy stragglers.

*d.* When the attack is launched, enemy strongpoints that cannot be immediately reduced are bypassed. Small elements are detached from the battalions of the first echelon to block these strongpoints and contain them, pending the commitment of the second echelon. The first-echelon battalions, supported by the regimental artillery, attempt to penetrate the enemy defenses and create gaps between the positions to allow for the employment of exploitation forces.

*e.* Should a weak point in the enemy defenses develop, the second echelon is promptly committed to encircle the enemy and destroy him. The second echelon is also used to reinforce the first echelon should the advance begin to slow down, to outflank enemy defenses, and to block counterattacks from the flanks. Actions of the battalions are coordinated by changes of direction where necessary and by readjustment in supporting artillery fires. During this phase, the regimental commander is particularly alert for enemy counterattacks from the flanks supported by armor. Regimental antitank reserves are used to counter such threats. Hasty antitank minefields are used to block approaches favorable to the enemy. When the enemy armor threat no longer exists, the antitank mines are recovered and moved forward by assigned engineers assisted by motorized rifle elements.

*f.* The tank battalion is the commander's tank reserve and is committed to exploit penetrations. If its companies have been placed under the operational control of the motorized rifle battalions and the regimental commander desires to commit his tanks in mass, he will direct the motorized rifle battalions to release them to the control of the parent battalion. These tanks attempt to drive through and overrun enemy positions immediately in front of the battalion positions, enabling the motorized rifle units to continue the assault.

*g.* The motorized rifle regiment begins pursuit operations at the first opportunity. During the initial phase, the regiment attempts to prevent the enemy from breaking contact and strives to keep up the pressure. Small units are employed to infiltrate the enemy area to set up road blocks and, in general, to delay and harass the retreating enemy. Motorized rifle columns, reinforced with tanks and artillery, are employed in coordination with tank units in the tasks of cutting up and destroying enemy columns.

*h.* Tank units are employed to race ahead of the retreating enemy columns and block their withdrawal routes; to attack withdrawing columns from the flanks; to make rapid surprise thrusts into the enemy rear and create panic, destroy supplies, rupture communications, and attack command posts. Strong reserves of tanks, with SP artillery and motorized rifle elements, are held in readiness to engage enemy reserves.

## 14–8. Regimental Artillery Group

*a.* To reinforce the regimental artillery, the division normally forms regimental artillery groups from artillery organic or attached to the division. Regimental artillery is not included in these groups, which normally consist of light artillery and heavy mortar or rocket launcher units.

*b.* Regimental artillery groups and mortar units are attached to motorized rifle regiments. They interdict defiles on the lines of retreat to cut off the enemy and prevent the arrival of reinforcements. As the pursuit develops, they advance by bounds so that one echelon is in position to fire while the other displaces. Attached nuclear delivery systems, if released by army, are retained under division control. Supporting air units interdict bottlenecks on the routes of retreat with nuclear and nonnuclear (to include chemical and biological) fires, keep the enemy under constant surveillance and attack, reconnoiter for advancing hostile reinforcements, and protect the pursuing units from hostile air attack.

## 14–9. Regimental Support Units

*a. Mortar Battery.*

(1) The regimental attack order normally prescribes general location of firing positions, sequence of firing missions, time to open fire, and communication coordination with motorized rifle and tank units. Target distribution and displacement plans are prepared by the regimental artillery commander in coordination with the supporting artillery. After participation in the preparation, the mortar battery is assigned a general support mission. As the attack develops, particularly during the second phase, one mortar platoon may be detached to each first-echelon battalion. One platoon usually is retained under regimental control for support of the second echelon when committed.

(2) Mortars of the regiment in the second echelon of the motorized rifle division may be employed to support the initial phases of the attack on the first echelon. These mortars revert

to control of their regiment when the regiment is committed.

*b. Air Defense Artillery Batteries.* The 57mm gun battery is normally used to protect the regimental artillery. The 14.5mm machinegun battery is used to protect rifle units. Firing positions of the 14.5mm machinegun battery are close behind the supported units. When the enemy air threat is slight, both batteries are used for ground support fires. In this case platoons of both batteries are placed in direct support of rifle battalions. The AD missile platoon of the AD Gun/Missile Battery (57mm) is used to augment the battery's weapons for protection of the regimental artillery, as well as to protect the regimental headquarters. The ROVER launchers may also be attached to the first echelon battalions to augment the battalion's air defense capability. The AD missile platoon of the AD MG/Missile Battery, which is equipped with ROGUE missiles, is used in a close support role to protect the displaced elements of the battery, and the AD Gun/Missile Battery. The platoon may also be placed in support of the forward battalions, to provide increased air defense capability and supplement the ROGUE weapons found in the battalion's support battery.

*c. Antitank Battery.* The six 85mm SP guns of this battery normally are attached to the battalions of the first echelon. The number of guns attached to the battalion depends on which part of the regimental sector is considered most vulnerable to enemy armor. Normally, at least two antitank guns are kept in a regimental antitank reserve. Antitank guns follow close behind the battalions to which they are attached. They displace to successive firing positions for direct fire at enemy tanks and SP guns. Antitank guns are also used for direct fire on enemy strongpoints.

*d. Antitank Guided Missile (ATGM) Battery.* Two RIPPER equipped platoons normally are attached to the battalions of the first echelon, and one is held in the regimental antitank reserve.

*e. Reconnaissance Platoon.* Under the operational control of the regimental intelligence officer, this platoon is used to maintain contact with the enemy, to provide flank security, and to carry out specialized reconnaissance missions.

## Section III. THE DEFENSE

### 14–10. Organization for Defense

*a.* The first-echelon motorized rifle regiment usually is assigned to defend a zone approximately 10 to 15 kilometers wide and from 8 to 10 kilometers deep. The defense is organized in two echelons with two reinforced motorized rifle battalions in the first echelon and a reinforced motorized rifle battalion in the second. A regimental artillery group, consisting of two or more light artillery battalions and a multiple-rocket launcher battalion, is formed from division assets and placed in support of a first-echelon regiment; this artillery group takes the designation of the regiment which it is supporting.

*b.* The first-echelon motorized rifle battalions defend the forward 4 kilometers of the regimental zone. The third motorized rifle battalion establishes a battalion defense area in the rear of the regimental defense zone. This defensive area is approximately 5 kilometers wide and from 3 to 5 kilometers deep; it is located 5 to 7 kilometers from the forward trace of the main defense belt.

*c.* The regimental artillery group prepares primary, alternate, and night firing positions for each battery within the regimental second-echelon defense zone. The platoons of the regiment's 57mm air defense gun battery are deployed to protect the batteries of the regimental artillery group.

*d.* The motorized rifle regiment's reserve force, consisting of the regimental tank battalion and an 85mm antitank gun platoon from the regiment's antitank gun battery, are located in the vicinity of the second-echelon battalion.

*e.* The regimental command post is located with the second-echelon battalion and is protected by the security platoon of regimental headquarters company.

### 14–11. Conduct of the Defense

*a.* The combat outposts keep the enemy under continuous surveillance and a constant volume of long-range fires. Action is taken to deceive the enemy as to the location of the main defense belt and to cause him to mass his forces. The combat outpost line holds its positions as long as possible without becoming closely engaged with the enemy.

*b.* The motorized rifle regiment begins the defense when the enemy makes contact with the

security outposts. As hostile elements move within range, security outposts take them under fire with mortars, small arms, machineguns, tanks, and antitank weapons. Artillery places fire on the advancing enemy and covers the withdrawal of the security outposts as the latter are forced back.

(1) Hostile penetrations of the forward positions of battalion defense areas are blocked by the second echelon.

(2) Small mobile tank forces are employed by the regiment to execute local counterattacks and reduce penetrations of the first-echelon positions.

(3) Penetrations of the regimental sectors are counterattacked by the divisional counterattack force (usually the divisional reserve consisting of the medium tank regiment, antitank weapons and other artillery). If these counterattacks fail to stop the enemy advance, threatened units may withdraw to alternate defense areas.

# CHAPTER 15
# THE MEDIUM AND HEAVY TANK REGIMENT

## Section I. GENERAL

### 15–1. Organization of Tank Regiments

There are two types of Aggressor tank regiments; the medium tank regiment and the heavy tank regiment. They are the main combat elements of the tank division. Both types are organized in a similar manner. The medium tank regiment is organic to both the motorized rifle division and the tank division. It is equipped with the medium tank called THORN. The heavy tank regiment is always organic to the tank army, and will sometimes be found in the tank division. Its organization, being similar to that of a medium tank regiment, is shown as a typical tank regiment in figure 15–1. Personnel, weapons, and equipment are shown in figure 15–2.

### 15–2. Missions and Methods of Employment

The missions and methods of employment will be discussed separately in that missions are slightly different for both types of tank regiments when used in the motorized rifle division as opposed to the tank division.




Note: Same organization as units of motorized rifle regiment, if the situation demands.

*Figure 15–1. Organization—tank regiment—tank and motorized rifle divisions.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Tank (Mdm or (HVY) | AMTK (Thunder) | Tk Recov Veh | MRT | ROVER (SAM 5) | ROGUE (SAM 6) | 57mm AD Gun(Dual)(SP) | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr | CALLOUS | TRUCK |
| HHC | 15 | 109 | 124 | 2 | | | 6 | | | | 3 | 3 | | 11 |
| Hq Sec | (10) | (17) | (27) | (2) | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Engr Plat | (1) | (23) | (24) | | | | | | | | (3) | (3) | | (2) |
| Sig Plat | (1) | (25) | (26) | | | | (4) | | | | | | | (2) |
| Trf Con Plat | (1) | (19) | (20) | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Cml Plat | (2) | (25) | (27) | | | | (2) | | | | | | | (3) |
| Tank Bn (3) | 26 | 179 | 205 | 31 | | 1 | 2 | | | | | | | 11 |
| Regt Arty* | (32) | (296) | (328) | | | | (15) | (4) | (36) | | | | (1) | (20) |
| AD Gun/MSL BTRY | 5 | 59 | 64 | | | | 6 | (16) | 36 | 12 | | | 1 | 2 |
| Scout Plat | 1 | 27 | 28 | | 3 | | 2 | | | | 2 | 2 | | |
| Svc Co | 6 | 89 | 95 | | | 2 | | | | | | | | 55 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (6) | (8) | | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Maint Plat | (2) | (31) | (33) | | | (2) | | | | | | | | (3) |
| MT Plat (2) | (1) | (26) | (27) | | | | | | | | | | | (25) |
| Total | 105 | 821 | 926 | 95 | 3 | 5 | 20 | (16) | 36 | 12 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 101 |

*Organization of regiment artillery, same as that of motorized rifle regiment and augments regiment when situation demands it.

*Figure 15-2. Personnel, weapons and equipment—tank regiment, tank and motorized rifle divisions.*

## Section II. THE MEDIUM TANK REGIMENT

### 15-3. Offensive Employment in the Motorized Rifle Division

*a.* The medium tank regiment is the main exploitation force of the motorized rifle division. In that Aggressor doctrine emphasizes the vital role of tanks in nuclear warfare, particularly in overrunning hastily occupied defenses, in the mobile exploitation phase of the offensive, and in the pursuit, the rate of advance of other divisional units is determined by that achieved by the tanks. The speed of the tanks and the comparative invulnerability of tanks to radioactivity increase the suitability of the tank regiment for employment in the exploitation of nuclear strikes and in sustaining the

momentum of the advance by rapid crossing of contaminated areas.

*b.* The medium tank regiment is used to hold tactically important positions until Aggressor rifle units arrive; operate as a forward detachment when reinforced; conduct meeting engagements; envelope flanks; operate in the enemy rear; conduct counterattacks; pursue the enemy; and employ antitank and indirect fires.

*c.* Aggressor doctrine permits the tank regiment to be employed as a first-echelon unit only if enemy tanks are expected to be encountered early and where the mission, terrain, and opposing forces favor its employment. Good tank terrain, a weak enemy, and a high level of use of nuclear weapons favor the use of the tank regiment as part of the breakthrough force to exploit nuclear breakthroughs, for deep penetration, for enveloping movements, and for exploiting gaps in enemy formations. Its mission would be to break through the opposing defenses and continue the advance to the division's objective.

*d.* For a deliberate attack against a prepared enemy defense, the motorized rifle division normally attacks in two echelons, with two motorized rifle regiments in the first, and one in the second echelon. In such an attack the tank regiment reinforced constitutes the division reserve to exploit the initial penetration by the forward motorized rifle units and to develop the attack into the depths of the enemy defense.

*e.* During mobile phases of offensive operations, when the attack from the march or the meeting engagement characterizes the combat action, deployment of forces does not follow a standard pattern. The motorized rifle division normally advances in three or more columns, depending on the width of the division zone and the number of routes available. The attack formation is developed by rapid employment of forces from march columns as the situation requires. In such an advance, the medium tank regiment moves well forward in the division main body in order to facilitate rapid commitment to exploit nuclear strikes or to attack the flanks of an encountered enemy force.

*f.* The division commander organizes his forces to include follow-up echelons and reserves in order to maintain a high tempo of advance, to repel enemy counterattacks, and to provide a force to exploit the offensive success of the first echelon. The reserve is a force withheld initially from an engagement for later commitment at a decisive moment. The division commander organizes this reserve force to include all combat arms (combined arms reserve, tank reserve, antitank reserve, and engineer reserve). The tank reserve consists of the medium tank regiment, less any detachments reinforcing the motorized rifle units, when the regiment is not employed in the first echelon. As the main striking force of the division, the regiment is committed to exploit the initial penetration of motorized rifle regiments by deep thrusts into the depths of the enemy defense.

## 15–4. Defensive Employment in the Motorized Rifle Division

*a.* Normally, the tank regiment is employed in a counterattack role during the defense, and is usually located in or behind the area of the second echelon forces. Such a mission is offensive in nature, and the tank regiment will be employed in a manner similar to that discussed in paragraph 15–3.

*b.* The tank regiment is prepared to conduct a defense if required to gain time to mass necessary forces to continue the offense, to consolidate captured positions, or to repel enemy ground attacks. In this case, the medium tank regiment may be employed in a first echelon role. As a first echelon force, the regiment would be assigned the defense of the most vital sector, or of that sector where an armor-heavy enemy attack is expected.

*c.* Normally, the tank battalions of the motorized rifle regiment are employed to provide tank reinforcements to first-echelon motorized rifle battalions and to constitute a regimental tank reserve. The tank regiment is thus left at the disposal of the division commander to form the main counterattack force of the division's defense system. However, if the terrain does not permit the maneuver of large tank formations, elements of the tank regiment may be subordinated to first-echelon motorized rifle regiments as tank reinforcements.

## 15–5. Offensive Employment in the Tank Division

*a.* The medium tank regiment is normally a first-echelon force of the tank division. By combining its organic heavy firepower with supporting tactical nuclear strikes, conventional artillery fire, and air strikes, the medium tank regiment can rapidly maneuver to accomplish its offensive mission.

*b.* As described in chapter 13, the medium tank regiment organizes for the attack to be

employed as a first-echelon unit where the mission, terrain, and opposing forces favor its employment. Regardless of whether the medium tank regiment attacks in the first-echelon of a large-scale operation or is committed after the forward enemy defenses have been breached, its attack is also characterized by utmost violence and extremely vigorous action.

*c.* In that the medium tank regiment when found in the tank division, has a different mission (as described in chap 13) from that when found in the motorized rifle division, the methods of employment will parallel those of the tank division and the tank army.

### 15-6. Defensive Employment in the Tank Division

*a.* In a defensive posture, the medium tank regiment as a unit in a tank division, may become a first-echelon defensive force and await the development of the situation in order to reassume an offensive role. If the regiment is not in a first-echelon defensive force then it awaits to counterattack, and is disposed well into the second defensive belt and dispersed in order to avoid becoming a lucrative nuclear target. Should the first-echelon defensive belt collapse, a series of counterattacks will be initiated, coordinated with all combat units to include aviation and nuclear strikes. A powerful nonnuclear artillery preparation, tactical air support, and missile support will probably precede the counterattacks if the enemy temporarily delays the continuation of his attack.

*b.* The medium tank regiment as a segment of the counterattack force, receives two missions to perform when the counterattack is executed; immediate and subsequent. The immediate mission may be the destruction of the enemy in front of the second defense belt and the recpature of the third defensive line of the first defense belt. The subsequent mission may be the recapture of the second and first defensive lines. If the counterattack fails or does not at least lead to the recapture of the third defensive line of the first defense belt, then the regiment must disengage, fall back, and seal off the second defense belt until the tank division's reserve can execute a counterblow to overcome the enemy's penetration.

## Section III. THE HEAVY TANK REGIMENT

### 15-7. Offensive Employment in the Tank Army

*a.* The heavy tank regiment as a unit of the tank division serves as the exploitation force. It is committed as soon as a gap of at least 20 kilometers deep is created in the enemy's defenses. Its early commitment is designed to catch the enemy off balance, complete an encirclement of forward enemy forces before they can be reinforced, and exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical fires.

*b.* The heavy tank regiment normally attacks in parallel battalion columns preceded by strong advanced detachments reinforced with artillery and antitank guns. An attack will commence at the termination of short but intense preparation fired by all available air and artillery fires in the area. During the attack, the regiment attempts to maintain its momentum and shock action in driving for the army group objective. Resistance that cannot be overcome rapidly is bypassed. Destruction of encircled enemy forces is left to the motorized rifle units in that the regiment is expected to destroy any threats to the breakthrough area from enemy forces advancing to the relief of the encircled enemy. At the first indication of an enemy withdrawal, the heavy tank regiment starts in pursuit, and the securing of the army group objective is assigned to units within the combined arms army.

### 15-8. Offensive Employment in the Tank Division

*a.* The heavy tank regiment of the tank division is the primary offensive maneuver element with the ground forces and is considered the combined arms army's exploitation force. Its employment is characterized by shock action, mobility, and firepower. It may be employed as part of the first or second echelon, or it may be considered as the army's tank reserve. In either case its mission is to exploit gaps created in the enemy defenses, rapidly penetrate enemy territory, destroy the continuity of the defense, and assist in securing the army's objectives.

*b.* The heavy tank regiment is used to create and maintain shock deep in the enemy rear; prevent or break up the formation of hasty rear defense positions; disrupt enemy command, communications, and logistical installations; and overrun communications centers, airfields, and nuclear weapon launching sites.

*c.* As the tank division's exploitation force, the heavy tank regiment's mission is to exploit gaps created in the enemy defenses caused by the initial thrust of the medium tank regiment. It will destroy or isolate small groups of the

enemy, avoid becoming decisively engaged by bypassing enemy resistance, and destroy the enemy corps reserves. It will attack enemy counterattacks that threaten the breakthrough area. Its operations are directed to destroy the enemy's ability to reconstitute an organized defense or engage in an orderly retrograde movement, and are characterized as a series of meeting engagements. At the first sign of an enemy withdrawal, the heavy tank regiment will initiate pursuit operations designed to divide and destroy the enemy force.

## 15–9. Defensive Employment in the Tank Army

*a.* While the heavy tank regiment is designed to neutralize or destroy the enemy's strategic reserves and to seize the tank army's objective, it is not well suited to static defensive operations. Defensive combat by the heavy tank regiment is avoided whenever possible. Therefore, during a defensive stage, the heavy tank regiment is held in reserve as the tank army's counterattack force.

*b.* For more detail as to the employment, organization for the defense, and conduct of the defense, refer to paragraphs 11–10 through 11–12.

## 15–10. Defensive Employment in the Tank Division

*a.* The heavy tank regiment, when found in the tank division, is considered an offensive unit, and in circumstances where it is forced to assume the defense, attempts will be made to relieve it with a motorized rifle regiment. The heavy tank regiment is normally employed in a counterattack role during the defense, and is usually located in or behind the area of the second-echelon forces. Such a mission is offensive in nature, and the tank division will be employed in a manner similar to that discussed in paragraph 15–8.

*b.* The heavy tank regiment is prepared to conduct a defense if required to gain time to mass necessary forces to continue the offense, to consolidate captured positions, or to repel enemy ground attacks. In this case, the regiment may be employed in a first-echelon role, or be charged with the defense of the second defense belt. For more detail, refer to paragraphs 13–9 through 13–13 for employment, organization for the defense, and conduct of the defense.

# CHAPTER 16
# THE MOTORIZED RIFLE AND TANK BATTALIONS

## Section I. MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION

### 16–1. General

The motorized rifle battalion of the motorized rifle regiment is a completely mobile unit with organic fire support in the form of antitank guns, recoilless guns, air defense machineguns, and mortars. Combat troops of the battalion are transported in motorized rifle transporters (MRT) which are organic to the motorized rifle transport platoon and attached to combat elements for operations. The organization of the




*Figure 16–1. Organization—motorized rifle battalion.*

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | MRT 3, MRT 4* | 57mm (ATAP) | 82mm Rcl Gun | 82mm Mort | ROGUE (SAM 6) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) (SP) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr | GRIEF | TRUCK |
| H & S Co | 10 | 81 | 91 | 48 | | | | | | | | | 1 | 10 |
| Hq Sec | (7) | (9) | (16) | (4*) | | | | | | | | | | (1) |
| Sig Plat | (1) | (13) | (14) | (2) | | | | | | | | | (1) | (1) |
| MRT Plat | (1) | (48) | (49) | (48) | | | | | | | | | (2) | |
| Svc Plat | (1) | (11) | (12) | | | | | | | | | | | (6) |
| Rifle Co (3) | 6 | 105 | 111 | (9) | | | | | | 6 | 9 | 9 | | 1 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (5) | (7) | (1*) | | | | | | | | | | (1) |
| Rifle Plat (3) | (1) | (25) | (26) | | | | | | | | (3) | (3) | | |
| Hq Sec | [1] | [ 1] | [ 2] | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rifle Sqd [3] | | [ 8] | [ 8] | | | | | | | | [1] | [1] | | |
| MG Plat | (1) | (25) | (26) | | | | | | | (6) | | | | |
| Hq Sec | [1] | [1] | [2] | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hv MG Sqd [3] | | [8] | [8] | | | | | | | [2] | | | | |
| Mort Btry | 5 | 43 | 48 | (4) | | | 6 | | | | | | | 2 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (7) | (9) | (1*) | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| Mort Plat (3) | (1) | (12) | (13) | | | | (2) | | | | | | | |
| Spt Btry | 6 | 60 | 66 | (6) | 3 | 3 | | 36 | 2 | | | | | 2 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (3) | (5) | (1*) | | | | | | | | | | (2) |
| AT Gun Plat | (1) | (17) | (18) | [3] | (3) | | | | | | | | | |
| Rcl Gun Plat | (1) | (13) | (14) | [3] | | (3) | | | | | | | | |
| ADMG Plat | (1) | (15) | (16) | | | | | | (2) | | | | | |
| AD MSL Plat | (1) | (12) | (13) | | | | | (36) | | | | | | |
| Total | 39 | 499 | 538 | 48 | | 3 | 6 | 36 | 2 | 18 | 27 | 27 | 1 | 17 |

*Figure 16-2. Personnel, weapons and equipment—motorized rifle battalion.*

motorized rifle battalion is shown in figure 16-1. The personnel, weapons and equipment of a motorized rifle battalion is shown in figure 16-2.

### 16-2. Mission

The mission of the motorized rifle battalion in the regimental first echelon is to break through the enemy forward positions to permit the establishment of a gap that can be exploited. When this is accomplished, the battalion continues the attack as directed either to destroy the enemy or overrun his light artillery. Second echelon battalions reinforce and support the first echelon. The tactics employed are essentially the same as for the first-echelon battalions. Should the situation occur where there is no contact with enemy forces, the mission of the motorized rifle battalion is to conduct successive meeting engagements until adequate information is gathered to provide sufficient intelligence for the planning of an offensive operation.

## Section II. MOTORIZED RIFLE BATTALION IN THE OFFENSE

### 16-3. Organization for the Attack

*a.* The motorized rifle battalion will use one of the following formations in the attack:

(1) Line of companies (one echelon).

(2) Inverted wedge (normally two echelons).

(3) Wedge (variation of the two-echelon formation, used when the enemy is concentrated and a double envelopment is contemplated. This formation is seldom used).

(4) Column of companies (three echelons, usually used in the attack of heavily fortified positions where the shock action of successive waves is desired).

*b.* The battalion normally attacks in two echelons, the first consisting of two of the three motorized rifle companies reinforced by tanks and antitank weapons. The second echelon contains the third motorized rifle company that may be reinforced by tanks. A battalion making a secondary attack normally will have a wider sector than one making the main attack and may use all three companies on line. In this case, a reserve on the order of one motorized rifle platoon may be held out. A tank reserve usually is not retained at battalion.

*c.* Aggressor does not employ the task force or team concept, and thus does not cross-attach infantry and tank platoons. Attachments are made only one way; i.e., tank units to motorized rifle companies or motorized rifle companies to tank companies.

*d.* Recoilless guns and antitank guns of the battalion normally are attached to attacking motorized rifle companies. A section of antitank guns normally is detached from the regiment and is held under battalion control as an antitank reserve. Combat engineer units are attached to motorized rifle companies expecting to encounter minefields or obstacles. Where necessary, these units are equipped with flamethrowers or mine-clearing tanks.

### 16-4. Frontages and Depths

*a.* A battalion making a main effort will have an attack zone 1000-1500 meters wide with a depth of up to 3 kilometers. The second echelon normally is about 800 meters behind the first echelon and follows the company making the main effort. A battalion making a secondary attack will have an attack zone of from 1700-2300 meters. In both cases the attack zone may be the same as or less than the frontage actually assigned the battalion.

*b.* A company normally attacks on a frontage of 500-800 meters and usually attacks with three platoons abreast preceded by the attached tank platoons. The company may echelon its platoons or employ them in a wedge formation if there is a threat to the flank.

*c.* A platoon normally attacks on a frontage of 150-250 meters, with all squads on line. The platoon may echelon its squads or employ them in a wedge formation.

### 16-5. Preparation for the Attack

Within the battalion attack position, the companies are placed, if possible, directly opposite their initial objectives. Supporting weapons occupy positions from which they can support the attack. The mortar battery normally occupies positions not more than 400 meters behind the leading companies. The battalion machineguns and recoilless guns initially occupy positions on the flanks of the battalion or in the gaps between the motorized rifle companies and platoons. Antitank artillery occupies camouflaged firing positions directly behind the battalion, on the flanks, or in the gaps between motorized rifle companies.

## 16-6. Conduct of the Attack

*a. General.*

(1) The motorized rifle battalion conducts the attack as a part of the motorized rifle regiment, or, when so attached, as part of the tank regiment. It may be in the first or second echelon, or it may be detached and employed as an advance guard (suitably reinforced), or it may also be employed as part of the division reserve.

(2) Although a motorized rifle battalion may participate in any of the basic maneuvers employed by Aggressor, the battalion itself will conduct either a penetration or an envelopment. The objective in either case is to get into the enemy's rear areas and destroy the continuity of the defense.

(3) Motorized rifle troops remain mounted until forced out of their motorized rifle transporters (MRTs), thereafter, the MRTs follow and support the assault with machinegun fire, usually from defilade positions. A company dismounts as a unit, except in rare cases such as an advanced guard action where one or two platoons will remain mounted to conduct an envelopment.

(4) Aggressor uses fire and maneuver within the maneuvering force when under heavy defensive fire, but prefers to advance rapidly and simultaneously. Tanks preferably fire while moving, or halt for 4–8 seconds to fire a single round. A tank platoon or company may occupy firing positions and concentrate its fire on a single tank or antitank weapon delaying the advance. Infantry elements rely primarily on mortar and artillery fire to suppress defensive fires during their movement to the final coordination line, and use accompanying direct fire weapons to reduce targets of opportunity.

(5) The motorized rifle battalion has no organic reconnaissance element. Battle reconnaissance patrols are organized and dispatched by companies, either on their own initiative or on the battalion commander's orders.

(*a*) Whenever companies are not in contact, battalions dispatch battle reconnaissance patrols to determine enemy locations, strength, and activities. For example, battalions will send patrols to the front and flanks of march columns and to open flanks during attacks. These patrols usually consist of no more than a squad of infantry, and engineer or chemical personnel.

(*b*) Companies dispatch battle reconnaissance patrols whenever committed to action, beginning with reconnaissance of approaches to enemy defensive positions and the positions themselves, and continuing throughout the attack. Primary objectives are information of terrain trafficability, covered and concealed routes of approach, and location of enemy weapons. Patrols range from two men to the maximum size given above.

(6) Aggressor stresses speed and shock action in the attack and does not emphasize fire and maneuver. Primary emphasis is placed on penetrating enemy defenses so as to carry the battle to the enemy rear, rather than seizing and consolidating on terrain objectives. The assault will not necessarily be directed to the key defensive terrain; instead the battalion attempts to push through weakly defended areas and leaves the capture of strongpoints and key terrain to succeeding echelons. Aggressor commanders concern themselves less with the survival of their units than with rapidly opening holes through each defense line they encounter. Aggressor considers that exploitation of these holes will benefit the force sufficiently to offset the increased risk of losing entire units through attrition or capture. Aggressor believes that these tactics will so disrupt a prepared defense that he will be able to penetrate 12–15 kilometers in 6–15 hours, and maintain an average rate of advance of 3–4 kilometers per hour thereafter.

(7) If the motorized rifle battalion is attacking as part of a large-scale offensive, a preparation normally precedes the assault. In other planned assaults a 15–20 minute artillery and mortar preparation normally will be fired before an attack is launched. Nuclear fires may be included in the preparation. If speed, shock effect, or surprise is delayed or lost by waiting for the preparation, Aggressor forces can be expected to attack without the normal preparatory fires.

(8) Aggressor habitually attaches one or two tank companies to a motorized rifle battalion, which further attaches tank companies or platoons to motorized rifle companies. If more than one tank company is attached to a battalion, a full tank company will be attached to at least one of the first-echelon companies. Not more than one platoon of tanks will be attached to a second-echelon motorized rifle company. Tank platoons are seldom broken up, and each habitually works with one motorized rifle company. Motorized rifle elements, whether mounted or dismounted, normally follow the tanks, except in wooded terrain where they will precede the tanks. Tanks lead the assault.

*b. Attack Against a Linear Defense.* Movement to the Final Coordination Line.

(1) Approach march formations are assumed on leaving final assembly areas. Companies may remain in a column of platoons beyond this point if terrain dictates, if troops are concealed from enemy observation, and if reconnaissance elements are protecting the advance from surprise. Normally, companies move out in line of platoon columns and later deploy to line formation when necessary to bring weapons into action or to reduce casualties. Tank platoons may deploy at different points than motorized rifle platoons, either earlier because they have longer range fire capabilities, or later because advance is canalized by terrain or minefields. Where necessary, one lane through a minefield usually is prepared for each tank platoon before the attack begins; in attacks from march column or other cases where lanes have not been cleared, each platoon may be preceded by a mine-clearing tank.

(2) Tank movement in this phase of the attack is governed by vulnerability. If antitank fire is accurate and effective, Aggressor will not expose tanks unnecessarily to antitank fire by moving them at the speed of dismounted infantry. When motorized rifle elements cannot remain in their MRTs because of enemy fire or the lack of any suitable dismount point nearer the enemy, the tanks continue to move at a maximum rate and the infantry is allowed to fall behind, even as much as 600 meters. Where a covered position exists within assault range of the enemy, tanks will wait there for the infantry. Rarely, tanks may even cross the line of departure after the infantry and join up with it at the final coordination line. In all possible cases tanks will lead the assault, even if considerable engineer work is required to provide paths through natural or artificial obstacles.

(3) Scheduled artillery and mortar fires are emphasized during this phase. Aggressor considers that heavy expenditure of ammunition during a short period will completely neutralize defensive antitank fire while the tanks move rapidly forward. Targets of opportunity are primarily the concern of direct fire weapons. Smoke is often used to obstruct the use of enemy antitank weapons.

*c. Conduct of Attack by the First Echelon Motorized Rifle Battalion.* Movement to the Final Coordination Line (FCL). The battalion leaves the final assembly area and heads for the FCL with companies moving out in line of platoon columns. Platoon columns deploy to line formation when necessary to reduce casualties or employ weapons. Tank platoon columns may deploy at different points than motorized rifle platoons because of longer range weapons or terrain obstacles and minefields. Firing while moving is preferred. Tanks may precede dismounted infantry to avoid prolonged exposure to accurate antitank fire and then wait for infantry in cover positions along the FCL. In rare cases tanks may cross the line of departure after the infantry and join up on the final coordination line to avoid antitank fire. Scheduled artillery and mortar fires are employed and targets of opportunity are engaged by direct weapons. The assault will not necessarily be directed against key terrain; instead the battalion attempts to push through weakly defended areas and leave the capture of key terrain and strongpoints to the regimental second echelon.

*d. The Assault.*

(1) The assault is considered to start when the final coordination line is crossed. This line is designated by the battalion commander, and normally is about 200 meters from the enemy. It is close enough to permit reaching the enemy positions in one bound, yet out of danger of Aggressor artillery fire on the defensive positions. If the motorized rifle units have lagged behind the tanks and there is no covered position available for final coordination, the assault actually begins when the tanks start across the last open ground.

(2) When the final coordination line is crossed, supporting fires lift from the enemy's forward positions to targets behind it. Tanks assault at full speed, and motorized rifle units follow as rapidly as possible. When dismounted and through the enemy forward obstacles, the motorized rifle company normally attacks in a line of skirmishers, though other formations may be used. The advance of the company is controlled by a designated base platoon. Direct fire weapons normally are attached to platoons and move in the platoon formation or on its flanks.

(3) When the platoon has passed through the obstacles, it usually takes up a line formation. Squads rarely move separately from the rest of the platoon formation. When advancing under heavy fire, the platoon may move forward by alternating squad rushes. Attached direct fire weapons move in the platoon formation either between squads or on the platoon flanks. Platoon and squad leaders control the movement of their units by voice and hand signals.

Riflemen fire without pausing to aim, and the last 80–100 meters is negotiated at a run. Neither tanks nor motorized rifle units are supposed to halt on the enemy position, and, if possible, they continue forward in a direction specified in the attack order. Halts for reorganization are held to a minimum. Gaps developing in the enemy defenses and fires are exploited in an effort to attack individual strongpoints and antitank gun positions from the rear. The advance is pushed vigorously regardless of the progress of adjacent units. Where possible, riflemen remount their MRTs for operations subsequent to overrunning the initial enemy defenses.

(4) If the attack fails, the platoon digs in as close to the enemy as possible and prepares to continue the assault. The assault is repeated until the attack is successful or is canceled by higher headquarters. Should the enemy counterattack, all units take up the defensive. Every means is used to hold the ground gained. If the enemy counterattack is with armor, the motorized rifle units concentrate on destroying the accompanying enemy infantry while antitank weapons and tanks engage the enemy armor. The attack is resumed at the first opportunity.

*e. Attack Against Isolated Strongpoints or Units.* The major difference between this type of attack and that described in *b* above is the Aggressor considers speed essential to destroy the enemy before reinforcements or counterattacks can arrive. Attacks will, therefore, be launched from the march with little or no artillery preparation. Envelopment will be used where possible.

### 16–7. Employment of Supporting Weapons

*a. Indirect Fires.* Aggressor places greater emphasis on planned and scheduled fires than on engaging targets of opportunity. An artillery preparation precedes virtually every attack and continues until the assault begins. This results from the Aggressor emphasis on speed of advance and the use of successive moving echelons; Aggressor is reluctant to hold up the advance to bring fire on targets of opportunity, and tries to neutralize defensive fires by planned artillery and mortar fires. This emphasis is one of degree; Aggressor will not push his advance into destructive fires, but will halt and employ his weapons to neutralize them. Aggressor will, however, accept heavy casualties in his attacking units before holding up the advance.

*b. Direct Fires.* Aggressor emphasizes the use of machineguns, recoilless guns and antitank guns for neutralizing and destroying enemy direct fire weapons that interfere with his advance. These weapons habitually accompany motorized rifle platoons and are fired on known or suggested enemy weapons during the artillery preparation. During the advance, these weapons are halted briefly to fire on targets of opportunity. Tanks fire at the same types of targets, but concentrate on enemy tanks. Antitank guns in the motorized rifle battalion reserve are employed as units (platoon or battery) under battalion control from stationary positions to repel armored counterattacks; primary targets are tanks and antitank guns.

*c. Separate Batteries of the Motorized Rifle Battalion.*

(1) The motar battery provides support for the battalion as a whole from positions usually 400 meters behind the leading companies. It displaces by bounds to provide continuous fire support.

(2) The antitank platoon and the recoilless gun platoon of the support battery usually are attached to the first echelon companies.

(3) The air defense platoon protects the artillery battery; though, when the air threat is negligible, it may be used for direct fire in support of the assault. The air defense missile platoon is usually distributed to support the forward companies and the battalion headquarters elements.

## Section III. MOTORIZED RIFLE UNITS IN THE DEFENSE

### 16–8. Main Defense Belt

*a.* The defense is based on the motorized rifle divisions of the combined arms armies in the main defense belt destroying or canalizing the enemy. The division defends in place.

*b.* The motorized rifle battalion conducts the defense as part of the regiment. The same procedures are used whether the battalion is in the first or second echelon.

(1) Little general firing from the frontline positions occurs until the enemy's attack is definitely underway. When the enemy reaches a line about 400 meters from the main defense belt, artillery and mortar barrages are fired. Here the enemy is brought under direct antitank and artillery fire and at the same time he must deal with antipersonnel and antitank obstacles including mine belts.

(2) Tanks are considered the primary target and the fires of all weapons that can damage or destroy tanks are directed at them. Machinegun and rifle fire is used in an attempt to separate the infantry from the tanks.

(3) Defending battalions remain in place until overrun or ordered to withdraw by higher headquarters; however, occupation of alternate and supplemental positions within the defense area is considered normal. Aggressor expects enemy penetrations in the gaps between units and intends to accomplish maximum killing in these areas. Unengaged units adjacent to threatened defense areas may be employed to attack the flanks of attacking enemy forces. Local counterattacks, employing small mobile tank forces are employed by the battalion, within its capability, to maintain the integrity of the defense area.

*c.* A platoon of antitank guns or recoilless guns from the battalion support battery, a platoon of tanks, and a platoon of mortars from the battalion mortar battery normally are attached to each first echelon company. The tanks are dug in between the first and second defense lines but not further than 600 meters from the forward trace of the main defense belt, and they are prepared to move forward to assist a hard pressed defense. The reinforcing mortar platoon and an organic battalion mortar platoon are usually attached to the second echelon company on the third defense line. A platoon of tanks is also attached to the second echelon and usually employed forward of the third defense line to add depth to the antitank defense; the tank platoon will participate in counterattacks and blocking operations of the second echelon.

*d.* Supplemental and alternate company and platoon defensive areas are prepared within the battalion defensive areas to permit the movement of forces during the conduct of the defense. Supplemental and alternate battalion defensive areas are also prepared and occupied when directed by regiment.

*e.* The second echelon consists of a motorized rifle company but may be only a reinforced platoon when the battalion has a wide zone and is defending on an extended frontage. Second-echelon companies usually place all three platoons on line, establishing the third defense line of the battalion. This line is located about 900 meters to the rear of the second defense line and usually on a reverse slope. It supports the first two defense lines with mortar fires.

*f.* The battalion reserve normally consists of the reinforcing 85mm antitank platoon and the RIPPER antitank guided missile platoon which are located in the area of the third defense line (second-echelon company).

## 16-9. Organization of the Defense

*a.* A first-echelon motorized rifle battalion usually is assigned to defend a zone 5000 to 7500 meters wide and approximately 4000 meters deep. Within this zone the battalion occupies a defensive area which covers important avenues of approach and is oriented to enable delivery of flank fire into adjacent battalion defense areas. The defense area is organized into two echelons and has a total of three lines of defense. First-echelon battalions are usually reinforced with a medium tank company, a 120mm mortar platoon, an 85mm antitank gun platoon, a RIPPER antitank guided missile platoon, a 14.5mm air defense machinegun platoon, and elements from the air defense missile platoon.

*b.* The battalion first echelon normally consists of two motorized rifle companies when the zone assigned to the battalion is up to 5000 meters wide. If the zone is extended to 7500 meters, three motorized rifle companies (one minus a platoon) may be employed. The first-echelon companies establish the first and second defense lines. First-echelon companies usually place two platoons in the first defense line and the third platoon in the second line. The first defense line is located along the forward trace of the defense belt, and when possible, on a forward slope. The second defense line is about 450 meters to the rear. Company command posts are located with the platoons in the second defense line, and battalion command posts are located with the second-echelon companies.

## 16-10. Support Weapons in the Defense

*a.* Weapons are placed so that they can cover the entire company front and interlock with fires of adjacent companies. The gaps between battalions are covered with artillery and antitank fire and heavy belts of mines and obstacles designed to force the enemy into those areas covered by small arms fires. The third defense line supports the first two defense lines with mortar fire only. Aggressor tries to deceive the enemy as to the location of his support weapons, and habitually places a few in surprise or ambush locations covering flanks and gaps. These weapons will not open fire until the enemy is at close range.

*b.* Recoilless guns are placed either within or immediately behind the forward platoon position. Antitank guns are sited to cover the distant approaches and to cover gaps in the defense lines of over 600 meters. The motorized rifle platoon machineguns are employed to provide interlocking fire in front of each platoon; however, no concept of a final protective line is used. The light machinegun of each squad covers the front of that squad. The 82mm squad antitank launcher organic to each squad covers the gaps between squads of up to 200 meters. Additional tanks from the division medium tank regiment may be attached to battalions if the enemy armor threat is particularly great. The machineguns on the motorized rifle transporters are considered particularly valuable in covering gaps and adding to the depth of the defense. However, the MRTs are not emplaced where they may be subjected to direct fire, or where they may not be available for the movement of troops.

*c.* Artillery batteries and battalions are occasionally placed in direct support of a motorized rifle battalion, but normally the motorized rifle battalion relies on fires from the regimental artillery group (formed by attaching artillery units from division to the regiment) for support beyond the capabilities of the attached 120mm mortars. The 14.5mm air defense weapons organic to the battalion support battery are deployed in defense of the battalion command post; they are frequently sited to provide direct fire support against attacking enemy forces.

## Section IV. THE TANK BATTALION IN THE OFFENSE

### 16-11. Organization

Tank battalions are the main components of the tank regiment and are also found in the motorized rifle regiment. There are two types of battalions; medium and heavy which have identical organizations. The organization of a tank battalion is shown in figure 16-3. The tank battalion's personnel, weapons and equipment are shown in figure 16-4.

### 16-12. Mission

In order to cope with any circumstance during an offensive operation, the tank battalion commander will assign one or more of the following missions to his companies:

*a.* Operate as a first-echelon element of a tank battalion or regiment.

*b.* Become attached to a first-echelon motorized rifle battalion as the battalion reserve or as a battalion second-echelon force.

*c.* Operate as the reserve force of a tank regiment or a motorized rifle regiment with or without attachments.

*d.* Operate with attachments as the tank battalion advance guard on the march in anticipation of a meeting engagement.

*e.* Operate as part of the advance guard force of regimental size units.

*f.* Operate as part of a forward detachment.

*g.* Conduct special reconnaissance in force missions for the regiment.

### 16-13. Organization for the Attack

*a.* Tank units are considered the basic striking force. Such units combine their organic heavy firepower with supporting tactical nuclear strikes, conventional artillery, and air strikes in rapid maneuver to accomplish an offensive mission. Offense is considered the prime combat operation and is continued on an around-the-clock basis in any type of weather and over any kind of terrain. Aggressor emphasizes the night attack for the continuation of a daytime offensive operation conducted in order to maintain momentum in the advance and to achieve surprise. Aggressor doctrine holds that nuclear weapons directly and indirectly create the conditions for deep maneuver by tank units. Directly, a nuclear strike forms a breach or separation of enemy units which allows the tank force to envelop or penetrate into the enemy defensive depths. Indirectly, an enemy force on the defense disperses to offset the danger of nuclear annihilation. This dispersion creates gaps and separation of units which may be exploited by tank elements maneuvering into the enemy defenses. Relentless pressure following a breakthrough prevents the enemy from employing nuclear strikes against the attacking forces.

*b.* Aggressor tank units use two basic forms of maneuver to attack the frontal attack and the envelopment.

(1) The frontal attack is the less desirable of the two forms and is employed when the enemy does not have an assailable flank. Its purpose is to create a gap in the enemy defense for subsequent exploitation by enveloping maneuvers. The frontal attack may be used also as a secondary effort or feint in support of a main enveloping force.




*Figure 16-3. Organization—tank battalion.*

(2) An envelopment may be close or deep. The close envelopment is a comparatively shallow maneuver directed against one or both flanks of an enemy force and is directly supported by fire from units attacking frontally. The deep envelopment is directed against the flanks or rear of the enemy to a depth beyond close fire support range of other attacking units. A force employed in a deep envelopment is reinforced for independent action and coordinates its tactical operation with units attacking frontally.

*c.* In that Aggressor organizes all combat forces into a first echelon, a second echelon, and a reserve, the first echelon is the main striking force and normally is heavily supported by artillery, air, and nuclear firepower. The second echelon moves in approach march formation behind the combat formations of the first echelon at a distance prescribed by the battalion commander. It is used to support the first echelon and may revert to the role of reserve to exploit the success of the first echelon or to replace depleted units. The mission of the second echelon is assigned at the same time as the mission of the first echelon and is amended during combat as the situation develops. In addition to the two echelons, reserves are formed to be committed at a decisive moment during the operation. A tank company forming all or part of the tank reserve moves in a designated direction and maintains a specified distance from the attacking units. Plans are made for commitment of the reserve from the line of march.

## 16-14. Conduct of the Attack

*a.* There are three types of operations which the tank battalion will conduct in order to successfully complete an overall attack mission. The first is the meeting engagement, then a breakthrough operation, followed by pursuit. Forces greater than the tank company are normally required to conduct significant pursuit operations. However, the tank company's mobility, speed, and firepower are necessary for participation in either the direct or parallel pursuit force of a higher command.

*b.* The meeting engagement is considered the type of combat action most likely to be conducted in a nuclear war. This type of action presents the commander with many uncertainties and requires him to be aggressive and decisive in his actions as the situation develops. The meeting engagement implies unexpected contact with undetermined size enemy units on the move. Since both forces are on the move the use of effective tactical nuclear strikes is difficult. Nuclear weapons in the meeting engagement are most effective in sealing off the enemy forces from reinforcement by reserves moving to their support. The meeting engagement consists of three phases:

(1) The pre-engagement phase is essentially the tactical march in anticipation of contact with an enemy force. During this phase, the

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | Tk (Mdm or Hv) | Tk Recov Veh | MRT, MRT 4* | ROGUE (SAM 6) | TRUCK |
| H & S Co | 11 | 56 | 67 | 1 | 1 | 8 | 36 | 8 |
| Hq Sec | (6) | (6) | (12) | (1) | | (1) | | |
| Tfc Con Sec | (1) | (11) | (12) | | | (1) | | |
| Sig Sqd | (1) | (8) | (9) | | | | | (2) |
| Svc Sec | (1) | (8) | (9) | | | | | (4) |
| Maint Sec | (1) | (11) | (12) | | (1) | | | (2) |
| AD MSL Plat | (1) | (12) | (13) | | | (6*) | (36) | |
| Tk Co (3) | 5 | 41 | 46 | 10 | | | | 1 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (8) | (10) | (1) | | | | (1) |
| Tk Plat (3) | [1] | (11) | (12) | | | | | |
| Hq Sec (Note) | [1] | | (1) | (3) | | | | |
| Tk Sec [3] | | [4] | [4] | [1] | | | | |
| Total | 26 | 179 | 205 | 31 | 1 | 8 | 36 | 11 |

Note: Platoon leader is counted as a member of a tank section.

*Figure 16-4. Personnel, weapons and equipment—tank battalion.*

tank company as a part of the advance guard of a larger unit moves forward of the main body in search of enemy forces. The company commander prepares for initial contact by maintaining all-around observation, contact with flank security elements, air reconnaissance elements if available and ground reconnaissance elements forward of the advance guard. In this role the tank company commander normally is expected to make contact, fix, and force the enemy to deploy. The tank company with motorized rifle elements attached is not considered large enough both to contact and envelop an enemy force. Elements of the main body are charged with this responsibility. This phase terminates when initial contact is made.

(2) The deployment phase occurs when the advance guard commander deploys his forces in front of the enemy column and delivers maximum firepower to force the enemy to deploy. He reports the situation to the tank battalion commander giving location, strength and disposition of the enemy force so that immediate steps may be taken to deploy the main body. The tank company commander continues to take the enemy force under fire, holding fast to give the main body time to deploy and attack. When the tank company operates as part of the main body, the commander awaits orders from the battalion commander to deploy to the flank or rear of the enemy force.

(3) The attack phase is executed when the

tank company moves on line with other elements of the enveloping force and moves into the attack on order of the battalion commander. Every effort is made to assail the flank or rear of the enemy force to overrun, destroy, or force his withdrawal. If possible, motorized rifle elements supporting the tank attack remain mounted in MRTs to speed the overrunning of the enemy forces.

(4) The meeting engagement is terminated when the enemy force is destroyed, is forced into a defensive situation, or withdraws. The tank company commander may be ordered to initiate pursuit operations in case of an enemy withdrawal. If a superior enemy force is encountered which cannot be overcome by the tank units available, the tank company commander is ordered to take up positions along with other enveloping force units to contain the enemy until superior Aggressor units can move forward and conduct either a breakthrough or an enveloping action.

*c.* Successful breakthrough operations are greatly dependent upon thorough reconnaissance, and detailed fire planning, applicable to both nuclear and nonnuclear warfare. This enhances the tanks' penetration efforts, then upon successful penetration through the first portion of the enemy's defense, the tanks revert to an exploitation role to assist in overrunning enemy positions in depth. These objectives are for both a tank battalion in the attack or the tank company in direct support of motorized rifle units. The conduct of the attack is executed in the following manner.

(1) The tank units move forward, joining with those elements attached on the route to contact. The movement is timed to arrive and depart the departure position at the time specified in the battalion order. If the attack is to be preceded by a nuclear strike against forward enemy positions, arrangements are made to protect all elements of the attacking force from the adverse effects of the nuclear strike. Areas for protection are preselected along the route of contact and are occupied only as long as is necessary to shield the tanks and attached units.

(2) The tanks then deploy in phases so as to move into the attack fully deployed in combat formation. The tank companies deploy into columns of platoons approximately two kilometers behind the line of contact. Platoon tanks deploy into a line formation approximately 500 meters before reaching the line of contact.

(3) Normally the tank companies attack with three platoons in the first echelon. No second echelon or reserve is held at company level.

(4) The tanks move into the attack at a high rate of speed. All tanks commence firing on enemy weapons and personnel on the forward edge and in the immediate depths of the defenses. Antitank obstacles forward of the defenses are negotiated through previously prepared passages. Minefields may have been previously cleared by engineer units, or mine-clearing tanks may precede the advancing units.

(5) Under cover of supporting fire and air support, the tanks on the move intensify their fires and, together with motorized rifle units, attempt to penetrate the defense, destroy personnel and weapons, and continue an uninterrupted advance into the depths of the defenses. During this phase, the tank companies render assistance by fire to halted adjacent units when possible but do not deviate from their own direction of advance. Momentum is maintained even if supporting elements are slowed.

(6) During the attack the tanks fire on the move, from short halts, or at a complete halt. The most preferable method is fire on the move, which provides immediate firepower without slowing down the tempo of the advance. Since movement affects aiming and accuracy, tank crews utilize a combination of firing on the move and firing from brief halts. The halt is used to fire only one aimed round or several bursts from the machinegun and then the tank moves on. If necessary, a longer halt is ordered to fire three to five rounds. When tanks encounter a heavily fortified target or an object considered to be of vital importance to the mission, concentrated fire is used. The tanks halt behind any available natural cover and continue to fire until the target is destroyed.

(7) Attached motorized rifle elements normally follow the tanks up to 150 meters to the rear. These troops remain mounted in their MRTs to keep pace with tanks. Riflemen deliver individual fire over the sides and through the ports of the MRTs.

(8) Upon overcoming the forward positions of the enemy defense, tank units become the spearhead of the advance and are given priority of supporting fires to insure a rapid rate of advance. Action of the tank company is determined by the strength of enemy resistance encountered. Stubborn, isolated enemy strongpoints are bypassed in order to maintain momentum. If the advance is halted and a flanking maneuver is not possible, the com-

mander calls for additional supporting fires, assigns attack missions for an attempted penetration, and launches the attack. Tanks move under cover of supporting fires, fire on the move, penetrate the enemy positions, and continue in their assigned direction of advance. Antitank obstacles are either bypassed or cleared by supporting engineers or motorized rifle units. Radiologically or chemically contaminated areas must not lower the tempo of the advance. Such areas are passed through rapidly or bypassed.

(9) Upon overrunning the enemy defensive position, the commander orders all elements to continue the movement forward. If resistance collapses completely the tanks form into approach march formation and are ordered to continue the advance in pursuit of the withdrawing enemy forces.

*d.* Aggressor's concept, should the enemy attack first and fail or counterattack and fail, is that the enemy must quickly changeover to a hasty defense and will attempt to strengthen their positions along tactically important terrain such as road junctions, commanding heights, and defiles. A hastily prepared defensive position is characterized by instability of the defensive system, lack of engineer fortifications, inadequate fire planning, and significant gaps within the defensive lines. Aggressor considers that the basis for success in overrunning this type of defense is a penetration from the march without a lengthy organization for the attack. This rapid movement to effect a penetration is supported by all available fire means to include nuclear strikes, conventional artillery fires, and air strikes. The rapid momentum and shock created by aggressive movement of tanks is intended to disrupt enemy plans for withdrawal to new defensive lines and to force the enemy into a piecemeal commitment of units. The suddenness of the attack is designed to enhance seizure of the initiative, while continuous pressure throughout the operation is intended to force the enemy to fight under unfavorable conditions. As the Aggressor tanks approach the enemy positions in either the approach march formation or in combat formation, the commanders receive the attack order by radio from the battalion commander. The order will specify the line of deployment, the objective within the first defensive positions, and the direction of further advance. When supported by motorized rifle units, the tank unit commander defines the missions and departure positions of the motorized rifle elements.

*e.* Pursuit is the continuation of the advance against a disorganized withdrawing enemy. The tank battalion with its speed and great firepower is ideally suited to the conduct of pursuit action. Each commander is required to initiate pursuit action immediately on noting indications of enemy withdrawal and to inform the higher commander of his action so that any limited withdrawal may be developed into a more general withdrawal by concentrated effort of all forces in contact. The pursuit is continued day and night and may be terminated only on orders of the higher commander or by encounter with strong enemy resistance. Pursuit operations require considerable logistic support both in ammunition and fuel. In order to conduct effective pursuit, higher headquarters must keep these types of supplies well forward and readily available to the pursuit forces. The tank battalion normally participates in pursuit action as a part of a larger force. The pursuit action may be direct (frontal), parallel, or a combination of both. An explanation for these techniques are as follows:

(1) Direct pursuit is the continued frontal pressure applied to a withdrawing enemy force to deny him time to reestablish a defensive position.

(2) Parallel pursuit is the rapid movement forward along an axis parallel to the enemy route of withdrawal. Parallel pursuit forces strike the flank or rear of the enemy force in an attempt to destroy him piecemeal.

(3) A combined operation is the application of both direct and parallel pursuit forces against a withdrawing enemy to apply the greatest pressure, disruption, and destruction.

## Section V. THE TANK BATTALION IN THE DEFENSE

### 16-15. Defensive Operations

*a.* Aggressor doctrine considers the defense as the occupation and holding of previously well-prepared or hastily occupied areas or positions from which units inflict losses on the attacker, repel his troops, and create favorable conditions for launching a counteroffensive. Defense is considered a transitory stage of combat which is used to repel a superior enemy, to consolidate objectives, to secure the flanks of

attacking units, to gain time for the regrouping of forces, to repel counterattacks, and to canalize an enemy into a disadvantageous position where maneuvering forces can destroy him. Aggressor units in the forward defensive system may be required to hold their areas at all costs while larger groupings of forces utilize maneuver and mobility to destroy the attacker. However, forward units may be included in the overall maneuver defense plan and utilize rapid movement to absorb the initial attack, give ground, and create favorable conditions for the commitment of the tank heavy reserves. Tanks in defense are placed in prepared positions which are dispersed laterally and in depth to lessen the effects of nuclear attack. Aggressor avoids massing units larger than battalion, the basic forward defensive unit. These battalion defense areas consist of a series of well-dispersed company positions, protected by mines, obstacles, nuclear fires, and conventional artillery.

*b.* Tank units may be assigned various defensive missions which include:

(1) Holding a designated area.

(2) Destroying an enemy penetration by direct fire or counterattack.

(3) Engaging the enemy from ambush.

(4) Protecting the defending units as part of the antitank strongpoint.

(5) Closing gaps created by enemy nuclear strikes.

(6) Providing indirect fire support.

(7) Forming a part or all of the reserve.

*c.* Frontage and depth for a tank battalion are determined by terrain, cover, comparative strengths, mission, and available fire support. Normally, a tank battalion can cover an area 2,000 to 3,000 meters wide and 2,000 to 4,000 meters deep. Within the defensive area, the tank battalion organizes mutually supporting company defensive areas, each of which is up to 1,000 meters wide and 1,000 meters deep. When the battalion defensive area is 3,000 meters wide, the gaps between company positions may be as much as 800 meters wide.

*d.* Organization for the defense is normally composed of two echelons, with two tank companies in the first echelon and one tank company in the second echelon. There are occasions when terrain will dictate the disposition of the battalion, therefore, there may be only one company in the first echelon and the other two in the second echelon. A platoon of the second-echelon company may initially defend ahead of the main defense position and later fall back. A motorized rifle company normally is attached to the tank battalion; each of its platoons attached to each tank company. If the enemy penetrates to a minor degree, the battalion commander may order a first-echelon tank company to launch a counterattack. However, the counterattack usually is conducted by the second echelon supported by fire from the tank company in the first echelon. Medium tank units can be used as a first echelon force, however, normally these units are the commander's counterattack force. When the medium tank unit is used as a first echelon defensive force and heavy tank units are available then the heavy tank units become the counterattack force.

# PART FOUR
# STRATEGY OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENCY
# CHAPTER 17
# INTRODUCTION

## Section I. GENERAL

### 17–1. Purpose

The purpose of part four is to present the theory, strategy, organizational structure, and methods of operation of an Aggressor inspired, supported, and/or controlled insurgency. As a means of application, an insurgent movement is conducted in the fictitious nation of Patria Liberata, which is a geographic, climatic, economic, sociological, and political composite of various countries. Chapter 3, FM 30–103 provides background information for the country of Patria Liberata. An understanding of the insurgent organization and activities presented will enable commanders to devise an appropriate insurgent maneuver enemy. Modifications to fit training needs and local situations are permitted.

### 17–2. Definitions

Terms such as "Aggressor insurgency," "Aggressor insurgent forces," and "Aggressor insurgent warfare operations," are used to denote a type or method of insurgency devised by Aggressor. These methods and techniques will be employed by personnel in the target country. Other definitions used in part four may be found in the glossary.

### 17–3. Aggressor involvement in Insurgency

*a.* Aggressor's ultimate aim is to control all insurgent movements in an effort to further its goal of world domination. Aggressor personnel may be, from the beginning, covertly active in an insurgent movement against an established government. Aggressor personnel will use dissident indigenous peoples to build the insurgent organization, and will be active in guidance and control of the insurgent's activities. Clandestine personnel will receive directives for increasing social and political instability in a target country from the Director of Land Masses, through the Aggressor Clandestine Intelligence Services. Small quantities of weapons and supplies will also follow this route. Aggressor has the capability of clandestinely inserting its special warfare forces to assist the insurgent forces.

*b.* Leaders of organizations disaffected with existing government policies may request covert Aggressor aid in the development of a liberation movement. Aggressor will supply aid in an attempt to gain enough "influence" over indigenous leaders to insure Aggressor policies are followed.

*c.* In revolutions that are not Aggressor inspired or aided, Aggressor will attempt to gain influence by offering guidance, aid, and economic support. In this manner economic dependence may be established. Aggressor clandestine personnel may establish control channels within the populace.

## Section II. EMPLOYMENT OF INSURGENT FORCES

### 17–4. Planning

*a.* The planning for the use of insurgent forces in internal defense/internal development exercises (command post exercises, field training exercises, and maneuvers) is the same as for conventional Aggressor forces. Details pertaining to planning, as well as training and employment of Aggressor forces, are outlined in paragraphs 1–4 through 1–9.

*b.* In addition to planning factors in paragraph 1–4, a determination must be made on the number and size of insurgent military units and the size of the insurgent infrastructure to be employed in a maneuver. The size of the

infrastructure and military units varies widely. The ratio of infrastructure personnel to insurgent military forces varies from 3:1 to 9:1. The size of the ratio of government security forces in the maneuver to total insurgents (infrastructure plus military) varies from less than 1:1 to 18:1. These ranges of ratios are designed as guidelines only, and are subject to personnel available. If the field training exercise is primarily training in combat operations against insurgent forces, the necessity for physical portrayal of the infrastructure is minimal. Conversely, if the field training exercise is to provide training in intelligence operations and targeting of the infrastructure, extensive portrayal of military forces is not necessary.

*c.* The objectives in inserting Aggressor insurgent warfare operations in training exercises are to:

(1) Familiarize the United States soldier with guerrilla and other types of insurgent warfare operations which may be directed against him in combat.

(2) Emphasize the necessity for providing adequate security measures against such operations.

(3) Provide training in combat operations against unconventional forces.

(4) Provide training in intelligence operations and targeting of the insurgent infrastructure.

(5) Familiarize commanders and staffs with the capabilities and limitations of insurgent infrastructure organization and its military forces.

(6) Indicate this form of warfare incorporates the use of a vast potential of otherwise unused manpower and equipment which, when properly organized, controlled and directed, can exercise extensive influence upon the outcome of military operations.

### 17–5. Uniforms and Equipment

*a. Guerrilla Units.* For those exercises which use the country of Patria Liberata as a training vehicle, Aggressor guerrillas may wear peasant dress of any type to characterize an authentic situation. When an actual country is the setting for exercises, the dress of the natives of that particular country should be worn. Aggressor guerrillas may be equipped with old model weapons and equipment or civilian type weapons. There is no supply of civilian type clothing available nor is there any practical means of converting US Army issue uniform items to represent peasant dress. A supply of old model weapons and equipment does not exist. Therefore, local commanders are encouraged to improvise so that all exercises are as realistic as possible.

*b. Regular Units.* Regular units employed in internal defense/internal development exercises should wear the uniforms and be equipped the same as Aggressor regulars described in chapter 22. Aggressor uniforms and equipment may be obtained as outlined in appendix E.

## Section III. REVOLUTIONARY THEORY AND PRINCIPLES OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENCY

### 17–6. Characteristics of Conventional and Partisan versus Insurgent (Revolutionary) Warfare Strategy

*a.* The most obvious difference between conventional and insurgent warfare is the absence of clearly defined front lines and decisive major battles, except possibly in the final stages. Conventional warfare generally proceeds from the destruction of the opposing nations military forces to the capture and/or destruction of its government. The people continue to remain hostile to the conquering forces and tend to remain loyal to the fallen social and political system. Insurgency reverses this process. The people are in the forefront of the battle rather than in a protected home base in the rear. The insurgent attempts to detach the loyalities of the people from the existing government and transfer them to the insurgents through a combination of coercion and exploitation of popular grievances. Similar attempts are made to separate the security and military forces from the government. If this fails, the insurgents use harassing tactics to disperse and demoralize these forces and make them ineffective in carrying out their mission. The final target is the collapse of the government because it is incapable of physically defending itself and has lost the support of the people.

*b.* Both partisan and insurgent warfare employ guerrilla warfare tactics to harass and distract the enemy. However, partisan strategy is designed to support conventional warfare by

harassing the enemy and allowing regular forces to reach a decision in conventional battle. Partisan forces are not in a position to achieve victory by their own efforts, where as an insurgent movement is totally committed, and totally dedicated to achieving victory. Partisans conduct guerrilla warfare in resistance to a conqueror. Their aim is to restore the status quo and is essentially traditional and conservative in nature rather than revolutionary. However, history has many examples of revolutionary leaders using the respectability of partisan resistance movements to build an insurgent organization. The core of the insurgent movement is dedicated to the revolutionary movement and will resist any attempt to compromise or negotiate away possible victory for their cause. Insurgents conducting guerrilla warfare may work in conjunction with conventional forces to achieve victory. This could occur if the insurgent organization is capable of developing main force units or if Aggressor conventional forces are introduced to aid in bringing about the insurgent victory.

## 17-7. Historical Origin and Development of Revolutionary Theory

*a.* The current vogue in revolutionary activity which the world is enduring has its roots in the writings of the 19th century theorist Karl Marx. Others along the way have added to and changed basic principles and characteristics in the evolution of this form of revolutionary war called insurgency. Marx originated the basic concept of class struggle, and Lenin added the necessity for party organization and leadership. Mao Tse-tung contributed the concept of protracted guerrilla warfare and applied it to peasant societies. Trotsky and Lin Piao made application to world revolution while Trong Chinh and Vo Nguyen Giap have refined the techniques of insurgent warfare. Fidel Castro, Che Guevara and others have aided in expanding the appeal of revolutionary warfare to dissidents of the world.

*b.* Marxist theory presumes an inherent antagonism between the capitalist owners of the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and the working class (the proletariat). This is the basis for class conflict. Because of the economic "laws" of capitalism, the bourgeoisie will continue to grow richer while the workers grow poorer. Rather than yield any control over their businesses or profits to the workers, the bourgeoisie will fiercely fight any such attempts. The only solution is for industrial workers to overthrow their capitalist masters. At some point, capitalist oppression and misery would force the proletariat to burst into spontaneous revolution. The inevitable result of this class struggle is a new economic and social order—a classless society. Several attempts to bring about revolution by this theory were failures. It became evident that someone would have to show the workers that their best interests would inevitably lead to revolution. The only way to bring about a successful revolution would be to develop an organization that could lead the working class. Therefore, a political party was developed, composed of highly disciplined, fanatical, and professional revolutionaries that would act as the "vanguard of the proletariat" and lead the working class to revolution. It is the work of the party to create a parallel political organization to compete and ultimately seize power from the government. From a study of the historical development of revolutionary theory, Aggressor has derived its theories and strategy of insurgent activity.

## 17-8. Principles of Aggressor Insurgency

*a.* In analyzing the historical development of revolutionary thought, Aggressor has derived several principles upon which it has based the development of its insurgent program for the spread of Circle Trigonism. Such principles as the necessity for an *ideology* to unify and justify the insurgent movement, the need for *control* and *organization* in the development of insurgency, the requirement to train cadre and foster insurgent *leadership*, and emphasis on revolutionary *tactics* are of primary importance as the basis for Aggressor to build insurgent movements. Revolutionary tactics are discussed in chapter 18 under various insurgent operations.

*b.* Aggressor leaders realize the importance of ideology (a unified set of ideas and characteristic manner of thinking of a person or group) as the cohesiveness which holds organizations together. Ideology is the line of division between the "insurgent" and the "criminal." Aggressor leaders know that a country under internal attack will try to brand the insurgents as hooligans, thieves, and criminals. Circle Trigonists must make people aware, by publicizing their ideology, of their interest in "social welfare," "the people," and "liberation," Aggressor inspired insurgent propaganda emphasizes political consciousness and plays down any material gains. Anyone who opposes the ideology will be identified as the enemy and treated as such.

The unifying ideology of the Aggressor Homeland is Circle Trigonism. It is through the spread of Circle Trigonism that Aggressor hopes to achieve its goal of world domination. Circle Trigonism will serve as the basis for the development of the Circle Trigon Party that will control the insurgent movement. Aggressor knows that appeal to ideology will probably not motivate any but the political activist—the intellectuals. Insurgents will propose actions such as land reform, elimination of corrupt officials, better living conditions, and elimination of ethnic prejudice which can only be brought about under Circle Trigonism. If the combination of pure (ideas and beliefs) and practical (proposed programs and actions) ideology are not enough to motivate the people, intimidation and terror will supplement ideology in gaining mass support.

*c.* Contemporary Circle Trigonist concern over insurgent political organization takes precedence over all other considerations. They realize that Western powers have failed to understand that superior organization is the road to power. Circle Trigonist revolutionaries concentrate on creating a dedicated, tightly structured, disciplined organizational machine which is capable of seizing power in a politically and socially unstable society. Aggressor knows that it is the insurgent political organization which will replace both the political and social systems once they have been destroyed. The insurgent answer to a technically superior government army is the party cadre's ability to organize and mobilize the population against the government and in favor of the insurgency.

*d.* Various types of leadership skills are necessary for the development of a Circle Trigonist movement. An insurgency may begin as a group of dedicated followers of a charismatic leader who firmly believes in the Circle Trigonist ideology. As the organization develops other types of leaders are needed. Aggressor recognizes the need for activist leaders, persons skilled in developing effective organizations and leading other men, who may not understand or may even be bored by discussions of Circle Trigonist ideas. For these men, the insurgent movement provides an outlet for their organizational and leadership skills and a fundamentally satisfying challenge. Leaders who have management skills will handle administrative functions and others are needed to work in the insurgent covert organizations. These are the persons that will direct and control the Circle Trigonist insurgent movement.

# CHAPTER 18
# FUNDAMENTALS AND EMPLOYMENT OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENT DOCTRINE

## Section I. METHODOLOGY OF AGGRESSOR INSURGENT DEVELOPMENT

### 18–1. General

*a.* This chapter provides guidance on the development, structure, and functions of an insurgent organization at the lower levels of the insurgent apparatus. It is designed to emphasize the necessity for dealing with the insurgent's infrastructure in order to effectively combat Aggressor type insurgent movements. In stimulating intelligence play during CPXs, FTXs, and other training exercises emphasis should be placed on portraying the insurgent organization at the lower (district and local) levels as the operational activities carried on at these levels are critical to the success of the insurgency. Where possible, intelligence personnel should augment the insurgent forces to provide technical assistance in the development and portrayal of the clandestine activities conducted by the insurgent infrastructure. This will enhance realism and provide a more challenging target for personnel involved in the exercise.

*b.* In accordance with its principles of insurgent theory, Aggressor has developed a pattern or series of activities that set forth the essentials of Aggressor revolutionary methodology. The method involves both a series of *revolutionary tactics* and corresponding *organizational techniques.* To fully understand revolutionary development, these two must be seen as interactive and inseparable ingredients. Aggressor revolutionary methodology is expressed in phases of development. Since insurgency is an evolutionary process, Aggressor uses phasès only to denote general changes in types of activities that occur as the insurgent movement develops. No sharp distinction between phases is possible, and there is no set minimum or maximum time frame for any phase. Due to local conditions, the evolutionary process will vary in different parts of the country. Because of the flexibility of the insurgent process, time is one of the insurgent's most valuable assets.

### 18–2. Party Creation/Clandestine Organization

A premium is placed on the earliest possible creation of a political organization which is the nucleus of the insurgent movement. This core can form in various ways. For example, a charismatic leader, who is a true believer in Circle Trigonism, may draw the discontented and disaffected to him and form a Circle Trigon Party. The organization will begin to plan its campaign for revolution. Ideology will unify the party and members will decide what type of ideological appeal will draw the most support. If Circle Trigonism does not have popular appeal, appeals to nationalistic feelings may bring broad support. A clandestine organization will begin to develop. Initial emphasis is placed on developing the discontents originally drawn to the party into an effective revolutionary cadre by training and testing in insurgent activities. Clandestine cells will be organized to direct administrative (e.g., finances, recruitment, etc.) and functional (e.g., sabotage, terror, intelligence, etc.) operations. Cadre, to carry out these operations, will be further developed by selective identification, recruitment, training, and testing of additional personnel. Selective party cadre recruitment will be attempted in vital areas like governmental activities, communications, industrial labor unions, and national organizations. The placement of covert party cadre in these areas will serve as a point of departure for later insurgent expansion. If the party is legal, it will develop both *overt* and *covert* organizations. The overt organization will function like any political party, but will also set up a cellular structure to which all overt members belong. This cell system will help train members in covert behavior, and allow the party to keep functioning if it is declared illegal. As the revolutionary agitation increases, the party may be declared illegal. The clandestine part of the organization will be separate from the open party, if an overt party exists,

and clandestine members will not be outwardly identifiable as active in antigovernment activities. Maximum use will be made of clandestine techniques. Popular grievances against the government will be examined to see which can best be exploited to create and expand antigovernment feelings. The revolutionary cadre will gather information on government security forces, reconnoiter terrain to pick out sites for potential base areas and training grounds, and choose potential targets for sabotage and terror attacks. These types of clandestine organizational activities will occur in both rural and urban areas. Once the political organization is established, a campaign to establish greater influence and control over the population will begin. If Aggressor personnel are not covertly involved, insurgent leaders may request clandestine aid from Aggressor Homeland.

### 18–3. Psychological Offensive

This phase begins a program of interrelated actions designed to initiate and/or broaden a political base among the urban and rural population, and to develop the party from a small conspiratorial elite to a mass based party of depth and authority. The insurgent organization will develop a propaganda program designed to capitalize upon popular dissatisfaction and the desire for prompt change in government programs. Practical grievances, chosen for exploitation in Phase I, will be used to develop support among those people not motivated by political ideals. Covert party cadre recruited from government, labor, national, and other organizations will begin agitation activities to exploit tension created by social, economic, and political problems. Covert party members in various organizations will push for demonstrations and strikes, emphasizing grievances against government policies. Sympathizers will be developed as unwitting sources of information. Emphasis on practical grievances is designed to detach the loyalties of workers and peasants from the government and transfer them to the revolutionary movement. Operational terror and sabotage cells of the political organization will operate throughout the country through the selective use of threats, intimidation, and assassination. The psychological offensive is calculated to speed up the political and social disintegration of the country. Aggressor style subversion begins a vicious circle of frustration and distrust among the various political, economic, and social groups in the target country. Modern propaganda, especially in urban areas where radio, television, and newspapers may exist, creates an information explosion. By disseminating large quantities of propaganda, the insurgents attempt to show themselves as representing the will of the people. In emerging nations with poor communications media, the person-to-person verbal method is preferred. Propaganda helps polarize social and political groups so that one is either on the side of "the people" or "an enemy of the people." As the loyalties of more people are detached from the government, increased emphasis on organization of the people in this and succeeding phases is of supreme importance. By means of coercion and persuasion, the insurgents seek to build powerful mass organizations whose members will execute orders with unquestioning obedience. The party will liquidate or silence those who interfere. Recruitment into mass organizations is less selective, therefore, the insurgent political apparatus will begin to develop local militia enforcement arms in the area in which it is operating. Aggressor insurgency calls this paramilitary organization the Green Guard, and it is used to enforce policies of insurgent leaders and intimidate villagers who do not actively support the revolutionary movement. However, recruitment into the party will always be selective.

### 18–4. Organizational Expansion

*a.* In this phase the insurgents take prompt and meaningful advantage of the human resources created by the psychological offensive. Insurgent cadre will take firm control of favorable events and circumstances which have occurred (both planned and unplanned) and turn the process of agitation into one of positive revolutionary action. Insurgents seek to crystallize public support for a strong organization that will restore order. Replacement of the government at the national level normally will not be possible at this time (however, some governments have collapsed at this point) because the national forces of law and order are still responsible to the existing government. Aggressor insurgent methodology focuses on the creation of new governments at the local level, with the ultimate goal of enrolling the entire population into a mass structure. Using the "united front from below" tactic, the party will not seek entrance into established popular socio-economic organizations already in existence. Trained cadres will create clandestine cells in these organizations in order to attempt to control

them. The insurgent core will create new competitive organizations which will attempt to draw people away from associations they already belong to (or draw people to them who were not previously active in any organization) by claiming to more democratically represent the genuine interests of the people. If the technique is effective, leaders of labor, governmental, social, and other associations will be deserted by the rank and file. The insurgent associations will at this time not be overtly identified with the revolutionary movement.

*b.* During organizational expansion the insurgent infrastructure will begin to become apparent. The infrastructure, when fully developed, will form the thrust of the insurgent movement. Infrastructure members are carefully selected, with party guidance, from the ranks of the mass organizations. Not all members of the insurgent movement will be party members and the percentage of party members varies significantly as the insurgency expands. Infrastructure personnel will constitute the proven elements of the revolutionary cause. Members of organizations are considered "the people" and those that are reluctant to join are suspect as being "enemies of the people." Social pressure and/or physical coercion can be used to enlist nonmembers in the mass organization. Friendships are developed among organization members which help bind people to the cause. Leaders of the mass organization will draw together into a united federation claiming to represent "the people." This federation of party-guided organizations will serve as the foundation upon which, in Aggressor terminology, liberation committees and the National Liberation Front will be built.

*c.* As more people become active in the insurgency, local Green Guard militia units will "motivate" potentially reluctant people to carry out party policy. The Green Guard is considered in Aggressor methodology to be a special type of mass organization and *not* primarily a military force. In the militarization phase Green Guard personnel may be drawn from to help develop military units, or used as replacements, but only with party approval. Although it can engage in guerrilla warfare, it is primarily a support activity to local party authorities. The Green Guard is not composed of primarily party personnel. Party members will probably not exceed 40 percent.

*d.* To further develop the infrastructure in rural areas, the party may decide to clandestinely organize into a covert form of liberation committee and shadow government, but the ultimate insurgent mass organization—the overt "People's Liberation Committee"—is unlikely to appear until clear insurgent military control of the area has occurred. If a clandestine committee organization is decided on, party members and leaders of local mass organizations will call a meeting of the local population for the purpose of "nominating" members from each organization to serve on a liberation committee. Nominees are approved by the party prior to the meeting. The newly elected liberation committee serves as a board of directors for the mass organizations. Committee members form the basis for a clandestine or shadow government which will eventually displace any existing governmental structure. As the area comes under insurgent military control, the committee will emerge as a local liberation front government. The civil structure of local liberation committee/local liberation front will pyramid up to national level, resulting in a National Liberation Front. The National Liberation Front will overtly request support and recognition from third countries on behalf of the oppressed peoples of the target country. Recognition by the Aggressor Homeland will lend credence to the insurgent's claim of being a parallel or provisional government which represents the true will of the people.

*e.* Organizational expansion will also include the initial development of military elements by military personnel of the party. These elements are distinct from militia forces, and the units are referred to by Aggressor as regional force guerrillas and mobile main force units. Takeover of local areas may be possible with little violence, but downfall of the national government normally will require defeat or neutralization of the armed forces. Theoretically Aggressor states that subversive activities should have destroyed the integrity of the government's security forces. Party/military activists at the local level will form a military core. The military core forms armed recruiting and propaganda teams which, with assistance from the local infrastructure leaders, will recruit personnel to form regional guerrilla forces. As militarization expands, experienced personnel are drawn from regional forces to form the basis for mobile main forces. The infrastructure will maintain a constant flow of recruits to replenish regional and main force structures. As military units expand in size and activities, a system of political controls over the military will be maintained by the party. Regional guer-

rilla forces are assigned responsibility for an area comparable to a province or state.

## 18-5. Militarization

In Aggressor methodology the militarization phase is subdivided into three steps—strategic defensive, organized guerrilla warfare, and the counteroffensive.

*a.* Step 1, strategic defensive, is designed to extend and weaken the government military forces while building the insurgent guerrilla force structure. There will be small raids and ambushes for purposes of destroying government material and capturing equipment and supplies for use and stockpiling by the guerrilla forces. The government and military will be harassed, but the technique will be primarily one of hit and run. Open battle will be avoided. Attacks on communities, sabotage against industry and communications, assassinations, and other acts will be accomplished by a means of drawing the government forces into isolated static security roles and proving to the people that the government is incapable of providing them security. The successes of the guerrilla bands will be pictured by the insurgent propagandists as heroic victories of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army against a corrupt government. This will tend to show the people that the revolutionary cause is winning some and will win more popular support. At the same time the government forces will be continually discredited, blamed for atrocities and brutality and generally painted as iron-fisted puppets of the elite ruling class or foreign imperialists.

*b.* Step 2, organized guerrilla warfare, of the militarization phase reflects an increased capability on the part of the guerrilla force. Regional guerrilla forces are being formed. No longer are the guerrillas confined to operations involving only a few men. Platoons and companies are now within the guerrilla force structure. Their weapons and training have also seen improvement with time. This new capability allows them to consider larger targets. Limited mobile warfare is now a possibility as are larger scale ambushes and raids. However, the guerrillas still do not seek to capture and hold real estate from the government, and a given guerrilla unit will still operate within an established area. All military action initiated by the guerrilla units is directed by the infrastructure and is designed to accomplish political ends. The objective remains that of whittling away at the government forces and proving the inability of the government to maintain law and order in the nation.

*c.* Step 3, counteroffensive, of the militarization stage is reached when the regularization of all or a portion of the guerrilla force can be considered. Battalions and larger units (mobile main forces) capable of employment anywhere in the country are now formed and for the first time, capture and control of areas by military action is considered. In this stage, the final collapse of the government's military forces is sought and, with their fall, will come the collapse of the national government. The militarization phase can also involve assistance forces from an outside power, e.g., individual agents, terrorists, guerrillas, or organized units. Throughout the militarization phase the revolutionary movement does not cease any of the political, social, and economic actions previously initiated. All of the activities of the previous phases are expanded and intensified in both the urban and rural environments. Clandestine organizations developed in Phase I in the cities will expand their promotion of demonstrations, strikes, riots, sabotage, and terrorist activities that can effectively cripple the cities' ability to function. Crippling the cities can be an impressive propaganda victory since the instruments and symbols of the viable government are located in its cities. Foreign press representatives can be found in the cities and National Liberation Front spokesmen can talk with these people in an effort to focus world-wide attention on and gain recognition for the insurgency. Funds and supplies are more readily available in the cities and the clandestine organization can use businesses as front organizations to purchase supplies without suspicion. Good intelligence is also available in the urban environment. Aggressor views insurgency as both a rural and urban movement. In the urban areas insurgent activities are designed to harass, frustrate, demoralize, and splinter the government. In the rural areas insurgents hope to ultimately defeat the military forces. If the insurgent forces cannot decisively defeat the government's military forces, the drain on the economy and the effect of political pressure by the insurgents, from both urban and rural activities, will be enough to insure the government's collapse.

## 18-6. Consolidation

With the defeat of the military and the collapse of the government, the insurgents now move into consolidation. There may be isolated

pockets of resistance to be wiped out to complete the military victory. At the same time, the previous government loyalists will be sought out and eliminated. An extensive intelligence/secret police network will be established that ties together the nets which already exist in controlled areas. This network will have as its primary mission the detection of any counterrevolutionary activity in the population. Mass organizations will be further developed to additionally control the people. Strict controls will be established over all activities that can influence the population, such as the news media, schools, churches and the entertainment industry. A saturation propaganda effort will be applied to build up the image of the new heroic leadership, the "glorious" future of the new "Democratic People's Republic," and the need for watchfulness, sacrifice, and work on the part of each citizen revolutionist. The liberation front government, which may have been a combination Circle Trigonist-Non-Circle Trigonist grouping, would evolve into a fully Circle Trigonist governing body by elimination or demotion. If all guerrilla units have not been regularized or disbanded, this action must be completed. This can be a touchy problem because many of the guerrillas may never have been ideologically associated with the insurgent movement and are now susceptible for recruitment into counterrevolutionary bands. There is also that understandable tendency for guerrillas to develop a spirit of independence that makes them unwilling to come under the control of any ruling group.

### 18–7. Coalition Government

If the insurgent movement is unable to bring about a decisive victory and a stalemate occurs, a coalition government between the insurgents and the existing government may result. Since insurgents, who are true believers in their ideology, will not compromise it, a coalition government will be understood by the insurgents as simply a delay. Coalition governments are viewed by Circle Trigonist revolutionaries as simply another means to the ultimate and inevitable victory, and the revolutionaries will continue, by using different techniques, to work for that victory.

## Section II. INFRASTRUCTURE ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

### 18–8. General

*a.* The Aggressor insurgent process advocates preparation for eventual rule from the very onset of the conflict. An essential characteristic of the insurgent process is the progressive building of the future administrative structure within the civil population at the same time the fight to destroy the government continues. Preoccupation with the matters of daily administration are not regarded by Aggressor insurgents as a matter to be taken up after victory, but rather as one of the principal means through which victory is to be achieved.

*b.* An Aggressor insurgent organization can be divided into three elements, each one developing into a vertical hierarchy as the insurgency progresses. These elements consist of the party apparatus, the mass civil organization, and the military forces. Clearly, this structure, as illustrated in Figure 18–1, will only evolve gradually spreading from one insurgent dominated area to another and from lower levels of organization to higher as the insurgency progresses. These three elements are held together by a unique system of interlocking directorates. Party members hold dual positions in both the mass civil organizations and military forces. Membership in the civil organizations may be covert and insurgent control exercised by party influence over the leaders of the organization. This section deals primarily with the infrastructure, the control and support mechanism of the insurgent movement.

*c.* The degree of clandestine organization of the insurgent infrastructure represents a compromise between the need for security and the necessity to operate efficiently. The extent to which the insurgent movement operates clandestinely depends on such factors as size and efficiency of the government's security forces, degree of popular support, and extent of insurgent control of the area of operations. In areas militarily dominated by the insurgency, the infrastructure acts openly. As insurgent military presence declines, or the presence of internal security forces increase, a premium is placed on covert behavior. Initially all insurgent activities may be clandestine, but as mass civil organizations are developed in controlled areas the insurgents operate overtly. Even in controlled areas parts of the infrastructure, especially the party, may continue to operate covertly. In both rural and urban areas the amount of clandestine activity will vary with




*Figure 18-1. Aggressor insurgent organizational structure.*




*Figure 18–2. Cells.*




*Figure 18–3. Parallel cells.*

the phase of insurgent development. Before discussing the activities of the infrastructure, it is necessary to understand the techniques of clandestine operations used by the insurgent infrastructure to carry out its activities.

## 18–9. Techniques of Clandestine Operation

*a. Cells.* The basic unit of the clandestine organization is the cell, which consists of a cell leader and cell members. The cell leader assigns tasks, supervises cell activities, and reports to his respective committee. Cell size and structure will depend on its assigned functions, but in times of danger cell size is reduced. To increase cell security and protect personnel, cells may be compartmentalized. Compartmentalization is employed by Aggressor to restrict the information about identity, background, and residence of another member. Each member will have an alias by which he is known within the organization. Cells operate on the "fail safe" principle, if one element of the organization is detected, the effect on the rest of the organization is minimal. Cells are organized on both a geographic basic (street cells) and a functional basis (within labor unions, professional groups, etc.). Cell structure and size will depend on the type of mission to be performed.

(1) The operational cell (fig 18–2) is usually composed of from three to eight members all of whom work together directly as a unit. This type of cell performs such functions as money collection, propaganda distribution, and is used for party indoctrination sessions. The size of the cell will vary according to insurgent development and, if the party is legal, those cells used for political indoctrination may have as many as 20 members. Large operational cells minimize the need for communication links between individuals, but they are far more vulnerable to detection if one member is caught and informs on the others.

(2) Auxiliary cells, as illustrated in figure 18–2, are usually found in front groups and sympathetic organizations. It contains a cell leader, assistant cell leaders, and members. It differs from operational cells in that it has an intermediate level of supervision and little or no compartmentalization. This type of cell is used to handle large influxes of members during expansion periods and cell leaders will identify potential recruits for operational, intelligence, or other clandestine cell functions.

(3) Operational cells may be arranged as cells in series in order that each cell can carry out a limited segment of a complex function. Activities which require a division of labor (weapons manufacture, escape and evasion routes, etc.) will be accomplished by cells in series. For example, in publishing an insurgent clandestine newspaper one cell would gather information, a second writes and edits the stories, a third obtains printing supplies, and the fourth and fifth print and distribute the paper (fig 18–2).

(4) Critical high-risk operational cells such as terror and sabotage cells are usually kept to 3-man cells. They remain independent of other underground networks and usually set up their own communications network.

(5) Intelligence cells (fig 18–2) are highly compartmentalized and unique in that the cell leader seldom comes into direct contact with all members. Cell members rarely, if ever, contact each other. Communication is maintained through a mail-drop or transported from one mail drop to another via courier if the cell or branch leader is located a distance away. The use of such indirect communication is characteristic of Aggressor type intelligence cells.

(6) Aggressor, for various reasons, makes use of parallel cells to support a primary cell. The clandestine organization will then have a backup in case the primary cell is compromised. In intelligence, duplicate cells are needed to independently verify information and check source reliability (fig 18–3).

*b. Organization.* Aggressor insurgent organization tries to distribute cells and supervisory committees over widely separated geographic areas, in various political organizations, and among different ethnic and social groups in an attempt to overextend government security forces.

(1) Insurgents organize their areas of responsibility and administrative boundaries so that they do not coincide with the political boundaries of the police and other internal security forces. The crossing of city and state lines or district and provincial boundaries may cause delays and confusion between the various government security forces because of lack of coordination between jurisdictions.

(2) Because centralization requires extensive communication, and communication is a serious vulnerability to clandestine organization, Aggressor clandestine organizational principles emphasize decentralization in the planning of specific activities (tactical decisions) needed to accomplish a mission that requires adjustment to local conditions. This allows a great deal of independent local action




*Figure 18–4. Dual party control channels.*




*Figure 18–5. Staff agencies of district level committee.*

in planning the necessary details to accomplish the mission. However, higher supervisory committees maintain tight control over mission assignment (strategic decisions) to insure a unified effort in attempting to destroy the existing government. Higher commands issue instructions in the form of mission orders, i.e., do whatever is necessary to accomplish the objective.

(3) As the infrastructure expands and/or controls specific areas, emphasis is placed on overt action in order to increase efficiency. Activities (except intelligence and security functions) become less compartmentalized and centralized control is established.

*c. Communications.* Communications between insurgent members is the most dangerous of clandestine and covert activities. Insurgent agents will meet in public only when necessary and normally communicate through mail-drops or couriers.

(1) Mail-drops should be located in natural and safe places. It should not be a place where people might very easily, and by accident, pick up the message. Primary and secondary locations should be established in case the primary is detected and signals should be arranged to indicate whether the mail-drop is loaded or unloaded. Anyplace a person goes without arousing suspicion (restaurants, lunchrooms, washrooms, telephone booths) is a good place to locate mail-drops or signals.

(2) Couriers can be anyone who can travel between the necessary points without drawing attention to themselves. Individuals that travel as part of their occupation (salesmen, taxi drivers, etc.) are potential couriers. Children, women, and aged men are also used because of their apparent innocence.

(3) Meetings should be held at times and places which insure that both agents have a plausible reason for being there. When meeting in public visual identification signals should be exchanged for recognition purposes. If a meeting is missed, an alternate place is prearranged for a later time. Meeting places should be changed frequently.

(4) Clandestine personnel are always mindful of possible surveillance by government security forces. They are always ready to employ countersurveillance techniques.

*d. Selective Recruitment.* Recruitment into the clandestine organization will be selective and depend upon organizational needs for qualified leaders, intelligence information, and the need for specially qualified persons such as doctors, locksmiths, printers, sheet metal workers, and chemists. Potential recruits must first be identified as being both useful to the organization and susceptible to recruitment. An Aggressor insurgent organization designates specific individuals, called "locators" to identify potential recruits and they pass the information to "recruiters" who will attempt the actual recruitment. Locators look for those who are frustrated by their present positions in life and blame others for their status. Locators try to identify politicians who have been passed over for higher office, doctors mired in mediocrity, lawyers with limited practices, and similar situations. Recruitment procedures gradually build committment through a series of smaller decisions. Once the individual is committed, his loyalty to the insurgent organization is constantly evaluated by continuously assigning him test missions. A recruit's background is thoroughly investigated and he is placed in a probationary cell until he is cleared. The last step is assignment to a permanent cell, but only after thorough training, testing, and evaluation. All covert insurgent members attempt to carry out their assigned missions while appearing to follow the daily routines of their everyday lives. The organization fills many insurgent jobs with persons who can perform their duties to the movement while engaged in legal occupations.

## 18–10. The Political Structure

*a. General.* The Aggressor insurgent political structure is designed so party cadre will be able to assume control over the complex of mass civil organizations and military forces as well as the party apparatus. For this reason Aggressor insurgent organization develops two systems of control; the party committee system is designed to carry out functions necessary to the success of the insurgency, while the cellular structure oversees the spiritual and intellectual life of the party members and is where political indoctrination takes place. Not all persons in the committee system are party members; some may be needed technicians. The cellular system consists of only party members. In urban areas and local rural areas where only rudimentary insurgent organization is found, the dual committee/cellular structure will probably not exist. Both party indoctrination and operational planning for conducting the insurgency will take place in the cell system. Aggressor realizes that where insurgent personnel are few in number the committee system is not feasible. In




*Figure 18–6. Basic level party structure.*




*Figure 18-7. Cellular structure of the committee hierarchy.*

urban areas the cellular system is maintained for security reasons.

*b. Party Committee System.* An Aggressor styled committee system is a totalitarian structure, ordered hierarchically with committees at the national, provincial, district, and local levels. There can also be regional levels.

(1) Each committee is dominated by its secretary and each secretary is supported by a permanent standing (executive) committee. In addition, a system of staff or branch agencies is attached to each committee to supervise the various activities necessary to the successful prosecution of the insurgency. The number and type of staff agencies vary in complexity from level to level. The heads of the various staff agencies are usually members of the executive committee they support, but this is not always the case. Some staff agency chiefs may not be on the executive committee. Military Affairs, Intelligence and Security, and Psychological Operations and Recruitment are always represented. It is also not necessary to be a staff agency chief to be a member of the executive committee. Figure 18–5 illustrates a probable insurgent executive committee and its staff agencies at a district level. Aggressor realizes that there are numerous variations on the number and type of staff agencies and the organizational structure will depend on the local situation. This same basic structure is usually maintained from district through national level with necessary changes in degree of sophistication.

(2) The lowest level of committee organization is the local party chapter which is the base of the party and the link between the party and the people. The party chapter may exist in several forms depending on the number of members and the extent of their experience (fig 18–6). Where the basic unit is small (3 members) no organizational level exists below the chapter level. All persons are members of a single cell. As membership in the chapter increases, (above eight members) personnel are assigned to subordinate cells. This is the most common form of local party organization. It consists of an eight to 25 man body organized into two or more cells and directed by an executive committee of from three to seven people (including the secretary). In urban areas, and unsecured rural areas, this organization would carry out operations and party activities using a party cellular structure. The dual committee/cellular system would not exist. The most complex form is a system of several party chapters that are coordinated by creating a multichapter executive body. Where expansion of party membership in a geographic area necessitates the establishment of two or more party chapters, it is necessary to establish a multichapter executive body. Although it is organizationally similar to a district executive committee, the party still treats it as a basic chapter unit. Some special cases do exist. For example, an important city multichapter executive body may report directly to provincial level rather than to district. The type of organization will depend on how Aggressor personnel interpret such factors as importance of the city or rural area, strength of government, and internal security forces. Circle Trigonist guidelines limit the number of party members to seventy in an enterprise or factory chapter and fifty in a village chapter. In fact, chapters seldom reach this size so there is little need for creating two or more chapters plus a multichapter coordinating body.

*c. Party Cellular System.* The hierarchical structure of committees is identified as the party bureaucracy, and is charged with the prosecution of the insurgency. Aggressor sharply distinguishes this bureaucracy from the cellular structure of the party. An organization of party cells is embedded within the committee system at all levels. The party cellular structure has its own command channels and programs of activities to carry out which are separate from committee channels and functions. Every party member in the committee system is also a member of one of these cells, and he is simultaneously responsible to leaders in both systems. At any one level in the bureaucratic structure, the party members of each staff agency and the members of the executive committee are grouped into cells according to their numbers. In the cellular structure a cell captain is designated and he is responsible to a body known as the "party group." The party group will have a Secretary, Assistant Secretary and a cellular committee similar in structure but smaller than the bureaucratic executive committee. The party group is in turn responsible to yet a third cellular office, the "interparty committee," and also has a secretary, assistant secretary and cellular committee. The dual relationship between the cellular system and the committee system is illustrated in figure 18–7. While one is dealing with only one level of authority in the committee system (i.e., district), a hierarchy of several levels has formed in the cellular system.




*Figure 18-8. Insurgent clandestine organization.*

This cellular system is reproduced at every level in the committee system. Since the chain of command in the cellular structure is totally separate from the bureaucratic structure, the local interparty committee reports not to the district bureaucratic committee but to the district interparty committee and so on up the line. The two systems can be dominated by a single person if he holds the first secretary's position in both the cellular and bureaucratic committee systems. In this type of Aggressor insurgent organizational structure one person tends to eventually dominate both systems. Where one person is not head of both systems the cellular first secretary even if he occupies an inconspicuous position in the bureaucracy (i.e., assistant chief of a bureaucratic staff agency), is the more powerful position and he "influences" all decisions made at that level.

## 18-11. Function of the Party Cellular and Committee Systems

*a. The Cellular System.* The reason for the party cell is far broader than the most evident reason—survival of the insurgency. It is in the cell that new recruits are molded into disciplined and dedicated insurgents. The cell is where insurgents learn to live with indoctrination practices that are aimed at isolating them from activities occuring in the rest of society. As a worker for one of the various staff agencies of the bureaucratic organizations, the party member is a worker among other workers. The bureaucratic system is not the type of environment needed to indoctrinate personnel and supply the hardened and disciplined leadership necessary to carry on a protracted struggle for the seizure of political power. Whereas the cell is designed to demand total commitment of a person's energies—physical, intellectual and moral. It is where the new revolutionary man is molded. In the cell meeting the individual receives orders from his interparty committee and each person's work load is set. As a member of a staff agency he may receive the same directives again through the bureaucratic channels of communication, but the party instructions are what count. The road to success in Aggressor's insurgent structure is by achieving success in the party cellular hierarchy.

*b. The (Bureaucratic) Committee System.* It is the function of the various executive committees and their staff agencies to coordinate and control all activities of the insurgent effort. At each level the executive committee will have under it various specialized staff agencies designed to carry out administrative and operational activities in support of the insurgency. An Aggressor inspired insurgency follows the same basic pattern at each level in the hierarchy. There will be an executive committee (dominated by the secretary) for direction and control, and its staff agencies: Intelligence and Security, Psychological Operations and Mass Recruiting, Propaganda and Training, Communications and Liaison, Finances and Logistics, and Military Affairs. The strength and efficiency of the government's internal security forces in the area of operations determines how covert or overt the insurgent organization is. Figure 18-8 represents the organizational chart of a highly compartmentalized, covert and clandestine Aggressor type insurgent organization. To the maximum extent possible, all staff agencies will organize their operational activities according to the techniques of clandestine organization outlined in paragraph 18-9.

(1) *Intelligence and security.* One of the first tasks of the insurgent movement is to set up an intelligence network. Aggressor relies heavily on mass organizational work among the population so that all civilians in the area will serve as a mass informer network for espionage, sabotage, and subversive activities. Information targets assigned to the intelligence cells are such items as public opinion about the government officials in the area, attitudes of government agencies, social organizations, and politicians toward the people, intelligence and security activities of the internal security forces, and information on missions and movements of military units. This could include the number and morale of the troops, the pattern and routine of their patrols, unit designations, weapons and equipment. In the area of political intelligence Aggressor guidelines suggest that a file be kept on those who cooperate with the government. This type of information can be passed to the psychological operations agency at a later date should these people not come over to the insurgent side. Women can play an important role as sources of intelligence. They can obtain jobs as secretaries, domestics employed on military installations, or in the homes of enemy personnel as servants. People in professions (doctors, lawyers, engineers, scientists, etc.) have direct access to valuable information. Jobs that require persons to travel extensively and meet people (salesmen, etc.) can be good sources of information along with certain types of businesses such as restaurants, taverns, and

shopkeepers. Numerous other sources are available. Insurgent security personnel will investigate enemy intelligence activity in their area and handle interrogations of suspect personnel as part of the counterintelligence effort. This section is responsible for reporting on the political conversations of party members and the local population, paying special attention to the ideology and political viewpoints expressed by these people. Security personnel will also establish informant nets in their local areas as one means of defending against penetration by hostile intelligence forces. The Intelligence and Security Agency will have organic armed reaction cells within its intelligence and security units. These armed reaction cells are used by the agency chief to assist in the intelligence gathering and security effort. For example, an armed reaction cell may be sent to deal with an insurgent intelligence agent who has cooperated with the enemy, or an informant who has become defiant or more demanding of rewards. These cells function purely in a clandestine intelligence capacity and are not to be confused with sabotage and terror cells under the Psychological Operations and Mass Recruiting Agency, which are designed to have an effect on the mass population.

(2) *Psychological operations and mass recruiting.* These operations are designed to create social disorganization and uncertainty, and create doubt and suspicion about the government and its officials. All propaganda stresses the strength and legitimacy of the insurgent effort against a corrupt government, and the inevitability of the insurgent victory. The insurgent organization may have a small mimeograph with which they can publish leaflets and a weekly newspaper. Both are used to expose the actions of corrupt government officials. Information on collaborators and government tactics is also published. Government intelligence agents working among the population are exposed. Simple techniques of sabotage as well as targets for sabotage are also published in an effort to get more persons committed to the insurgent movement through some illegal action. In some areas radios and even television may be used. Other subversive tactics such as letter writing campaigns are used. The insurgents write letters to police and other internal security forces to tie up their efforts with a flood of false reports. Loyal government officials may be denounced as members of the insurgency. It is this agency that is responsible for organizing demonstrations, strikes and riots. Trained agitators channel the group's grievances and hostilities toward selected outsiders such as landlords, business firms, government tax collectors, and "corrupt" politicians. The Psychological Operations Agency also has terror and sabotage cells which it can call upon. Terror and sabotage are used in support of other techniques such as propaganda and agitation. Prime targets are security forces and local officials. Proper selection is important so that terror is not used indiscriminately. The first targets chosen will be police and government officials that insurgent intelligence points out as being corrupt and/or unpopular. The insurgents can then boast of eliminating thugs and hooligans. Terror cells are used to punish those who defect from or betray the insurgent cause. Intimidation and threats will be used in attempting to gain support from the undecided or uncommitted. Terror and sabotage cells will back up insurgent threats made against those who support the government cause. Both terror and sabotage are used by Aggressor to provoke, if possible, a harsh government counterreaction which could further polarize the population and make recruitment easier. Insurgent personnel involved in sabotage will have the more stable forms of explosives available to them (TNT and plastic explosives). The Aggressor Homeland is known to have at times infiltrated explosives experts from their military units into countries experiencing insurgency for the purpose of training indigeneous saboteurs. Saboteurs may have among their personal belongings leaflets or technical manuals on the use and placement of explosives. All types of psychological operations are inseparable from organizational work. The objective is to make the population more susceptible to recruitment into party controlled mass organizations. Insurgents attempt to create categories of mass organizations calculated to make every person in the area subject to membership in some organization. The creation of mass organizations lends credibility to the insurgent claim of supporting popular revolution. The most common categories are youth, women, farmers or workers, and any religious, ethnic, or racial minorities in the area. Youth are encouraged to evade government military service and perform work for the insurgents. A final mass organization deals with government internal security personnel. Party operations within it are designed to build up an informer apparatus in these forces, provoke desertions from the military, resignations from police and

military forces, and adversely influence their morale.

(3) *Propaganda and Training Agency.* This section generates all forms of propaganda for both party member indoctrination and the populace. It conducts political and ideological indoctrination during training courses. Pamphlets and leaflets developed by this section popularize the claim of popular revolution. It will distribute books, magazines, and posters supporting the revolution. Troupes of traveling entertainers that put on propagandized performances are sponsored by the Propaganda and Training Agency. Textbooks for use in primary and secondary schools are developed. In its capacity as the conscience and trainer of party members, the section "reeducates" those members whose Circle Trigonist orthodoxy has been found not to conform to party policy.

(4) *Communications and Liaison Agency.* Efficient communications between personnel is one of the most important insurgent activities. This agency provides communications within and between each level of the insurgent infrastructure. Communications and liaison nets are needed for clandestine operations so couriers with messages and funds and cadre organizers or training instructors can move through government controlled areas. Liaison routes are established for the infiltration and exfiltration of an area by cadre members, agents, or military units. Communications and liaison networks consist of escape routes and hide-outs or relay stations along the routes. Relay stations are usually within one day's travel of each other and they provide some method of hiding personnel or material that is being transported. Stations are able to provide food, shelter, funds, and instructions. Some may provide identification papers and false documents. Many types of facilities can be used as stations. For example, a doctor in charge of a station could put evaders in a hospital as patients. Each organizational level (i.e., district) is responsible for the stations and routes in its area of operation. Personnel who maintain the stations seldom, if ever, engage in other insurgent activities. Each person in the route knows how to reach only the next link, and no one person in the net knows the identity or location of every link. Guides generally escort personnel from one station to the next and meet at prearranged locations about halfway between the two stations. Neither guide knows the location of the other's station. No one carries personal papers, photographs, or letters that may identify him and talking along the route is discouraged. Aggressor agents traveling across international boundaries will travel to a neutral or third country and contact liaison personnel there in order to infiltrate into the target country. The communications and liaison chief will coordinate closely with all other staff agencies.

(5) *Finances and Logistics Agency.* The activities of this agency presuppose the ability to control portions of the population. It is responsible for the management and control of supplies contributed by the populace, distribution and storage of such goods, and the collection of funds. Funds may be obtained outside the country by loans from foreign governments (i.e., Aggressor Homeland), collections from foreign sympathizers and friendship societies, and even foreign business speculators. Funds can be infiltrated back into the country via couriers, international bank accounts, import businesses, or dummy corporations set up by the infrastructure. Support from within the country can be obtained by soliciting funds from the population and business community in the form of gifts, loans, or taxes. Persons or businesses that do not willingly contribute will be forced into contributing prearranged amounts by terror cells. They will be made an example of in order to aid future collection efforts. Tax committees are set up to investigate in detail a person's occupation and income. Insurgents attempt to levy taxes fairly in order to validate their claim of legitimately representing a popular movement. Aggressor insurgents attempt to avoid a public image as outlaws and thieves and being labeled as such by the government. Articles may be sold through front organizations (bookstores, coffeeshops, etc.), lottery tickets may be sold, and large sums are available through the sale of narcotics both inside and outside the country. Insurgents may sell war bonds or counterfeit the government's currency. Logistical needs are obtained by covert members of the supply net as part of their daily civilian occupations. Clothing, food, medicines, printing materials, radios, etc., can be obtained by personnel whose occupations deal with these goods. Supplies can also be obtained from the black market, purchased by front organizations on the legal market, stolen from factories, or obtained during raids. The Finances and Logistics Agency may also organize cottage industries to produce items such as small arms, sabotage equipment, and uniforms. Agricultural commodities can be obtained by taxing the farmers and crop production will be monitored.

The enemies of the insurgent movement will attempt to monitor these types of finance and logistical activities.

(6) *Military Affairs Agency.* The primary function of this agency is to coordinate all military activity with the executive committee and its secretary. It, like the other staff agencies, is composed of primarily party members whose decisions on military matters reflect the needs and wants of the political apparatus rather than the professional military. It is thus primarily a political agency and only secondarily a military body. The Military Affairs Agency is the staff section through which the executive committee sends directives to the military headquarters at its level and supervises the military units under that headquarters. No proposals that originate in the military headquarters may be acted upon until they are approved through the Military Affairs Agency, Executive Committee, and Secretary of that level. It is through the Military Affairs Agency that the party is able to maintain control of all operations in which the military forces engage.

## 18-12. Mass Civil Organizations

*a. Purpose of Mass Organizations.* The infrastructure is developed from the party elite and a variety of popular mass associations which are fully under the control of the party. Mass organizations serve as convenient cover for the party, and insurgents carry out their activities in the name of these organizations. By mobilizing the unorganized into formal mass organizations, the insurgents are able to create the support mechanisms among the people that are necessary for their activities. By this method the Circle Trigonist party will appear to be only one organization among many that are working for the insurgent cause. In fact, the party, through a system of interlocking directorates, guides all the organizations. By manipulating human behavior through the use of mass organizations, the insurgents hope to divert and eventually replace the traditional values and loyalties of the population with Circle Trigonist values. The insurgent schedule calls for the entire society to be restructured from the bottom to the top by the day the insurgents take control of the country. Thus the insurgents must rely on mass support and not merely a clandestine conspiratorial organization if the revolution is to succeed. Public support and sympathy is vital as a shield for infrastructure members against the internal security forces. Informants are recruited from mass organizations by intelligence and security personnel to set up intelligence nets for monitoring organizational activities and obtaining information.

*b. Types of Mass Organizations.* Aggressor insurgent guidelines call for the categorizing of the population in an area of operation according to various economic, social, physical, cultural, ethnic, religious, and other dominant factors. Groups are created based on these categories with the goal of having everyone in the area join a group which he most closely identifies with. The leadership of each group is to deal with the specific problems of its membership. Organizations developed by insurgents fall into several general categories such as workers, farmers, women, youth, ethnic, religious, political, and professional (writers, lawyers, etc.) groups. A special type of mass organization developed by the insurgents is the paramilitary militia units at the local levels. They are directly under the control of the political apparatus and provide the insurgents with a force that can be used to back up its directives. These units play a significant role in the indoctrination of the population. Militia personnel are trained in both political and military subjects, with the bulk of the time being spent on the political subjects. The constant presence of a militia force lends credence to the insurgent's claims that the government is weak and ineffective. The Aggressor type insurgent organization considers the militia a special type of mass organization because of its greater impact on the population than on government security forces. A relatively small percentage of militia men are party members. Its constant presence hastens the breakdown of loyalties to the government so that the infrastructure leaders can gradually assume de facto government administrative functions. Although militia members are known to the people, they are seldom turned in to security forces even in government security areas. Two other paramilitary organizations that come under direct party control are the terror and sabotage squads. These squads are operationally controlled by the Psychological Operations and Mass Recruitment Staff Agency of the party executive committee. They usually function as clandestine cells, unlike the militia they are not normally known to the rest of the population, and the percentage of party members in these cells is very high (perhaps 100 percent).

*c. Techniques of Mass Recruitment.* The

party organization set up in both the cities and the rural areas will devise means of winning sympathy and support from the people and later channeling it toward the insurgency. The mass recruiters survey the needs, likes, and dislikes of the people. Insurgents will create social indebtedness by seeking out families that have lost everything, the poor and the propertyless, the unemployed, and the sick who have not received assistance from the government. These people will be helped and later asked to repay the debt by assisting the movement. A word from a friend or relative is a more powerful persuader than impersonal propaganda. Young people in the area will be concentrated on because of their value to the movement (i.e., as soldiers), their high susceptibility to persuasion, and the strong influence their peers can exert. In rural areas where it is difficult to build a clandestine organization because everyone is closely associated, a more forceful approach may be used. A rebel force, referred to as an Armed Propaganda Team, may march in and aid the organizational work in the local insurgent cadre. Tactics of these Armed Propaganda Teams vary with the local situation. They range from a simple show of force, to assassination of loyal government officials, to actively helping the local population. If directed to by the cadre they will help in the fields, advise on crop production, and assist during times of flood and droughts. They can assist in civic and public functions that the government is unable to handle. Possession of weapons gives these forces "prestige" among the population and the insurgent cadre's suggestion that villages organize various mass associations to carry on the work begun is particularly persuasive. Elections are held to fill leadership positions in the various organizations and the cadre insure that party members fill enough leadership positions to guarantee control of the organizations. More often than not the top position is not held by a party member. Each mass organization will elect an executive committee and a secretary.

## 18–13. Establishment of People's Liberation Committees

*a. Prerequisites.* It is the establishment of People's Liberation Committees that signifies the existence of the shadow government. Through the control of these committees the insurgents displace the existing government and begin to carry out administrative functions. Liberation committees are usually formed in an area where insurgent military forces are strong enough to contest the government's control. Mass organizational work must be successful enough that large segments of people (ideally 50 percent) are members of organizations. Finally the local party chapter must have established a sound cellular/committee structure and expanded enough so that adequate numbers of party personnel are available to control the liberation committee.

*b. Local Elections.* People's liberation committees are established by "elections" in which the bulk of the population participate. In this manner insurgents claim that the committee is a freely elected representative of the people. To the extent that mass organizations are controlled, the election of liberation committees will be also. To indicate to the local population who the correct candidates are, the local party chapter will propose a single list of candidates during a general meeting and it will discourage additional nominations. Pressure is applied through the mass organizations to which the people belong to insure that everyone votes. This insures that the bulk of the population is involved at least in some small part, in the insurgent movement. If party cadre believe it necessary, Armed Propaganda Teams will be present. Individuals chosen for election are predominantly nonparty members, but they can be manipulated (some may be striving for party membership) to make decisions that are in the insurgent's best interests. The party organization is smaller than the liberation committee and only a few party members are elected. The liberation committee will have an executive council of three to five persons which will carry on activities between full committee meetings. This council will have *staff agencies* which Aggressor insurgents claim are political instruments for the implementation of liberation committee policy. These staff agencies of the executive council provide the party with its ultimate control of the people's liberation committee system. The staff agencies of the local party bureaucratic committee system, which had probably been operating clandestinely, now become the staff agencies of the overt People's Liberation Committee Executive Council. These staff agencies will continue to carry on the same insurgent functions but this time as the "apolitical" instruments of democratically elected popular movement. Party members in the liberation committee will also be elected to the executive council and appointed to its staff agencies. Thus the entire party organization

will live within the mass organizational structure (fig 18–1) which assures its cover while at the same time justifying its actions as the wishes of the people. The mass organizational structure has now fully developed into an efficient support mechanism. The assumption by the liberation committee of executive, legislative, and even judicial functions proceeds from the development of the liberation committee and the staff agencies. The liberation committee becomes, in fact, a shadow government. This committee system will raise hierarchically to the national level where it will claim to be a provisional government (fig 18–1). The gradual building of a tightly integrated political and mass organizational structure from local to national level is the process of infrastructure consolidation.

# CHAPTER 19
# ORGANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT FOR INSURGENT GUERRILLA WARFARE

## Section I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INSURGENT MILITARY FORCES

### 19–1. General

In an Aggressor directed insurgency the military forces are considered as being only one of several instruments by which the Circle Trigon Party seeks to consolidate its power and overthrow the existing government. The insurgent military forces do not determine policy objectives but are an instrument through which policy is implemented by the party leadership in the front system.

### 19–2. Development of Insurgent Forces

The Aggressor insurgent method for developing military forces, once the initial infrastructure is operating, follows a cumulative progression. Cadre of the party organization who specialize in military activities recruit personnel and form armed propaganda teams. These teams normally consist of four or five personnel, but can be larger. They are designed primarily to support the mass organizational activities already begun by other party cadre in the area, to include the development of a local militia force for the local party chapter. Armed propaganda teams are the forerunners to regional forces, and by aiding the expansion of mass organizations they help build a base from which ambitious military activity will later be sustained. Once the infrastructure can support regional units, armed propaganda teams develop into regional units by withdrawing some militarily competent personnel from the local militia (Green Guard) units and obtaining recruits from the infrastructure. Once regional units are trained and become combat effective, seasoned personnel are withdrawn from them for the formation of main force units. Additional personnel are recruited by the infrastructure, with some being drawn from the militia units, to maintain necessary strength levels of the regional forces. Both main force and many regional force units are capable of providing armed propaganda teams to be dispatched when requested by the political apparatus. Armed propaganda teams within both regional and main forces are considered special mission units because of their activities in organizing the population to support the insurgent movement. As such, they contain almost exclusively party members and are tightly controlled by the party. It is not unusual for the military leader of a special mission unit to be a high echelon party member and therefore more powerful in the insurgent organization than the military commander to whom the special mission unit is militarily subordinate.

### 19–3. Types of Forces

*a.* The local militia is composed of the local population who remain in residence in their towns and villages and are subject to the infrastructure control apparatus evolved by the local party. The local militia will conduct raids, ambushes, and on occasion will fight in support of regional and/or main force units operating in the area. The insurgents do not, however, consider the local militia as primarily a fighting force even though they continuously harass government authorities and security forces. Their basic mission is political: to constantly emphasize that the insurgent organization is always present among the population. Although government forces may deploy in an area for a while, the insurgent forces are always there. This relentless pressure at the local level not only forces the dispersion of government forces, but will inhibit the populace from supplying the government with information on insurgent personnel. Approximately seventy percent of the militia's training is spent on political indoctrination.

*b.* Regional forces are composed almost exclusively of personnel from the geographic area in which they are operating. These forces are structured more along military lines and operate within a given geographic region usually of province or state size. If there are extended periods of time between operations, regional

forces may completely disband and personnel return to their villages, to regroup at a predetermined later time and place. Regional forces will use basically guerrilla tactics in conducting raids, ambushes, and attacks on government forces. Unlike the local militia, the military activity of regional forces is coordinated and controlled by a military headquarters which in turn receives instructions from the political apparatus, through the Military Affairs Agency.

*c.* Mobile main force units are usually organized along conventional Aggressor military lines into squads, platoons, companies, battalions, and up to regiments. They employ basically conventional tactics in engaging the government's forces. Main forces are the best of the insurgent's military structure, and usually have a high concentration of party members, as well as candidates for party membership.

## 19–4. The Party Cellular Structure Within the Military

In similar fashion to the party bureaucratic organization, there is a party cellular structure within the military which is composed of party cells, party groups, and interparty committees. Precisely because there is both a military and party chain of command within the military, it is possible for a militarily lower ranking individual to be more influential in the insurgent organization because he holds a higher party position than his military superior. Generally, military rank and party position equate, but this is not always the case. As professional military personnel, individuals are responsible to their immediate superiors and so on up the chain of command to commanding general, but those same persons who are party members are also responsible to the party through the cell, party group, and interparty committees within the military. The party cell structure within the military serves the same function that it serves within the bureaucratic organization. The interparty cellular committees ultimately speak with the authority of the Circle Trigon Party at the national level.

## 19–5. Lines of Authority Over the Military

*a.* The interparty (cellular) committee at each level (local, district, provincial, regional, and national) is the final approving authority for all insurgent activities carried out at that level, and decisions by the interparty committees ultimately effect the activities of the military forces.

*b.* The party bureaucratic committee at each echelon, being the administrative apparatus through which insurgent operations are coordinated, is responsible for drawing up plans and combining military and nonmilitary activities necessary in implementing directives from above.

*c.* The Military Affairs Agency, as a staff section of the bureaucratic committee, is the party control arm at the command and staff level in the military organization. Through this agency the party assures itself that tactical military operations are carried out to promote established political requirements. The leadership of the Military Affairs Agency is drawn from political personnel of the bureaucratic committee and key staff personnel who head critical offices at the military headquarters. Likewise the military headquarters contains a political component that consists of several members of the Military Affairs Agency. Even though several individuals hold concurrent membership in both organizations, the practical distinction between the military environment at the military headquarters and the political emphasis in the Military Affairs Agency is kept clear. The Military Affairs Agency is divided into three sections: a staff section, a political section, and a logistics section.

(1) The staff section is responsible for the development and combat training of the military forces, administrative functions, training of special mission personnel, communications and other activities.

(2) The political section is responsible for proper employment of propaganda and training materials, indoctrination of insurgent military personnel, propagandizing civilians and enemy troops, party administrative procedures, and party security.

(3) The logistics section is responsible for the supplies and materials, transportation, and financial needs of the military forces.

*d.* The military headquarters is the directing center for specific tactical operations undertaken by military forces within its command. The military headquarters is where the insurgent's military expertise is concentrated. If large operations are planned that require more forces than a particular military headquarters has readily available to it, a tactical command is available to coordinate the actions of multiple units at lower levels. For example, company and platoon sized units in a given district can be moved to an adjoining district by a tactical command to reinforce, resupply, or rescue a

comparable or larger force that is under fire. Tactical commands do not figure in all military operations, but are implemented when coordination becomes necessary. No operations planned at the military headquarters are implemented without approval by the Military Affairs Agency.

### 19–6. Interlocking the Levels of Authority

The problems that could be encountered in trying to coordinate all four lines of authority at a particular level are overcome by assigning individuals in each of these activities to multiple positions at two or more layers of the structure. This effectively interlocks the four organizations. For example, the secretary of the interparty committee at district level could concurrently be the head of the district bureaucratic committee and commander of the district military headquarters. He could also be chief of the Military Affairs Agency or any combination of these positions. Through this system of interlocking directorates the secretary of the interparty cellular committee is able to use alternate command channels to insure that party policy is correctly implemented.

### 19–7. Staff Sections of a Military Headquarters

The staff sections of a military headquarters are identical to the staff sections of the Military Affairs Agency (para 19–5) in both name and function. This has occurred because the same three functions (administration, political, and logistics) are carried out by the Military Affairs Agency of the Party Committee in those areas where the insurgency has not yet developed a military headquarters.

### 19–8. The Political Officer

The political officer is the official party representative in the military headquarters and the military units. In a military unit he cooperates with the commanding officer in the formulation of campaign plans. He is responsible for the implementation of all higher level party decisions and for influencing the soldiers' thinking toward correct party policy. Through both the party cellular structure and the system of political officers, the party maintains party control over the military, enhances the image of the insurgent forces as a military force drawn from the people and acting on behalf of the people, and insures, through indoctrination, that the military rank and file see themselves as the inevitable wave of the future. As part of political indoctrination the political officer stresses organizational work among the population as an important part of each soldier's life. This effort among military personnel is designed to complement mass organizational work by the bureaucratic committees at various levels. A political officer and a military commander will exist side by side in all units of the insurgent forces. In platoons and squads the individuals are called political fighters and they aid the company political officer. In battalion and regimental units the political officer will have a staff to aid him in his political education, mass organizational work, and party duties.

## Section II. BASE AREAS, LOGISTICS, AND TRAINING

### 19–9. Establishment of Bases

After the formation of the mass civil organization and the establishment of the various bureaucratic party committees in a country, Aggressor beings to organize operational bases. Bases are organized in the less densely populated areas. Depending upon the situation in a given country, a base is formed in the most favorable area or bases are established simultaneously in several regions of the country.

### 19–10. Characteristics of a Base

A base may be clandestine or open depending upon the situation in a country. Both types have the same characteristics except for the secrecy which clothes the location of a clandestine base. These characteristics are—

*a.* A closely integrated complex of villages prepared for defense. The area is normally located in terrain which is fairly inaccessible to the enemy's armed forces and which provides hiding places for guerrillas.

*b.* A population politically indoctrinated with the insurgent ideology. Each individual, including women and children, living in a base area has a task related to the advancement of the Party's ideas.

*c.* A network of food and ammunition dumps for the support of regional and main forces.

*d.* Training facilities with Aggressor advisors and instructors.

### 19–11. Qualities of Leaders

All leaders must be unyielding in their policies, loyal to the Insurgent Party, and sincere in their desire to assist the Party. They must be

well educated in party doctrine techniques, self-confident, able to establish severe discipline, and capable of coping with counterpropaganda. Having all these qualities, the leaders will become models for the people to emulate.

## 19–12. Political Objective

The political objective of military operations overshadows all other aspects. The mission of the military is not merely to eliminate enemy positions but the political objective is to win the support of the people. Tactical instruction continually emphasizes that the principal goal is to liberate the inhabitants within the area of an operation.

## 19–13. Security of the Rear

In Aggressor doctrine security of the rear means the people of a country are sympathetic to the insurgent cause and that wherever regional or main forces operate they will receive full support from the people. Guerrilla warfare depends on the population to form a secure base for its operations. Once the people have been indoctrinated, they are not expected merely to be sympathetic to the cause, but also must provide such positive contributions as food, manpower, shelter, intelligence, and transportation. In addition, the local inhabitants provide hiding places for guerrillas, often quartering them for long periods of time. All of these activities are made possible by the mass organizational work of the insurgent infrastructure and party control apparatus.

## 19–14. Logistics

*a.* In the early stages of an insurgency, logistics poses a serious problem. Arms and other military equipment are especially difficult to procure and in many instances only enough individual weapons are available for issue to 75 percent of the personnel. Military equipment may be very primitive, especially that issued to the militia and regional forces, but as the insurgency progresses, more modern material is acquired.

*b.* All personnel of the insurgent forces are impressed with the need for picking up government arms and equipment from the battle area during and after any operation. Raids are conducted against government ammunition and supply areas for the specific purpose of capturing arms and equipment.

*c.* In almost every country in the world some form of armed conflict has taken place. As a result of such action, arms and equipment are either inadvertently left in the area or the contesting forces have left caches of them for future use. Insurgents take every opportunity to gather those left and establish their own caches. Arms and equipment are also supplied by the Aggressor Homeland.

*d.* Local manufacture is a major source of arms and equipment. Small shops are established and equipped with the crudest sort of equipment. These shops are usually mobile so they can be moved from place to place. Some shops produce small arms, others ammunition and still others mines and explosives. In almost all instances, shops produce material for a local area and not for the entire country.

## 19–15. Training

*a.* The underlying principle in the training of personnel for the insurgent forces is that everyone should initially be assigned to a regional guerrilla unit. After an individual has learned the rudiments of guerrilla warfare, he may then be assigned to units at other levels, and subsequently to the main forces. Regardless of the unit of assignment, the most important aspect of the soldier's training, and that which consumes the most time, is the political. The objectives of the political training are to produce soldiers instilled with the insurgent cause and to provide effective propaganda agents. All troops, whether party members or not, receive political indoctrination.

*b.* After the leaders of the local guerrilla forces have been trained, the training cadre moves to district level, and the local units conduct their own training. The local training is largely political in nature but does include—

(1) Use of individual weapons.
(2) Conduct of sabotage.
(3) Some close order drill.
(4) Familiarization with automatic weapons.

*c.* Once the district units are operational, they also conduct their own training with some supervision by main force personnel. Training is essentially the same as that at the local level but less emphasis is placed on political training and personnel receive more individual instruction and begin to study unit tactics. Training personnel concentrate their efforts on training the support units which are equipped with crew served weapons. Provincial schools are established to conduct this type of training when the situation permits.

*d.* Training of main forces is much more extensive and professional than training of re-

gional forces. Aggressor regulars may supervise the training, which follows the same pattern as that conducted for the Aggressor armed forces. Both officer and noncommissioned officer schools are established to provide well-grounded leaders. Branch schools are organized to train individuals to fill positions in the various combat units. Those individuals needing specialized training, as well as high-ranking officers and personnel extremely dedicated to Circle Trigonist ideology, are sent to schools in the Aggressor Homeland.

## Section III. INSURGENT MILITARY ORGANIZATION

### 19–16. Organization of Militia

There is no established organization or even a pattern for the organization of militia units. Under the direction of the town or village Military Affairs Agency of the party bureaucratic committee, able-bodied individuals are formed into section-size groups. Each group may then be assigned certain defensive, sabotage, information collection or propaganda missions depending upon whether the village is located in government or Aggressor controlled territory. Paramilitary units, which are a part of the mass civil organization, are organized in the villages immediately after the people agree to support an insurgency. Individuals assigned to the units are "part-time" soldiers who work at their normal vocations (e.g., farmers, workers, and teachers) by day and operate as guerrillas at night. The formation and training of militia units may be supervised by Aggressor trained indigenous personnel. Militia units in insurgent-controlled areas have the mission of protecting the villages against attacks from government military forces. In government-controlled areas, the militia units may collect combat intelligence and conduct sabotage and espionage operations against the established authorities, thus supplementing the efforts of the clandestine insurgent organization. Arms and equipment for these units are rather primitive with only equipment captured from the government and not needed by the regional forces being available to them.

### 19–17. Organization of Regional Forces

Once local units are operational, guerrilla units, normally referred to as regional units, are organized at district and provincial levels.




*Figure 19–1. Organization of Regional Company.*




*Figure 19-2. Organization—Main Force Battalion.*

Members of the regional units are "full-time" soldiers who are not issued uniforms but wear the same type clothing as the peasants. Regional units, which may be advised by regular Aggressor or Aggressor satellite personnel, usually conduct operations only within their own provinces.

*a. General.* According to the environment in which they operate, there will be innumerable differences in the organization of regional forces. While they have no formalized organization, a certain organizational pattern does exist. Aggressor feels a guerrilla unit should not be larger than 150 men and a unit of about 125 men is ideal; therefore, company strength is usually maintained at about this level. Because of the need for rapid movement and the lack of weapons and equipment, few support type units are organized. The number of men and the quantity and quality of equipment in each unit often depends on the ability of the local infrastructure cadre to recruit personnel and procure weapons and equipment in the area. The figures representing various unit sizes are only guides, and smaller numbers of personnel may be more appropriate for a specific situation.

*b. Guerrilla Squad.* The operational tendency for guerrillas to function in small groups makes the squad the ideal unit. Eight to ten men is the maximum number that can operate efficiently; therefore, the squad, which is organized in each village and town, should always function as a complete unit under the control of its leaders. Members of the squad are armed with various weapons. An attempt is made to furnish each member with an Aggressor-manufactured weapon, but this usually is not possible. In addition, each individual carries several grenades or incendiary devices, if they are available.

*c. Guerrilla Platoons.* As is true of the squad, a platoon does not have a standard organiza-

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 57mm AT Gun | 82mm Rcl Gun | 82mm Mort | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr |
| H & H Co | 9 | 29 | 38 | | | | | | | |
| Hq Sec | (7) | (9) | (16) | | | | | | | |
| Sig Plat | (1) | (9) | (10) | | | | | | | |
| Sup Plat | (1) | (11) | (12) | | | | | | | |
| Rifle Co (3) | 6 | 105 | 111 | | | | | 6 | 9 | 9 |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (5) | (7) | | | | | | | |
| Rifle Plat (3) | (1) | (25) | (26) | | | | | | (3) | (3) |
| Hq Sec | [1] | [1] | [2] | | | | | | | |
| Rifle Sqd [3] | | [8] | [8] | | | | | | [1] | [1] |
| MG Plat | (1) | (25) | (26) | | | | | (6) | | |
| Hq Sec | [1] | [1] | [2] | | | | | | | |
| Hv MG Sqd [3] | | [8] | [8] | | | | | [2] | | |
| Mort Btry | 5 | 43 | 48 | | | 6 | | | | |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (7) | (9) | | | | | | | |
| Mort Plat (3) | (1) | (12) | (13) | | | (2) | | | | |
| Spt Btry | 5 | 48 | 53 | 3 | 3 | | 2 | | | |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (3) | (5) | | | | | | | |
| AT Gun Plat | (1) | (17) | (18) | (3) | | | | | | |
| Rcl Gun Plat | (1) | (13) | (14) | | (3) | | | | | |
| ADMG Plat | (1) | (15) | (16) | | | | (2) | | | |
| Total | 37 | 435 | 472 | 3 | 3 | 6 | 6 | 18 | 27 | 27 |

*Figure 19-3. Personnel, weapons and equipment—Main Force Battalion.*

tion. Normally it has three squads (organized as outlined in *b* above) plus a platoon leader and a political fighter. Total strength will vary between 24 and 32 individuals, depending upon the organization of the squads. A platoon is usually organized in each district.




*Figure 19–4. Organization—Main Force Regiment.*

*d. Guerrilla Company.* A guerrilla company (fig 19–1) is normally organized in each province. In addition to a headquarters element, it is composed of three platoons (organized as outlined in *c* above) and a weapon support platoon. The headquarters consists of a commander, a political officer and an assistant, one or two administrative personnel, and three or four supply and mess personnel for a total of 7 to 9. The support platoon has a strength of 22 to 28 personnel organized into a headquarters consisting of a platoon leader and a political fighter, a light recoilless rifle squad, a light machinegun squad, and a light mortar squad, if such personnel and equipment are available. Each squad is equipped with two weapons which may have been manufactured in any country. Both the machinegun and mortar squads have a strength of six to eight men while the recoilless rifle squad has ten to twelve.

## 19–18. Organization of Main Force Units

*a.* As the civilian population becomes more sympathetic to the insurgency and the regional forces assume a more military posture, Aggressor begins to organize main forces. Initially, only companies and battalions are formed; then as additional personnel and equipment become available, regiments, support and service type units are organized. All main force units are subordinate to an insurgent party committee and operate from base areas. Typical battalion and regimental organizations are shown in figures 19–2 through 19–5. The actual size, organization and equipment will vary with the insurgent's capabilities in the area of operation.

*b.* Personnel to form main force units are obtained from the regional forces. When the regional units are no longer capable of furnishing personnel in sufficient quantity, individuals are recruited from the population and some defectors from the enemy's armed forces are accepted. Units may be advised by Aggressor military personnel.

| Unit | Personnel | | | Weapons and Equipment | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Officers | Enlisted Men | Total | 57mm AT Gun | 82mm Rcl Gun | 120mm Mort | 82mm Mort | 57mm AD Gun (Dual) | 14.5mm AD MG (Quad) | 14.5mm AD MG (Dual) | 7.62mm Hv MG | 7.62mm Lt MG | 82mm AT Lchr |
| HHC | 20 | 127 | 147 | | | | | | | | | 6 | 6 |
| Hq Sec | (14) | (28) | (42) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Engr Plat | (1) | (23) | (24) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sig Plat | (1) | (29) | (30) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Scty Plat | (1) | (33) | (34) | | | | | | | | | (6) | (6) |
| Med Plat | (3) | (14) | (17) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Rifle Bn (3) | 37 | 435 | 472 | 3 | 3 | | 6 | | | 6 | 18 | 27 | 27 |
| Regt Arty | 21 | 179 | 200 | | | 6 | | 6 | 6 | | | | |
| H&S Btry | (8) | (40) | (48) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Mort Btry | (5) | (55) | (60) | | | (6) | | | | | | | |
| AD Gun Btry | (4) | (42) | (46) | | | | | (6) | | | | | |
| ADMG Btry | (4) | (42) | (46) | | | | | | (6) | | | | |
| Sup Co | 5 | 83 | 88 | | | | | | | | | | |
| Hq Sec | (2) | (5) | (7) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Sup Plat (3) | (1) | (26) | (27) | | | | | | | | | | |
| Total | 157 | 1694 | 1851 | 9 | 9 | 6 | 18 | 6 | 6 | 18 | 54 | 87 | 87 |

*Figure 19-5. Personnel and weapons—Main Force Regiment.*

## Section IV. GUERRILLA WARFARE DOCTRINE

### 19–19. Basic Doctrine

Guerrilla warfare doctrine is based primarily on alertness, mobility, and attack. It is adjusted to the enemy situation, the terrain, the existing lines of communication, the weather, and the support which can be expected from the populace in the area of operation. Basically, the doctrine is: when the enemy advances, withdraw; when he defends, harass; when he is tired, attack; and when he withdraws, pursue. The objective of this doctrine is to tire the enemy in preparation for eventual defeat by main forces. Aggressor guerrilla warfare actions are based on the strategy of one man against ten and the tactics of ten men against one.

### 19–20. Essential Guerrilla Task

At the beginning of guerrilla warfare, an essential task of guerrillas is to keep from being destroyed. Survival can best be assured by taking positions that are relatively impossible to approach or reach enabling the guerrillas to evade the enemy. As individuals and units become accustomed to operating from relatively inaccessible positions, an advantage is gained over the enemy. He can then be attacked at his nearest point to guerrilla positions and later operations can be launched deeper into enemy territory against communications and bases of operations.

### 19–21. Factors of Guerrilla Warfare

The three interrelated factors of Aggressor guerrilla warfare are—

*a.* A set of six tactical principles.

*b.* Completely accurate and current intelligence.

*c.* Detailed planning, training, and rehearsal for every operation.

### 19–22. Six Tactical Principles

*a. Mobility.* Mobility permits guerrilla units to concentrate quickly in a given area, assume positions almost immediately and depart an area on a moment's notice. Units are capable of moving considerable distances in short periods of time, often marching several nights to the area of operations. After an attack is launched and is successful, the units depart the area, usually in another direction from which they arrived. Mobility also permits guerrilla units to escape from the threat of encirclement.

*b. Surprise.* The tactical principle of surprise combines the elements of speed, secrecy and the capability of choosing the objective as well as the time and place to attack. Speedy movements are possible because guerrillas are not encumbered with an excessive amount of equipment. Secrecy is achieved by marching at night avoiding villages and inhabited areas. Many ruses are used to disguise the place and time of an attack. One is to mislead the enemy into believing an attack would take place at a time and place other than that actually scheduled. This is achieved by providing double agents with false documents and by giving the incorrect information to local inhabitants collaborating with the enemy. Another ruse is to overtly move units away from the direction of the attack only to have them return by a covert route.

*c. Undermine Enemy Morale.* Aggressor believes the undermining of enemy morale is an absolute necessity; consequently, every available means is used to accomplish this important tactical principle. Agents are infiltrated into enemy camps to encourage treason and spread propaganda. Threats are made against pro-enemy families. Bribes are paid to persons usually in positions of authority in order to induce them to perform illegal functions beneficial to the insurgents. Women are used for blackmail and bribery purposes.

*d. Security.* Much emphasis is placed on the security of insurgent forces. Special intelligence units of the insurgent clandestine organization are used to screen and cover movements of regional as well as main force units. These intelligence units also infiltrate enemy positions to obtain information on the preparedness and morale of the enemy. Local units cover the movement of district and provincial units which in turn cover the movement of main force units. Local inhabitants also cooperate by not disclosing any information or by giving the government false information as to the whereabouts or movements of insurgent forces.

*e. Collaboration of Population.* In all military actions, collaboration of the population is considered essential as insurgent forces operate from bases which exist because of the attitude of local population. This means that collaboration is an integral part of insurgent operations as acquiring additional area is one of the chief aims of insurgent forces. Attacks, for example, are launched not only to liquidate enemy military units, but to gain control of the population,

for without control of the population the ground gained cannot be an asset to the insurgent cause.

*f. Flexibility.* Flexibility permits the guerrilla to adapt himself to all circumstances. While regular warfare follows a firm set of tactical principles, guerrilla units change their tactics frequently during the fight in an attempt to surprise the enemy. This is necessary in order to overcome the numerical superiority which government units invaribly have over the guerrilla units.

## 19–23. Intelligence

*a.* Aggressor intelligence policy is based on the Chinese adage, "Know yourself and your adversary and you will be able to fight a hundred battles without a single disaster." Nothing provides more assistance to insurgent forces than correct and current information regarding the enemy. This is a primary function of the clandestine organization of the insurgent infrastructure.

*b.* In each country an elite intelligence corps is formed within the military. The corps is mostly composed of insurgent party members chosen because of their special physical, mental, and moral qualifications. After members are assigned to the corps they undergo intensive training prior to being assigned to guerrilla units. Because the intelligence corps is the reconnaissance element of the military, training stresses the improvement of observation and the preparation of reports.

*c.* While the intelligence corps employs such comparatively modern methods as telephone and radio intercept, it depends heavily on interrogations of local civilians. They are probably the most valuable means of obtaining information pertaining to government activities. Thus, a single careless spoken word or the movement of government vehicles or personnel is reported almost immediately to the espionage system. The intelligence corps evaluates the information and relays it to the military, enabling countermeasures to be taken in time to prevent the government forces from successfully accomplishing their mission.

## 19–24. Detailed Planning

Insurgent forces place considerable emphasis on planning for any type of operation. A plan is considered necessary regardless of the size of a unit whether it be a squad or a regiment. Plans include military as well as political instructions, the matter of supply and equipment, and the proper means of cooperating with the local civilians. After a plan is formulated it is discussed with all participants and assignment of duties are made. Improvised sand tables, such as diagramming the operation in the dirt with a stick, are used as training aids. Then the plan is rehearsed as many times as deemed necessary over the exact terrain, if possible; or a terrain similar to that where the operation will take place.

## 19–25. Operational Techniques

A basic Aggressor guerrilla technique is to keep the enemy constantly off balance through an initial seizure and subsequent maintaining of the initiative. Taking maximum advantage of their mobility and ability to remain undetected until the last moment, insurgent guerrillas give the enemy the impression that he is surrounded and fully at their mercy. Outposts are attacked and liquidated where desirable for political purposes, and an attempt is made to keep the enemy from obtaining rest and sleep. Enemy positions in heavily wooded areas are harassed day and night; those in open areas by night patrols. In order to accomplish this, cooperation of the populace and a perfect knowledge of the terrain is necessary.

## 19–26. Offensive Categories

Aggressor guerrilla warfare doctrine emphasizes offensive action as the primary means of successful operations. The three broad categories of offensive action are attacks, meeting engagements, and ambushes.

## 19–27. Attacks

*a.* Attacks are operations against outposts, training centers, villages and sometimes capitals of districts and provinces. Great effort is expended to make sure no pattern is established as where and when they will be launched.

*b.* In addition to the factors of guerrilla warfare, certain other tactical principles are applicable to attack tactics. They are—

(1) Planning routes of escape.

(2) Considering the possibility of the attacked positions being reinforced by reserves.

(3) Protecting the roads and areas which reserves and other support must use to move to the point of attack.

(4) Numerical superiority at the point of action.

## 19–28. Meeting Engagements

*a.* Aggressor defines a meeting engagement as an unexpected and sudden meeting of two opposing forces neither of which knows the other's strength, weapons, composition or mission. In such a situation neither force has an operation plan. Insurgent guerrillas realize they will usually be at a disadvantage in such a situation; therefore, meeting engagements are avoided if possible.

*b.* Realizing meeting engagements cannot be avoided in all instances, Aggressor trained guerrillas, if possible, will immediately break contact unless they have the advantage. In the event they cannot break contact or immediately see that they have the advantage, the basic tenets are—

(1) Deploy troops to critical terrain before the enemy does.

(2) Open fire before the enemy does.

(3) Assault before the enemy does.

*c.* In order to preclude the possibility of meeting engagements, Aggressor doctrine stresses the need for security and silent communications. Scouts precede the main body and both flank and rear security are established. When any of these security elements detect the enemy, word is passed quickly and silently to the commander. While this is being done the remainder of the security element takes positions which permit observation of the enemy unit.

## 19–29. Ambushes

*a.* Aggressor divides ambushes into two main categories—

(1) The "hit and run" which is designed to delay the enemy unit, to inflict casualties, to cause the enemy unit to deploy a portion of its force for route protection, or to disrupt their communications.

(2) The "annihilation," which has the purpose of intercepting, encircling by surprise, and destroying an enemy unit.

*b.* The hit-and-run ambush is used to restrict the action of the ambushed force, and also to assist other types of guerrilla operations. In the latter instance, its purposes are to cover the withdrawal of a guerrilla force and to prevent enemy reinforcements from reaching an area of operation. The principal difference between the hit-and-run and the annihilation ambush is that in the former guerrillas do not normally deploy force to the rear of the ambushed enemy unit. Strength of a hit-and-run ambush force may vary from half a squad to a company.

*c.* The annihilation ambush is normally used during the latter phases of an insurgency. There are two types—

(1) *Ambush of a small force.* The main objective of the ambush of a small force is the center of the column. Secondary objectives are the blocking of the enemy's retreat and the interception of reinforcements. About half of the ambush forces is committed to the main objective. The remainder of the force is split with the majority being employed to the rear and the others to the front of the ambushed unit. Small groups occupy prepared ambush positions.

(2) *Ambush of a large force.* At times, the enemy unit is so large that one unit does not have sufficient strength to ambush the enemy force. When this occurs, three units rather than one are employed. One element occupies prepared positions blocking the advance of the enemy unit. When the lead element of the enemy unit reaches the blocking position it is fired upon by the blocking force. At this time the main assault force attacks both flanks of the enemy column while the third element moves into positions to the rear of the column. These tactics enable the guerrilla units to completely surround the enemy force preventing the withdrawal of the ambushed unit. The blocking force may be as large as a company, the main assault force possibly five companies and the lead blocking force three companies.

## 19–30. Defense

In view of the fact that Aggressor guerrilla warfare doctrine emphasizes offensive action little emphasis is placed on the defensive tactics. To preclude the need for defensive operations, elaborate precautions are taken to prevent the discovery of guerrilla positions. Positions are located in relatively inaccessible terrain; only the most trusted civilians know of their locations; outposts are established which can notify the position well in advance of the enemy's presence; and positions are well camouflaged.

## 19–31. Defensive Tactics

Disappearing is the principal defensive tactic. All villages and positions are organized in such a manner that even if the enemy launches a surprise attack, everyone is able to disappear on a given signal. When a surprise attack is launched, militia units establish a perimeter defense around the position permitting regional and main forces time to escape. The two methods of disappearing are:

*a.* To retreat into previously prepared hiding places in the area. These hiding places can be subterranean caves, specially constructed tunnels, and positions prepared in the banks of rivers. All of these are well camouflaged and usually stocked with food and water in the event concealment is necessary for several days. Tunnels are constructed in several levels with secret doors leading from one level to another.

*b.* To retreat individually or in small groups either into the woods or neighboring villages where the guerrillas simply melt into the population.

### 19–32. Communications

Guerrilla forces rely primarily upon radios and messengers as means of communication. The insurgent communications system of the insurgent infrastructure serves all agencies of the party committee system (intelligence, propaganda, training, etc.) as well as the military forces. Communications personnel are carefully selected for their assignments and receive extensive training. As with other types of equipment, the quantity and quality of communications material increase as the insurgency progresses.

### 19–33. Handling of Prisoners of War

*a.* Neither the regional nor the main forces take large numbers of prisoners because prisoners slow down operations and cause special security problems. In addition, prisoners require a certain amount of food which is often a scarce commodity.

*b.* Immediately upon capture, prisoners are guarded and bound. After collecting captured arms and equipment in the area of operation, prisoners are marched, under guard, to a base area. The location of the base area is concealed by taking devious routes, marching at night or even blindfolding the prisoners.

### 19–34. Treatment of Prisoners

*a.* Prisoners may be afforded limited medical treatment and receive the same food as the insurgents, depending on their cooperation with the insurgents. They are, however, confined to buildings or other restricted areas and are subjected to extensive psychological pressure and political indoctrination.

*b.* Interrogations of prisoners are conducted by trained individuals. Information obtained supplements tactical information which is usually procured by the insurgent Intelligence and Security Agency. Depending on the type of approach the insurgents believe will be successful, prisoners may be threatened with, and subjected to, bodily harm or the withholding of certain privileges.

### 19–35. Indoctrination of Prisoners

Aggressor insurgent doctrine stresses that the most important reason for taking prisoners is for propaganda exploitation. Almost all of the prisoner's time is devoted to politically reeducating him. The purpose of this policy is to convince him that the insurgent's policy is better than the government's. The insurgent indoctrination theme stresses that insurgents do not want to use physical force on a prisoner but are "forced" to because he has shown himself to be an enemy of the people and the revolution. The prisoner is told that whatever is done to him is because of his own actions. He is punishing himself and all he has to do is admit he was an enemy of the revolution and repent. By this method, insurgents attempt to make prisoners believe they are at fault for any physical coercion they suffer and not the insurgents.

# PART FIVE
# REFERENCE DATA
# CHAPTER 20
# COMPUTING AGGRESSOR MOVEMENTS

## Section I. AGGRESSOR MOVEMENT CAPABILITIES

### 20–1. General

This chapter outlines procedures for determining Aggressor movement capabilities. Included is a listing of applicable definitions and terminology, a discussion of foot and vehicle marches, the general movement procedures used by Aggressor units, applicable movement data tables, and a section of computation examples.

### 20–2. Definitions and Terminology

The following terms are defined as a basis for understanding march planning computations.

*a. Arrival Time.* The time the head of a column or element thereof reaches a designated point, line or object.

*b. Column.* A formation in which elements are placed one directly behind the other.

*c. Column Gap.* The space between two organized march elements following each other on the same route. It can be calculated in units of length (meters) or in units of time (minutes) as measured from the rear of one element to the front of the following element. Column Gap may also be expressed as Time Gap.

*d. Completion Time.* The time the tail of a column passes the release point.

*e. Infiltration.*

(1) *Foot March:* Infiltration is the dispatch of units over a route in small groups at irregular intervals to provide the maximum secrecy, deception, and dispersion.

(2) *Motor March:* March is accomplished by the dispatch of individual vehicles or small groups of vehicles over a specified route at irregular intervals.

*f. Length of a Column.* The length of roadway occupied by a column in movement, including the gaps inside the column measured from front to rear inclusive.

*g. March Unit.* Unit that moves and halts at the command of a single commander. Normally corresponds to smaller tactical troop units.

*h. Pass Time.* Actual time between the mo-

| | Visibility | Rate of March | Normal March (8 hours) | Forced March (12 hours) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roads | Day | 4 kmph | 32 km | 48 km |
| | Night | 3 kmph | 24 km | 36 km |
| Cross Country | Day | 2 kmph | 16 km | 24 km |
| | Night | 1 kmph | 8 km | 12 km |

*Figure 20–1. Basic Data Table, Foot Marches.*

| Formation | Meters per man | |
|---|---|---|
| | Road March * | Tactical March ** |
| Single file | 3.0 | 6.0 |
| Column of twos | 1.5 | 3.0 |
| Column of threes | 1.2 | 2.0 |
| Column of fours | 1.0 | 1.5 |

* Based on average of 2 meters between men

** Based on average of 5 meters between men

*Figure 20-2. Length of Column, Factor Table Foot Marches.*

| Rate (Kmph) | Factors |
|---|---|
| 4 | .015 |
| 3 | .018 |
| 2 | .020 |
| 1 | .023 |

*Figure 20-3. Pass Time Factors, Foot Marches.*

ment when the first element passes a given point and the moment when the last element passes the same point.

*i. Rate of March.* The average number of kilometers traveled in a given period of time, including short periodic halts and short delays, expressed as kilometers per hour (kmph).

*j. Release Point.* A well-defined point on a route at which elements composing a column revert to control of their respective commander and are no longer a part of the march formation.

*k. Start Point.* An identified point at which a movement comes under march formation control.

*l. Time Distance.* The time required for the head of a column, or any single element thereof, to move from one point to another at a given rate of speed.

*m. Vehicle Density.* The average number of vehicles that occupy one mile or one kilometer of road space expressed in vehicles per mile or vehicles per kilometer.

*n. Vehicle Distance.* The space between two

| VEHICLES | | VISIBILITY | RATE(KMPH)** | SPEED(m/min) | VEHICLE DISTANCE/ COLUMN GAP**(m)* | VEHICLE DENSITY**** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | ROADS | Blackout | 16 | 267 | vehicle 30/267 | 33 |
| | | Night* | 24 | 400 | 40/400 | 25 |
| | | Day | 32 | 533 | 50/1066 | 20 |
| | CROSS COUNTRY | Blackout | 4 | 67 | 30/67 | 33 |
| | | Night* | 8 | 133 | 30/133 | 33 |
| | | Day | 12 | 200 | 40/250 | 25 |

*Includes marches during periods of reduced visibility such as fog and moonlight, and night marches by vehicles equipped with infrared devices.

** Computed on a 50 minute hour, allowing for a 10 minute halt in each hour.

***Column gap may be stated as a time factor by dividing column gap by speed.

****Vehicle density is based on an estimate of the number of vehicles that would occupy one kilometer of road space.

*Figure 20-4. Basic Data Table, Vehicle Marches.*

consecutive vehicles of an organized element of a column as measured from the front of one vehicle to the front of the following vehicle.

## 20-3. Foot Marches

*a. Organization.* Units march in tactical groupings to facilitate adoption of combat formations. Tactical integrity is maintained to insure forces are ready for action on arrival at the objective area.

*b. Formations.* March formations are varied to include movement in multiple columns. Column gaps vary at each tactical echelon and are influenced by terrain and threats of hostile air and artillery fires. A minimum of 20 meters between platoon size elements of a march unit and 100 meters between company size march units is standard. Unless otherwise stated, Aggressor foot marches are computed on movement in a single file using a normal rate of movement for the given conditions of terrain and visibility.

*c. Rates of March.* Aggressor is capable of maintaining rates of march shown in figure 20-1. Normal and forced march distances are based on favorable conditions during 8 and 12 hour time periods. The rate of march does not vary for normal and forced marches. If the march is in mountainous terrain, add one hour for each 300 meters of ascent or 500 meters of descent to the above time periods.

*d. Computations.*

(1) *Length of a Column.* To determine the length of a column occupied by a dismounted unit, multiply the estimated or known number of personnel by the applicable factor in figure 20-2.

(2) *Pass Time.* To determine the pass time for a dismounted unit, multiply the length of the column (as determined above) by the appropriate factor for the estimated or known rate of march, figure 20-3.

## 20-4. Vehicle Marches

*a. Organization.* Aggressor generally moves vehicles in company columns consisting of 10-vehicle march units. Vehicles and march units are separated by the distances shown in figure 20-4. Column gap between battalions is 2 kilometers.

*b. Formations.*

(1) *Close Column.* A close column is one in which the elements are formed as compactly as practicable to increase traffic density and reduce pass time. The close column march provides minimum dispersion for passive protection against observation and attack. Column gaps would be reduced to vehicle distance for a close column march.

(2) *Open Column.* In open column, elements are widely spaced as a passive defense or safety measure. Open column is most frequently used during daylight.

(3) *Infiltration.* When sufficient time, traffic density, and other tactical considerations permit, infiltration of vehicles is used to provide maximum secrecy, dispersion, and deception as means of passive protection against enemy observation and attack.

*c. Rates of March.* Aggressor is capable of maintaining rates of march and speed for varied conditions shown in figure 20-4.

*d. Computations.*

(1) *Length of Column (LC).* To determine LC of a vehicle march unit, divide the estimated number of vehicles by an estimated vehicle density (vehicles to the kilometer) then add the minutes in time gaps multiplied by the rate of march; or

$$LC = \frac{\text{number of vehicles}}{\text{vehicle density}} + \left( \frac{\text{number of time gaps}}{\text{60 min}} \times \text{rate} \right)$$

(2) *Pass Time (PT).* To determine PT of a motorized column, divide length of column, as determined above, by the rate of march and multiply the answer by 60 minutes to convert the fraction of an hour to minutes; or

$$PT = \frac{\text{length of column}}{\text{rate (kmph)}} \times \text{60 minutes}$$

## 20-5. General Considerations

*a. Time Distance.* Time distance (TD) is determined by dividing the distance (D) (kilometers) by the rate of march (R) (kilometers per hour); or TD = D ÷ R.




Divide a triangle as shown. To find an unknown factor, cover it and the uncovered portion of the triangle gives you the formula for finding the unknown. For example, if distance is unknown, cover it and RT (rate X time) remains. If rate (R) is unknown, covering R leaves $\frac{D}{T}$. Do the same for (T), and you find $\frac{D}{R}$ remaining.

*b. Ready for Combat.* In calculating Aggressor combat capabilities, it is considered ready for action as of the movement completion time.

*c. Strength.* Consider units as being at full personnel and equipment strengths unless specific information is given in a problem.

*d. Start Points.* The starting time and place is the time and place the unit was last reported.

*e. Release Points.* Select as the destination of the unit a logical point the unit must reach to start a particular action.

*f. Completion Time.* To determine completion time, add pass time of the column, time distance from start point to release point, and any known halts to the start point time.

*g. Forced Marches.* For forced marches, the rate of march is not changed. Forced marches are 12 hours in duration, whereas normal marches are 8 hours in duration.

*h. Mixed Movement.* Variations in visibility or transition from road to cross-country conditions require use of applicable tables and factors in problem solving.

*i. Rounding Rules.*

(1) Computations in minutes resulting in a fraction are raised to the next higher full minute (e.g., 15.3 or 15.6 = 16 minutes).

(2) Computations in kilometers resulting in a fraction are rounded to the nearest tenth (e.g., 12.55 = 12.6 kilometers, 12.43 = 12.4 kilometers).

## Section II. EXAMPLE COMPUTATIONS

### 20–6. Length of Column

*a. Foot March.*

(1) *Question.* What is the length of column for 100 men moving in 3 march units each consisting of three elements? The force is reportedly moving in a column of threes with a 2 meter interval between men in column.

(2) *Answer.* 440 meters.

LC = (number of men × factor) + column gaps
= 100 × 1.2 + 2(100) + 6(20)
= 120 + (200 + 120)
= 440 meters

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Number of men is 100 (problem statement).

(*b*) Appropriate factor is 1.2 (fig 20–2) based on 2 meter interval between men and column of threes (problem statement).

(*c*) There are two column gaps between three march units. The march formation (para 20–3*b*) provides for 100 meters between march units.

(*d*) There are six intervals between elements of the march units. The march formation (para 20–3*b*) provides for 20 meters between elements.

*b. Vehicle March.*

(1) *Question.* Determine the length of a mounted column of an Aggressor Motorized Rifle Battalion moving on a road during daylight hours. There are 67 vehicles in an Aggressor Motorized Rifle Battalion.

(2) *Answer.* 6.6 kilometers.

$$LC = \frac{\text{number of vehicles}}{\text{vehicle density}} + \left(\frac{\text{time gaps}}{60} \times \text{Rate of movement}\right)$$

$$LC = \frac{67}{20} + \left(\frac{6}{60} \times 32\right)$$

$= 3.35 + 3.2$
$= 6.55$ or 6.6 km

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Number of vehicles is 67 from equipment tables.

(*b*) Vehicle density is 20 from figure 20–4. Road movement, day visibility.

(*c*) Time gaps are determined by dividing total vehicles by the number of vehicles per march unit (10) (para 20–4*a*) (67 ÷ 10 = 6.7 or 7 march units). Column gaps are determined by subtracting 1 from the number of march units (7 – 1 = 6).

(*d*) Rate of movement is extracted from figure 20–4, road movement, day visibility.

### 20–7. Pass Time

*a. Foot March.*

(1) *Question.* What is the pass time for a dismounted unit having a length of column of 440 meters moving at an estimated rate of 4 kmph?

(2) *Answer.* 7 minutes.

PT = LC × factor from figure 20–3
= 440 × .015
= 6.6 or 7 minutes

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Length of column is given as 440 meters in the problem statement. If length is not stated, it is computed as in example 20–6*a*(1).

(*b*) Factor is taken from figure 20–3 for the estimated rate of 4 kmph.

(*c*) Answers in minutes are raised to the next higher full minute (para 20–5*i*(1)).

*b. Vehicle March.*

(1) *Question.* What is the pass time for an Aggressor Motorized Rifle Battalion? (Use 6.6 kilometers as the length of column as determined in the preceding problem and rate of movement as 32 kmph given in the preceding problem.)

(2) *Answer.* 12.4 minutes.

$$PT = \frac{LC}{\text{rate (kmph)}} \times 60$$

$$= \frac{6.6}{32} \times 60$$

$= 12.4$ or 13 minutes

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Length of column is given as 6.6 kilometers. If LC is not stated, it is computed as in example 20–6*a*(2).

(*b*) Rate is 32 kmph.

(*c*) 60 is a constant to convert rate to minutes.

(*d*) Answers in minutes are raised to the next higher full minute (para 20–5*i*(1)).

### 20–8. Time Distance

*a. Foot March.*

(1) *Question.* What time distance is required for a dismounted element to move along

a road segment 21 kilometers long during daylight conditions?

(2) *Answer.* 5 hours 15 minutes.

$$TD = \frac{D}{R}$$
$$= \frac{21 \text{ km}}{4 \text{ kmph}}$$
$$= 5.25 \text{ hr or } 5 \text{ hours } 15 \text{ minutes} \left( \begin{matrix} 60 \\ .25 \\ \hline 15 \text{ minutes} \end{matrix} \right)$$

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Distance is given in the problem statement.

(*b*) Rate of movement is taken from figure 20–1 for road march during daylight hours.

(*c*) Conversion of decimal to minutes is accomplished by multiplying by 60.

*b. Vehicle March.*

(1) *Question.* What time distance is required for a motorized element to move cross-country during darkness using vehicles equipped with infrared viewing devices? The distance to be traveled is estimated as 28 kilometers.

(2) *Answer.* 3 hours 30 minutes.

$$TD = \frac{D}{R}$$
$$= \frac{28 \text{ km}}{8 \text{ kmph}}$$
$$= 3.5 \text{ hours or } 3 \text{ hours } 30 \text{ minutes}$$

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Distance is given in the problem statement.

(*b*) Rate of movement is taken from figure 20–4 for cross-country movement at night. See single asterisk subnote for inclusion of infrared capability stated in the problem.

(*c*) Conversion of decimal to minutes is accomplished by multiplying by 60.

## 20–9. Completion Time

*a. Foot March.*

(1) *Question.* What is the expected completion time of a cross-country daylight march over average terrain for a dismounted element having an estimated 440 meter length of column? The unit has a 12 kilometer distance to travel from the position of the lead element as reported at 1000 hours. No halts are anticipated.

(2) *Answer.* 1609 hours.

$$CT = SP + PT + TD + \text{Halts.}$$
$$= 1000 + 0009 + 0600$$
$$= 1609 \text{ hours}$$

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Start point (SP) time is given as 1000 hours.

(*b*) Pass time is determined by multiplying length of column (given as 440 meters) by the appropriate factor (from fig 20–1). Rate of movement for the cross-country daylight condition is 2 kmph. (Enter fig 20–3 using the rate to determine the appropriate factor of .02.) PT = LC × F = 440 × .02 = 8.80 or 9 minutes (rounding rule, para 20–5*i*(1)).

(*c*) Time distance is determined by distance to be traveled (12 km) by the rate 2 kmph (from fig 20–1 as explained in step 2, above).

$$TD = \frac{D}{R} = \frac{12 \text{ kmph}}{2 \text{ kmph}} = 6 \text{ hours}$$

*b. Vehicle March.*

(1) *Question.* The lead element of a motorized column was observed at 0700 hours. The column passed by an observation point for 20 minutes. Time distance from the point the lead element was observed to the nearest friendly unit is 3 hours. What is the expected completion time for a vehicle march to the line of contact?

(2) *Answer.* 1040 hours.

$$CT = SP + PT + TD + \text{Halts}$$
$$= 0700 + 0020 + 0300 + 20$$
$$= 1040$$

(3) *Explanation.*

(*a*) Start point is given as 0700 hours.

(*b*) Pass time is given as 20 minutes.

(*c*) Time distance is given as 3 hours.

(*d*) A 10 minute halt per hour of march.

# CHAPTER 21
# MAPS AND MILITARY SYMBOLS

## 21-1. Aggressor Maps

Conventional signs, marginal data and grid systems found on Aggressor maps generally correspond to those used on United States Army maps. In fact, many of the maps used by Aggressor are captured United States maps. On some maps, a special grid system may be overprinted and marginal data shown in a language used by Aggressor. Also, Aggressor military grid system coordinates are read up and to the right with the northings and eastings being separated by a comma as opposed to the US system. For example, US coordinates written as 498357 would be recorded by Aggressor as 357,498. Color coding on Aggressor maps indicate information on Aggressor forces to be shown in red, blue portrays enemy information, green indicates areas of interest to the Circle Trigon Party, black reveals obstacles, and yellow warns of contaminated areas.

## 21-2. Weapons Symbols

Military symbols are an amalgamation of original symbols from the Homeland with those contributed by the various military personnel of occupied countries and miscellaneous soldiers of fortune. When necessary, Aggressor will improvise symbols which are usually added to the legend of a map or overlay (fig 21-1). These symbols may be used alone to identify a weapon at a particular location or they may be placed inside a modified rectangle. When the latter occurs, the symbol identifies the type of unit rather than a weapon position.

## 21-3. Abbreviations

In addition to military symbols, Aggressor uses a number of abbreviations. When used inside modified rectangles they identify the type unit portrayed. Otherwise, they may be used in any type of military publication. All known Aggressor terms and abbreviations are listed in the glossary of this publication.

## 21-4. Unit Identification

The basic means of unit identification used by Aggressor on maps is a modified rectangle (fig 21-2). Branch of service or type of unit are shown by either symbols or abbreviations placed inside the rectangle. Numerical designations are placed beneath the rectangle. These numerals, reading from left to right, show the unit depicted on the left followed by the next higher unit or units on the right, each separated by a slash. For example, a rectangle with a notch in the top, a diamond in the center, and the numerals 2/1/3/33F(HV TK) beneath it identifies the 2d Platoon, 1st Company, 3d Battalion, 33d Fusilier Heavy Tank Regiment.

## 21-5. Installations and Boundaries

Installations are located by a staff extending from the upper left corner of the modified rectangle. The end of the staff depicting an inverted "V" locates an observation post, a triangle on the end of a staff locates a command post, and a circle locates a supply installation (fig 21-2). Boundaries are placed on maps with solid lines. The numerical designation of the unit located to the left of the line is placed to the left of the symbol and the numerical designation of the one located on the right is placed on the right of the symbol.




*Figure 21–1. Weapons7Weapons and Branch Symbols.*




*Figure 21-2. Unit and Installation Map Symbols.*

# CHAPTER 22
# UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA AND EQUIPMENT

## Section I. AGGRESSOR ARMY

### 22-1. Basic Army Uniform

*a.* The basic uniform of the Aggressor Army is a combat uniform. The same uniform is worn by officers and enlisted personnel (fig 22-1 and 22-2). Shoulder loops and shoulder boards are worn to designate various officers and enlisted ranks. Personnel of the elite type units (Fusilier and Airborne) wear small colored cloth tabs (3/4 × 1/2 inch) on both sides of the collar. Because of high esprit and strong organizational pride, Aggressor soldiers wear their distinctive insignia into combat.

*b.* The army uniform is jungle green in color in keeping with the national colors and traditional emblem of the Circle Trigon Party. The cut of the tunic and trousers, is based primarily on US Army design. The tunic, when used as an outer garment, is worn outside the trousers. The poncho is worn across the chest from left to right in a flat roll 8" wide and is tied in the back. The addition of a pistol belt complete the uniform. Footwear consists of black combat boots.

*c.* The uniform is made of 9-oz. weight twill cotton wind resistant sateen, water repellant, shade jungle green, and is worn winter and summer. Outer clothing, such as field jackets and parkas are designed similar to like items in the US Army. In arctic areas and under conditions of snow and ice operations, overwhites are normally worn by all personnel. The regular US Army pile cap is worn with a 3-inch Circle Trigon patch affixed to the upturned visor.

*d.* The Aggressor helmet (fig 22-3), although similar to the US Army helmet, has a distinctive ridge running front to rear over the crest of the helmet. The ridge is approximately 8 1/2-long, 1 1/2-inches wide and tapers in height from 1 1/2-inches in front to 1/2 inch in back.

### 22-2. Distinctive Army Uniforms

*a. Fusilier Units.* All Fusilier soldiers wear the basic army uniform. Their elite status is indicated by a rectangular (1 1/2 × 3/4 inch) red cloth tab on each side of the tunic collar.

*b. Airborne Units.* Airborne units are also considered elite. Wearing the basic army uniform, Aggressor airborne soldiers have white rectangular tabs attached to both sides of the tunic collar.

*c. Special Uniforms.* Aggressor marshals, generals and admirals are authorized and encouraged to design distinctive uniforms from locally available materials such as braid, sateen shoulder loops or shoulder boards, sateen tabs, sateen stripes on trousers, riding boots, swords and daggers. All general officers, admirals and marshals wear white shoulder loops.

*d. Shoulder Loops.* Army shoulder loops are of three colors: white, blue, and green. Shoulder loops denoting flag officers are distinguished by a combination of stripes and bars affixed (fig 22-4). They are worn as follows:

(1) White—Worn by all marshals, general officers, and admirals.

(2) Blue—Worn by all other officers.

(3) Green—Worn by all enlisted personnel.

### 22-3. Officer's Insignia of Rank

*a. General.* Aggressor Army officers of company grade are designated by means of angled stripes, field grade by a combination of stripes and bars, while marshals and general officers are so designated by a combination of stripes and wreaths on each shoulder loop. All insignia of rank are worn on applicable colored shoulder loops.

*b. Comparative Army Rank.*

| *Aggressor Army* | *United States Army* |
|---|---|
| Marshal | General of the Army |
| General of Armies | General |
| General of Army | Lieutenant General |
| General of Division | Major General |
| General of Brigade | Brigadier General |
| Colonel | Colonel |
| Commandant | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Major | Major |
| Captain | Captain |
| Lieutenant | 1st Lieutenant |
| Officer Candidate | 2d Lieutenant |

### 22-4. Enlisted Insignia of Grade

*a. General.* Aggressor Army enlisted grades are designated by a combination of bars. They are mounted on green shoulder loops (fig 22-4).

GENERAL OF DIVISION, ARMY

ADMIRAL, NAVY



MAJOR, AIRBORNE

CAPTAIN, AIR FORCE

# AGGRESSOR OFFICER UNIFORMS

**When portrayed by U.S. Special Forces personnel.**



LIEUTENANT, FUSILIER

*Figure 22–1. Aggressor officer uniforms.*



SENIOR SERGEANT, FUSILIERS

STAFF SERGEANT, AIR FORCE SUPPORT



SECTION SGT, ARMY

SENIOR SOLDIER

# AGGRESSOR ENLISTED UNIFORMS

**When portrayed by U.S. Special Forces personnel.**



ENLISTED MAN, NAVY

*Figure 22-2. Aggressor enlisted uniforms.*

*Figure 22–3. Aggressor uniforms and insignia.*




*Figure 22–4. Aggressor officer and enlisted grades.*




*Figure 22–5. Aggressor equipment markings.*

Various grades are designated by combinations of Overseas Bars on green shoulder loops. Aggressor troops of the two lowest enlisted grades seldom wear any distinguishing insignia of rank; however, all noncommissioned officers and officers wear their rank at all times.

*b. Comparative Army Enlisted Grades.*

| *Aggressor Army* | *United States Army* |
|---|---|
| Sergeant Major | Sergeant Major |
| Senior Sergeant | Master Sergeant |
| Staff Sergeant | Sergeant First Class |
| Platoon Sergeant | Staff Sergeant |
| Section Sergeant | Sergeant |
| Corporal | Corporal |
| Senior Soldier | Private First Class |
| Soldier | Private |
| Recruit | Recruit |

## 22–5. Unit Insignia

*a.* Aggressor does not utilize any insignia on uniforms to identify specific units.

*b.* Personnel, both officers and enlisted men, normally will carry an identification, pay and service card. This will show the individual's branch of service and unit (FM 30–103).

*c.* Aggressor weapons and equipment are marked as depicted in figure 22–5.

# Section II. AGGRESSOR AIR FORCE

## 22–9. Basic Air Force Uniform and Insignia

Personnel of the Aggressor Air Force (fig 22–1 and 22–2) wear the basic army uniform with a blue cloth tab ($^3/_4 \times 1^1/_2$ inches) on each side of the tunic collar. Personnel of air force security and support units wear the Aggressor helmet and combat boots. Other air force personnel wear a blue cap and black low-quarter shoes. All Aggressor Air Force personnel on flight status wear wings on the left side of the tunic (fig 22–3).

## 22–10. Air Force Officer's Insignia of Rank

*a. Insignia of Rank.* The Aggressor Air Force Marshals and General Officers wear the white shoulder loops in the same manner as the corresponding Aggressor Army ranks. Field and company grade officers wear the blue shoulder loops. Their insignia of rank, worn on the shoulder loops, are identical to the army officer tanks.

*b. Comparative Air Force Rank.*

| *Aggressor Air Force* | *United States Air Force* |
|---|---|
| Air Marshal | General of the Air Force |
| Vice Air Marshal | General |
| General of Air | Lieutenant General |
| General of Air Army | Major General |
| General of Air Division | Brigadier General |
| Commander of Air | Colonel |
| Vice Commander of Air | Lieutenant Colonel |
| Commandant | Major |
| Captain | Captain |
| Leader | 1st Lieutenant |
| Leader Candidate | 2d Lieutenant |

## 22–11. Air Force Enlisted Personnel

*a. General.* Aggressor Air Force enlisted grades are identified the same as in the Aggressor Army except that Aggressor Air Force titles are different. The green shoulder loop is worn with the identifying combination of bars to denote the grade. The blue cloth tabs are worn on the collar of the tunic as well as the air force wings on the left side of the tunic.

*b. Comparative Air Force Enlisted Grades.*

| *Aggressor Air Force* | *United States Air Force* |
|---|---|
| Master Sergeant of Aeroshipmen | Chief Master Sergeant |
| Senior Sergeant of Aeroshipmen | Senior Master Sergeant |
| Staff Sergeant of Aeroshipmen | Master Sergeant |
| Sergeant of Aeroshipmen | Technical Sergeant |
| Aeroshipman Senior Grade | Staff Sergeant |
| Aeroshipman | Sergeant |
| Aeroshipman Junior Grade | Airman First Class |
| Aeroshipman Apprentice | Airman |
| Aeroshipman Recruit | Airman Basic |

# Section III. AGGRESSOR NAVY

## 22–12. Basic Navy Uniform

Aggressor Navy personnel, both officers and enlisted men, wear the basic army uniform with green colored cloth tabs on both sides of the tunic collar. During normal duty on board ship and for off-duty wear, the service cap is worn by officers, while the appropriate Aggressor headgear is worn by the enlisted men. In combat, the Aggressor helmet is worn. Normally, the footwear is black low-quarter shoes (fig 22–1 and 22–2).

## 22–13. Navy Insignia of Rank

*a. Officer's Insignia of Rank.* The Aggressor Fleet Admiral and Flag Officers wear the white shoulder loops with their identifying combination of stripes and wreaths to denote their appropriate rank. Naval officers below the status of Flag Officer wear the blue shoulder loops and the distinguishing rank insignia.

*b. Comparative Navy Officers Ranks.*

| *Aggressor Navy* | *United States Navy* |
|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral | Fleet Admiral |
| Admiral | Admiral |
| Vice Admiral | Vice Admiral |
| Rear Admiral | Rear Admiral |
| Commodore | Commodore |
| Group Commander | Captain |
| Commander | Commander |
| Lieutenant Commander | Lieutenant Commander |
| Captain | Lieutenant |
| Group Leader | Lieutenant Junior Grade |
| Leader | Ensign |

*c. Comparative Navy Enlisted Grades.*

| *Aggressor Navy* | *United States Navy* |
|---|---|
| Master Mariner Supervisor | Master Chief Petty Officer |
| Senior Mariner Supervisor | Senior Chief Petty Officer |
| Mariner Supervisor | Chief Petty Officer |
| Junior Mariner Supervisor | Petty Officer First Class |
| Mariner Senior Grade | Petty Officer Second Class |
| Mariner | Petty Officer Third Class |
| Mariner Junior Grade | Seaman |
| Mariner Apprentice | Seaman Apprentice |
| Mariner Recruit | Seaman Recruit |

## Section IV. AGGRESSOR DECORATIONS AND AWARDS

### 22–14. Background

*a.* Aggressor has made thorough studies of the use of decorations and awards throughout history and their usage by contemporary foreign nations. It comes as no surprise that Aggressors, with their emphasis on loyalty to the Circle Trigon Party and patriotism among the Homeland citizens, have adopted the extensive use of decorations and awards as a morale builder.

*b.* The Aggressor Chamber of Councilors establishes decorations and titles of honor in accordance with the Aggressor Constitution. Recently they decreed that certain previous decorations had been invalidated. New decorations have been originated as replacements.

*c.* All awards, both decorations and campaigns, have been placed into an order of precedence. Prior to 1964, small silver and gold palms were added to indicate additional awards, and stars were added to campaign ribbons to denote additional campaigns. Now to denote subsequent awards of the same decoration or campaign ribbon, individuals will be awarded an additional decoration or campaign ribbon of the same type, to be worn side by side. Each award will be supplemented with an immediate cash payment upon presentation. In addition, monthly payments of various amounts are paid the bearers of these awards.

### 22–15. Decorations for Heroism and Meritorious Service

The following decorations are awarded to those individuals who have performed heroic acts during times of war for the advancement of the ideals of the Homeland:

*Marshal's Star* — **Red**

Awarded only by Marshals to any officer or enlisted man who has distinguished himself by exceptionally personal meritorious service or performance of heroic deeds.

*Supreme Order of Honor* — **Violet**

Awarded to any officer or enlisted man who shall have distinguished himself by gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of his life, above and beyond the call of duty, in action involving actual combat with the enemy.

*Legion of Honor* — **Pink**

Awarded to any person, who while serving in any capacity with the Army, Navy or Air Force, shall have distinguished himself by extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against an armed enemy.

*Legion of the Distinguished* — **White**

Awarded to any person, who while serving with the Army, Navy or Air Force, shall distinguish himself by exceptionally meritorious service to the Homeland or the Circle Trigon Party in a duty of great responsibility.

*Order of the Circle Trigon* — **Light Green**

Awarded to members of the Circle Trigon Party who are serving with the Army, Navy or Air Force, and have performed heroic deeds in armed combat against the enemy.

*Security Star* — **Light Blue**

Awarded to any person who has contributed to the national intelligence effort of Aggressor.

*Valor Star* — **Orange**

Awarded to all members of the Army, Navy and Air Force who have been cited for gallantry

in action against an armed enemy by the headquarters of a general officer.

*Guerrilla Hero Star* — **Dark Green**

Awarded to any person who, while serving in a guerrilla unit, has performed a heroic deed, including those members of the Armed Forces who have participated and distinguished themselves as advisors to guerrilla units.

*Star of the Fusiliers* — **Black**

Awarded to units of the Armed Forces for extraordinary heroism in action against an armed enemy. The unit must display such gallantry, determination and esprit de corps in accomplishing its mission so as to set it apart from and above other units participating in the same campaign.

*Star of Glory* — **Yellow**

Awarded to any person wounded in action while serving with the Armed Forces; also awarded posthumously and presented to the next of kin of personnel killed in battle or dead as a result of wounds received in action.

*Star of Petrovansi* — **Dark Blue**

Awarded to those who participated in or supported the formation of the Aggressor nation.

*Star of Grandafrato* — **Brown**

Awarded to those who were in the Aggressor Armed Forces prior to 1965.

### 22-16. Campaign Ribbons (For each award-additional pay)

*a. Continental United States Campaign Ribbon.* Awarded to those who participated in the original campaigns or defense thereof or have completed 3 months within the area concerned.

*Star of Appalachia* — **Red** | **Green**

*Star of California* — **Pink** | **Blue**

*Star of the Carolinas* — **Red** | **Blue**

*Star of Florida* — **Red** | **Yellow**

*Star of St. Lawrence* — **Red** | **White**

*Star of Texas* — **Pink** | **Brown**

*b. Insular Campaign Ribbons.* Awarded to those who participated in the original campaigns or defense thereof or have completed 3 months within the area concerned.

*Star of Alaska* — **Black** | **White**

*Star of the Caribbean* — **Black** | **Green**

*Star of Hawaii* — **Black** | **Yellow**

*c. European Campaign Ribbons.* Awarded to those who participated in the original campaigns or defense thereof or have completed 3 months within the area concerned.

*Star of the Balkans* — **Green** | **Blue**

*Star of Central Europe* — **Green** | **Yellow**

*d. Asiatic Campaign Ribbon.* Awarded to those who participated in the original campaigns or defense thereof or have completed 3 months within the area concerned.

*Star of Asia* — **Yellow** | **Brown**

## Section V. EQUIPMENT OF AGGRESSOR FORCES

### 22-17. General

One of the most international of activities is that of military developments, including the armament and equipment. The picture of any nation's armament, including that of Aggressor, is one of constant obsolescence, change and development. The Triumvirate has constantly reminded the pertinent technical main directorates to design and produce far better weapons and equipment than those of their

enemies. Their efforts have, for the post part, met with unqualified success. Aggressor probably has one of the best equipped armed forces in the world. The following paragraphs describe that equipment which has not been discussed in previous chapters.

## 22-18. Tanks

*a.* The four major tanks used by Aggressor are the TABU, THORN, THUNDER, and TRYANT (fig 11-2). These vehicles achieve exceptional maneuverability and agility (both road and cross-country) through advanced mechanical systems, permitting maximum advantageous use of covered and concealed routes.

*b.* All of the tanks are multiple-fueled, have infrared devices, and can be equipped with snorkel devices. Flamethrowers are used either as the main armament replacing the turret gun, or as a secondary auxiliary weapon useful against dug-in troops in caves or city basements.

*c.* Aggressor tank chassis of all types are used for a variety of purposes such as self-propelled antiaircraft guns, rocket launchers, and recovery vehicles. These can be found at most levels through the armed forces of the Aggressor.

## 22-19. Motorized Rifle Transporters (MRT)

Aggressor has devoted considerable effort to improving the combat effectiveness of its motorized rifle transporters. All Aggressor MRTs are now fully armored, to include armored overhead cover, and provided with firing ports to allow troops to fire small arms while on the move with the vehicle hatches closed. All Aggressor MRTs can be used as prime movers for light artillery pieces and some can be converted for command posts. The principal characteristics of known motorized rifle transporters are—

| Nomenclature | Type | Personnel | Maximum road speed | Maximum range | Armor thickness |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | | | | (cm) |
| MRT-1††† | Medium, wheeled 6x6 | 19 | 75 KPH | 650 km | 1.38 |
| MRT-2††† | Tracked | 12 | 50 KPH | 200 km | 1.50 |
| MRT-3†, ††† | Amphib-tracked | 15 | 40 KPH* | 260 km | 2.00 |
| MRT-4††, ††† | Amphib-wheeled 4x4 | 6 | 65 KPH** | 550 km | 1.25 |
| MRT-5††† | Amphib-wheeled 8x8 | 15 | 70 KPH*** | 400 km | 1.25 |

* 12 KPH in water.
** 10 KPH in water.
*** 8 KPH in water.
† Basic MRT for motorized rifle units. Normally armed with machine guns; has been encountered carrying 57mm antitank gun.
†† Has been adopted as the standard wheeled reconnaissance vehicle. A modified version mounts a launcher for 3 antitank guided missiles.
††† Equipped with improved vision devices. infrared driving lights and infrared searchlights.

## 22-20. Amphibious Vehicles (AV)

In addition to amphibious motorized rifle transporters, tanks and RAGE launchers, Aggressor makes wide use of amphibious cargo vehicles. Principal characteristics of presently known amphibious cargo vehicles are as follows:

| Name | Type | Capacity | | Maximum speed, KPH | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Personnel | Cargo | Road | Water |
| AV-1 | Light, wheeled 4x4 | 5 | 480Kg | 120 | 14 |
| AV-2 | Medium, wheeled 6x6 | 26 | 2600Kg | 90 | 16 |
| AV-3 | Tracked | 60 | 8000Kg* | 50 | 16 |

* Equipped with ramp and tail gate to facilitate loading. Can carry a 152-mm gun howitzer or a 2-ton truck.

## 22-21. Wheeled Vehicles (WV)

The Homeland's automotive industries have sharply increased the production of the standard and special purpose vehicles in order to keep up with the Aggressor armed forces trend toward a greater logistical commitment and an increasing complexity in transportation requirements. A controlling factor of great military importance is Aggressor's use of a basic standard truck chassis which employs interchangeable components. Principal characteristics of Aggressor wheeled vehicles are as follows:

| Nomenclature | Type | Personnel | Cargo* | Speed (KPH) | Cruising range, inboard fuel |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WV-1 | ¼ ton 4x4 | 5 | 450 kg | 120 | 500 km** |
| WV-2 | 1½ ton 4x2 | 14 | 1300 kg | 80 | 900 km |
| WV-3 | 2 ton 4x4 | 25 | 1750 kg | 100 | 560 km |
| WV-4 | 2½ ton 4x2 | 25 | 2500 kg | 90 | 500 km |
| WV-5 | 4 ton 4x2 | 28 | 3000 kg | 100 | 580 km |
| WV-6 | 5 ton 6x6 | 30 | 4500 kg | 90 | 600 km |
| WV-7 | 5 ton 4x2 | 28 | 6000 kg | 80 | 900 km |
| WV-8 | 7 ton 6x6 | 35 | 6500 kg | 75 | 850 km |
| WV-9 | 12 ton 6x4 | 40 | 8000 kg | 70 | 1000 km |

* Normal road capacity. For cross-country reduce 25 percent; for emergency conditions increase 50 percent.
** Aggressor wheeled vehicles have multiple-fuel capability but range figures are for diesel fuel.

## 22-22. Tracked Prime Movers (TPM)

Aggressor has developed and produced a new family of TPMs and completely replaced all of its older models and wheeled prime movers. These new TPMs are used for a multiplicty of purposes to include towing artillery pieces, transporting cargo and personnel across marshy terrain or in arctic regions, and the towing of rolling fluid transporters. Principal characteristics of these tracked prime movers are as follow:

| Nomenclature | Speed (KPH) | Range (KM) | Personnel capacity | Uses |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| TPM-1 | 70 | 400 | 10 | Towing 85-mm; 100-mm; 122-mm pieces. |
| TPM-2 | 60 | 375 | 16 | Towing 57-mm AD gun; 122-mm howitzers; 160-mm mortars. |
| TPM-3 | 48 | 360 | 8 | Towing 100-mm AD gun; 152-mm gun-howitzer. |
| TPM-4 | 42 | 500 | 22 | Towing heavy artillery pieces including 203-mm gun-howitzer. |

# Section VI. INSURGENT UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

## 22-23. Uniforms and Insignia

*a. Regional Forces and Militia.* Members of the regional forces and militia usually wear the traditional garb of the Patria Liberata peoples. Types of dress vary among the different cultural groups in Patria Liberata. Inasmuch as the regional forces and militia do not have a rank structure, no insignia of rank is worn by personnel. Occasionally, an individual may wear a part of a uniform discarded by a regular, however, this practice is generally avoided because the uniform is immediately identifiable, thus hampering the blending into the local population by guerrillas.

*b. Mobile Main Forces.* Uniforms, insignia, and rank structure of the Mobile Main Forces are similar to those of the Aggressor armed forces; however, branch and rank insignia are seldom worn in combat. As soon as the People's Liberation Army of Patria Liberata (PLAPL) began to organize main forces, uniforms were provided by the Aggressor Homeland. By late 1969, some uniforms and insignia were being manufactured by local factories in areas controlled by the insurgents.

## 22-24. Procurement of Materiel

*a.* Weapons and equipment for PLAPL forces are acquired from many sources. Initially they were obtained from small government outposts which were overrun, ambushed government patrols, and local artisans who fabricated some crude weapons. As additional Mobile Main Force units were organized and operations increased, weapons and equipment were obtained by recovery from the battlefield after large engagements with Patria Liberata forces. The main source of supply however, is the Aggressor Homeland, which early in 1964, began shipping materiel to base areas in the Morane Mountains.

*b.* In order to provide sufficient ammunition, PLAPL established ammunition factories in each of the three large base areas. Also, located in these base areas are weapons and equipment repair shops.

## 22-25. Equipment of Militia and Regional Forces

*a.* Militia units are issued materiel available to PLAPL such as old model weapons and the crude weapons manufactured locally. Regional forces receive captured equipment and some outdated models of Aggressor equipment.

*b.* PLAPL policy dictates that not all members of the militia and regional units will

be armed. In most instances only 60 percent of the squad personnel are issued individual weapons but all carry handgrenades or incendiary devices. PLAPL rationalizes that in any type operation some casualties will be sustained. The weapons of the casualties are then distributed to those without weapons.

# APPENDIX A

# REFERENCES

## A-1. Field Manuals (FM)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1-15 | Aviation Company, Battalion, Group, and Brigade |
| | 1-100 | Army Aviation Utilization |
| | 3-10 | Employment of Chemical Agents |
| (C) | 3-10B | Employment of Chemical Agents (U) |
| | 3-12 | Operational Aspects of Radiological Defense |
| | 5-20 | Camouflage |
| | 5-30 | Engineer Intelligence |
| | 6-15 | Artillery Meteorology |
| | 6-20-1 | Field Artillery Tactics |
| | 6-121 | Field Artillery Target Acquisition |
| | 8-10 | Medical Support, Theater of Operations |
| | 11-40 | Signal Corps Pictorial Operations |
| | 17-36 | Divisional Armored and Air Cavalry Units |
| | 19-1 | Military Police Support, Army Divisions and Separate Brigades |
| | 19-4 | Military Police Support Theater of Operations |
| | 19-30 | Physical Security |
| | 19-40 | Enemy Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees |
| | 20-60 | Battlefield Illumination |
| | 21-5 | Military Training Management |
| | 21-6 | Techniques of Military Instruction |
| | 21-26 | Map Reading |
| | 21-30 | Military Symbols |
| | 21-31 | Topographic Symbols |
| | 21-40 | Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense |
| | 21-75 | Combat Training of the Individual Soldier and Patrolling |
| | 21-76 | Survival, Evasion, and Escape |
| (S) | 21-77A | Joint Worldwide Evasion and Escape Manual (U) |
| | 24-1 | Tactical Communications Doctrine |
| | 30-5 | Combat Intelligence |
| | 30-9 | Military Intelligence Battalion, Field Army |
| | 30-10 | Military Geographic Intelligence (Terrain) |
| (C) | 30-10A | Special Applications of Terrain Intelligence (U) |
| | 30-15 | Intelligence Interrogation |
| | 30-16 | Technical Intelligence |
| (S) | 30-17A | Counterintelligence Special Operations (U) |
| (S) | 30-18 | Intelligence Collections Operations, Intelligence Corps, USA (U) |
| | 30-20 | Aerial Surveillance-Reconnaissance, Field Army |
| | 30-28 | Armed Forces Censorship |
| | 30-31 | Stability Operations-Intelligence |
| | 30-103 | Aggressor Order of Battle Book |
| | 31-10 | Denial Operations and Barriers |
| | 31-12 | Army Forces in Amphibious Operations (The Army Landing Force) |
| | 31-16 | Counterguerrilla Operations |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 31–18 | Long-Range Reconnaissance Ranger Company |
| | 31–20 | Special Forces Operations—Techniques |
| | 31–21 | Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine |
| (S) | 31–21A | Special Forces Operations—US Army Doctrine |
| | 31–22 | US Army Counterinsurgency Forces |
| (C) | 31–40 | Tactical Cover and Deception (U) |
| | 31–71 | Northern Operations |
| | 31–72 | Mountain Operations |
| | 31–73 | Advisor Handbook for Stability Operations |
| (C) | 32–5 | Signal Security (SIGSEC) (U) |
| (S) | 32–10 | USASA in Support of Tactical Operations (U) |
| (C) | 32–20 | Electronic Warfare (U) |
| | 33–1 | Psychological Operations—US Army Doctrine |
| | 33–5 | Psychological Operations—Techniques and Procedures |
| | 41–10 | Civil Affairs Operations |
| | 44–1 | US Army Air Defense Artillery Employment |
| | 45–20 | Civil Censorship |
| | 45–25 | Field Press Censorship |
| | 55–8 | Transportation Intelligence |
| | 57–35 | Airmobile Operations |
| | 61–100 | The Division |
| | 100–5 | Operations of Army Forces in the Field |
| | 100–10 | Combat Service Support |
| | 100–15 | Larger Units Theatre Army—Corps |
| | 101–5 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Staff Organization and Procedures |
| | 101–10–1 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical and Logistical Data Unclassified Data |
| | 101–10–2 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organization, Technical and Logistical Data Extracts of Non-Divisional Tables of Organization and Equipment |
| (S) | 101–10–3 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data—Classified Data (U) |
| | 101–31–1 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Doctrine and Procedures |
| (S) | 101–31–2 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Effects Data (U) |
| | 101–31–3 | Staff Officers' Field Manual: Nuclear Weapons Employment Data |

## A–2. Technical Manuals (TM)

| | |
|---|---|
| 3–210 | Fallout Prediction |
| 3–215 | Military Chemistry and Chemical Agents |
| 3–216 | Technical Aspects of Biological Defense |
| 3–220 | Chemical, Biological, and Radiological (CBR) Decontamination |
| 3–240 | Field Behavior of Chemical, Biological and Radiological Agents |
| 5–248 | Foreign Maps |
| 5–545 | Geology |
| 30–245 | Image Interpretation Handbook |
| 30–246 | Tactical Interpretation of Air Photos |

## A–3. Army Regulations (AR)

| | |
|---|---|
| (C) 10–122 | United States Army Security Agency (U) |
| 190–11 | Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives |
| 220–5 | Designation, Classification, and Change in Status of Units |
| 220–55 | Field and Command Post Exercises |
| 310–25 | Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Short Title: AD) |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 310–50 | Authorized Abbreviations and Brevity Codes |
| | 350–30 | Code of Conduct |
| | 350–225 | Survival, Evasion and Escape Training |
| | 360–65 | Establishment and Conduct of Field Press Censorship in Combat Areas |
| | 380–5 | Department of the Army Information Security Program |
| | 380–83 | Civil Censorship |
| | 380–235 | Enemy, Prisoner of War, and Civilian Internee Communications Censorship |
| (C) | 381–101 | Employment, Utilization, and Special Administration of Counterintelligence and Area Intelligence Personnel (U) |
| | 381–115 | Counterintelligence Investigative Agencies |
| | 604–5 | Clearance of Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information and Material |

## A–4. Department of the Army Pamphlets (DA Pam)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| (S) | 30–20–7 | Counterintelligence Trends and Developments (U) |
| | 108–1 | Index of Army Motion Pictures and Related Audio-Visual Aids |
| | 310–series | Military Publications Indexes |
| | 350–15–series | Operations—Lessons Learned |
| | 550–104 | Human Factors Considerations of Undergrounds in Insurgencies |
| | 550–106 | Communist Insurgent Infrastructure in South Vietnam; A Study of Organization and Strategy |

## A–5. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 1 | Dictionary of US Military Terms for Joint Usage (Short Title: SD) |
| (O) | 2 | Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (U) |

## A–6. Army Subjects Schedules (ASubjScd)

| | |
|---|---|
| 6–12 | Field Exercises (Field Artillery) |
| 6–30 | Umpiring and Aggressor Forces |
| 6–32 | Field Artillery Command Post Exercises (CPX) |
| 30–9 | Combat Intelligence |
| 30–40 | Order of Battle Personnel |

## A–7. Miscellaneous

| | |
|---|---|
| ATP 20–5 | Field Exercises and Maneuvers |
| TC 30–1 | Tactical Cover and Deception |

# APPENDIX B
# TRAINING PROGRAM FOR AGGRESSOR PERSONNEL

## Section I. GENERAL

B–1. This sample training program may be used to train US Army personnel who will be participating as Aggressors in training exercises. This program should be made to fit the requirements of each particular training situation and consequently, it may be altered as necessary.

## Section II. GENERAL TRAINING OF AGGRESSOR SOLDIERS (20 HRS)

B–2. The following program is intended to be a general orientation to be given to all US soldiers participating in a training exercise as part of an Aggressor force.

| *Subject* | *Hours & Type** | *General Subjects (5 hrs) Scope of Instruction* | *References* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction to Aggressor | 1C | Purpose and scope of course; history, terminology and missions of Aggressor; the Aggressor military system. | FM 30–102 |
| Organization of Aggressor field forces & air army† | 1C | Organization of the regional command army group, armies, divisions, general headquarters troops, air army. | FM 30–102 |
| Aggressor uniforms and insignia | 1C | Uniforms and insignia of the Aggressor army, air force, and armed forces high command. Awards and decorations. | FM 30–102 |
| Aggressor Order of Battle, and military symbols† | 2C | Identification of units and organizations of the Aggressor armed forces; index to officers; code names and code numbers. | FM 30–102<br>FM 30–103 |
| | | *Aggressor Tactics (3 hrs)* | |
| Unit tactics | 1C | Aggressor individual and small unit tactics; special operations. | FM 30–102 |
| Ground forces tactics | 2C | Tactics of Aggressor Infantry, Armor, Artillery, and Combined Arms Army. (Emphasizing Aggressor Tactical Cover and Deception Concepts) | FM 30–102 |
| | | *Aggressor Representation (12 hrs)* | |
| Organization and training of Aggressor force† | 2C | Organizing US unit into Aggressor units, uniforms, and insignia requirements. Use of Aggressor names and personal documents. Training of an Aggressor force. | FM 30–102 |
| Employment of Aggressor for training exercise | 4C, PE | Employment of Aggressor in the tactical exercise to be conducted. | All previous references and Aggressor scenario |
| Exercise Intelligence Plan†† | 2C | Intelligence from higher headquarters, documents, radio intercept, ground activity counterintelligence and prepared prisoners of war, deserters and casualties. | FM 30–102<br>FM 30–103<br>FM 30–15<br>FM 30–17<br>Aggressor scenario |
| Aggressor simulation equipment and weapons††† | 2C, D | Description and use of simulated equipment, simulator banks, sonic equipment, and weapons adapters. Marking of equipment. | FM 30–102 |

| Subject | Hours & Type* | General Subjects (5 hrs) Scope of Instruction | References |
|---|---|---|---|
| Artillery and fire marking††† | 1C, PE | Aggressor artillery organization and representation, fire marking. | FM 30–102 FM 105–5 |
| Review | 1C, PE | Review of mission, clarification of participation in exercise, review of all previous material. | Aggressor scenario, operation orders, intelligence plan, maps, FM 30–102 FM 30–103 |

## Section III. AGGRESSOR PREPARED PRISONER OF WAR AND AGENT TRAINING (30 HRS)

B–3. This specialized training should be given to personnel who will act as prepared prisoners of war, Aggressor agents, and in general, be utilized to generate specialized intelligence play. Personnel in this category need not undergo general training presented in B–2; therefore, the training outlined in this section may be conducted concurrently with training outlined in B–2.

| Subject | Hours & Type* | General Subjects (7 hrs) Scope of Instruction | References |
|---|---|---|---|
| Introduction | 1C | Introduction, mission and organization of Aggressor force, employment of prepared prisoners, casualties and agents. | Aggressor scenario, intelligence plan. |
| Aggressor history | 1C | Aggressor history, political background, and military organization. | Aggressor scenario, FM 30–102 |
| Aggressor uniforms | 1C | Aggressor uniforms, insignia and decorations. | FM 30–102 |
| Documents | 1C, D | Documents and forms used by Aggressor, purpose of each. | FM 30–102 Aggressor scenario. |
| Aggressor order of battle | 2C | Aggressor order of battle, general organization and history of units participating in exercise, names and personalities of commanders in Aggressor force. | FM 30–102 FM 30–103 Aggressor scenario. |
| Signs and symbols | 1C, PE | Aggressor signs and symbols. | FM 30–102 |
| Introduction to Aggressor intelligence | 1C | Types of intelligence teams, purpose of each, coordination necessary, headquarters level at which various types of intelligence teams are found. | FM 30–5 |
| Interrogation | 2C, D & PE | Techniques employed in interrogating various types of prisoners, testing of background stories. | FM 30–15 |
| PW processing | 1C | Processing a prisoner of war through various command levels and techniques employed at each type of information desired at each level. | FM 30–15 |
| Background stories and documents | 8C, PE | Preparation of briefs and background stories for prepared PW and agents, checking for completeness and accuracy, preparation of documents to be carried by PW and agents. | Aggressor scenario, background stories, documents, intelligence. |

| *Subject* | *Hours & Type** | *Intelligence Oriented Subjects (23 hrs) Scope of Instruction* | *References* |
|---|---|---|---|
| Map and terrain study | 2PE | Map and terrain study of exercise area, location of boundaries, roads, bridges, streams, swamps, highground, woods, etc. | All previous references and aerial photos exercise area. |
| Counter-intelligence | 1C | Mission of counterintelligence, methods of operation, use of passwords and countersigns, uniforms and credentials. | FM 30–5<br>FM 30–17 |
| Review | 8C, PE | Review of mission testing of background stories, final check of documents for completeness and accuracy, review of all previous material. | Aggressor scenario, operation orders, intelligence plan, maps of exercise area,<br>FM 30–102<br>FM 30–103 |

* C-Conference; D-Demonstration; PE-Practical Exercise.
† Relate to specific training exercise situation.
†† Minimum orientation for all soldiers (personnel who will generate special intelligence play, prepared PW and Agents, etc., must receive specialized training).
††† Minimum orientation. Equipment handlers must receive additional training.

# APPENDIX C
# AGGRESSOR INFORMATION REQUEST AND REPORT FORMATS

## C-1. Purpose

The purpose of the Aggressor Information Request and Report is to provide exercise planners with a standardized method of requesting and receiving additional order of battle data and other information pertaining to Aggressor. Requesting units should communicate directly with the Commander, US Army Intelligence Center and School, ATTN: Office of Doctrine Development, Literature and Plans, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613. Requests may be written or telephonic.

## C-2. Request for Aggressor Order of Battle Unit File Information

*a. Complete Request Sample.*

(1) Requesting Unit: *1st Inf Div (Mech), ATTN: G3, Ft Riley, KS 66442*

(2) DTG of Request: *250900 Oct 72*

(3) Purpose: *Brigade FTX*

(4) Type of Request: *Complete*

(5) Aggressor Unit Echelon: *Regt (indicate lowest level of organization requested)*

(6) Aggressor Unit Identification: *31st Mtr Rfl Div (from FM 30-103)*

*b. Complete Report Sample Based Upon Request C-2a, above.*

(1) Response Number: *00001*

(2) DTG of Response: *280990 Oct 72*

(3) Requesting Unit: *1st Inf Div (Mech), ATTN: G3, Ft Riley, KS 66442*

(4) DTG of Request: *250900 Oct 72*

(5) Purpose: *Brigade FTX*

(6) Type of Request: *Complete*

(7) Aggressor Unit Echelon: *Regt*

(8) Aggressor Unit Identification: *31 Mtr Rfl Div*

(9) Aggressor Unit Branch/Type: *Mtr Rfl*

(10) Aggressor Unit Service Role: *Combat Arms*

(11) Other Name: *N/A*

(12) Code Number: *108604*

(13) Aggressor Unit Commander: *G/D MACIVER, Angus*

(14) Other Key Personalities: *Col Hahann, CofS, Col BORJIK, G-3*

(15) Army Group: *AG GOLFO*

(16) Regional Command: *RC ATLANTICO*

(17) Parent Unit Designation: *6 CAA*

(18) Parent Unit Commander: *G/A FERLINGHETTI, Luigi*

(19) Subordinate Unit Summary:

| *Unit* | *Commander* | *Combat Eff* | *Code No* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *358 Mtr Rfl Regt* | *Cmdt STOH* | *80%* | *805474* |
| *unk Mtr Rfl Regt* | *Cmdt BAHZ* | *60%* | *unknown* |
| *360 Mtr Rfl Regt* | *unknown* | *unknown* | *006434* |
| *369 Mdm Tk Regt* | *Col NITOBE, Yoshio* | *90%* | *901484* |
| *331 Arty Regt* | *Col SSTACHS* | *75%* | *108443* |

(20) Area of Operation: *Louisiana*

(21) Terrain: *Flat Marsh*

(22) Combat Effectiveness: *80%*

(23) Morale: *Fair*

(24) Discipline: *Fair*

(25) Training: *Fair*

(26) Logistical Support: *Fair*

(27) Specialized Training: *Jungle Warfare*

(28) Activity: *Attacking*

(29) Level of Conflict: *Medium*

(30) Offense Capabilities: *Nuclear, Chemical, Electronic*

(31) Defense Capabilities: *Nuclear, Chemical, Electronic*

(32) Personnel Strength:

| | *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Officer* | *1000* | *800* | *80%* |
| *NCO* | *4000* | *4000* | *100%* |
| *EM* | *6000* | *6000* | *100%* |
| *Total* | *11000* | *10800* | *95%* |

(33) Tank Strength:

| *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|
| *200* | *190* | *95%* |

(34) Artillery Strength:

| *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|
| *230* | *200* | *87%* |

(35) Small Arms Strength:

| *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|
| *11000* | *11000* | *100%* |

(36) Air Vehicle Strength:

| *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|
| *20* | *05* | *25%* |

(37) General Vehicle Strength:

| *Authorized* | *Current* | *Effectiveness* |
|---|---|---|
| *1700* | *1200* | *71%* |

(38) Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Electronic Activity:

*The 31st has used extensive mechanical radar jamming and electronic countermeasures in the past. Unit also possesses nuclear and chemical capabilities.*

(39) Unit History: *Unit suffered heavy losses in last Aggressor Texas Campaign. Has been on occupation duty in Canal Zone since withdrawal from the US in 1969. Unit has mediocre training record, but is anxious to do well in its first combat test since 1969.*

*c. Specific Request.* Specific requests differ from the complete request in that the requesting unit must specify those items of information which it wishes to receive. For a complete request, the requester need only complete items (1) through (6) of paragraph C–2*a*, above. In the case of a specific request, the requester must complete items (1) through (6) and specify those items (7) through (39) of paragraph C–2*b* which are deemed necessary for the exercise.

## C–3. Request for Aggressor Order of Battle Personality File Information

*a. Complete Request Sample.*

(1) Requesting Unit: *1st Inf Div (Mech), ATTN: G3, Ft Riley, KS 66442*

(2) DTG of Request: *250900 Oct 72*

(3) Purpose: *Brigade FTX*

(4) Type of Request: *Complete*

(5) Name: *MACIVER, Angus (from FM 30–103)*

*b. Complete Report Sample Based Upon Request C–3a, above.*

(1) Response Number: *00001*

(2) DTG of Response: *280900 Oct 72*

(3) Purpose: *Brigade FTX, 1st Inf Div, G–3, Ft Riley, KS 66442*

(4) Type of Report: *Complete*

(5) Rank: *G/D*

(6) Name: *MACIVER, Angus*

(7) Branch: *Mtr Rfl*

(8) Other Name: *Unknown*

(9) Place/Date of Birth: *Posnan, Poland, 6 Sept 25*

(10) Current Assignment: *31 Mtr Rfl Div*

(11) Position in Unit: *CG, 8 July 70*

(12) Civilian Education: *Secondary*

(13) Military Education: *Aggressor Staff College, Aggressor National War Academy*

(14) Character Traits: *Reluctant to take risks, very organization-conscious*

(15) Political Affiliation: *CTP member of long-standing*

(16) Physical Characteristics: *Short, slender, great stamina*

(17) Remarks: *A political appointee with background in Agency for Special Operations of ACIS. He is a good tactician, but the nature of his appointment makes him reluctant to take tactical risks. Cares little for his troops and considers this assignment as a stepping-stone to a position in the Ministry of the Armed Forces.*

*c. Specific Request.* As in the case of the specific unit AOB request, the requester must specify those items (9) through (16) from paragraph C–3*b*, above, which are desired. For a complete personality request, the requester need only complete items (1) through (5) of paragraph C–3*a* above.

# APPENDIX D
# PROCEDURES FOR EQUIPPING AN AGGRESSOR FORCE

## Section I. PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

### D–1. General

*a.* Procedures to be used in equipping Aggressor forces give maximum consideration to the use of materials immediately available to US Army units at the local level. Commanders at all levels who are tasked with playing the Aggressor role, are enjoined to use imagination in developing the image of a hostile force, within the concept of this manual, by utilizing whatever materials or equipment that may be readily available. A realistic portrayal of any local situation demands that Aggressor resort to improvisation to meet specific needs. Recommendations for the modification of standard US Army clothing, insignia, and equipment to resemble the Aggressor forces as outlined in chapter 22, are made in paragraphs D–5 and D–6 below. All awards and decorations (ribbons), if used, will conform generally to the specifications outlined in paragraphs 22–14 through 22–16 and will be fabricated locally.

*b.* Paragraphs D–7 and D–8 below list special items of equipment and training devices applicable for use in Aggressor training exercises. A more complete list of applicable Army training devices can be found in DA Pam 310–12. Listed training aids, as well as devices in DA Pam 310–12, may be requested, referencing appropriate federal stock numbers (FSN) and/or device numbers when applicable, for use by Aggressor forces from supporting Training Aids Centers. Paragraphs D–7 and D–8 below also contain information of Aggressor items recommended for local fabrication (specifications supplied by the users) by supporting Training Aids Centers. Quantities of special Aggressor equipment and other training aids may presently be stored at or obtainable by supporting Training Aids Centers. For planning purposes, exercise planners are encouraged to contact their supporting centers to determine availability of such equipment.

### D–2. Requesting Procedures

*a. Local Training.* Army Service Schools, Posts, and all Army units including Civilian Component units, in CONUS, requiring any Aggressor Training Aids for training, should submit a request in accordance with local procedures to their supporting Training Aids Centers. Those Training Aids Centers which cannot fill requests will prepare consolidated requests, at the station level, and submit them to the Training Aids Management Agency (TAMA).

*b. DA and Other Directed Exercises.* Army units designated to portray Aggressor, requiring Aggressor Training Aids, will submit requests to their Training Aids Centers. Should their Training Aids Centers not be able to fill the requests, the requests will be consolidated and submitted, citing the title of the maneuver or field exercise, in accordance with AR 71–7 and other appropriate regulations.

*c. Overseas Commands.* Overseas commands will locally reproduce, modify, or fabricate, as necessary, all items required for the employment of an Aggressor force in the overseas area. Detailed instructions for the fabrication of simulator banks for Aggressor technical intelligence items will be furnished upon direct request to the Training Aids Management Agency.

*d. Requests From Units Other Than Army.* Units other than Army will submit all requests for listed Aggressor Training Aids to the nearest Training Aids Center. The Training Aids Center will initiate action through normal fiscal channels for reimbursement of the Army appropriation. Shipment of special simulation equipment to other services must be approved in accordance with appropriate regulations.

### D–3. Funding

*a.* USCONARC will annually program for transportation costs of Aggressor Training

Aids to satisfy DA/USCONARC directed exercise requirements.

*b.* CONUS Armies will annually program for transportation costs for shipment of Aggressor Training Aids to satisfy the needs of elements within their respective areas.

### D–4. Disposition of Aggressor Training Aids

All equipment drawn from supporting Training Aids Centers will be returned, in accordance with AR 71–7, upon completion of the exercise or training.

## Section II. UNIFORMS, INSIGNIA, AND EQUIPMENT MODIFICATIONS

### D–5. Aggressor Army

*a.* US Army field uniforms may be converted to resemble the Aggressor uniform described in paragraph 22–1*b*. Shoulder loops can be made from appropriately colored cloth fastened to the shoulder of the field uniform by tack-sewing the four corners, pinning, or stapling. Indications of rank can be fabricated by using the appropriate combination of overseas bars, service stripes, and wreaths. If the above items are not available utilization of felt-tip pens of the proper colors is acceptable.

*b.* For cold weather wear US Army pile caps are converted by affixing a 3-inch Circle Trigon patch to the upturned visor. The Circle Trigon can be made from white cloth and green felt-tip pen, crayon, or paint.

*c.* The distinctive ridge for converting US Army helmet liners can be cut from wood to the specifications in paragraph 22–1*d* and fixed to the liner with contact cement, or ridges with adhesive can be requisitioned from supporting Training Aids Centers. A plastic helmet liner, identified in paragraphs D–7 and D–8 below, is also available through supporting Training Aids Centers.

*d.* US Special Forces personnel portraying Aggressor Fusilier soldiers may wear the Special Forces Beret. All other US forces personnel portraying Aggressor Fusilier soldiers will wear the Aggressor helmet.

*e.* Although Aggressor troops of the two lowest enlisted grades seldom wear insignia of rank, reference paragraph 22–4*a*, for intelligence play purposes Aggressor PW injectees of all grades should wear their insignia of rank.

*f.* Conversion of individual weapons to resemble Aggressor equipment should be accomplished as simply as possible with materials readily available. The following are suggestions which may be utilized by commanders playing the Aggressor role.

(1) Pistols. None.

(2) Rifles.

(*a*) Taping the bayonet (in scabbard) extended along the right side of the barrel with the butt of the handle of the bayonet toward the muzzle and the point of the bayonet toward the rear (to give the impression of a folded bayonet).

(*b*) Strips of white adhesive tape around the stock at a right angle to the longitudinal axis of the rifle.

(*c*) Attachment of grenade launchers.

(*d*) Habitual slinging of the weapons over the head and left shoulder so that it rests at waist level, parallel to the ground, to the right front of the soldier to allow for immediate firing of the weapon from the hip.

*g.* The affixing of the Circle Trigon, drawn with crayon, paint, or similar methods, to crew served weapons is recommended. The injection of any actual foreign weapons available for intelligence play is certainly recommended and encouraged.

*h. Physical Security of Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives.* All US personnel portraying Aggressor forces will be reminded of the need to secure their arms, ammunition, explosives, and other weapons in accordance with AR 190–11.

### D–6. Aggressor Naval and Air Force

Insignia of rank for both the Aggressor Air Force and the Navy are fabricated by using the appropriate combination of overseas bars, service stripes, wreaths, and colored cloth.

## Section III. LISTING OF SPECIAL ITEMS APPLICABLE TO AGGRESSOR

### D–7. Items Available Through DA Pam 310–12

*a.* Ridged, durable molded plastic helmet to fit over US Army helmet liner. The device identifies personnel as members of an Aggressor force. Device number 21–14.

*b.* The artillery, mine, and demolition noise simulator provides realistic simulation of common battle noises. Device number 16–19A, 17A1 and 16–19C, 17A1B.

*c.* The antipersonnel practice mine can be used to gain practice in the recognition and handling of antipersonnel mines. Device number 7–37; FSN 1345–028–5092 (K105).

*d.* DA Pam 310–12 can be consulted for other devices applicable to specific training missions.

### D–8. Items For Fabrication

The following types of items may be locally fabricated or fabricated by supporting Training Aids Centers with specification supplied by the users. Users are encouraged to use imagination in developing Aggressor publications, e.g., psychological operations. If appropriate to the exercise, documents and publications, can be fabricated either locally or by Training Aids Centers and in any language so desired to add realism and adequately exercise the skills of interpreter translators and other language trained personnel.

*a.* The Aggressor flag can be fabricated from a rectangular piece of white cloth (48″ x 60″) with a 30″ diameter circle centered on the cloth. A green trigon (made of cloth or painted on) is inscribed in the circle.

*b.* Aggressor publications can be of numerous types and are limited only by the exercise planner's imagination. Examples of the Aggressor Identification, Pay, and Service card, and the Circle Trigon Party card are available in FM 30–103, figures 12–1 and 12–2. Other forms (e.g., unit roster, unit strength report, field operations order, intelligence estimate and summary, etc.) can be modeled after US Army formats with the modifications users feel are appropriate.

# APPENDIX E
# GLOSSARY

ABATER—Aggressor nuclear powered attack submarine.

AGGRESSOR—The Maneuver Enemy, designated Aggressor, is a training aid consisting of an imaginary enemy nation with a fictitious history, government, and armed forces.

AGGRESSOR FORCES—Aggressor forces in the field are represented by units of the United States Armed Forces designated to act as a maneuver enemy.

AGGRESSOR NATION—An imaginary nation with an assumed history, government, military organization, and political philosophy, whose armed forces are fictitiously located in known geographical areas for strategic, tactical, and logistical maneuver play.

ARMY—The three types of Aggressor Armies are:

Combined Arms Army (CAA)—Usually consists of two motorized rifle divisions, one tank division, one SAM brigade, one SSM brigade, two mixed artillery brigades, an antitank regiment, and army support units.

Tank Army (TA)—Usually consists of two or more tank divisions, one SAM brigade, one SSM brigade, a heavy tank regiment, and army support units.

Air Army (AA)—Normally consists of two fighter divisions, two bomber divisions, two ground attack divisions, helicopter regiments, air transport regiments and other support units.

These armies are usually directly subordinate to an army group. In practice it has been found that the composition of Aggressor armies varies widely in time and location.

ARMY GROUP (AG)—Although any organizational structure is possible, it normally consists of two combined arms armies, one tank army, an air army, one artillery division, one airborne division, one SSM division, two SAM brigades, and army group support units. The army group is usually part of a regional command but may be directly subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces.

AMMUNITION—Projectiles, regardless of caliber size. Includes nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads.

AMMUNITION DEPOT—Stocks all types of ammunition except nuclear.

AMMUNITION BASIC LOAD—The amount of ammunition authorized to be in the unit, expressed in units of fire.

AMPHIBIOUS VEHICLE (AV)—A wheeled or tracked vehicle capable of operating on both land and water.

ARRIVAL TIME—The time the head of a column or element reaches a designated point, line or object.

ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS DEPOT—Established in conjunction with ammunition depot. Handles receipt, storage, accounting, and issue of all weapons except assault guns. Includes a repair workshop which repairs artillery and small arms.

ARTILLERY MATERIEL—Mortars, guns, howitzers, gun-howitzers, antitank missiles, recoilless guns, air defense guns, surface-to-air missile launchers, and associated ground handling, electronic and firing equipment.

BREAKTHROUGH—A tactical breach of an enemy defensive line, oriented on the enemy's weak points rather than key terrain.

CALLOUS—Aggressor air defense fire control radar.

CARNAGE A3—RAIDER fire control radar.

CARNAGE B—REGENT fire control radar.

CARNAGE C—RASCAL fire control radar.

CHALLENGER—Aggressor height finder radar.

CHARLATAN—Aggressor early warning radar.

CHOPPER—Aggressor early warning radar.

CLEAVER—Aggressor command guidance fire control radar.

CRUSHER—Aggressor nuclear powered guided missile cruiser.

CIRCLE TRIGON PARTY (CTP)—The controlling party in the Aggressor Homeland which ruthlessly pursues its main objectives of internal consolidation and world domination.

COMPLETION TIME—The time the tail of a column passes the release point.

DIVISION (DVN)—A unit having a fixed organization which varies only between types.

DIVISION BASIC LOAD (DBL)—The amount of a given item of supply authorized to be in the possession of a divisional size unit and

which is distributed between the man/weapon, unit trains, and depots.

DRIVER—Aggressor guided missile destroyer.

ENEMY—The forces, both political and military, viewed from Aggressor's standpoint which opposes Aggressor.

FIENDISH—Aggressor fighter aircraft.

FRACTURE—Aggressor fighter/interceptor aircraft.

FOOT MARCH—Infiltration of units by foot over a route dispatched in small groups at irregular intervals to provide the maximum secrecy, deception, and dispersion.

FORFEIT—Aggressor ground attack aircraft.

FRENZY—Aggressor tactical bomber aircraft.

FRUGAL—Aggressor assault transport aircraft.

FRUGAL-A—Advanced Aggressor assault transport aircraft.

FURY—Aggressor artillery observation/surveillance aircraft.

FUSILIER (F)—A designation of elite troops, awarded to any type unit (except airborne already considered elite) of division size or smaller.

FUTILE—Aggressor observation/liaison aircraft.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS UNITS (GHQ)—Those units which comprise ground and air force elements designated as the strategic reserves, directly subordinate to the Ministry of Armed Forces. Their primary purpose is to provide a combat-ready strategic reserve to be used as the Minister of Armed Forces may direct. GHQ units may be transferred to the regional commands or army groups to replace units which have been withdrawn for reorganization, refitting, or retraining, as well as to reinforce existing army groups. In addition to the type of units normally found in operational regional commands, GHQ has such special type units as long range surface-to-surface (SSM) and surface-to-air (SAM) missile units presently integrated in the overall Homeland defense scheme.

GRIEF—Aggressor company ground surveillance radar.

GRIM—Aggressor regimental ground surveillance radar.

GRIP—Aggressor division ground surveillance radar.

GRUDGE—Aggressor side-view airborne radar.

GUACO—Aggressor camera system (TN-2).

GUARDIAN—Aggressor unattended sensors.

GUARANTORS—Infrared sensors (IR).

GUERRILLA WARFARE—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy held or hostile territory by irregular and predominantly indigenous forces.

HEATHEN-A—Aggressor observation helicopter.

HEATHEN-B—Aggressor observation helicopter.

HECKLER—Aggressor helicopter carrier.

HECTOR-A—Aggressor utility helicopter.

HECTOR-B—Aggressor utility helicopter.

HOODOO-A—Aggressor light transport helicopter.

HOODOO-B—Aggressor medium transport helicopter.

HOODOO-C—Aggressor heavy transport helicopter.

INSURGENCY—A subversive illegal attempt by an organized group outside the established government to weaken, modify, and eventually replace the existing government with a rival governing authority. This may be accomplished by the protracted use of force or threat of force, but falls short of recognized belligerency.

INSURGENT INFRASTRUCTURE—A complex of basically noncombatant organizations (party and mass civil organizations) created to control and support the insurgent effort. It functions in both an overt and clandestine manner and includes party members, personnel of the party committee system and its staff agencies, the political control apparatus within the military, and persons in positions of authority and control within the mass organizational structure, whether party members or not. Infrastructure leaders lead and control the insurgent movement.

INTENDANCE BRANCH (Inten)—An Aggressor noncombat branch responsible for the administration of supplies and equipment.

IRREGULAR FORCES—Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the government's regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces.

MAIL-DROP—A location where a message may be left by one person to be recovered later by another.

MAIN DEFENSE BELT (MDB)—The forward edge of a battle position, composed of a series of mutually supporting defensive areas, normally in three lines of defense.

MOBILE MAIN FORCE (MMF)—Those insurgent units which have a typical military organization, use conventional tactics, and are directly controlled by the insurgent infrastructure.

MOTORIZED RIFLE TRANSPORTER (MRT)—Aggressor equivalent of an armored personnel carrier.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEPOT—Established at army level and above unless nuclear weapons have been allocated to division which requires a division nuclear weapons depot.

This depot is subordinate to the ammunition depot, but is not established in conjunction with the ammunition depot. This depot stores, issues, and maintains nuclear artillery shells, nuclear rockets, nuclear missiles, and nuclear warheads. Repairs and modifications are performed at army group and army level only.

PURGER—Aggressor guided missile boat.
RAGE—Aggressor free rocket.
RAIDER—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
RAKE—Aggressor free rocket.
RAMMER—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
RANCOR—Aggressor surface-to-surface missile.
RASCAL—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
RAVAGE—Aggressor surface-to-surface missile.
REBEL—Aggressor surface-to-surface missile.
REGAL—Aggressor surface-to-surface missile.
REGENT—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
REGIONAL COMMAND—The organization directly subordinate to the Ministry of the Armed Forces which controls operations in a particular area and consists of two or more army groups.
REVOLUTION—The illegal modification of a country's political, economic, and social systems by force or threat of force. To be considered revolution, the modification must be associated with changes in the society's value structure.
RIPPER—Aggressor wire-guided antitank missile.
RIPPER 1-A—Advanced Aggressor infrared-guided antitank missile.
ROGUE—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
ROVER—Aggressor surface-to-air missile.
SMALL ARMS—Sub-machinegun, light and heavy machinegun, rifles and pistols.
SHAKER—Aggressor nuclear powered fleet ballistic missile submarine.
SECURITY ZONE (SZ)—That area in front of the main defense belt which is covered by fire, surveillance devices, and covering forces.
SECOND DEFENSE BELT (SDB)—The defensive positions intended to contain the enemy, should he break through the main defense belt, and until counterattacks from the third defense belt can be launched.
TABU—Heavy tank, 122mm main gun.
THORN—Medium tank, 100mm main gun.
THUNDER—Amphibious tank, 76mm main gun.
TYRANT—Light tank, 57mm main gun.
TRACKED PRIME MOVER (TPM)—Tracked vehicles for towing artillery, hauling cargo and personnel across marshy terrain or in arctic regions, or towing rolling fluid transporters.
TRIBUTE—Aggressor nuclear powered transport.
UNIT OF FIRE (UF)—An arbitrary number of rounds per weapon corresponding to a basic load.
URGE—Aggressor underwater surface-to-surface missile.
UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES—United States forces who oppose the Aggressor force during tactical exercises.
VEHICLE DENSITY—The average number of vehicles that occupy one kilometer of road space expressed in vehicles per kilometer.
VEHICLE DISTANCE—The space between two consecutive vehicles of an organized element of a column as measured from the front of one vehicle to the front of the following vehicle.
WHEELED VEHICLE (WV)—Any land restricted or amphibious vehicle which uses wheels to move the vehicle.

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